Humanitext Reader

Plato · Charmides §163

Distinction of Making and Doing, and Temperance as Good Deeds

Passage 8 of 18 · Greek

Summary

Socrates and Critias discuss the distinction between "producing" and "doing." Critias cites Hesiod's poetry to clarify his terms, redefining temperance as the doing of good things.

§163ἦ οὖν δοκοῦσί σοι τὰ ἑαυτῶν μόνον ποιεῖν ἢ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων; καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων. σωφρονοῦσιν οὖν οὐ τὰ ἑαυτῶν μόνον ποιοῦντες; τί γὰρ κωλύει;
"Do they seem to you to produce their own things only, or also those of others?" "Those of others as well." "Are they temperate, then, in producing not their own things only?" "For what prevents it?" he said.
ἔφη. οὐδὲν ἐμέ γε, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· ἀλλʼ ὅρα μὴ ἐκεῖνον κωλύει, ὃς ὑποθέμενος σωφροσύνην εἶναι τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν ἔπειτα οὐδέν φησι κωλύειν καὶ τοὺς τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντας σωφρονεῖν. ἐγὼ γάρ που, ἦ δʼ ὅς, τοῦθʼ ὡμολόγηκα, ὡς οἱ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντες σωφρονοῦσιν, εἰ τοὺς ποιοῦντας ὡμολόγησα. εἰπέ μοι, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, οὐ ταὐτὸν καλεῖς τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πράττειν; οὐ μέντοι, ἔφη·
"Nothing prevents me, at least," I said; "but look out lest it prevents him, who, having hypothesized that temperance is doing one's own business, then says that nothing prevents those who do the business of others from being temperate as well." "For have I," he said, "in any way agreed to this, that those who do the business of others are temperate, if I agreed about those who produce?" "Tell me," I said, "do you not call producing and doing the same thing?" "Certainly not," he said, "nor indeed working and producing.
οὐδέ γε τὸ ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν. ἔμαθον γὰρ παρʼ Ἡσιόδου, ὃς ἔφη ἔργον οὐδὲν εἶναι ὄνειδος.
For I learned from Hesiod, who said that no work is a disgrace.
οἴει οὖν αὐτόν, εἰ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔργα ἐκάλει καὶ ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ πράττειν, οἷα νυνδὴ σὺ ἔλεγες, οὐδενὶ ἂν ὄνειδος φάναι εἶναι σκυτοτομοῦντι ἢ ταριχοπωλοῦντι ἢ ἐπʼ οἰκήματος καθημένῳ;
Do you think then that if he called such works as you were just speaking of 'work' and 'working' and 'doing', he would say that it is no disgrace for anyone to make shoes, or to sell salt-fish, or to sit in a brothel?
οὐκ οἴεσθαί γε χρή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκεῖνος οἶμαι ποίησιν πράξεως καὶ ἐργασίας ἄλλο ἐνόμιζεν, καὶ ποίημα μὲν γίγνεσθαι ὄνειδος ἐνίοτε, ὅταν μὴ 1 μετὰ τοῦ καλοῦ γίγνηται, ἔργον δὲ οὐδέποτε οὐδὲν ὄνειδος· τὰ γὰρ καλῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως ποιούμενα ἔργα ἐκάλει, καὶ ἐργασίας τε καὶ πράξεις τὰς τοιαύτας ποιήσεις.
You must not think so, Socrates; but he too, I think, considered producing to be something other than doing and working," "and that a product sometimes becomes a disgrace when it is not made with beauty, but a work is never any disgrace; for he called things produced beautifully and usefully 'works', and such productions he called 'workings' and 'doings'.
φάναι δέ γε χρὴ καὶ οἰκεῖα μόνα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἡγεῖσθαι αὐτόν, τὰ δὲ βλαβερὰ πάντα ἀλλότρια·
And we must say that he considered only such things to be one's own, and all harmful things to be foreign.
ὥστε καὶ Ἡσίοδον χρὴ οἴεσθαι καὶ ἄλλον ὅστις φρόνιμος τὸν τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττοντα τοῦτον σώφρονα καλεῖν. ὦ Κριτία, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, καὶ εὐθὺς ἀρχομένου σου σχεδὸν ἐμάνθανον τὸν λόγον, ὅτι τὰ οἰκεῖά τε καὶ τὰ αὑτοῦ ἀγαθὰ καλοίης, καὶ τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήσεις πράξεις· καὶ γὰρ Προδίκου μυρία τινὰ ἀκήκοα περὶ ὀνομάτων διαιροῦντος.
So we must think that Hesiod and any other wise man calls him who does his own business temperate." "Critias," I said, "even from your very beginning, I almost understood your argument, that you called 'one's own' and 'one's own business' 'good', and the productions of good things 'doings'; for indeed I have heard countless things from Prodicus dividing names.
ἀλλʼ ἐγώ σοι τίθεσθαι μὲν τῶν ὀνομάτων δίδωμι ὅπῃ ἂν βούλῃ ἕκαστον· δήλου δὲ μόνον ἐφʼ ὅτι ἂν φέρῃς τοὔνομα ὅτι ἂν λέγῃς.
But I grant you to define each of the names in whatever way you wish; only make clear to what you apply the name whenever you speak.
νῦν οὖν πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς σαφέστερον ὅρισαι· ἆρα τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πρᾶξιν ἢ ποίησιν ἢ ὅπως σὺ βούλει ὀνομάζειν, ταύτην λέγεις σὺ σωφροσύνην εἶναι; ἔγωγε, ἔφη.
Now then, define again from the beginning more clearly:" "do you say that this doing or producing of good things, or however you wish to name it, is temperance?" "I do," he said.
οὐκ ἄρα σωφρονεῖ ὁ τὰ κακὰ πράττων, ἀλλʼ ὁ τἀγαθά; σοὶ δέ, ἦ δʼ ὅς, ὦ βέλτιστε, οὐχ οὕτω δοκεῖ;
"Then he who does bad things is not temperate, but he who does good things is?" "And does it not seem so to you, my excellent friend?" he said.
ἔα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ· μὴ γάρ πω τὸ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦν σκοπῶμεν, ἀλλʼ ὃ σὺ λέγεις νῦν. ἀλλὰ μέντοι ἔγωγε, ἔφη, τὸν μὴ ἀγαθὰ ἀλλὰ κακὰ ποιοῦντα οὔ φημι σωφρονεῖν, τὸν δὲ ἀγαθὰ ἀλλὰ μὴ κακὰ σωφρονεῖν· τὴν γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν πρᾶξιν σωφροσύνην εἶναι σαφῶς σοι διορίζομαι.
"Let that be," I said; "for let us not yet examine what seems to me, but what you are now saying." "But indeed," he said, "I say that he who produces not good but bad things is not temperate, but he who produces good and not bad things is temperate; for I clearly define for you that the doing of good things is temperance."

