§170ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταὐτόν ἐστιν τοῦτο ἐκείνῳ. ἴσως, ἔφην, ἀλλʼ ἐγὼ κινδυνεύω ἀεὶ ὅμοιος εἶναι·
"Because, Socrates," he said, "this is the same as that." "Perhaps," I said, "but I am likely always to be the same.
οὐ γὰρ αὖ μανθάνω ὡς ἔστιν τὸ αὐτό, ἃ οἶδεν εἰδέναι καὶ ἅ τις μὴ οἶδεν εἰδέναι. πῶς λέγεις, ἔφη;
For I do not understand, on the other hand, how it is the same thing, to know what one knows and to know what someone does not know." "How do you mean?" he said.
ὧδε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ.
"In this way," I said.
ἐπιστήμη που ἐπιστήμης οὖσα ἆρα πλέον τι οἵα τʼ ἔσται διαιρεῖν, ἢ ὅτι τούτων τόδε μὲν ἐπιστήμη, τόδε δʼ οὐκ ἐπιστήμη; οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον. ταὐτὸν οὖν ἐστιν ἐπιστήμῃ τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνῃ ὑγιεινοῦ, καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ τε καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνῃ δικαίου; οὐδαμῶς. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν οἶμαι ἰατρική, τὸ δὲ πολιτική, τὸ δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ ἐπιστήμη. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; οὐκοῦν ἐὰν μὴ προσεπίστηταί τις τὸ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον, ἀλλʼ ἐπιστήμην μόνον γιγνώσκῃ ἅτε τούτου μόνον ἔχων ἐπιστήμην, ὅτι μέν τι ἐπίσταται καὶ ὅτι ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἔχει, εἰκότως ἂν γιγνώσκοι καὶ περὶ αὑτοῦ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων· ἦ γάρ; ναί. ὅτι δὲ γιγνώσκει, ταύτῃ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ πῶς εἴσεται;
"Surely, being a knowledge of knowledge, will it be able to distinguish anything more than that of these things, this one is knowledge, and that one is not knowledge?" "No, but only that much." "Is it then the same as the knowledge and lack of knowledge of the healthy, and the knowledge and lack of knowledge of the just?" "Not at all." "Rather, the one, I think, is medicine, the other politics, and the third nothing else than knowledge." "For how could it not be?" "Therefore, if someone does not additionally know the healthy and the just, but knows only knowledge, since he has the knowledge of this only, he would naturally know, both about himself and about others, that he knows something and that he has some knowledge; would he not?" "Yes." "But how will he know what he knows, by this knowledge?
γιγνώσκει γὰρ δὴ τὸ μὲν ὑγιεινὸν τῇ ἰατρικῇ ἀλλʼ οὐ σωφροσύνῃ, τὸ δʼ ἁρμονικὸν μουσικῇ ἀλλʼ οὐ σωφροσύνῃ, τὸ δʼ οἰκοδομικὸν οἰκοδομικῇ ἀλλʼ οὐ σωφροσύνῃ, καὶ οὕτω πάντα· ἢ οὔ; φαίνεται. σωφροσύνῃ δέ, εἴπερ μόνον ἐστὶν ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη, πῶς εἴσεται ὅτι τὸ ὑγιεινὸν γιγνώσκει ἢ ὅτι τὸ οἰκοδομικόν; οὐδαμῶς. οὐκ ἄρα εἴσεται ὃ οἶδεν ὁ τοῦτο ἀγνοῶν, ἀλλʼ ὅτι οἶδεν μόνον. ἔοικεν. οὐκ ἄρα σωφρονεῖν τοῦτʼ ἂν εἴη οὐδὲ σωφροσύνη, εἰδέναι ἅ τε οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, ἀλλʼ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅτι οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν μόνον. κινδυνεύει. οὐδὲ ἄλλον ἄρα οἷός τε ἔσται οὗτος ἐξετάσαι φάσκοντά τι ἐπίστασθαι, πότερον ἐπίσταται ὅ φησιν ἐπίστασθαι ἢ οὐκ ἐπίσταται· ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον μόνον, ὡς ἔοικεν, γνώσεται, ὅτι ἔχει τινὰ ἐπιστήμην, ὅτου δέ γε, ἡ σωφροσύνη οὐ ποιήσει αὐτὸν γιγνώσκειν. οὐ φαίνεται. οὔτε ἄρα τὸν προσποιούμενον ἰατρὸν εἶναι, ὄντα δὲ μή, καὶ τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄντα οἷός τε ἔσται διακρίνειν, οὔτε ἄλλον οὐδένα τῶν ἐπιστημόνων καὶ μή.
For surely, he knows the healthy by medicine and not by temperance, and the harmonic by music and not by temperance, and building by house-building and not by temperance, and so for all things; or not?" "It seems so." "And by temperance, if indeed it is only a knowledge of knowledges, how will he know that he knows the healthy or that he knows building?" "Not at all." "Therefore, he who is ignorant of this will not know what he knows, but only that he knows." "It seems so." "Therefore, to be temperate, or temperance, would not be this: to know what one knows and what one does not know, but, as it seems, only that one knows and that one does not know." "It is likely." "Therefore, this person will not be able to examine another who claims to know something, as to whether he knows what he says he knows or does not know; but only this much, as it seems, he will know, that the person has some knowledge; but of what it is, temperance will not make him know." "It does not appear so." "Therefore, he will not be able to distinguish the person who pretends to be a doctor, but is not, from the one who truly is, nor any other of those who have knowledge and those who do not.
σκεψώμεθα δὲ ἐκ τῶνδε· εἰ μέλλει ὁ σώφρων ἢ ὁστισοῦν ἄλλος τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἰατρὸν διαγνώσεσθαι καὶ τὸν μή, ἆρʼ οὐχ ὧδε ποιήσει· περὶ μὲν ἰατρικῆς δήπου αὐτῷ οὐ διαλέξεται—οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπαΐει, ὡς ἔφαμεν, ὁ ἰατρὸς ἀλλʼ ἢ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ τὸ νοσῶδες—ἢ οὔ; ναί, οὕτως. περὶ δέ γε ἐπιστήμης οὐδὲν οἶδεν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο δὴ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ μόνῃ ἀπέδομεν. ναί.
Let us consider it from this point of view: if the temperate man or anyone else is to distinguish the true doctor from the one who is not, will he not do as follows?" "Surely he will not talk with him about medicine—for, as we said, the doctor understands nothing else than the healthy and the diseased—or not?" "Yes, that is so." "But of knowledge indeed, he knows nothing; rather, this we assigned to temperance alone." "Yes."