§169ἀκοὴ δʼ αὖ καὶ ὄψις καὶ ἔτι γε κίνησις αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν κινεῖν, καὶ θερμότης κάειν, καὶ πάντα αὖ τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς μὲν ἀπιστίαν ἂν παράσχοι, ἴσως δέ τισιν οὔ.
"And on the other hand, hearing and sight, and further, motion itself moving itself, and heat burning, and all such things would, to some, cause disbelief, but perhaps to others not.
μεγάλου δή τινος, ὦ φίλε, ἀνδρὸς δεῖ, ὅστις τοῦτο κατὰ πάντων ἱκανῶς διαιρήσεται, πότερον οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων τὴν αὑτοῦ δύναμιν αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτὸ πέφυκεν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄλλο, ἢ τὰ μέν, τὰ δʼ οὔ· καὶ εἰ ἔστιν αὖ ἅτινα αὐτὰ πρὸς αὑτὰ ἔχει, ἆρʼ ἐν τούτοις ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, ἣν δὴ ἡμεῖς σωφροσύνην φαμὲν εἶναι.
It requires, my friend, some great man who will adequately distinguish this in all cases, whether none of the things that exist has by nature its own power directed toward itself, but toward something else, or some do and others do not; and further, if there are some that have it toward themselves, whether knowledge, which we indeed say is temperance, is among these.
ἐγὼ μὲν οὐ πιστεύω ἐμαυτῷ ἱκανὸς εἶναι ταῦτα διελέσθαι· διὸ καὶ οὔτʼ εἰ δυνατόν ἐστι τοῦτο γενέσθαι, ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, ἔχω διισχυρίσασθαι, οὔτʼ εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα ἔστι, σωφροσύνην ἀποδέχομαι αὐτὸ εἶναι, πρὶν ἂν ἐπισκέψωμαι εἴτε τι ἂν ἡμᾶς ὠφελοῖ τοιοῦτον ὂν εἴτε μή.
For my part, I do not trust myself to be adequate to distinguish these things; wherefore I can neither strongly assert whether it is possible for this to happen, namely for there to be a knowledge of knowledge, nor, even if it is ever so possible, do I accept that this is temperance, before I have considered whether being such it would benefit us at all or not.
τὴν γὰρ οὖν δὴ σωφροσύνην ὠφέλιμόν τι καὶ ἀγαθὸν μαντεύομαι εἶναι·
For I divine that temperance is something beneficial and good.
σὺ οὖν, ὦ παῖ Καλλαίσχρου—τίθεσαι γὰρ σωφροσύνην τοῦτʼ εἶναι, ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμης καὶ δὴ καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης—πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο ἔνδειξαι, ὅτι δυνατὸν ὃ νυνδὴ ἔλεγον, ἔπειτα πρὸς τῷ δυνατῷ ὅτι καὶ ὠφέλιμον· κἀμὲ τάχʼ ἂν ἀποπληρώσαις ὡς ὀρθῶς λέγεις περὶ σωφροσύνης ὃ ἔστιν. καὶ ὁ Κριτίας ἀκούσας ταῦτα καὶ ἰδών με ἀποροῦντα, ὥσπερ οἱ τοὺς χασμωμένους καταντικρὺ ὁρῶντες ταὐτὸν τοῦτο συμπάσχουσιν, κἀκεῖνος ἔδοξέ μοι ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ ἀποροῦντος ἀναγκασθῆναι καὶ αὐτὸς ἁλῶναι ὑπὸ ἀπορίας.
You then, son of Callaeschrus—for you lay down that temperance is this, a knowledge of knowledge and indeed also of lack of knowledge—first show this, that what I was just saying is possible, and then, in addition to its being possible, that it is also beneficial; and you might quickly satisfy me that you speak correctly about what temperance is." And Critias, having heard this and seeing me in difficulty, just as those who see people yawning opposite them experience this same thing, he too seemed to me to be forced by my being in difficulty to be caught by difficulty himself.
ἅτε οὖν εὐδοκιμῶν ἑκάστοτε, ᾐσχύνετο τοὺς παρόντας, καὶ οὔτε συγχωρῆσαί μοι ἤθελεν ἀδύνατος εἶναι διελέσθαι ἃ προυκαλούμην αὐτόν, ἔλεγέν τε οὐδὲν σαφές, ἐπικαλύπτων τὴν ἀπορίαν.
Since, therefore, he was highly esteemed on each occasion, he was ashamed before those present, and was neither willing to admit to me that he was unable to distinguish the things I was challenging him to do, and he said nothing clear, covering up his difficulty.
κἀγὼ ἡμῖν ἵνα ὁ λόγος προΐοι, εἶπον· ἀλλʼ εἰ δοκεῖ, ὦ Κριτία, νῦν μὲν τοῦτο συγχωρήσωμεν, δυνατὸν εἶναι γενέσθαι ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμης· αὖθις δὲ ἐπισκεψόμεθα εἴτε οὕτως ἔχει εἴτε μή.
And I, in order that our argument might go forward, said: "But if it seems good, Critias, for now let us grant this, that it is possible for a knowledge of knowledge to exist; and we will consider later whether it is so or not.
ἴθι δὴ οὖν, εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα δυνατὸν τοῦτο, τί μᾶλλον οἷόν τέ ἐστιν εἰδέναι ἅ τέ τις οἶδε καὶ ἃ μή;
Come then, if this is ever so possible, how is it any more possible to know what one knows and what one does not?
τοῦτο γὰρ δήπου ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὸ γιγνώσκειν αὑτὸν καὶ σωφρονεῖν· ἦ γάρ; πάνυ γε, ἦ δʼ ὅς, καὶ συμβαίνει γέ που, ὦ Σώκρατες.
For this, surely, we said was to know oneself and to be temperate; was it not?" "Certainly," he said, "and it surely follows, Socrates.
εἰ γάρ τις ἔχει ἐπιστήμην ἣ αὐτὴ αὑτὴν γιγνώσκει, τοιοῦτος ἂν αὐτὸς εἴη οἷόνπερ ἐστὶν ὃ ἔχει· ὥσπερ ὅταν τάχος τις ἔχῃ, ταχύς, καὶ ὅταν κάλλος, καλός, καὶ ὅταν γνῶσιν, γιγνώσκων, ὅταν δὲ δὴ γνῶσιν αὐτὴν αὑτῆς τις ἔχῃ, γιγνώσκων που αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν τότε ἔσται. οὐ τοῦτο, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ἀμφισβητῶ, ὡς οὐχ ὅταν τὸ αὑτὸ γιγνῶσκόν τις ἔχῃ, αὐτὸς αὑτὸν γνώσεται, ἀλλʼ ἔχοντι τοῦτο τίς ἀνάγκη εἰδέναι ἅ τε οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν;
For if someone has a knowledge which knows itself, he himself would be such as that which he has; just as when someone has speed, he is swift, and when beauty, beautiful, and when knowledge, knowing, so when someone has a knowledge of itself, he himself will surely then be knowing himself." "It is not this," I said, "that I dispute, as though when someone has that which knows itself, he will not know himself; but for one who has this, what necessity is there that he knows both what he knows and what he does not know?"