§164καὶ οὐδέν γέ σε ἴσως κωλύει ἀληθῆ λέγειν· τόδε γε μέντοι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, θαυμάζω, εἰ σωφρονοῦντας ἀνθρώπους ἡγῇ σὺ ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι σωφρονοῦσιν. ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἡγοῦμαι, ἔφη.
"And perhaps nothing prevents you from speaking the truth; however, this indeed, I said, I wonder at, if you think that temperate men are ignorant of the fact that they are temperate." "But I do not think so," he said.
οὐκ ὀλίγον πρότερον, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἐλέγετο ὑπὸ σοῦ ὅτι τοὺς δημιουργοὺς οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ αὖ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ποιοῦντας σωφρονεῖν; ἐλέγετο γάρ, ἔφη· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦτο; οὐδέν· ἀλλὰ λέγε εἰ δοκεῖ τίς σοι ἰατρός, ὑγιᾶ τινα ποιῶν, ὠφέλιμα καὶ ἑαυτῷ ποιεῖν καὶ ἐκείνῳ ὃν ἰῷτο; ἔμοιγε. οὐκοῦν τὰ δέοντα πράττει ὅ γε ταῦτα πράττων; ναί. ὁ τὰ δέοντα πράττων οὐ σωφρονεῖ; σωφρονεῖ μὲν οὖν. ἦ οὖν καὶ γιγνώσκειν ἀνάγκη τῷ ἰατρῷ ὅταν τε ὠφελίμως ἰᾶται καὶ ὅταν μή; καὶ ἑκάστῳ τῶν δημιουργῶν ὅταν τε μέλλῃ ὀνήσεσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔργου οὗ ἂν πράττῃ καὶ ὅταν μή; ἴσως οὔ. ἐνίοτε ἄρα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὠφελίμως πράξας ἢ βλαβερῶς ὁ ἰατρὸς οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτὸν ὡς ἔπραξεν·
"Was it not said by you a little earlier, I said, that nothing prevents craftsmen, and indeed those who make the things of others, from being temperate?" "For it was indeed said," he said; "but what of this?" "Nothing; but tell me if you think any physician, in making someone healthy, produces what is beneficial both to himself and to the one whom he heals?" "I do indeed." "Does he not, then, do what is necessary, he who does these things?" "Yes." "Does he who does what is necessary not act temperately?" "He does indeed." "Is it then necessary also for the physician to know when he heals beneficially and when not?" "Perhaps not." "Sometimes then," I said, "having acted beneficially or harmfully, the physician does not know how he acted; and yet having acted beneficially, according to your argument, he acted temperately.
καίτοι ὠφελίμως πράξας, ὡς ὁ σὸς λόγος, σωφρόνως ἔπραξεν. ἢ οὐχ οὕτως ἔλεγες; ἔγωγε. οὐκοῦν, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐνίοτε ὠφελίμως πράξας πράττει μὲν σωφρόνως καὶ σωφρονεῖ, ἀγνοεῖ δʼ ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μέν, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο, ἀλλʼ εἴ τι σὺ οἴει ἐκ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ὑπʼ ἐμοῦ ὡμολογημένων εἰς τοῦτο ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι συμβαίνειν, ἐκείνων ἄν τι ἔγωγε μᾶλλον ἀναθείμην, καὶ οὐκ ἂν αἰσχυνθείην μὴ οὐχὶ ὀρθῶς φάναι εἰρηκέναι, μᾶλλον ἤ ποτε συγχωρήσαιμʼ ἂν ἀγνοοῦντα αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν ἄνθρωπον σωφρονεῖν.
Or did you not say so?" "I did." "Therefore, as it seems, sometimes having acted beneficially, he acts temperately and is temperate, but is ignorant of himself that he is temperate?" "But this indeed, Socrates," he said, "could never happen, but if you think that from my previous admissions it is necessary that this should result, I would rather retract some of those admissions, and I would not be ashamed to say that I did not speak correctly, rather than ever concede that a man who is ignorant of himself is temperate.
