§172ἁμαρτίας γὰρ ἐξῃρημένης, ὀρθότητος δὲ ἡγουμένης, ἐν πάσῃ πράξει καλῶς καὶ εὖ πράττειν ἀναγκαῖον τοὺς οὕτω διακειμένους, τοὺς δὲ εὖ πράττοντας εὐδαίμονας εἶναι.
For with error being removed, and correctness leading, it is necessary that those who are in such a state fare beautifully and well in every action, and that those who fare well are happy.
ἆρʼ οὐχ οὕτως, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Κριτία, ἐλέγομεν περὶ σωφροσύνης, λέγοντες ὅσον ἀγαθὸν εἴη τὸ εἰδέναι ἅ τε οἶδέν τις καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οὕτως.
"Did we not, Critias," I said, "speak in this way about temperance, saying what a great good it would be to know what one knows and what one does not know?" "Certainly so," he said.
νῦν δέ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὁρᾷς ὅτι οὐδαμοῦ ἐπιστήμη οὐδεμία τοιαύτη οὖσα πέφανται. ὁρῶ, ἔφη.
"But now," I said, "you see that no such knowledge has appeared anywhere." "I see," he said.
ἆρʼ οὖν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τοῦτʼ ἔχει τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἣν νῦν εὑρίσκομεν σωφροσύνην οὖσαν, τὸ ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην, ὅτι ὁ ταύτην ἔχων, ὅτι ἂν ἄλλο μανθάνῃ, ῥᾷόν τε μαθήσεται καὶ ἐναργέστερα πάντα αὐτῷ φανεῖται, ἅτε πρὸς ἑκάστῳ ᾧ ἂν μανθάνῃ προσκαθορῶντι τὴν ἐπιστήμην· καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δὴ κάλλιον ἐξετάσει περὶ ὧν ἂν καὶ αὐτὸς μάθῃ, οἱ δὲ ἄνευ τούτου ἐξετάζοντες ἀσθενέστερον καὶ φαυλότερον τοῦτο δράσουσιν;
"Does it then," I said, "have this good—the temperance we are now finding it to be, namely the knowing of knowledge and lack of knowledge—that he who possesses it, whatever else he may learn, will learn it more easily and everything will appear clearer to him, since he looks closely at knowledge itself in addition to each thing he learns; and indeed he will examine others more beautifully concerning what he himself has learned, whereas those who examine without this will do so more weakly and poorly?
ἆρʼ, ὦ φίλε, τοιαῦτα ἄττα ἐστὶν ἃ ἀπολαυσόμεθα τῆς σωφροσύνης, ἡμεῖς δὲ μεῖζόν τι βλέπομεν καὶ ζητοῦμεν αὐτὸ μεῖζόν τι εἶναι ἢ ὅσον ἐστίν; τάχα δʼ ἄν, ἔφη, οὕτως ἔχοι. ἴσως, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· ἴσως δέ γε ἡμεῖς οὐδὲν χρηστὸν ἐζητήσαμεν.
Are there, my friend, such things that we shall enjoy from temperance, while we are looking for something greater and seeking for it to be something greater than it is?" "Perhaps," he said, "it might be so." "Perhaps," I said; "but perhaps we have sought for nothing useful.
τεκμαίρομαι δέ, ὅτι μοι ἄτοπʼ ἄττα καταφαίνεται περὶ σωφροσύνης, εἰ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν.
And I conjecture this because some strange things appear to me concerning temperance, if it is of such a nature.
ἴδωμεν γάρ, εἰ βούλει, συγχωρήσαντες καὶ ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιστήμην δυνατὸν εἶναι, καὶ ὅ γε ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐτιθέμεθα σωφροσύνην εἶναι, τὸ εἰδέναι ἅ τε οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, μὴ ἀποστερήσωμεν, ἀλλὰ δῶμεν· καὶ πάντα ταῦτα δόντες ἔτι βέλτιον σκεψώμεθα εἰ ἄρα τι καὶ ἡμᾶς ὀνήσει τοιοῦτον ὄν.
