§229ΣΩ. ἐστὸν δὲ δύο τὠπιγράμματε·
SOCRATES: And there are two inscriptions.
ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἐπʼ ἀριστερὰ τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ ἑκάστου ἐπιγέγραπται λέγων ὁ Ἑρμῆς ὅτι ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ ἄστεος καὶ τοῦ δήμου ἕστηκεν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐπὶ δεξιά—
"
μνῆμα τόδʼ Ἱππάρχου· στεῖχε δίκαια φρονῶν
"
φησίν.
On the left side of each Herm, there is an inscription with Hermes saying that he stands midway between the city and the deme, and on the right side— "This is the memorial of Hipparchus; walk with just thoughts "he says.
ἔστι δὲ τῶν ποιημάτων καὶ ἄλλα ἐν ἄλλοις Ἑρμαῖς πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἐπιγεγραμμένα· ἔστι δὲ δὴ καὶ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῇ Στειριακῇ ὁδῷ, ἐν ᾧ λέγει—
"
μνῆμα τόδʼ Ἱππάρχου· μὴ φίλον ἐξαπάτα. "
ἐγὼ οὖν σὲ ἐμοὶ ὄντα φίλον οὐ δήπου τολμῴην ἂν ἐξαπατᾶν καὶ ἐκείνῳ τοιούτῳ ὄντι ἀπιστεῖν, οὗ καὶ ἀποθανόντος τρία ἔτη ἐτυραννεύθησαν Ἀθηναῖοι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτοῦ Ἱππίου, καὶ πάντων ἂν τῶν παλαιῶν ἤκουσας ὅτι ταῦτα μόνον τὰ ἔτη τυραννὶς ἐγένετο ἐν Ἀθήναις, τὸν δʼ ἄλλον χρόνον ἐγγύς τι ἔζων Ἀθηναῖοι ὥσπερ ἐπὶ Κρόνου βασιλεύοντος.
And there are many other beautiful ones of his poems inscribed on other Herms; and indeed, there is also this one on the Steirian road, in which he says— "This is the memorial of Hipparchus; do not deceive a friend "I, therefore, would certainly not dare to deceive you who are my friend, or to distrust him who was such a man, after whose death the Athenians were tyrannized for three years by his brother Hippias, and you would have heard from all the ancients that it was only during these years that tyranny existed in Athens, and during the rest of the time the Athenians lived very nearly as if under the reign of Cronus.
λέγεται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν χαριεστέρων ἀνθρώπων καὶ ὁ θάνατος αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι οὐ διʼ ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ ᾠήθησαν, διὰ τὴν τῆς ἀδελφῆς ἀτιμίαν τῆς κανηφορίας—ἐπεὶ τοῦτό γε εὔηθες—ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν Ἁρμόδιον γεγονέναι παιδικὰ τοῦ Ἀριστογείτονος καὶ πεπαιδεῦσθαι ὑπʼ ἐκείνου, μέγα δʼ ἐφρόνει ἄρα καὶ ὁ Ἀριστογείτων ἐπὶ τῷ παιδεῦσαι ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ἀνταγωνιστὴν ἡγεῖτο εἶναι τὸν Ἵππαρχον.
And it is also said by the more cultivated people that his death did not come about for the reasons that the many thought, because of the insult to his sister regarding the basket-carrying—for that is indeed silly—but because Harmodius happened to be the favorite of Aristogeiton and had been educated by him, and Aristogeiton was very proud of having educated a man, and considered Hipparchus to be a rival.
ἐν ἐκείνῳ δὲ τῷ χρόνῳ αὐτὸν τὸν Ἁρμόδιον τυγχάνειν ἐρῶντά τινος τῶν νέων τε καὶ καλῶν καὶ γενναίων τῶν τότε—καὶ λέγουσι τοὔνομα αὐτοῦ, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐ μέμνημαι—τὸν οὖν νεανίσκον τοῦτον τέως μὲν θαυμάζειν τόν τε Ἁρμόδιον καὶ τὸν Ἀριστογείτονα ὡς σοφούς, ἔπειτα συγγενόμενον τῷ Ἱππάρχῳ καταφρονῆσαι ἐκείνων, καὶ τοὺς περιαλγήσαντας ταύτῃ τῇ ἀτιμίᾳ οὕτως ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν Ἵππαρχον.