Notes

  1. 163aὅρα μὴ ἐκεῖνον κωλύει — The construction with `ὅρα μὴ` (look out lest) followed by the indicative `κωλύει`. Here `κωλύει` functions transitively; its implied subject is the fact agreed upon in the previous sentence (that craftsmen produce things for others), and `ἐκεῖνον` (the person who posited the definition, i.e., Critias) is the direct object. The phrase means "look out lest that prevents (or refutes) him."
  2. 163bοἴει οὖν αὐτόν... οὐδενὶ ἂν ὄνειδος φάναι εἶναι — An infinitive construction representing a contrary-to-fact conditional in indirect discourse. The accusative with infinitive `αὐτὸν... ἂν φάναι` (that he would have said) depends on the main verb `οἴει` (do you think?). It responds to the protasis `εἰ... ἐκάλει` (if he had called) in the indicative imperfect, expressing a past or present counterfactual situation: "Do you think then that, if he had called... he would have said...?"
  3. 163dὅτι τὰ οἰκεῖά τε καὶ τὰ αὑτοῦ ἀγαθὰ καλοίης — The verb `καλοίης` in the `ὅτι` clause is in the optative mood because it is in indirect discourse dependent on a main verb in a past tense (`ἐμάνθανον`, imperfect), a classic usage of the optative of indirect discourse (oblique optative).

Cite this passage

Plato, Charmides §163. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg018.humanitext-grc2:163

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