§174καὶ ἴσως λέγεις ὃν νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τὸν εἰδότα τὰ μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι πάντα, τὸν μάντιν.
And perhaps you mean the one I was just now speaking of, the one who knows all things that are to be, the prophet.
τοῦτον ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ λέγεις;
Do you mean this one, or someone else?
καὶ τοῦτον ἔγωγε, ἔφη, καὶ ἄλλον. τίνα;
"Both this one, indeed, he said, and another." Who?
ἦν δʼ ἐγώ.
I said.
ἆρα μὴ τὸν τοιόνδε, εἴ τις πρὸς τοῖς μέλλουσιν καὶ τὰ γεγονότα πάντα εἰδείη καὶ τὰ νῦν ὄντα, καὶ μηδὲν ἀγνοοῖ;
Is it not someone of this sort: if someone, in addition to future things, should also know all things that have happened and things that are now, and should be ignorant of nothing?
θῶμεν γάρ τινα εἶναι αὐτόν.
For let us assume that there is such a person.
οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι τούτου γε ἔτι ἂν εἴποις οὐδένα ἐπιστημονέστερον ζῶντα εἶναι.
For I do not think you would say that anyone lives more knowledgeably than this person.
οὐ δῆτα. τόδε δὴ ἔτι προσποθῶ, τίς αὐτὸν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ποιεῖ εὐδαίμονα;
"Certainly not." This further thing, then, I still desire to know: which of the knowledges makes him happy?
ἢ ἅπασαι ὁμοίως;
Or do all of them do so equally?
οὐδαμῶς ὁμοίως, ἔφη.
"By no means equally," he said.
ἀλλὰ ποία μάλιστα;
"But which one especially?
ᾗ τί οἶδεν καὶ τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν γεγονότων καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι;
That by which he knows what, among things that are, things that have happened, and things that are to be?
ἆρά γε ᾗ τὸ πεττευτικόν; ποῖον, ἦ δʼ ὅς, πεττευτικόν;
Is it that by which he knows draughts-playing?" "What kind of draughts-playing?" he said.
ἀλλʼ ᾗ τὸ λογιστικόν; οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλʼ ᾗ τὸ ὑγιεινόν; μᾶλλον, ἔφη.
"But that by which he knows calculation?" "By no means." "But that by which he knows health?" "More so," he said.
ἐκείνη δʼ ἣν λέγω μάλιστα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ᾗ τί; ἧι τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἔφη, καὶ τὸ κακόν. ὦ μιαρέ, ἔφην ἐγώ, πάλαι με περιέλκεις κύκλῳ, ἀποκρυπτόμενος ὅτι οὐ τὸ ἐπιστημόνως ἦν ζῆν τὸ εὖ πράττειν τε καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν ποιοῦν, οὐδὲ συμπασῶν τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν, ἀλλὰ μιᾶς οὔσης ταύτης μόνον τῆς περὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ κακόν.
"And that one which I especially mean," I said, "that by which he knows what?" "That by which he knows the good," he said, "and the evil." "You rogue!" I said, "you have been dragging me around in a circle for a long time, hiding the fact that it was not living knowledgeably that makes us fare well and be happy, nor did all the other knowledges together do so, but only this single one, which is about the good and the evil.
ἐπεί, ὦ Κριτία, εἰ ʼθέλεις ἐξελεῖν ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐκ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν, ἧττόν τι ἡ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ὑγιαίνειν ποιήσει, ἡ δὲ σκυτικὴ ὑποδεδέσθαι, ἡ δὲ ὑφαντικὴ ἠμφιέσθαι, ἡ δὲ κυβερνητικὴ κωλύσει ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ ἀποθνῄσκειν καὶ ἡ στρατηγικὴ ἐν πολέμῳ; οὐδὲν ἧττον, ἔφη.
Since, Critias, if you are willing to exclude this knowledge from the other knowledges, will medicine any the less make us healthy, shoemaking shod, weaving clothed, and will navigation prevent dying at sea and generalship in war?" "None the less," he said.
ἀλλʼ, ὦ φίλε Κριτία, τὸ εὖ γε τούτων ἕκαστα γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὠφελίμως ἀπολελοιπὸς ἡμᾶς ἔσται ταύτης ἀπούσης. ἀληθῆ λέγεις. οὐχ αὕτη δέ γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶν ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἀλλʼ ἧς ἔργον ἐστὶν τὸ ὠφελεῖν ἡμᾶς.
"But, my dear Critias, that each of these things happens well and beneficially will have left us if this is absent." "You speak the truth." "But this, it seems, is not temperance, but the one whose work is to benefit us.
οὐ γὰρ ἐπιστημῶν γε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσυνῶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ· ὥστε εἰ αὕτη ἐστὶν ὠφέλιμος, ἡ σωφροσύνη ἄλλο τι ἂν εἴη ἡμῖν. τί δʼ, ἦ δʼ ὅς, οὐκ ἂν αὕτη ὠφελοῖ;
For it is not the knowledge of knowledges and lack of knowledges, but of good and evil; so that if this is the beneficial one, temperance would be something else for us." "Why," he said, "would not this benefit us?
εἰ γὰρ ὅτι μάλιστα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἡ σωφροσύνη, ἐπιστατεῖ δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμαις, καὶ ταύτης δήπου ἂν ἄρχουσα τῆς περὶ τἀγαθὸν ἐπιστήμης ὠφελοῖ ἂν ἡμᾶς. ἦ κἂν ὑγιαίνειν ποιοῖ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, αὕτη, ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἡ ἰατρική;
For if temperance is indeed as much as possible a knowledge of knowledges, and presides also over the other knowledges, then surely, by ruling over this knowledge about the good, it would benefit us." "Would it then also make us healthy," I said, "this, and not medicine?
καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τῶν τεχνῶν αὕτη ἂν ποιοῖ, καὶ οὐχ αἱ ἄλλαι τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον ἑκάστη;
And would it perform the other works of the arts, and not the other arts, each its own work?
ἢ οὐ πάλαι διεμαρτυρόμεθα ὅτι ἐπιστήμης μόνον ἐστὶν καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης ἐπιστήμη, ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός· οὐχ οὕτω;
Or did we not long ago protest that it is a knowledge only of knowledge and lack of knowledge, and of nothing else?
φαίνεταί γε. οὐκ ἄρα ὑγιείας ἔσται δημιουργός; οὐ δῆτα.
Was it not so?" "It seems so, at least." "It will not, therefore, be the producer of health?" "Certainly not."