§175ἄλλης γὰρ ἦν τέχνης ὑγίεια·
For health was of another art, was it not?
ἢ οὔ; ἄλλης. οὐδʼ ἄρα ὠφελίας, ὦ ἑταῖρε· ἄλλῃ γὰρ αὖ ἀπέδομεν τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον τέχνῃ νυνδή·
"Of another." Nor, therefore, is temperance of benefit, my friend; for we assigned this work to another art just now, did we not?
ἦ γάρ; πάνυ γε. πῶς οὖν ὠφέλιμος ἔσται ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας οὖσα δημιουργός;
"Certainly." How then will temperance be beneficial, when it is the producer of no benefit?
οὐδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔοικέν γε. ὁρᾷς οὖν, ὦ Κριτία, ὡς ἐγὼ πάλαι εἰκότως ἐδεδοίκη καὶ δικαίως ἐμαυτὸν ᾐτιώμην ὅτι οὐδὲν χρηστὸν περὶ σωφροσύνης σκοπῶ;
"By no means, Socrates, does it seem so." Do you see then, Critias, that I was long ago reasonably fearing and justly blaming myself that I was investigating nothing useful about temperance?
οὐ γὰρ ἄν που ὅ γε κάλλιστον πάντων ὁμολογεῖται εἶναι, τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἀνωφελὲς ἐφάνη, εἴ τι ἐμοῦ ὄφελος ἦν πρὸς τὸ καλῶς ζητεῖν.
For surely that which is agreed to be the most beautiful of all things would not have appeared useless to us, if I had been of any use for searching well.
νῦν δὲ πανταχῇ γὰρ ἡττώμεθα, καὶ οὐ δυνάμεθα εὑρεῖν ἐφʼ ὅτῳ ποτὲ τῶν ὄντων ὁ νομοθέτης τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἔθετο, τὴν σωφροσύνην. καίτοι πολλά γε συγκεχωρήκαμεν οὐ συμβαίνονθʼ ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ.
But now—for we are defeated on all sides, and we are unable to find to which of the things that are the lawgiver gave this name, 'temperance.' And yet we have conceded many things that do not follow for us in the argument.
καὶ γὰρ ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμης εἶναι συνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐκ ἐῶντος τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲ φάσκοντος εἶναι· καὶ ταύτῃ αὖ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἔργα γιγνώσκειν συνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐδὲ τοῦτʼ ἐῶντος τοῦ λόγου, ἵνα δὴ ἡμῖν γένοιτο ὁ σώφρων ἐπιστήμων ὧν τε οἶδεν ὅτι οἶδεν, καὶ ὧν μὴ οἶδεν ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν.
For we conceded that there is a knowledge of knowledge, though the argument did not allow it nor say that it is; and to this knowledge we further conceded that it knows the works of the other knowledges, though the argument did not allow this either, in order that our temperate person might become for us knowledgeable of what he knows that he knows, and of what he does not know that he does not know.
τοῦτο μὲν δὴ καὶ παντάπασι μεγαλοπρεπῶς συνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐδʼ ἐπισκεψάμενοι τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἅ τις μὴ οἶδεν μηδαμῶς, ταῦτα εἰδέναι ἁμῶς γέ πως· ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν, φησὶν αὐτὰ εἰδέναι ἡ ἡμετέρα ὁμολογία.
This indeed we conceded altogether magnificently, not even considering that it is impossible to know in any way whatsoever what one does not know at all; for our concession says that he knows that he does not know them.
καίτοι, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐχὶ ἀλογώτερον τοῦτʼ ἂν φανείη.
And yet, as I think, this would appear more irrational than anything whatsoever.
ἀλλʼ ὅμως οὕτως ἡμῶν εὐηθικῶν τυχοῦσα ἡ ζήτησις καὶ οὐ σκληρῶν, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον εὑρεῖν δύναται τὴν ἀλήθειαν, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον κατεγέλασεν αὐτῆς, ὥστε ὃ ἡμεῖς πάλαι συνομολογοῦντες καὶ συμπλάττοντες ἐτιθέμεθα σωφροσύνην εἶναι, τοῦτο ἡμῖν πάνυ ὑβριστικῶς ἀνωφελὲς ὂν ἀπέφαινε.
But nevertheless, having found us so simple-minded and not hard, the inquiry is none the more able to find the truth, but has so far laughed at it, that what we for a long time in agreement and modeling together set down to be temperance, this it showed to us, very insultingly, to be useless.
τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐμὸν καὶ ἧττον ἀγανακτῶ· ὑπὲρ δὲ σοῦ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Χαρμίδη, πάνυ ἀγανακτῶ, εἰ σὺ τοιοῦτος ὢν τὴν ἰδέαν καὶ πρὸς τούτῳ τὴν ψυχὴν σωφρονέστατος, μηδὲν ὀνήσῃ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς σωφροσύνης μηδέ τί σʼ ὠφελήσει ἐν τῷ βίῳ παροῦσα.
As for my own part, then, I am less vexed; but on your behalf, I said, Charmides, I am very vexed, if you, being such in appearance and besides this in your soul most temperate, will derive no benefit from this temperance, nor will it profit you at all by being present in your life.
ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἀγανακτῶ ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐπῳδῆς ἣν παρὰ τοῦ Θρᾳκὸς ἔμαθον, εἰ μηδενὸς ἀξίου πράγματος οὖσαν αὐτὴν μετὰ πολλῆς σπουδῆς ἐμάνθανον.
