§231ΣΩ. καὶ περὶ ποτοῦ οὖν ὁ αὐτὸς ἂν τρόπος εἴη τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, ὅτι τῇ τοῦ σώματος ὑγρᾷ τροφῇ, ἐάντε χρηστὴ ἐάντε πονηρὰ ᾖ, τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομά ἐστι, ποτόν·
SOCRATES: And so regarding drink too, the same way of answer would apply, that this is the name—namely 'drink'—for the liquid nourishment of the body, whether it is good or bad; and for other things likewise.
καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡσαύτως. πειρῶ οὖν καὶ σὺ ἐμὲ μιμεῖσθαι οὕτως ἀποκρινόμενον.
Try then, you too, to imitate me answering in this way.
τὸ χρηστὸν κέρδος καὶ τὸ πονηρὸν κέρδος κέρδος φῂς ἀμφότερον εἶναι τί τὸ αὐτὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς ὁρῶν, ὅτι δὴ καὶ τοῦτο κέρδος ἐστίν;
You say that both the good gain and the bad gain are 'gain'. Seeing what same thing in them, do you call this indeed also 'gain'?
εἰ δʼ αὖ μὴ αὐτὸς ἔχεις ἀποκρίνασθαι, ἀλλʼ ἐμοῦ λέγοντος σκόπει· ἆρα κέρδος λέγεις πᾶν κτῆμα ὃ ἄν τις κτήσηται ἢ μηδὲν ἀναλώσας, ἢ ἔλαττον ἀναλώσας πλέον λάβῃ;
If, on the other hand, you yourself cannot answer, then consider as I speak: do you call 'gain' any acquisition which one acquires either having spent nothing, or having spent less and receiving more?
ΕΤ. ἔμοιγε δοκῶ τοῦτο καλεῖν κέρδος.
FRIEND: To me, at least, I seem to call this gain.
ΣΩ. ἆρα καὶ τὰ τοιάδε λέγεις, ἐάν τις ἑστιαθείς, μηδὲν ἀναλώσας ἀλλʼ εὐωχηθείς, νόσον κτήσηται;
SOCRATES: Do you mean things like this too, if someone, having been entertained at a feast, having spent nothing but having feasted sumptuously, acquires a disease?
ΕΤ. μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγε.
FRIEND: By Zeus, not I at least.
ΣΩ. Ὑγίειαν δὲ κτησάμενος ἀπὸ ἑστιάσεως κέρδος ἂν κτήσαιτο ἢ ζημίαν;
SOCRATES: But if he acquired health from the feasting, would he acquire a gain or a loss?
ΕΤ. κέρδος.
FRIEND: Gain.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα τοῦτό γέ ἐστι κέρδος, τὸ ὁτιοῦν κτῆμα κτήσασθαι.
SOCRATES: Therefore, this is not gain: to acquire any acquisition whatsoever.
ΕΤ. οὐ μέντοι.
FRIEND: Indeed not.
ΣΩ. πότερον οὔκ, ἐὰν κακόν;
SOCRATES: Is it not, if it is bad?
ἢ οὐδʼ ἂν ἀγαθὸν ὁτιοῦν κτήσηται, οὐ κέρδος κτήσεται;
Or if he acquires any good thing whatsoever, will he not acquire a gain?
ΕΤ. φαίνεται, ἐάν γε ἀγαθόν.
FRIEND: It appears to be gain, if indeed it is good.
ΣΩ. ἐὰν δὲ κακόν, οὐ ζημίαν κτήσεται;
SOCRATES: But if it is bad, will he not acquire a loss?
ΕΤ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
FRIEND: To me at least, it seems so.
ΣΩ. ὁρᾷς οὖν ὡς πάλιν αὖ περιτρέχεις εἰς τὸ αὐτό;
SOCRATES: Do you see then that again you are running around to the same point?
τὸ μὲν κέρδος ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται, ἡ δὲ ζημία κακόν.
Gain appears to be good, and loss bad.
ΕΤ. ἀπορῶ ἔγωγε ὅτι εἴπω.
FRIEND: For my part, I am at a loss what to say.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἀδίκως γε σὺ ἀπορῶν. ἔτι γὰρ καὶ τόδε ἀπόκριναι·
SOCRATES: Not unjustly are you at a loss.
ἐάν τις ἔλαττον ἀναλώσας πλέον κτήσηται, φῂς κέρδος εἶναι;
But answer this too further: if someone, having spent less, acquires more, do you say that it is gain?
ΕΤ. οὔτι κακόν γε λέγω, ἀλλʼ ἐὰν χρυσίον ἢ ἀργύριον ἔλαττον ἀναλώσας πλέον λάβῃ.
FRIEND: I do not mean a bad thing, but if, having spent less gold or silver, he receives more.
ΣΩ. καὶ ἐγὼ μέλλω τοῦτο ἐρήσεσθαι.
SOCRATES: And I was about to ask this.
φέρε γάρ, ἐάν τις χρυσίου σταθμὸν ἥμισυν ἀναλώσας διπλάσιον λάβῃ ἀργυρίου, κέρδος ἢ ζημίαν εἴληφεν;
For come now, if someone, having spent half a weight of gold, receives double the weight of silver, has he received a gain or a loss?
ΕΤ. ζημίαν δήπου, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀντὶ δωδεκαστασίου γὰρ διστάσιον αὐτῷ καθίσταται τὸ χρυσίον.
FRIEND: Loss, surely, Socrates; for instead of twelve-fold value, his gold becomes for him of two-fold value.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν πλέον γʼ εἴληφεν· ἢ οὐ πλέον ἐστὶ τὸ διπλάσιον τοῦ ἡμίσεος;
SOCRATES: And yet he has received more; or is double not more than half?