σχεδὸν γάρ τι ἔγωγε αὐτὸ τοῦτό φημι εἶναι σωφροσύνην, τὸ γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν, καὶ συμφέρομαι τῷ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἀναθέντι τὸ τοιοῦτον γράμμα.
For I almost say that this very thing is temperance, to know oneself, and I agree with the one who dedicated that inscription at Delphi.
καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο οὕτω μοι δοκεῖ τὸ γράμμα ἀνακεῖσθαι, ὡς δὴ πρόσρησις οὖσα τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν εἰσιόντων ἀντὶ τοῦ χαῖρε, ὡς τούτου μὲν οὐκ ὀρθοῦ ὄντος τοῦ προσρήματος, τοῦ χαίρειν, οὐδὲ δεῖν τοῦτο παρακελεύεσθαι ἀλλήλοις ἀλλὰ σωφρονεῖν.
For indeed this inscription seems to me to be dedicated in this way, as if it were a greeting of the god to those who enter, instead of 'greetings', as if this greeting, 'greetings', were not correct, nor should we exhort this to one another, but rather 'be temperate'.
οὕτω μὲν δὴ ὁ θεὸς προσαγορεύει τοὺς εἰσιόντας εἰς τὸ ἱερὸν διαφέρον τι ἢ οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ὡς διανοούμενος ἀνέθηκεν ὁ ἀναθείς, ὥς μοι δοκεῖ· καὶ λέγει πρὸς τὸν ἀεὶ εἰσιόντα οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἢ Σωφρόνει, φησίν. §165αἰνιγματωδέστερον δὲ δή, ὡς μάντις, λέγει· τὸ γὰρ Γνῶθι σαυτόν καὶ τὸ Σωφρόνει ἔστιν μὲν ταὐτόν, ὡς τὰ γράμματά φησιν καὶ ἐγώ, τάχα δʼ ἄν τις οἰηθείη ἄλλο εἶναι, ὃ δή μοι δοκοῦσιν παθεῖν καὶ οἱ τὰ ὕστερον γράμματα ἀναθέντες, τό τε μηδὲν ἄγαν καὶ τὸ Ἐγγύη πάρα δʼ ἄτη.
In this way indeed, the god addresses those who enter the temple, differing somewhat from men, as the one who dedicated it intended when he dedicated it, as it seems to me; and he says to the one who enters at any time nothing else than 'Be temperate', he says." "But he speaks rather riddlingly, like a prophet; for 'Know thyself' and 'Be temperate' are indeed the same thing, as the inscriptions and I say, but perhaps someone might think it is something else, which indeed those who dedicated the later inscriptions seem to me to have suffered, both 'Nothing in excess' and 'Pledge brings ruin'.
καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι συμβουλὴν ᾠήθησαν εἶναι τὸ Γνῶθι σαυτόν, ἀλλʼ οὐ τῶν εἰσιόντων ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ πρόσρησιν· εἶθʼ ἵνα δὴ καὶ σφεῖς μηδὲν ἧττον συμβουλὰς χρησίμους ἀναθεῖεν, ταῦτα γράψαντες ἀνέθεσαν.
For these men also thought 'Know thyself' to be a piece of advice, but not a greeting of those who enter by the god; then, so that they themselves might dedicate no less useful advice, they wrote and dedicated these.
οὗ δὴ οὖν ἕνεκα λέγω, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα πάντα, τόδʼ ἐστίν· τὰ μὲν ἔμπροσθέν σοι πάντα ἀφίημι—ἴσως μὲν γάρ τι σὺ ἔλεγες περὶ αὐτῶν ὀρθότερον, ἴσως δʼ ἐγώ, σαφὲς δʼ οὐδὲν πάνυ ἦν ὧν ἐλέγομεν—νῦν δʼ ἐθέλω τούτου σοι διδόναι λόγον, εἰ μὴ ὁμολογεῖς σωφροσύνην εἶναι τὸ γιγνώσκειν αὐτὸν ἑαυτόν. ἀλλʼ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ὦ Κριτία, σὺ μὲν ὡς φάσκοντος ἐμοῦ εἰδέναι περὶ ὧν ἐρωτῶ προσφέρῃ πρός με, καὶ ἐὰν δὴ βούλωμαι, ὁμολογήσοντός σοι· τὸ δʼ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, ἀλλὰ ζητῶ γὰρ μετὰ σοῦ ἀεὶ τὸ προτιθέμενον διὰ τὸ μὴ αὐτὸς εἰδέναι.
