Humanitext Reader

Plato · Charmides §162

Doing One's Own Business as a Riddle and Critias Intervenes

Passage 7 of 18 · Greek

Summary

Socrates demonstrates that taking "doing one's own business" literally leads to a contradiction, pointing out that the definition is a riddle. Charmides then draws Critias, the real author of the definition, into the discussion, and Critias agrees to defend it himself.

§162τί οὖν;
"What then?" I said.
ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, δοκεῖ ἄν σοι πόλις εὖ οἰκεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ νόμου τοῦ κελεύοντος τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἱμάτιον ἕκαστον ὑφαίνειν καὶ πλύνειν, καὶ ὑποδήματα σκυτοτομεῖν, καὶ λήκυθον καὶ στλεγγίδα καὶ τἆλλα πάντα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, τῶν μὲν ἀλλοτρίων μὴ ἅπτεσθαι, τὰ δὲ ἑαυτοῦ ἕκαστον ἐργάζεσθαί τε καὶ πράττειν; οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
"Would it seem to you that a city is well governed by this law which commands each person to weave and wash his own cloak, and to make his own shoes, and his flask and scraper and all other things according to the same argument, not to touch the things of others, but each to work and do his own?" "It does not seem so to me," he said.
ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἔφην ἐγώ, σωφρόνως γε οἰκοῦσα εὖ ἂν οἰκοῖτο. πῶς δʼ οὔκ; ἔφη.
"And yet," I said, "if governed temperately, it would be well governed." "How could it not be?" he said.
οὐκ ἄρα, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, τὸ τὰ τοιαῦτά τε καὶ οὕτω τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν σωφροσύνη ἂν εἴη. οὐ φαίνεται. ἠινίττετο ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, ὁ λέγων τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν σωφροσύνην εἶναι· οὐ γάρ που οὕτω γε ἦν εὐήθης.
"Therefore," I said, "doing such things and doing one's own in this way would not be temperance." "It does not appear so." "He was riddling, then, as it seems, the one who said that temperance is doing one's own business, just as I was saying just now; for surely he was not so foolish.
ἤ τινος ἠλιθίου ἤκουσας τουτὶ λέγοντος, ὦ Χαρμίδη; ἥκιστά γε, ἔφη, ἐπεί τοι καὶ πάνυ ἐδόκει σοφὸς εἶναι. παντὸς τοίνυν μᾶλλον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, αἴνιγμα αὐτὸ προύβαλεν, ὡς ὂν χαλεπὸν τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν γνῶναι ὅτι ποτε ἔστιν. ἴσως, ἔφη.
Or did you hear some foolish person saying this, Charmides?" "By no means," he said, "since indeed he was thought to be very wise." "More than anything, then, as it seems to me, he proposed it as a riddle, on the ground that it is difficult to know what on earth doing one's own business is." "Perhaps," he said.
τί οὖν ἂν εἴη ποτὲ τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν;
"What then could doing one's own business ever be?
ἔχεις εἰπεῖν; οὐκ οἶδα μὰ Δία ἔγωγε, ἦ δʼ ὅς· ἀλλʼ ἴσως οὐδὲν κωλύει μηδὲ τὸν λέγοντα μηδὲν εἰδέναι ὅτι ἐνόει. καὶ ἅμα ταῦτα λέγων ὑπεγέλα τε καὶ εἰς τὸν Κριτίαν ἀπέβλεπεν.
Can you tell?" "By Zeus, I do not know," he said; "but perhaps nothing prevents even the one who said it from knowing nothing of what he meant." And as he said this, he laughed quietly and looked at Critias.
καὶ ὁ Κριτίας δῆλος μὲν ἦν καὶ πάλαι ἀγωνιῶν καὶ φιλοτίμως πρός τε τὸν Χαρμίδην καὶ πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας ἔχων, μόγις δʼ ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν κατέχων τότε οὐχ οἷός τε ἐγένετο· δοκεῖ γάρ μοι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀληθὲς εἶναι, ὃ ἐγὼ ὑπέλαβον, τοῦ Κριτίου ἀκηκοέναι τὸν Χαρμίδην ταύτην τὴν ἀπόκρισιν περὶ τῆς σωφροσύνης.