For let us see, if you wish, agreeing that it is possible to know knowledge, and let us not deprive him of what we laid down from the beginning to be temperance, namely knowing what one knows and what one does not know, but let us grant it; and having granted all these things, let us consider even better if indeed such a thing will benefit us at all.
ἃ γὰρ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, ὡς μέγα ἂν εἴη ἀγαθὸν ἡ σωφροσύνη εἰ τοιοῦτον εἴη, ἡγουμένη διοικήσεως καὶ οἰκίας καὶ πόλεως, οὔ μοι δοκοῦμεν, ὦ Κριτία, καλῶς ὡμολογηκέναι. πῶς δή; ἦ δʼ ὅς.
For what we were saying just now, how great a good temperance would be if it were of such a nature, leading the management of both house and city, we do not seem to me, Critias, to have agreed upon rightly." "How so?" he said.
ὅτι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ῥᾳδίως ὡμολογήσαμεν μέγα τι ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις εἰ ἕκαστοι ἡμῶν, ἃ μὲν ἴσασιν, πράττοιεν ταῦτα, ἃ δὲ μὴ ἐπίσταιντο, ἄλλοις παραδιδοῖεν τοῖς ἐπισταμένοις. οὐκ οὖν, ἔφη, καλῶς ὡμολογήσαμεν; οὔ μοι δοκοῦμεν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ.
"Because," I said, "we easily agreed that it would be a great good for men if each of us should do what they know, and hand over what they do not know to others who know." "Did we not then," he said, "agree rightly?" "We do not seem to me to have done so," I said.
ἄτοπα λέγεις ὡς ἀληθῶς, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες.
"You say strange things indeed, Socrates," he said.
νὴ τὸν κύνα, ἔφην, καὶ ἐμοί τοι δοκεῖ οὕτω, κἀνταῦθα καὶ ἄρτι ἀποβλέψας ἄτοπʼ ἄττʼ ἔφην μοι προφαίνεσθαι, καὶ ὅτι φοβοίμην μὴ οὐκ ὀρθῶς σκοποῖμεν. §173ὡς ἀληθῶς γάρ, εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐδέν μοι δῆλον εἶναι δοκεῖ ὅτι ἀγαθὸν ἡμᾶς ἀπεργάζεται. πῶς δή; ἦ δʼ ὅς.
"By the dog," I said, "it seems so to me too, and looking both there and just now I said that some strange things appeared to me, and that I feared lest we were not examining rightly." "For in truth, even if temperance is of such a nature as much as possible, nothing seems to me to be clear that it works good for us." "How so?" he said.
λέγε, ἵνα καὶ ἡμεῖς εἰδῶμεν ὅτι λέγεις. οἶμαι μέν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ληρεῖν με· ὅμως τό γε προφαινόμενον ἀναγκαῖον σκοπεῖν καὶ μὴ εἰκῇ παριέναι, εἴ τίς γε αὑτοῦ καὶ σμικρὸν κήδεται. καλῶς γάρ, ἔφη, λέγεις.
"Speak, so that we too may know what you are saying." "I think, indeed," I said, "that I am talking nonsense; nevertheless, it is necessary to examine what appears and not to pass it by randomly, if one cares even a little for oneself." "For you speak well," he said.
ἄκουε δή, ἔφην, τὸ ἐμὸν ὄναρ, εἴτε διὰ κεράτων εἴτε διʼ ἐλέφαντος ἐλήλυθεν.
"Listen then," I said, "to my dream, whether it has come through the gates of horn or of ivory.
εἰ γὰρ ὅτι μάλιστα ἡμῶν ἄρχοι ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὖσα οἵαν νῦν ὁριζόμεθα, ἄλλο τι κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας πάντʼ ἂν πράττοιτο, καὶ οὔτε τις κυβερνήτης φάσκων εἶναι, ὢν δὲ οὔ, ἐξαπατῷ ἂν ἡμᾶς, οὔτε ἰατρὸς οὔτε στρατηγὸς οὔτʼ ἄλλος οὐδείς, προσποιούμενός τι εἰδέναι ὃ μὴ οἶδεν, λανθάνοι ἄν·
For if indeed temperance should rule over us as much as possible, being of such a kind as we now define it, would not everything be done according to knowledge, and neither would any pilot claiming to be one, but not being so, deceive us, nor would any doctor or general or anyone else, pretending to know what he does not know, escape notice?
