§167ὁ ἄρα σώφρων μόνος αὐτός τε ἑαυτὸν γνώσεται καὶ οἷός τε ἔσται ἐξετάσαι τί τε τυγχάνει εἰδὼς καὶ τί μή, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὡσαύτως δυνατὸς ἔσται ἐπισκοπεῖν τί τις οἶδεν καὶ οἴεται, εἴπερ οἶδεν, καὶ τί αὖ οἴεται μὲν εἰδέναι, οἶδεν δʼ οὔ, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδείς·
"Therefore, the temperate person alone will both know himself and be able to examine what he happens to know and what not, and in the same way he will be able to inspect others as to what someone knows and thinks he knows, if indeed he knows it, and what on the other hand he thinks he knows but does not; whereas no one else will be able to do this.
καὶ ἔστιν δὴ τοῦτο τὸ σωφρονεῖν τε καὶ σωφροσύνη καὶ τὸ ἑαυτὸν αὐτὸν γιγνώσκειν, τὸ εἰδέναι ἅ τε οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν.
And indeed this is what it is to be temperate, and temperance, and knowing oneself: namely, to know what one knows and what one does not know.
ἆρα ταῦτά ἐστιν ἃ λέγεις; ἔγωγʼ, ἔφη.
Are these the things you mean?" "Indeed they are," he said.
πάλιν τοίνυν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπισκεψώμεθα πρῶτον μὲν εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν τοῦτʼ εἶναι ἢ οὔ—τὸ ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν εἰδέναι ὅτι οἶδε καὶ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν—ἔπειτα εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα δυνατόν, τίς ἂν εἴη ἡμῖν ὠφελία εἰδόσιν αὐτό. ἀλλὰ χρή, ἔφη, σκοπεῖν.
"Then once again," I said, "as a third cup to the Savior, let us examine as if from the beginning: first, whether it is possible for this to be so or not—namely, to know what one knows and what one does not know, that one knows them and that one does not know them—and next, even if it is ever so possible, what benefit there would be for us who know it." "Indeed, we must examine it," he said.
ἴθι δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, ὦ Κριτία, σκέψαι, ἐάν τι περὶ αὐτῶν εὐπορώτερος φανῇς ἐμοῦ· ἐγὼ μὲν γὰρ ἀπορῶ.
"Come then, Critias," I said, "consider if you appear to be any more resourceful about these matters than I am; for I myself am at a loss.
ᾗ δὲ ἀπορῶ, φράσω σοι; πάνυ γʼ, ἔφη.
Shall I tell you in what way I am at a loss?" "By all means," he said.
ἄλλο τι οὖν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, πάντα ταῦτʼ ἂν εἴη, εἰ ἔστιν ὅπερ σὺ νυνδὴ ἔλεγες, μία τις ἐπιστήμη, ἣ οὐκ ἄλλου τινός ἐστιν ἢ ἑαυτῆς τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη, καὶ δὴ καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης ἡ αὐτὴ αὕτη; πάνυ γε. ἰδὲ δὴ ὡς ἄτοπον ἐπιχειροῦμεν, ὦ ἑταῖρε, λέγειν· ἐν ἄλλοις γάρ που τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐὰν σκοπῇς, δόξει σοι, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἀδύνατον εἶναι. πῶς δὴ καὶ ποῦ; ἐν τοῖσδε.
"Therefore," I said, "would all these things be anything other than this, if indeed there is, as you said just now, a single knowledge which is of nothing else than of itself and of the other knowledges, and indeed also of the lack of knowledge?" "Certainly." "See then, my friend, what a strange thing we are attempting to say; for if you examine this very same thing in other cases, it will seem to you, as I think, to be impossible." "How so, and in what cases?" "In these.
ἐννόει γὰρ εἴ σοι δοκεῖ ὄψις τις εἶναι, ἣ ὧν μὲν αἱ ἄλλαι ὄψεις εἰσίν, οὐκ ἔστιν τούτων ὄψις, ἑαυτῆς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄψεων ὄψις ἐστὶν καὶ μὴ ὄψεων ὡσαύτως, καὶ χρῶμα μὲν ὁρᾷ οὐδὲν ὄψις οὖσα, αὑτὴν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὄψεις· δοκεῖ τίς σοι εἶναι τοιαύτη;
For consider if it seems to you that there is a certain sight which is not a sight of those things of which other sights are, but is a sight of itself and of other sights, and likewise of non-sights, and which, being a sight, sees no color, but only itself and other sights.
μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔμοιγε. τί δὲ ἀκοήν, ἣ φωνῆς μὲν οὐδεμιᾶς ἀκούει, αὑτῆς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀκοῶν ἀκούει καὶ τῶν μὴ ἀκοῶν; οὐδὲ τοῦτο. συλλήβδην δὴ σκόπει περὶ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων εἴ τίς σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι αἰσθήσεων μὲν αἴσθησις καὶ ἑαυτῆς, ὧν δὲ δὴ αἱ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις αἰσθάνονται, μηδενὸς αἰσθανομένη; οὐκ ἔμοιγε. ἀλλʼ ἐπιθυμία δοκεῖ τίς σοι εἶναι, ἥτις ἡδονῆς μὲν οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία, αὑτῆς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν; οὐ δῆτα. οὐδὲ μὴν βούλησις, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἣ ἀγαθὸν μὲν οὐδὲν βούλεται, αὑτὴν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας βουλήσεις βούλεται. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ἔρωτα δὲ φαίης ἄν τινα εἶναι τοιοῦτον, ὃς τυγχάνει ὢν ἔρως καλοῦ μὲν οὐδενός, αὑτοῦ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐρώτων; οὔκ, ἔφη, ἔγωγε.
Does any such seem to you to exist?" "By Zeus, not to me." "And what about a hearing, which hears no voice, but hears itself and other hearings and non-hearings?" "Not that either." "In sum, then, consider concerning all the senses if there seems to you to be any sense which is a sense of senses and of itself, while sensing nothing of what the other senses sense?" "Not to me." "And does there seem to you to be any desire which is a desire for no pleasure, but for itself and other desires?" "Certainly not." "Nor indeed a will, as I think, which wishes for no good, but wishes for itself and other wishes." "No indeed." "And would you say there is any such love, which happens to be a love for nothing beautiful, but for itself and other loves?" "No," he said, "not I."