And at that time, Harmodius himself happened to be in love with one of the young, beautiful, and noble of that day—they tell his name, but I do not remember it—and this youth, for a time, admired Harmodius and Aristogeiton as wise men, but afterwards, associating with Hipparchus, looked down on them, and they, deeply pained by this insult, thus killed Hipparchus.
ΕΤ. κινδυνεύεις τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἢ οὐ φίλον με ἡγεῖσθαι ἤ, εἰ ἡγῇ φίλον, οὐ πείθεσθαι Ἱππάρχῳ· ἐγὼ γὰρ ὅπως οὐ σὺ ἐμὲ ἐξαπατᾷς—οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅντινα μέντοι τρόπον— ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, οὐ δύναμαι πεισθῆναι.
FRIEND: It seems then, Socrates, that either you do not consider me a friend, or, if you do consider me a friend, you do not obey Hipparchus; for I cannot be convinced that you are not deceiving me—in what way, however, I do not know—in your arguments.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ὥσπερ πεττεύων ἐθέλω σοι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἀναθέσθαι ὅτι βούλει τῶν εἰρημένων, ἵνα μὴ οἴῃ ἐξαπατᾶσθαι.
SOCRATES: Well, just like in a game of checkers, I am willing to retract in the arguments whatever you wish of what has been said, so that you may not think you are being deceived.
πότερον γὰρ τοῦτό σοι ἀναθῶμαι, ὡς οὐχὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν πάντες ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι;
Shall I retract this for you: that not all men desire good things?
ΕΤ. μή μοί γε.
FRIEND: Not that, for my part.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ὡς τὸ ζημιοῦσθαι καὶ ἡ ζημία οὐ κακόν;
SOCRATES: But that suffering loss and loss is not a bad thing?
ΕΤ. μή μοί γε.
FRIEND: Not that, for my part.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ὡς οὐ τῇ ζημίᾳ καὶ τῷ ζημιοῦσθαι τὸ κέρδος καὶ τὸ κερδαίνειν ἐναντίον;
SOCRATES: But that gain and making a gain are not opposite to loss and suffering loss?
§230ΕΤ. μηδὲ τοῦτο.
FRIEND: Not this either.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ὡς ἐναντίον ὂν τῷ κακῷ οὐκ ἀγαθόν ἐστι τὸ κερδαίνειν;
SOCRATES: But that, being the opposite of a bad thing, making a gain is not a good thing?
ΕΤ. οὔτι πᾶν γε· τουτί μοι ἀνάθου.
FRIEND: Not in every case; retract this for me.
ΣΩ. δοκεῖ ἄρα σοι, ὡς ἔοικε, τοῦ κέρδους τὸ μέν τι ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, τὸ δέ τι κακόν.
SOCRATES: It seems to you, then, as it appears, that some gain is good, and some is bad.
ΕΤ. ἔμοιγε.
FRIEND: To me, yes.
ΣΩ. ἀνατίθεμαι τοίνυν σοὶ τοῦτο·
SOCRATES: I retract this for you, then.
ἔστω γὰρ δὴ κέρδος τι ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἕτερον κέρδος τι κακόν.
For let there be some good gain and another bad gain.
κέρδος δέ γε οὐδὲν μᾶλλόν ἐστιν αὐτῶν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ τὸ κακόν· ἦ γάρ;
But surely the good is no more gain than the bad; is that so?
ΕΤ. πῶς με ἐρωτᾷς;
FRIEND: What do you mean by your question?
ΣΩ. ἐγὼ φράσω.
SOCRATES: I will tell you.
σιτίον ἐστίν τι ἀγαθόν τε καὶ κακόν;
Is food both a good and a bad thing?
ΕΤ. ναί.
FRIEND: Yes.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν μᾶλλόν τι αὐτῶν ἐστι τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου σιτίον, ἢ ὁμοίως τοῦτό γε, σιτία, ἐστὸν ἀμφότερα καὶ ταύτῃ γε οὐδὲν διαφέρει τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου, κατὰ τὸ σιτίον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ᾗ τὸ μὲν αὐτῶν ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ κακόν;
SOCRATES: Is one of them, then, any more food than the other, or are both equally this, food, and in this respect does one not differ from the other, in being food, but only in that one is good and the other bad?