ἐκ δὴ τούτων οὕτως ἐχόντων ἄλλο ἂν ἡμῖν τι συμβαίνοι ἢ ὑγιέσιν τε τὰ σώματα εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν, καὶ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ κινδυνεύοντας καὶ ἐν πολέμῳ σῴζεσθαι, καὶ τὰ σκεύη καὶ τὴν ἀμπεχόνην καὶ ὑπόδεσιν πᾶσαν καὶ τὰ χρήματα πάντα τεχνικῶς ἡμῖν εἰργασμένα εἶναι καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ διὰ τὸ ἀληθινοῖς δημιουργοῖς χρῆσθαι;
From these things being so, would anything else happen to us than that our bodies would be healthier than now, and we would be saved when in danger at sea and in war, and our utensils and clothing and all footwear and all possessions would be crafted for us skillfully, and many other things because of employing true artisans?
εἰ δὲ βούλοιό γε, καὶ τὴν μαντικὴν εἶναι συγχωρήσωμεν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ μέλλοντος ἔσεσθαι, καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην, αὐτῆς ἐπιστατοῦσαν, τοὺς μὲν ἀλαζόνας ἀποτρέπειν, τοὺς δὲ ὡς ἀληθῶς μάντεις καθιστάναι ἡμῖν προφήτας τῶν μελλόντων.
And if you wish, let us also grant that prophecy is the knowledge of what is to be, and that temperance, presiding over it, turns away the pretenders but establishes the true prophets for us as spokesmen of the future.
κατεσκευασμένον δὴ οὕτω τὸ ἀνθρώπινον γένος ὅτι μὲν ἐπιστημόνως ἂν πράττοι καὶ ζῴη, ἕπομαι—ἡ γὰρ σωφροσύνη φυλάττουσα οὐκ ἂν ἐῴη παρεμπίπτουσαν τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην συνεργὸν ἡμῖν εἶναι—ὅτι δʼ ἐπιστημόνως ἂν πράττοντες εὖ ἂν πράττοιμεν καὶ εὐδαιμονοῖμεν, τοῦτο δὲ οὔπω δυνάμεθα μαθεῖν, ὦ φίλε Κριτία. ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἦ δʼ ὅς, οὐ ῥᾳδίως εὑρήσεις ἄλλο τι τέλος τοῦ εὖ πράττειν, ἐὰν τὸ ἐπιστημόνως ἀτιμάσῃς. σμικρὸν τοίνυν με, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἔτι προσδίδαξον.
The human race being thus prepared, that it would act and live knowledgeably, I follow—for temperance guarding would not permit lack of knowledge, slipping in, to be our helper—but that acting knowledgeably we would fare well and be happy, this we are not yet able to learn, my dear Critias." "But yet," he said, "you will not easily find any other end of faring well if you dishonor the acting knowledgeably." "Teach me then a little more," I said.
τίνος ἐπιστημόνως λέγεις;
"Of what is this knowledgeably?
ἦ σκυτῶν τομῆς; μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγε.
Is it of the cutting of leather?" "By Zeus, not I," he said.
ἀλλὰ χαλκοῦ ἐργασίας; οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλὰ ἐρίων ἢ ξύλων ἢ ἄλλου του τῶν τοιούτων; οὐ δῆτα. οὐκ ἄρα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἔτι ἐμμένομεν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ εὐδαίμονα εἶναι τὸν ἐπιστημόνως ζῶντα.
"But of the working of bronze?" "By no means." "But of wool or wood or any other of such things?" "Certainly not." "We no longer then," I said, "abide by the argument that the one living knowledgeably is happy.
οὗτοι γὰρ ἐπιστημόνως ζῶντες οὐχ ὁμολογοῦνται παρὰ σοῦ εὐδαίμονες εἶναι, ἀλλὰ περί τινων ἐπιστημόνως ζῶντα σὺ δοκεῖς μοι ἀφορίζεσθαι τὸν εὐδαίμονα.
For these, though living knowledgeably, are not agreed by you to be happy, but you seem to me to define the happy man as one living knowledgeably about certain things."