§166ἐπεὶ λέγε μοι, ἔφη, τῆς λογιστικῆς τέχνης ἢ τῆς γεωμετρικῆς τί ἐστιν τοιοῦτον ἔργον οἷον οἰκία οἰκοδομικῆς ἢ ἱμάτιον ὑφαντικῆς ἢ ἄλλα τοιαῦτʼ ἔργα, ἃ πολλὰ ἄν τις ἔχοι πολλῶν τεχνῶν δεῖξαι;
"For tell me," he said, "of the art of calculation or of geometry, what is such a product as a house of building, or a cloak of weaving, or other such products, many of which one might be able to point out from many arts?
ἔχεις οὖν μοι καὶ σὺ τούτων τοιοῦτόν τι ἔργον δεῖξαι;
Are you then able to point out to me some such product of these?
ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἕξεις. καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον ὅτι ἀληθῆ λέγεις· ἀλλὰ τόδε σοι ἔχω δεῖξαι, τίνος ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ἑκάστη τούτων τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ὃ τυγχάνει ὂν ἄλλο αὐτῆς τῆς ἐπιστήμης.
But you will not be able to." And I said: "You speak the truth; but I am able to show you this, of what each of these knowledges is the knowledge, which happens to be something other than the knowledge itself.
οἷον ἡ λογιστική ἐστίν που τοῦ ἀρτίου καὶ τοῦ περιττοῦ, πλήθους ὅπως ἔχει πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα· ἦ γάρ; πάνυ γε, ἔφη.
For example, calculation is, I suppose, of the even and the odd, how they are in relation to themselves and to one another; is it not so?" "Certainly," he said.
οὐκοῦν ἑτέρου ὄντος τοῦ περιττοῦ καὶ ἀρτίου αὐτῆς τῆς λογιστικῆς; πῶς δʼ οὔ;
"Therefore, the odd and the even being something other than calculation itself?" "How could it not be?
καὶ μὴν αὖ ἡ στατικὴ τοῦ βαρυτέρου τε καὶ κουφοτέρου σταθμοῦ ἐστιν στατική· ἕτερον δέ ἐστιν τὸ βαρύ τε καὶ κοῦφον τῆς στατικῆς αὐτῆς.
""And further, weighing is the weighing of the heavier and lighter weight; and the heavy and light are something other than the art of weighing itself.
συγχωρεῖς; ἔγωγε. λέγε δή, καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη τίνος ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, ὃ τυγχάνει ἕτερον ὂν αὐτῆς τῆς σωφροσύνης; τοῦτό ἐστιν ἐκεῖνο, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἐπʼ αὐτὸ ἥκεις ἐρευνῶν τὸ ᾧ διαφέρει πασῶν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἡ σωφροσύνη· σὺ δὲ ὁμοιότητά τινα ζητεῖς αὐτῆς ταῖς ἄλλαις.
Do you agree?" "I do." "Tell me then, of what is temperance also the knowledge, which happens to be something other than temperance itself?" "This is just the point, Socrates," he said; "you have come in your search to that very thing by which temperance differs from all other knowledges; but you seek some similarity between it and the others.
τὸ δʼ οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως, ἀλλʼ αἱ μὲν ἄλλαι πᾶσαι ἄλλου εἰσὶν ἐπιστῆμαι, ἑαυτῶν δʼ οὔ, ἡ δὲ μόνη τῶν τε ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶ καὶ αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς.
But it is not so, but all the others are knowledges of something else, but not of themselves, whereas this alone is the knowledge both of the other knowledges and of itself.
καὶ ταῦτά σε πολλοῦ δεῖ λεληθέναι, ἀλλὰ γὰρ οἶμαι ὃ ἄρτι οὐκ ἔφησθα ποιεῖν, τοῦτο ποιεῖς· ἐμὲ γὰρ ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐλέγχειν, ἐάσας περὶ οὗ ὁ λόγος ἐστίν. οἷον, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ποιεῖς ἡγούμενος, εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα σὲ ἐλέγχω, ἄλλου τινὸς ἕνεκα ἐλέγχειν ἢ οὗπερ ἕνεκα κἂν ἐμαυτὸν διερευνῴμην τί λέγω, φοβούμενος μή ποτε λάθω οἰόμενος μέν τι εἰδέναι, εἰδὼς δὲ μή.
And you are far from being unaware of this, but indeed I think you are doing what you said just now you were not doing: for you are trying to refute me, letting go of what the argument is about." "What a thing to do!" I said, "in thinking that, if I refute you ever so much, I refute you for any other reason than that for which I would also examine myself as to what I am saying, fearing lest I should ever unconsciously think I know something when I do not.
καὶ νῦν δὴ οὖν ἔγωγέ φημι τοῦτο ποιεῖν, τὸν λόγον σκοπεῖν μάλιστα μὲν ἐμαυτοῦ ἕνεκα, ἴσως δὲ δὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων· ἢ οὐ κοινὸν οἴει ἀγαθὸν εἶναι σχεδόν τι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, γίγνεσθαι καταφανὲς ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ὅπῃ ἔχει; καὶ μάλα, ἦ δʼ ὅς, ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες. θαρρῶν τοίνυν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ μακάριε, ἀποκρινόμενος τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ὅπῃ σοι φαίνεται, ἔα χαίρειν εἴτε Κριτίας ἐστὶν εἴτε Σωκράτης ὁ ἐλεγχόμενος· ἀλλʼ αὐτῷ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν τῷ λόγῳ σκόπει ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἐκβήσεται ἐλεγχόμενος. ἀλλά, ἔφη, ποιήσω οὕτω· δοκεῖς γάρ μοι μέτρια λέγειν. λέγε τοίνυν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, περὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης πῶς λέγεις; λέγω τοίνυν, ἦ δʼ ὅς, ὅτι μόνη τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν αὐτή τε αὑτῆς ἐστιν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη. οὐκοῦν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης ἐπιστήμη ἂν εἴη, εἴπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμης; πάνυ γε, ἔφη.
And indeed now, therefore, I say that I am doing this, examining the argument chiefly for my own sake, but perhaps also for the sake of my other friends; or do you not think it is a common good, almost for all men, that each of the things that are should become clear as to how it is?" "Very much so, Socrates," he said, "I do." "Be of good courage then, my good friend," I said, "in answering what is asked as it appears to you, and let it go whether it is Critias or Socrates who is being refuted; but paying attention to the argument itself, examine where it will turn out when refuted." "Well," he said, "I will do so; for you seem to me to speak reasonably." "Tell me then," I said, "about temperance, how do you say?" "I say then," he said, "that it alone of all other knowledges is both of itself and of the other knowledges the knowledge." "Therefore," I said, "it would also be a knowledge of the lack of knowledge, if indeed it is also of knowledge?" "Certainly," he said.