§138τί δʼ;
"And what of this?
ἐπειδὰν ἄνθρωπός τις ὢν ἀγνοῇ τοὺς χρηστοὺς καὶ μοχθηροὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἆρʼ οὐχ αὑτὸν ἀγνοεῖ πότερον χρηστός ἐστιν ἢ πονηρός, ἐπειδὴ καὶ αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν; συνεχώρει.
When someone, being a human being, is ignorant of good and bad human beings, is he not ignorant of himself, as to whether he is good or bad, since he too is a human being?" He agreed.
τὸ δὲ αὑτὸν ἀγνοεῖν σωφρονεῖν ἐστιν ἢ μὴ σωφρονεῖν; μὴ σωφρονεῖν. τὸ ἑαυτὸν ἄρα γιγνώσκειν ἐστὶ σωφρονεῖν; φημί, ἔφη.
"And is being ignorant of oneself to be temperate, or not to be temperate?" "Not to be temperate." "To know oneself, then, is to be temperate?" "I say so," he said.
τοῦτʼ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς γράμμα παρακελεύεται, σωφροσύνην ἀσκεῖν καὶ δικαιοσύνην. ἔοικεν. τῇ αὐτῇ δὲ ταύτῃ καὶ κολάζειν ὀρθῶς ἐπιστάμεθα; ναί. οὐκοῦν ᾗ μὲν κολάζειν ὀρθῶς ἐπιστάμεθα, δικαιοσύνη αὕτη ἐστίν, ᾗ δὲ διαγιγνώσκειν καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους, σωφροσύνη; ἔοικεν, ἔφη.
"This, then, as it seems, is what the inscription at Delphi exhorts: to practice temperance and justice." "It seems so." "And by this very same art do we also understand how to chastise rightly?" "Yes." "And so, that by which we understand how to chastise rightly is justice, and that by which we distinguish both ourselves and others is temperance?" "It seems so," he said.
ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐστὶ καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ σωφροσύνη; φαίνεται. καὶ μὴν οὕτω γε καὶ αἱ πόλεις εὖ οἰκοῦνται, ὅταν οἱ ἀδικοῦντες δίκην διδῶσιν. ἀληθῆ λέγεις, ἔφη.
"Are justice and temperance, then, the same thing?" "So it appears." "And indeed, in this way too, cities are well administered, when those who do injustice pay the penalty." "You speak the truth," he said.
καὶ πολιτικὴ ἄρα αὑτή ἐστιν. συνεδόκει.
"And so this is also the political art." He agreed.
τί δὲ ὅταν εἷς ἀνὴρ ὀρθῶς πόλιν διοικῇ, ὄνομά γε τούτῳ οὐ τύραννός τε καὶ βασιλεύς;
"And what when one man rightly administers a city?
φημί. οὐκοῦν βασιλικῇ τε καὶ τυραννικῇ τέχνῃ διοικεῖ; οὕτως. καὶ αὗται ἄρʼ αἱ αὐταὶ τέχναι εἰσὶν ἐκείναις; φαίνονται.
Is the name for this man not both tyrant and king?" "I say so." "And does he not administer it by the kingly and tyrannical art?" "Thus." "And are these arts, then, the same as those others?" "They appear so." "And what when one man rightly administers a household?
τί δʼ ὅταν εἷς ὢν ἀνὴρ οἰκίαν διοικῇ ὀρθῶς, τί ὄνομα τούτῳ ἐστίν;
What is the name for this man?
οὐκ οἰκονόμος τε καὶ δεσπότης; ναί. πότερον οὖν καὶ οὗτος δικαιοσύνῃ εὖ ἂν τὴν οἰκίαν διοικοῖ ἢ κἄλλῃ τινὶ τέχνῃ; δικαιοσύνῃ. ἔστιν ἄρα ταὐτόν, ὡς ἔοικε, βασιλεύς, τύραννος, πολιτικός, οἰκονόμος, δεσπότης, σώφρων, δίκαιος.
Is it not household manager and master?" "Yes." "Would this man also administer the household well by justice, or by some other art?" "By justice." "It is, then, the same thing, as it seems: king, tyrant, statesman, household manager, master, temperate man, and just man.
