§136τάχʼ ἂν ἴσως τοιοῦτόν τι λέγοις καὶ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν ἀπεργάζεσθαι τοὺς ἐπιτηδεύοντας τοῦτο τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα· τῶν μὲν πρώτων εἰς σύνεσιν περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἐλλείπεσθαι, τὰ δευτερεῖα δʼ ἔχοντας τῶν ἄλλων περιεῖναι, καὶ οὕτως γίγνεσθαι περὶ πάντα ὕπακρόν τινα ἄνδρα τὸν πεφιλοσοφηκότα·
"Perhaps indeed you might mean something of this sort, and that practicing philosophy produces such an effect on those who pursue this pursuit: that they fall short of the first in understanding concerning the arts, but by having the second prize they surpass the rest, and thus the one who has practiced philosophy becomes a sort of under-top man in all things.
τοιοῦτόν τινά μοι δοκεῖς ἐνδείκνυσθαι. καλῶς γέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, φαίνῃ ὑπολαμβάνειν τὰ περὶ τοῦ φιλοσόφου, ἀπεικάσας αὐτὸν τῷ πεντάθλῳ.
You seem to me to be indicating someone of this sort." "You seem to me, Socrates," he said, "to understand correctly the things concerning the philosopher, comparing him to the pentathlete.
ἔστιν γὰρ ἀτεχνῶς τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ δουλεύειν μηδενὶ πράγματι, μηδʼ εἰς τὴν ἀκρίβειαν μηδὲν διαπεπονηκέναι, ὥστε διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἑνὸς τούτου ἐπιμέλειαν τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων ἀπολελεῖφθαι, ὥσπερ οἱ δημιουργοί, ἀλλὰ πάντων μετρίως ἐφῆφθαι. μετὰ ταύτην δὴ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἐγὼ προθυμούμενος σαφῶς εἰδέναι ὅτι λέγοι, ἐπυνθανόμην αὐτοῦ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς πότερον χρησίμους ἢ ἀχρήστους εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνοι.
For he is absolutely such a person as not to be a slave to any single matter, nor to have worked out anything to precision, so that because of his attention to this one thing he is left behind in all the other things, like the craftsmen, but has touched upon all things moderately." After this answer, indeed, wishing to know clearly what he meant, I asked him whether he supposed the good to be useful or useless.
χρησίμους δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη.
"Useful, surely, Socrates," he said.
ἆρʼ οὖν, εἴπερ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ χρήσιμοι, οἱ πονηροὶ ἄχρηστοι; ὡμολόγει.
"Well then, if indeed the good are useful, are the bad useless?" He admitted it.
τί δέ;
"And what of this?
τοὺς φιλοσόφους ἄνδρας χρησίμους ἡγῇ ἢ οὔ; ὁ δὲ ὡμολόγει χρησίμους, καὶ πρός γε ἔφη χρησιμωτάτους εἶναι ἡγεῖσθαι.
Do you think the philosophers are useful or not?" And he admitted they are useful, and moreover he said that he thought they are most useful.
φέρε δὴ γνῶμεν, εἰ σὺ ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ποῦ καὶ χρήσιμοι ἡμῖν εἰσιν οἱ ὕπακροι οὗτοι; δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ἑκάστου γε τῶν τὰς τέχνας ἐχόντων φαυλότερός ἐστιν ὁ φιλόσοφος. ὡμολόγει.
"Come then, let us understand, if you speak the truth, where indeed these under-top men are useful to us; for it is clear that the philosopher is inferior to each of those who possess the arts." He admitted it.
φέρε δὴ σύ, ἦν δʼ ἐγώ, εἰ τύχοις ἢ αὐτὸς ἀσθενήσας ἢ τῶν φίλων τις τῶν σῶν περὶ ὧν σὺ σπουδὴν μεγάλην ἔχεις, πότερον ὑγείαν βουλόμενος κτήσασθαι τὸν ὕπακρον ἐκεῖνον εἰσάγοις ἂν εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν ἢ τὸν ἰατρὸν λάβοις; ἀμφοτέρους ἔγωγʼ ἄν, ἔφη.
"Come now," I said, "if you yourself happened to be sick, or some one of your friends for whom you have great concern, wishing to acquire health, would you bring that under-top man into your house, or would you take the doctor?" "I indeed would bring both," he said.
μή μοι, εἶπον ἐγώ, ἀμφοτέρους λέγε, ἀλλʼ ὁπότερον μᾶλλόν τε καὶ πρότερον. οὐδεὶς ἄν, ἔφη, τοῦτό γε ἀμφισβητήσειεν, ὡς οὐχὶ τὸν ἰατρὸν καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ πρότερον. τί δʼ;
"Do not say both to me," I said, "but which of the two you would bring more and first." "No one," he said, "would dispute this, that he would bring the doctor both more and first." "And what of this?
