§171οὐδὲ περὶ ἰατρικῆς ἄρα οἶδεν ὁ ἰατρικός, ἐπειδήπερ ἡ ἰατρικὴ ἐπιστήμη οὖσα τυγχάνει.
Therefore, not even the doctor knows about medicine, since medicine happens to be a knowledge.
ἀληθῆ. ὅτι μὲν δὴ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἔχει, γνώσεται ὁ σώφρων τὸν ἰατρόν· δέον δὲ πεῖραν λαβεῖν ἥτις ἐστίν, ἄλλο τι σκέψεται ὧντινων;
"True." "The temperate man, to be sure, will know that the doctor has some knowledge; but when it is necessary to test what kind it is, will he examine anything other than what things it is of?
ἢ οὐ τούτῳ ὥρισται ἑκάστη ἐπιστήμη μὴ μόνον ἐπιστήμη εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ τίς, τῷ τινῶν εἶναι; τούτῳ μὲν οὖν. καὶ ἡ ἰατρικὴ δὴ ἑτέρα εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ὡρίσθη τῷ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ εἶναι καὶ νοσώδους ἐπιστήμη. ναί. οὐκοῦν ἐν τούτοις ἀναγκαῖον σκοπεῖν τὸν βουλόμενον ἰατρικὴν σκοπεῖν, ἐν οἷς ποτʼ ἔστιν· οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἔν γε τοῖς ἔξω, ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστιν; οὐ δῆτα. ἐν τοῖς ὑγιεινοῖς ἄρα καὶ νοσώδεσιν ἐπισκέψεται τὸν ἰατρόν, ᾗ ἰατρικός ἐστιν, ὁ ὀρθῶς σκοπούμενος. ἔοικεν. οὐκοῦν ἐν τοῖς οὕτως ἢ λεγομένοις ἢ πραττομένοις τὰ μὲν λεγόμενα, εἰ ἀληθῆ λέγεται, σκοπούμενος, τὰ δὲ πραττόμενα, εἰ ὀρθῶς πράττεται; ἀνάγκη. ἦ οὖν ἄνευ ἰατρικῆς δύναιτʼ ἄν τις τούτων ποτέροις ἐπακολουθῆσαι; οὐ δῆτα. οὐδέ γε ἄλλος οὐδείς, ὡς ἔοικεν, πλὴν ἰατρός, οὔτε δὴ ὁ σώφρων· ἰατρὸς γὰρ ἂν εἴη πρὸς τῇ σωφροσύνῃ. ἔστι ταῦτα. παντὸς ἄρα μᾶλλον, εἰ ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη μόνον ἐστὶν καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης, οὔτε ἰατρὸν διακρῖναι οἵα τε ἔσται ἐπιστάμενον τὰ τῆς τέχνης ἢ μὴ ἐπιστάμενον, προσποιούμενον δὲ ἢ οἰόμενον, οὔτε ἄλλον οὐδένα τῶν ἐπισταμένων καὶ ὁτιοῦν, πλήν γε τὸν αὑτοῦ ὁμότεχνον, ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοί. φαίνεται, ἔφη.
Or is it not by this that each knowledge is defined as being not only knowledge, but also a specific kind, namely by being of certain things?" "By this, indeed." "And medicine was defined as being different from the other knowledges by being the knowledge of the healthy and the diseased." "Yes." "Therefore, is it not necessary for one who wishes to examine medicine to examine it in those things in which it is; for surely not in those outside, in which it is not?" "Certainly not." "Therefore, the one who examines rightly will examine the doctor, insofar as he is a doctor, in the healthy and the diseased." "It seems so." "Therefore, in things thus spoken or done, will he not examine what is spoken to see if it is spoken truly, and what is done to see if it is done rightly?" "Necessarily." "And could anyone without medicine follow either of these?" "Certainly not." "Nor indeed can anyone else, as it seems, except a doctor, and certainly not the temperate man; for he would have to be a doctor in addition to being temperate." "That is so." "Above all, therefore, if temperance is only a knowledge of knowledge and lack of knowledge, it will not be able to distinguish a doctor who knows the matters of his art from one who does not know but pretends or thinks he does, nor any other of those who know anything, except his own fellow-craftsman, just like the other artisans." "It seems so," he said.
τίς οὖν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Κριτία, ὠφελία ἡμῖν ἔτι ἂν εἴη ἀπὸ τῆς σωφροσύνης τοιαύτης οὔσης;
"What benefit then, Critias," I said, "would there still be for us from temperance if it is of such a nature?
εἰ μὲν γάρ, ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑπετιθέμεθα, ᾔδει ὁ σώφρων ἅ τε ᾔδει καὶ ἃ μὴ ᾔδει, τὰ μὲν ὅτι οἶδεν, τὰ δʼ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν, καὶ ἄλλον ταὐτὸν τοῦτο πεπονθότα ἐπισκέψασθαι οἷός τʼ ἦν, μεγαλωστὶ ἂν ἡμῖν, φαμέν, ὠφέλιμον ἦν σώφροσιν εἶναι·
For if, as we assumed from the beginning, the temperate man knew what he knew and what he did not know—the former because he knows, the latter because he does not—and was able to examine another who was in the same state, it would be of great benefit to us, we say, to be temperate.
ἀναμάρτητοι γὰρ ἂν τὸν βίον διεζῶμεν αὐτοί τε οἱ τὴν σωφροσύνην ἔχοντες καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὅσοι ὑφʼ ἡμῶν ἤρχοντο.
For we would have lived our lives without error, both ourselves who possess temperance and all the others as many as were ruled by us.
οὔτε γὰρ ἂν αὐτοὶ ἐπεχειροῦμεν πράττειν ἃ μὴ ἠπιστάμεθα, ἀλλʼ ἐξευρίσκοντες τοὺς ἐπισταμένους ἐκείνοις ἂν παρεδίδομεν, οὔτε τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπετρέπομεν, ὧν ἤρχομεν, ἄλλο τι πράττειν ἢ ὅτι πράττοντες ὀρθῶς ἔμελλον πράξειν—τοῦτο δʼ ἦν ἄν, οὗ ἐπιστήμην εἶχον—καὶ οὕτω δὴ ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης οἰκία τε οἰκουμένη ἔμελλεν καλῶς οἰκεῖσθαι, πόλις τε πολιτευομένη, καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν οὗ σωφροσύνη ἄρχοι·
For neither would we ourselves attempt to do what we did not know, but finding out those who knew, we would hand it over to them, nor would we permit the others whom we ruled to do anything else than what, in doing, they were likely to do rightly—and this would be what they had knowledge of—and thus, under temperance, a house being managed was likely to be managed well, and a city being governed, and everything else over which temperance might rule."