And Critias had long been clearly struggling and eagerly rivaling both Charmides and those present, and having with difficulty restrained himself previously, he was then no longer able to do so; for it seems to me to be true above all, as I suspected, that Charmides had heard this answer about temperance from Critias.
ὁ μὲν οὖν Χαρμίδης βουλόμενος μὴ αὐτὸς ὑπέχειν λόγον ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνον τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, ὑπεκίνει αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον, καὶ ἐνεδείκνυτο ὡς ἐξεληλεγμένος εἴη· ὁ δʼ οὐκ ἠνέσχετο, ἀλλά μοι ἔδοξεν ὀργισθῆναι αὐτῷ ὥσπερ ποιητὴς ὑποκριτῇ κακῶς διατιθέντι τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ποιήματα.
Charmides then, wishing not himself to hold the argument but that man to be responsible for the answer, nudged him and pointed out that he had been refuted; but Critias could not bear it, but seemed to me to be angry with him just as a poet is with an actor who performs his poems badly.
ὥστʼ ἐμβλέψας αὐτῷ εἶπεν, οὕτως οἴει, ὦ Χαρμίδη, εἰ σὺ μὴ οἶσθα ὅτι ποτʼ ἐνόει ὃς ἔφη σωφροσύνην εἶναι τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, οὐδὲ δὴ ἐκεῖνον εἰδέναι; ἀλλʼ, ὦ βέλτιστε, ἔφην ἐγώ, Κριτία, τοῦτον μὲν οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν ἀγνοεῖν τηλικοῦτον ὄντα· σὲ δέ που εἰκὸς εἰδέναι καὶ ἡλικίας ἕνεκα καὶ ἐπιμελείας.
So looking at him, he said, "Do you think so, Charmides, that if you do not know what on earth he meant who said that temperance is doing one's own business, that man did not know either?" "But, my excellent Critias," I said, "it is no wonder that this boy is ignorant, being of such an age; but you are likely to know, both on account of your age and your study.
εἰ οὖν συγχωρεῖς τοῦτʼ εἶναι σωφροσύνην ὅπερ οὑτοσὶ λέγει καὶ παραδέχῃ τὸν λόγον, ἔγωγε πολὺ ἂν ἥδιον μετὰ σοῦ σκοποίμην εἴτʼ ἀληθὲς εἴτε μὴ τὸ λεχθέν. ἀλλὰ πάνυ συγχωρῶ, ἔφη, καὶ παραδέχομαι. καλῶς γε σὺ τοίνυν, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, ποιῶν.
If then you agree that this is temperance, which this boy says, and you accept the argument, I would much more gladly examine with you whether what has been said is true or not." "But I completely agree," he said, "and accept it." "You do very well then," I said.
καί μοι λέγε, ἦ καὶ ἃ νυνδὴ ἠρώτων ἐγὼ συγχωρεῖς, τοὺς δημιουργοὺς πάντας ποιεῖν τι; ἔγωγε.
"And tell me, do you also agree with what I was just asking, that all craftsmen produce something?" "I do."

Notes

  1. 162aδοκεῖ ἄν σοι — The particle ἄν goes with the infinitive οἰκεῖσθαι, not with the main verb δοκεῖ, representing a potential sense ("would seem to be governed").
  2. 162aσωφρόνως γε οἰκοῦσα — The participle οἰκοῦσα is conditional ("if it were governed temperately"), corresponding to ἂν οἰκοῖτο (optative with ἄν) in the main clause.
  3. 162bὡς ὂν χαλεπὸν — Accusative absolute construction with ὡς and the impersonal participle ὄν (from ἔστι), meaning "on the ground that it is difficult."
  4. 162cβουλόμενος μὴ αὐτὸς ὑπέχειν λόγον ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνον — The subject of the infinitive ὑπέχειν. The nominative αὐτός is used because it refers back to the subject of the main clause (Charmides), whereas the accusative ἐκεῖνον is used to introduce a different subject (Critias).

Cite this passage

Plato, Charmides §162. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg018.humanitext-grc2:162

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