ἐν νηὶ χειμαζομένῃ ποτέρῳ ἂν μᾶλλον ἐπιτρέποις σαυτόν τε καὶ τὰ σεαυτοῦ, τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ἢ τῷ φιλοσόφῳ; τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ἔγωγε. οὐκοῦν καὶ τἆλλα πάνθʼ οὕτως, ἕως ἄν τις δημιουργὸς ᾖ, οὐ χρήσιμός ἐστιν ὁ φιλόσοφος; φαίνεται, ἔφη.
In a ship tossing in a storm, to which of the two would you rather entrust yourself and your belongings, the pilot or the philosopher?" "To the pilot, for my part." "And so is it not also in all other things, so long as there is a craftsman, the philosopher is not useful?" "So it appears," he said.
οὐκοῦν νῦν ἄχρηστός τις ἡμῖν ἐστιν ὁ φιλόσοφος; εἰσὶ γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀεί που δημιουργοί· ὡμολογήσαμεν δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθοὺς χρησίμους εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ μοχθηροὺς ἀχρήστους. ἠναγκάζετο ὁμολογεῖν.
"Is then the philosopher now something useless to us?
τί οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο; ἔρωμαί σε ἢ ἀγροικότερόν ἐστιν ἐρέσθαι—
ἐροῦ ὅτι βούλει.
For we always have craftsmen somewhere; and we agreed that the good are useful, and the bad useless." He was forced to admit it.
§137οὐδὲν δή, ἔφην ἐγώ, ζητῶ ἄλλο ἢ ἀνομολογήσασθαι τὰ εἰρημένα.
"What then after this?
ἔχει δέ πως ὡδί.
Shall I ask you, or is it rather rude to ask—" "Ask whatever you wish." "I seek nothing else, indeed," I said, "than to agree again upon the things that have been said.
ὡμολογήσαμεν καλὸν εἶναι τὴν φιλοσοφίαν καὶ αὐτοὶ φιλόσοφοι εἶναι, τοὺς δὲ φιλοσόφους ἀγαθούς, τοὺς δὲ ἀγαθοὺς χρησίμους, τοὺς δὲ πονηροὺς ἀχρήστους·
And they are somewhat like this.
αὖθις δʼ αὖ τοὺς φιλοσόφους ὡμολογήσαμεν, ἕως ἂν οἱ δημιουργοὶ ὦσιν, ἀχρήστους εἶναι, δημιουργοὺς δὲ ἀεὶ εἶναι.
We agreed that philosophy is a beautiful thing, and that we ourselves are philosophers, and that philosophers are good, and the good are useful, and the bad are useless; and on the other hand, we agreed that philosophers, as long as there are craftsmen, are useless, and that craftsmen always exist.
οὐ γὰρ ταῦτα ὡμολόγηται; πάνυ γε, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
Are these things not agreed upon?" "Certainly indeed," he said.
ὡμολογοῦμεν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, κατά γε τὸν σὸν λόγον, εἴπερ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν ἐστι περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἐπιστήμονας εἶναι ὃν σὺ λέγεις τὸν τρόπον, πονηροὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι καὶ ἀχρήστους, ἕως ἂν ἐν ἀνθρώποις τέχναι ὦσιν.
"We were agreeing then, as it seems, according to your argument, if practicing philosophy is indeed to be knowledgeable about the arts in the way you say, that they are bad and useless, as long as there are arts among men.
ἀλλὰ μὴ οὐχ οὕτως, ὦ φίλε, ἔχωσι, μηδʼ ᾖ τοῦτο φιλοσοφεῖν, περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἐσπουδακέναι, οὐδὲ πολυπραγμονοῦντα κυπτάζοντα ζῆν οὐδὲ πολυμαθοῦντα, ἀλλʼ ἄλλο τι, ἐπεὶ ἐγὼ ᾤμην καὶ ὄνειδος εἶναι τοῦτο καὶ βαναύσους καλεῖσθαι τοὺς περὶ τὰς τέχνας ἐσπουδακότας. ὧδε δὲ σαφέστερον εἰσόμεθα εἰ ἄρα ἀληθῆ λέγω, ἐὰν τοῦτο ἀποκρίνῃ·
But watch out, my friend, lest this is not so, and this is not practicing philosophy, namely to have been zealous about the arts, nor to live peering about with busybodying, nor being of much learning, but something else; since I thought that this was even a disgrace, and that those who have been zealous about the arts are called vulgar craftsmen.
