Humanitext Reader

Plato · Hipparchus §227-228

The Goodness of Gain and the Story of Hipparchus

Passage 2 of 4 · Greek

Summary

Socrates demonstrates that since gain is a good thing and all people love what is good, everyone must be a lover of gain. When his companion tries to redefine the term to resolve this contradiction, Socrates shifts the discussion to the educational initiatives and wisdom of the ancient Athenian ruler Hipparchus.

§227ΕΤ. ἔγωγε.
FRIEND: I do.
ΣΩ. ἔστιν οὖν ὅτῳ ἀγαθόν ἐστι ζημιοῦσθαι;
SOCRATES: Is there anyone, then, for whom it is a good thing to suffer loss?
ΕΤ. οὐδενί.
FRIEND: No one.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ κακόν;
SOCRATES: But is it a bad thing?
ΕΤ. ναί.
FRIEND: Yes.
ΣΩ. βλάπτονται ὑπὸ τῆς ζημίας ἄρα ἄνθρωποι.
SOCRATES: So people are harmed by loss.
ΕΤ. βλάπτονται.
FRIEND: They are harmed.
ΣΩ. κακὸν ἄρα ἡ ζημία.
SOCRATES: Loss, then, is a bad thing.
ΕΤ. ναί.
FRIEND: Yes.
ΣΩ. ἐναντίον δὲ τῇ ζημίᾳ τὸ κέρδος.
SOCRATES: And gain is the opposite of loss.
ΕΤ. ἐναντίον.
FRIEND: Opposite.
ΣΩ. ἀγαθὸν ἄρα τὸ κέρδος.
SOCRATES: Gain, then, is a good thing.
ΕΤ. ναί.
FRIEND: Yes.
ΣΩ. τοὺς οὖν τὸ ἀγαθὸν φιλοῦντας φιλοκερδεῖς καλεῖς.
SOCRATES: Do you then call those who love what is good "lovers of gain"?
ΕΤ. ἔοικεν.
FRIEND: It seems so.
ΣΩ. οὐ μανικούς γε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, λέγεις τοὺς φιλοκερδεῖς.
SOCRATES: You certainly do not mean, my friend, that the lovers of gain are mad.
ἀλλὰ σὺ αὐτὸς πότερον φιλεῖς ὃ ἂν ἀγαθὸν ᾖ, ἢ οὐ φιλεῖς;
But do you yourself love whatever is good, or do you not love it?
ΕΤ. ἔγωγε.
FRIEND: I do.
ΣΩ. ἔστι δέ τι ἀγαθόν, ὃ οὐ φιλεῖς, ἀλλὰ κακόν;
SOCRATES: Is there any good thing that you do not love, but rather a bad thing?
ΕΤ. μὰ Δίʼ οὐκ ἔγωγε.
FRIEND: By Zeus, not I!
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ ἀγαθὰ ἴσως φιλεῖς.
SOCRATES: But you love all good things, perhaps.
ΕΤ. ναί.
FRIEND: Yes.
ΣΩ. ἐροῦ δὴ καὶ ἐμὲ εἰ οὐ καὶ ἐγώ· ὁμολογήσω γὰρ καὶ ἐγώ σοι φιλεῖν τἀγαθά.
SOCRATES: Ask me too, then, if I do not also do so; for I too will agree with you that I love good things.
ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἐμοὶ καὶ σοὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἄνθρωποι ἅπαντες οὐ δοκοῦσί σοι τἀγαθὰ φιλεῖν, τὰ δὲ κακὰ μισεῖν;
But besides me and you, do not all other people seem to you to love good things and to hate bad things?
ΕΤ. ἔμοιγε φαίνεται.
FRIEND: It appears so to me.
ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ κέρδος ἀγαθὸν ὡμολογήσαμεν;
SOCRATES: And we agreed that gain is a good thing?
ΕΤ. ναί.
FRIEND: Yes.
ΣΩ. πάντες αὖ φιλοκερδεῖς φαίνονται τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον· ὃν δὲ τὸ πρότερον ἐλέγομεν, οὐδεὶς ἦν φιλοκερδής.
SOCRATES: In this way, again, all people appear to be lovers of gain; but in the way we spoke of before, no one was a lover of gain.
ποτέρῳ οὖν ἄν τις τῷ λόγῳ χρώμενος οὐκ ἂν ἐξαμαρτάνοι;
Which argument, then, would one use and not err?
ΕΤ. εἴ τις, ὦ Σώκρατες οἶμαι ὀρθῶς λαμβάνοι τὸν φιλοκερδῆ.
FRIEND: If one, Socrates, I think, should understand the "lover of gain" correctly.
ὀρθῶς δʼ ἐστὶ τοῦτον ἡγεῖσθαι φιλοκερδῆ, ὃς ἂν σπουδάζῃ ἐπὶ τούτοις καὶ ἀξιοῖ κερδαίνειν ἀπʼ αὐτῶν, ἀφʼ ὧν οἱ χρηστοὶ οὐ τολμῶσι κερδαίνειν.
And it is correct to consider a lover of gain as someone who is eager for and thinks it right to make a gain from things from which good men do not dare to make a gain.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ὁρᾷς, ὦ γλυκύτατε, τὸ κερδαίνειν ἄρτι ὡμολογήσαμεν εἶναι ὠφελεῖσθαι.
SOCRATES: But you see, my sweet friend, we agreed just now that making a gain is being benefited.
ΕΤ. τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτο;
FRIEND: What of it, then?
ΣΩ. ὅτι καὶ τόδε αὐτῷ προσωμολογήσαμεν, βούλεσθαι τὰ ἀγαθὰ πάντας καὶ ἀεί.