And still more am I vexed on behalf of the charm which I learned from the Thracian, if, being of no worthy thing, I learned it with much trouble.
ταῦτʼ οὖν πάνυ μὲν οὐκ οἴομαι οὕτως ἔχειν, ἀλλʼ ἐμὲ φαῦλον εἶναι ζητητήν· ἐπεὶ τήν γε σωφροσύνην μέγα τι ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, καὶ εἴπερ γε ἔχεις αὐτό, μακάριον εἶναί σε.
Now these things indeed I do not think are so, but that I am a poor inquirer; since temperance is indeed some great good, and if indeed you have it, you are blessed.
§176ἀλλʼ ὅρα εἰ ἔχεις τε καὶ μηδὲν δέῃ τῆς ἐπῳδῆς· εἰ γὰρ ἔχεις, μᾶλλον ἂν ἔγωγέ σοι συμβουλεύσαιμι ἐμὲ μὲν λῆρον ἡγεῖσθαι εἶναι καὶ ἀδύνατον λόγῳ ὁτιοῦν ζητεῖν, σεαυτὸν δέ, ὅσῳπερ σωφρονέστερος εἶ, τοσούτῳ εἶναι καὶ εὐδαιμονέστερον.
But see if you have it and have no need of the charm; for if you have it, I should rather advise you to hold me to be a fool and unable to search out anything in argument, but yourself, by how much more temperate you are, by so much also to be happier.
καὶ ὁ Χαρμίδης, ἀλλὰ μὰ Δίʼ, ἦ δʼ ὅς, ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ οἶδα οὔτʼ εἰ ἔχω οὔτʼ εἰ μὴ ἔχω· πῶς γὰρ ἂν εἰδείην ὅ γε μηδʼ ὑμεῖς οἷοί τέ ἐστε ἐξευρεῖν ὅτι ποτʼ ἔστιν, ὡς φῂς σύ;
And Charmides said, "But by Zeus, Socrates, I indeed do not know either if I have it or if I do not have it; for how should I know that which not even you are able to find out what indeed it is, as you say?
ἐγὼ μέντοι οὐ πάνυ σοι πείθομαι, καὶ ἐμαυτόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάνυ οἶμαι δεῖσθαι τῆς ἐπῳδῆς, καὶ τό γʼ ἐμὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει ἐπᾴδεσθαι ὑπὸ σοῦ ὅσαι ἡμέραι, ἕως ἂν φῇς σὺ ἱκανῶς ἔχειν. εἶεν· ἀλλʼ, ἔφη ὁ Κριτίας, ὦ Χαρμίδη, ἢν δρᾷς τοῦτο ἔμοιγʼ ἔσται τοῦτο τεκμήριον ὅτι σωφρονεῖς, ἢν ἐπᾴδειν παρέχῃς Σωκράτει καὶ μὴ ἀπολείπῃ τούτου μήτε μέγα μήτε σμικρόν. ὡς ἀκολουθήσοντος, ἔφη, καὶ μὴ ἀπολειψομένου· δεινὰ γὰρ ἂν ποιοίην, εἰ μὴ πειθοίμην σοὶ τῷ ἐπιτρόπῳ καὶ μὴ ποιοίην ἃ κελεύεις. ἀλλὰ μήν, ἔφη, κελεύω ἔγωγε. ποιήσω τοίνυν, ἔφη, ἀπὸ ταυτησὶ τῆς ἡμέρας ἀρξάμενος. οὗτοι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τί βουλεύεσθον ποιεῖν; οὐδέν, ἔφη ὁ Χαρμίδης, ἀλλὰ βεβουλεύμεθα. βιάσῃ ἄρα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ οὐδʼ ἀνάκρισίν μοι δώσεις; ὡς βιασομένου, ἔφη, ἐπειδήπερ ὅδε γε ἐπιτάττει· πρὸς ταῦτα σὺ αὖ βουλεύου ὅτι ποιήσεις. ἀλλʼ οὐδεμία, ἔφην ἐγώ, λείπεται βουλή· σοὶ γὰρ ἐπιχειροῦντι πράττειν ὁτιοῦν καὶ βιαζομένῳ οὐδεὶς οἷός τʼ ἔσται ἐναντιοῦσθαι ἀνθρώπων. μὴ τοίνυν, ἦ δʼ ὅς, μηδὲ σὺ ἐναντιοῦ. οὐ τοίνυν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἐναντιώσομαι.
I, however, do not altogether believe you, and myself, Socrates, I think I very much need the charm, and for my part nothing prevents my being charmed by you every day, until you say that it is sufficient." "Very well," said Critias; "Charmides, if you do this, it will be for me a proof that you are temperate, if you present yourself to Socrates to be charmed and do not leave him in anything either great or small." "As one who will follow," he said, "and will not leave him; for I should do terrible things if I should not obey you, my guardian, and not do what you order." "But indeed," he said, "I do order it." "I will do so then," he said, "beginning from this very day." "Hey you two," I said, "what are you planning to do?" "Nothing," said Charmides, "but we have already planned." "Will you then force me," I said, "and not even give me an inquiry?" "As one who will force you," he said, "since indeed this man orders it; against this, you in turn plan what you will do." "But," I said, "no choice is left; for when you attempt to do anything and use force, no human being will be able to oppose you." "Do not you, then," he said, "oppose me either." "I will not, then," I said, "oppose you."