τίνες ἵππους ἐπίστανται κολάζειν ὀρθῶς; πότερον οἵπερ βελτίστους ποιοῦσιν ἢ ἄλλοι;
But we shall know this more clearly, if indeed I speak the truth, if you answer this: Who understand how to chastise horses rightly?
οἵπερ βελτίστους. τί δέ;
Those who make them best, or others?" "Those who make them best." "And what of this?
κύνας οὐχ οἳ βελτίστους ἐπίστανται ποιεῖν, οὗτοι καὶ κολάζειν ὀρθῶς ἐπίστανται; ναί. ἡ αὐτὴ ἄρα τέχνη βελτίστους τε ποιεῖ καὶ κολάζει ὀρθῶς; φαίνεταί μοι, ἦ δʼ ὅς.
Do not those who understand how to make dogs best, also understand how to chastise them rightly?" "Yes." "The same art then makes them best and chastises them rightly?" "So it appears to me," he said.
τί δέ;
"And what of this?
πότερον ἥπερ βελτίστους τε ποιεῖ καὶ κολάζει ὀρθῶς, ἡ αὐτὴ δὲ καὶ γιγνώσκει τοὺς χρηστοὺς καὶ τοὺς μοχθηρούς, ἢ ἑτέρα τις; ἡ αὐτή, ἔφη.
Does the same art which makes them best and chastises them rightly, also recognize the good and the bad ones, or is it some other art?" "The same," he said.
ἐθελήσεις οὖν καὶ κατʼ ἀνθρώπους τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖν, ἥπερ βελτίστους ἀνθρώπους ποιεῖ, ταύτην εἶναι καὶ τὴν κολάζουσαν ὀρθῶς καὶ διαγιγνώσκουσαν τοὺς χρηστούς τε καὶ μοχθηρούς; πάνυ γʼ, ἔφη.
"Will you be willing then to agree to this also in the case of men, that the very art which makes men best is also the one that chastises them rightly and distinguishes the good and the bad?" "Certainly indeed," he said.
οὐκοῦν καὶ ἥτις ἕνα, καὶ πολλούς, καὶ ἥτις πολλούς, καὶ ἕνα; ναί. καὶ καθʼ ἵππων δὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων οὕτως; φημί. τίς οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ἥτις τοὺς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀκολασταίνοντας καὶ παρανομοῦντας ὀρθῶς κολάζει;
"And that which distinguishes one, also distinguishes many, and that which distinguishes many, also distinguishes one?" "Yes." "And indeed in the case of horses and all other things likewise?" "I say so." "What then is the science which rightly chastises those who behave lawlessly and act in an undisciplined way in cities?
οὐχ ἡ δικαστική; ναί. ἦ ἄλλην οὖν τινα καλεῖς καὶ δικαιοσύνην ἢ ταύτην; οὐκ, ἀλλὰ ταύτην. οὐκοῦν ᾗπερ κολάζουσιν ὀρθῶς, ταύτῃ καὶ γιγνώσκουσι τοὺς χρηστοὺς καὶ μοχθηρούς; ταύτῃ. ὅστις δὲ ἕνα γιγνώσκει, καὶ πολλοὺς γνώσεται; ναί. καὶ ὅστις γε πολλοὺς ἀγνοεῖ, καὶ ἕνα; φημί. εἰ ἄρα ἵππος ὢν ἀγνοοῖ τοὺς χρηστοὺς καὶ πονηροὺς ἵππους, κἂν ἑαυτὸν ἀγνοοῖ ποῖός τίς ἐστιν; φημί. καὶ εἰ βοῦς ὢν ἀγνοοῖ τοὺς πονηροὺς καὶ χρηστοὺς βοῦς, κἂν αὑτὸν ἀγνοοῖ ποῖός τίς ἐστιν; ναί, ἔφη. οὕτω δὴ καὶ εἰ κύων;
Is it not the judicial art?" "Yes." "Do you call any other thing justice than this?" "No, but this." "And by the very same art by which they chastise rightly, do they also recognize the good and the bad?" "By this." "And whoever recognizes one, will also know many?" "Yes." "And whoever indeed is ignorant of many, is also ignorant of one?" "I say so." "If indeed, being a horse, one should be ignorant of the good and bad horses, would he also be ignorant of himself, as to what sort of horse he is?" "I say so." "And if, being an ox, one should be ignorant of the bad and good oxen, would he also be ignorant of himself, as to what sort of ox he is?" "Yes," he said.
ὡμολόγει.
"And so also if he is a dog?" He agreed.