Now, the reason why I say all these things, Socrates, is this: all the previous things I release to you—for perhaps you were saying something more correct about them, and perhaps I was, but nothing of what we were saying was very clear—but now I wish to give you an account of this, if you do not agree that temperance is to know oneself." "But, Critias," I said, "you approach me as if I claim to know about the things I ask, and as if, if I indeed wish, I will agree with you; but this is not the case, for I always search with you for what is proposed because I myself do not know.
σκεψάμενος οὖν ἐθέλω εἰπεῖν εἴτε ὁμολογῶ εἴτε μή.
So, having examined it, I wish to say whether I agree or not.
ἀλλʼ ἐπίσχες ἕως ἂν σκέψωμαι. σκόπει δή, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
But hold on until I examine it." "Examine then," he said.
καὶ γάρ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, σκοπῶ.
"For indeed," I said, "I am examining.
εἰ γὰρ δὴ γιγνώσκειν γέ τί ἐστιν ἡ σωφροσύνη, δῆλον ὅτι ἐπιστήμη τις ἂν εἴη καὶ τινός· ἢ οὔ; ἔστιν, ἔφη, ἑαυτοῦ γε. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἰατρική, ἔφην, ἐπιστήμη ἐστὶν τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ; πάνυ γε. εἰ τοίνυν με, ἔφην, ἔροιο σύ· ἰατρικὴ ὑγιεινοῦ ἐπιστήμη οὖσα τί ἡμῖν χρησίμη ἐστὶν καὶ τί ἀπεργάζεται,
εἴποιμʼ ἂν ὅτι οὐ σμικρὰν ὠφελίαν· τὴν γὰρ ὑγίειαν καλὸν ἡμῖν ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται, εἰ ἀποδέχῃ τοῦτο. ἀποδέχομαι. καὶ εἰ τοίνυν με ἔροιο τὴν οἰκοδομικήν, ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν τοῦ οἰκοδομεῖν, τί φημι ἔργον ἀπεργάζεσθαι, εἴποιμʼ ἂν ὅτι οἰκήσεις· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν.
For if indeed temperance is to know something, it is clear that it would be some knowledge, and of something; or not?" "It is," he said, "of oneself." "Therefore medicine too," I said, "is knowledge of the healthy?" "Certainly." "If then," I said, "you should ask me: 'medicine being knowledge of the healthy, how is it useful to us and what does it produce?' I would say that it is no small benefit; for it produces health as a beautiful work for us, if you accept this." "I accept." "And if then you should ask me about housebuilding, which is knowledge of housebuilding, what work I say it produces, I would say dwellings; and likewise with the other arts.
χρὴ οὖν καὶ σὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς σωφροσύνης, ἐπειδὴ φῂς αὐτὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ἐρωτηθέντα,
ὦ Κριτία, σωφροσύνη, ἐπιστήμη οὖσα ἑαυτοῦ, τί καλὸν ἡμῖν ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται καὶ ἄξιον τοῦ ὀνόματος; ἴθι οὖν, εἰπέ.
Therefore you too, on behalf of temperance, since you say it is knowledge of oneself, must be able to say when asked: 'Critias, temperance, being knowledge of oneself, what beautiful work does it produce for us and worthy of the name?' Come then, tell me." "But, Socrates," he said, "you do not search correctly.
ἀλλʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ζητεῖς. οὐ γὰρ ὁμοία αὕτη πέφυκεν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐπιστήμαις, οὐδέ γε αἱ ἄλλαι ἀλλήλαις· σὺ δʼ ὡς ὁμοίων οὐσῶν ποιῇ τὴν ζήτησιν.
For this is not by nature similar to the other knowledges, nor indeed are the others to one another; but you make your search as if they were similar."