καὶ μία τέχνη ἐστὶν βασιλική, τυραννική, πολιτική, δεσποτική, οἰκονομική, δικαιοσύνη, σωφροσύνη. φαίνεται, ἔφη, οὕτως.
And there is one single art: kingly, tyrannical, political, masterly, managerial, justice, and temperance." "So it appears," he said.
πότερον οὖν τῷ φιλοσόφῳ, ὅταν μὲν ἰατρὸς περὶ τῶν καμνόντων τι λέγῃ, αἰσχρὸν μήθʼ ἕπεσθαι τοῖς λεγομένοις δύνασθαι μήτε συμβάλλεσθαι μηδὲν περὶ τῶν λεγομένων ἢ πραττομένων, καὶ ὁπόταν ἄλλος τις τῶν δημιουργῶν, ὡσαύτως· ὅταν δὲ δικαστὴς ἢ βασιλεὺς ἢ ἄλλος τις ὧν νυνδὴ διεληλύθαμεν, οὐκ αἰσχρὸν περὶ τούτων μήτε ἕπεσθαι δύνασθαι μήτε συμβάλλεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν; πῶς δʼ οὐκ αἰσχρόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, περί γε τοσούτων πραγμάτων μηδὲν ἔχειν συμβάλλεσθαι; πότερον οὖν καὶ περὶ ταῦτα λέγωμεν, ἔφην, πένταθλον αὐτὸν δεῖν εἶναι καὶ ὕπακρον, καὶ ταύτης μὲν τὰ δευτερεῖα ἔχοντα πάντων τὸν φιλόσοφον, καὶ ἀχρεῖον εἶναι ἕως ἂν τούτων τις ᾖ, ἢ πρῶτον μὲν τὴν αὑτοῦ οἰκίαν οὐκ ἄλλῳ ἐπιτρεπτέον οὐδὲ τὰ δευτερεῖα ἐν τούτῳ ἑκτέον, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸν κολαστέον δικάζοντα ὀρθῶς, εἰ μέλλει εὖ οἰκεῖσθαι αὐτοῦ ἡ οἰκία;
"Now then, for the philosopher, when a doctor says something about the sick, is it shameful neither to be able to follow what is said nor to contribute anything to what is said or done, and likewise when some other of the craftsmen speaks; but when a judge or a king or any other of those we have just now gone through speaks, is it not shameful concerning these things neither to be able to follow nor to contribute concerning them?" "How could it not be shameful, Socrates, to have nothing to contribute concerning such great matters?" "Should we say then," I said, "that in these things too he must be a pentathlete and under-top, and the philosopher must hold the second prize in all of this, being useless as long as one of these specialists is present?
συνεχώρει δή μοι.
Or must he first not entrust his own household to another, nor hold the second prize in this, but himself chastise and judge rightly, if his household is to be well administered?" He agreed with me.
§139ἔπειτά γε δήπου ἐάντε οἱ φίλοι αὐτῷ διαίτας ἐπιτρέπωσιν, ἐάντε ἡ πόλις τι προστάττῃ διακρίνειν ἢ δικάζειν, αἰσχρὸν ἐν τούτοις, ὦ ἑταῖρε, δεύτερον φαίνεσθαι ἢ τρίτον καὶ μὴ οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι; δοκεῖ μοι. πολλοῦ ἄρα δεῖ ἡμῖν, ὦ βέλτιστε, τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν πολυμαθία τε εἶναι καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰς τέχνας πραγματεία. εἰπόντος δʼ ἐμοῦ ταῦτα ὁ μὲν σοφὸς αἰσχυνθεὶς τοῖς προειρημένοις ἐσίγησεν, ὁ δὲ ἀμαθὴς ἔφη ἐκείνως εἶναι· καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἐπῄνεσαν τὰ εἰρημένα.
"And then surely, whether his friends entrust arbitrations to him, or the city commands him to decide or judge something, is it not shameful in these things, my friend, to appear second or third, and not to lead?" "So it seems to me." "Far indeed, then, my excellent friend, is practicing philosophy from being polymathy and busy occupation with the arts." When I said these things, the wise one, feeling ashamed at what had been said before, kept silent, but the ignorant one said that it was indeed so; and the others praised what had been said.