ΕΤ. οὔτι τῇ ἀξίᾳ γε ἀργύριον χρυσίου.
FRIEND: Not in value, at any rate, is silver gold.
ΣΩ. δεῖ ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικε, τῷ κέρδει τοῦτο προσεῖναι, τὴν ἀξίαν.
SOCRATES: Therefore, it seems, this must belong to gain: value.
νῦν γοῦν τὸ μὲν ἀργύριον πλέον ὂν τοῦ χρυσίου οὐ φῂς ἄξιον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ χρυσίον ἔλαττον ὂν ἄξιον φῂς εἶναι.
Now, at any rate, you say that the silver, though being more than the gold, is not worthy, while the gold, though being less, is worthy.
ΕΤ. σφόδρα· ἔχει γὰρ οὕτως.
FRIEND: Very much so; for it is so.
ΣΩ. τὸ μὲν ἄξιον ἄρα κερδαλέον ἐστίν, ἐάντε σμικρὸν ᾖ ἐάντε μέγα, τὸ δὲ ἀνάξιον ἀκερδές.
SOCRATES: The worthy thing, therefore, is profitable, whether it is small or great, and the worthless is unprofitable.
ΕΤ. ναί.
FRIEND: Yes.
ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ ἄξιον λέγεις ἄξιον εἶναι ἄλλο τι ἢ κεκτῆσθαι;
SOCRATES: And by 'worthy', do you mean worthy of being possessed, or something else?
ΕΤ. ναί, κεκτῆσθαι.
FRIEND: Yes, to be possessed.
ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ ἄξιον αὖ λέγεις κεκτῆσθαι τὸ ἀνωφελὲς ἢ τὸ ὠφέλιμον;
SOCRATES: And again, by 'worthy of being possessed', do you mean the useless or the useful?
ΕΤ. τὸ ὠφέλιμον δήπου.
FRIEND: The useful, surely.
§232ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ ὠφέλιμον ἀγαθόν ἐστιν;
SOCRATES: Therefore, the useful is good?
ΕΤ. ναί.
FRIEND: Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν, ὦ ἀνδρειότατε πάντων, οὐ τὸ κερδαλέον ἀγαθὸν αὖ πάλιν τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον ἥκει ἡμῖν ὁμολογούμενον;
SOCRATES: Therefore, O most courageous of all, has not the profitable come back to us as agreed to be good for the third or fourth time?
ΕΤ. ἔοικεν.
FRIEND: It seems so.
ΣΩ. μνημονεύεις οὖν ὅθεν ἡμῖν οὗτος ὁ λόγος γέγονεν;
SOCRATES: Do you remember, then, whence this argument of ours arose?
ΕΤ. οἶμαί γε.
FRIEND: I think so, at least.
ΣΩ. εἰ δὲ μή, ἐγώ σε ὑπομνήσω.
SOCRATES: And if not, I will remind you.
ἠμφεσβήτησάς μοι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς μὴ πάντα τὰ κέρδη βούλεσθαι κερδαίνειν, ἀλλὰ τῶν κερδῶν τἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ πονηρὰ μή.
You disputed with me that good men do not wish to gain all gains, but the good ones of gains, and not the wicked ones.
ΕΤ. ναίχι.
FRIEND: Yes, indeed.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν νῦν πάντα τὰ κέρδη ὁ λόγος ἡμᾶς ἠνάγκακε καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα ὁμολογεῖν ἀγαθὰ εἶναι;
SOCRATES: Therefore, has not the argument now forced us to agree that all gains, both small and great, are good?
ΕΤ. ἠνάγκακε γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μᾶλλον ἐμέ γε ἢ πέπεικεν.
FRIEND: For it has forced me indeed, Socrates, rather than convinced me.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἴσως μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ πείσειεν ἄν·
SOCRATES: But perhaps after this it might also convince you.
νῦν δʼ οὖν, εἴτε πέπεισαι εἴτε ὁπωσδὴ ἔχεις, σύμφῃς γοῦν ἡμῖν πάντα τὰ κέρδη ἀγαθὰ εἶναι, καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα.
But at any rate, whether you are convinced or however you may be, you do at least agree with us that all gains, both small and great, are good.
ΕΤ. ὁμολογῶ γὰρ οὖν.
FRIEND: For I do indeed agree.
ΣΩ. τοὺς δὲ χρηστοὺς ἀνθρώπους βούλεσθαι τἀγαθὰ ὁμολογεῖς ἅπαντα ἅπαντας·
SOCRATES: And you agree that all good men wish for all good things?
ἢ οὔ;
Or not?
ΕΤ. ὁμολογῶ.
FRIEND: I agree.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ τούς γε πονηροὺς αὐτὸς εἶπες ὅτι καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ μεγάλα κέρδη φιλοῦσιν. ΕΤ. εἶπον.
SOCRATES: But surely you yourself said that the wicked love both small and great gains. FRIEND: I said so.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν κατὰ τὸν σὸν λόγον πάντες ἄνθρωποι φιλοκερδεῖς ἂν εἶεν, καὶ οἱ χρηστοὶ καὶ οἱ πονηροί.
SOCRATES: Therefore, according to your argument, all men would be lovers of gain, both the good and the wicked.
ΕΤ. φαίνεται.
FRIEND: It appears so.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα ὀρθῶς ὀνειδίζει, εἴ τίς τῳ ὀνειδίζει φιλοκερδεῖ εἶναι· τυγχάνει γὰρ καὶ ὁ ταῦτα ὀνειδίζων αὐτὸς τοιοῦτος ὤν.
SOCRATES: Therefore, it is not correct to reproach, if someone reproaches someone for being a lover of gain; for it happens that even the one who reproaches this is himself such a person.