ΕΤ. ναί.
FRIEND: Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ποτὸν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα, ὅσα τῶν ὄντων ταὐτὰ ὄντα τὰ μὲν πέπονθεν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κακά, οὐδὲν ἐκείνῃ γε διαφέρει τὸ ἕτερον τοῦ ἑτέρου, ᾗ τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν;
SOCRATES: Therefore, drink too, and all other things, as many as among existing things are the same but some happen to be good and others bad, does one differ from the other in no respect in that it is the same?
ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος δήπου ὁ μὲν χρηστός ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ πονηρός.
Just as, I suppose, one man is good and another is wicked.
ΕΤ. ναί.
FRIEND: Yes.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἄνθρωπός γε οἶμαι οὐδέτερος οὐδετέρου οὔτε μᾶλλον οὔτε ἧττόν ἐστιν, οὔτε ὁ χρηστὸς τοῦ πονηροῦ οὔτε ὁ πονηρὸς τοῦ χρηστοῦ.
SOCRATES: But I think neither is more or less a man than the other, neither the good than the wicked, nor the wicked than the good.
ΕΤ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
FRIEND: You speak the truth.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὕτω καὶ περὶ τοῦ κέρδους διανοώμεθα, ὡς κέρδος γε ὁμοίως ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ πονηρὸν καὶ τὸ χρηστόν;
SOCRATES: Therefore, let us think the same way about gain too, that both the wicked and the good are equally gain?
ΕΤ. ἀνάγκη.
FRIEND: Necessarily.
ΣΩ. οὐδὲν ἄρα μᾶλλον κερδαίνει ὁ τὸ χρηστὸν κέρδος ἔχων ἢ τὸ πονηρόν· οὔκουν μᾶλλόν γε κέρδος φαίνεται οὐδέτερον ὄν, ὡς ὁμολογοῦμεν.
SOCRATES: Therefore, the one having the good gain gains no more than the one having the wicked gain; for neither appears to be any more gain, as we agree.
ΕΤ. ναί.
FRIEND: Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐδετέρῳ γὰρ αὐτῶν οὔτε τὸ μᾶλλον οὔτε τὸ ἧττον πρόσεστιν.
SOCRATES: For to neither of them belongs either the more or the less.
ΕΤ. οὐ γὰρ δή.
FRIEND: No, indeed.
ΣΩ. τῷ δὴ τοιούτῳ πράγματι πῶς ἄν τις μᾶλλον ἢ ἧττον ὁτιοῦν ἂν ποιοῖ ἢ πάσχοι, ᾧ μηδέτερον τούτων προσείη;
SOCRATES: In such a thing, then, how could one do or suffer anything more or less, to which neither of these belongs?
ΕΤ. ἀδύνατον.
FRIEND: Impossible.
ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν κέρδη μὲν ὁμοίως ἐστὶν ἀμφότερα καὶ κερδαλέα, τουτὶ δὴ δεῖ ἡμᾶς ἐπισκέψασθαι, διὰ τί ποτε ἀμφότερα αὐτὰ κέρδος καλεῖς, τί ταὐτὸν ἐν ἀμφοτέροις ὁρῶν;
SOCRATES: Since, then, both are equally gains and profitable, this is what we must examine: why in the world do you call both of them gain, seeing what same thing in both?
ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ σύ με ἠρώτας τὰ νυνδή, διὰ τί ποτε καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν σιτίον καὶ τὸ κακὸν σιτίον ὁμοίως ἀμφότερα σιτία καλῶ, εἶπον ἄν σοι διότι ἀμφότερα ξηρὰ τροφὴ σώματός ἐστιν, διὰ τοῦτο ἔγωγε· τοῦτο γὰρ εἶναι σιτίον κἂν σύ που ἡμῖν ὁμολογοῖς.
Just as if you had asked me just now why in the world I call both the good food and the bad food equally food, I would have told you: because both are dry nourishment for the body, for this reason indeed; for you too, I suppose, would agree with us that this is food.
ἦ γάρ;
Is that so?
ΕΤ. ἔγωγε.
FRIEND: I would.