SOCRATES: Because we also agreed on this besides, that everyone wants good things, and always.
ΕΤ. ναί.
FRIEND: Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ πάντα τὰ κέρδη βούλονται ἔχειν, εἴπερ ἀγαθά γέ ἐστιν.
SOCRATES: Therefore, good men also want to have all gains, if indeed they are good things.
ΕΤ. οὐκ ἀφʼ ὧν γε μέλλουσιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, βλαβήσεσθαι τῶν κερδῶν.
FRIEND: Not from those gains, Socrates, from which they are going to be harmed.
ΣΩ. βλαβήσεσθαι δὲ λέγεις ζημιώσεσθαι ἢ ἄλλο τι;
SOCRATES: By "being harmed," do you mean "suffering loss," or something else?
ΕΤ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ ζημιώσεσθαι λέγω. ΣΩ. ὑπὸ τοῦ κέρδους οὖν ζημιοῦνται ἢ ὑπὸ τῆς ζημίας ἄνθρωποι;
FRIEND: No, I mean "suffering loss." SOCRATES: Are people, then, lose-damaged by gain, or by loss?
ΕΤ. ὑπὸ ἀμφοτέρων· καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ τῆς ζημίας ζημιοῦνται καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ κέρδους τοῦ πονηροῦ.
FRIEND: By both; for they suffer loss both by loss and by wicked gain.
ΣΩ. ἦ δοκεῖ οὖν τί σοι χρηστὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν πρᾶγμα πονηρὸν εἶναι;
SOCRATES: Does it really seem to you, then, that any useful and good thing is wicked?
ΕΤ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε.
FRIEND: Not to me.
§228ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὡμολογήσαμεν ὀλίγον πρότερον τὸ κέρδος τῇ ζημίᾳ κακῷ ὄντι ἐναντίον εἶναι;
SOCRATES: Did we not agree, then, a little earlier that gain is the opposite of loss, which is a bad thing?
ΕΤ. φημί.
FRIEND: I say we did.
ΣΩ. ἐναντίον δὲ ὂν κακῷ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι;
SOCRATES: And being the opposite of a bad thing, it is a good thing?
ΕΤ. ὡμολογήσαμεν γάρ.
FRIEND: Yes, for we agreed.
ΣΩ. ὁρᾷς οὖν, ἐπιχειρεῖς με ἐξαπατᾶν, ἐπίτηδες ἐναντία λέγων οἷς ἄρτι ὡμολογήσαμεν.
SOCRATES: Do you see, then, that you are trying to deceive me, by purposely saying the opposite of what we have just agreed?
ΕΤ. οὐ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον σύ με ἐξαπατᾷς καὶ οὐκ οἶδα ὅπῃ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ἄνω καὶ κάτω στρέφεις.
FRIEND: By Zeus, no, Socrates! Rather, on the contrary, you are deceiving me, and I do not know how you turn me upside down and inside out in your arguments.
ΣΩ. εὐφήμει·
SOCRATES: Speak fair words!
οὐ μεντἂν καλῶς ποιοίην οὐ πειθόμενος ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ καὶ σοφῷ.
I would certainly not be acting well if I did not obey a good and wise man.
ΕΤ. τίνι τούτῳ;
FRIEND: Who is this person?
καὶ τί μάλιστα;
And why especially?
ΣΩ. πολίτῃ μὲν ἐμῷ τε καὶ σῷ, Πεισιστράτου δὲ ὑεῖ τοῦ ἐκ Φιλαϊδῶν, Ἱππάρχῳ, ὃς τῶν Πεισιστράτου παίδων ἦν πρεσβύτατος καὶ σοφώτατος, ὃς ἄλλα τε πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ ἔργα σοφίας ἀπεδείξατο, καὶ τὰ Ὁμήρου ἔπη πρῶτος ἐκόμισεν εἰς τὴν γῆν ταυτηνί, καὶ ἠνάγκασε τοὺς ῥαψῳδοὺς Παναθηναίοις ἐξ ὑπολήψεως ἐφεξῆς αὐτὰ διιέναι, ὥσπερ νῦν ἔτι οἵδε ποιοῦσιν, καὶ ἐπʼ Ἀνακρέοντα τὸν Τήιον πεντηκόντορον στείλας ἐκόμισεν εἰς τὴν πόλιν, Σιμωνίδην δὲ τὸν Κεῖον ἀεὶ περὶ αὑτὸν εἶχεν, μεγάλοις μισθοῖς καὶ δώροις πείθων·
SOCRATES: A fellow citizen of mine and yours, Hipparchus, the son of Pisistratus of Philaidae, who was the eldest and wisest of the children of Pisistratus, who displayed many other beautiful works of wisdom, and first brought the epic poems of Homer to this land, and compelled the rhapsodists at the Panathenaea to go through them in succession, taking one another up, just as they still do now. He also sent a fifty-oared vessel to fetch Anacreon of Teos to the city, and always kept Simonides of Ceos about him, persuading him with great rewards and gifts.
ταῦτα δʼ ἐποίει βουλόμενος παιδεύειν τοὺς πολίτας, ἵνʼ ὡς βελτίστων ὄντων αὐτῶν ἄρχοι, οὐκ οἰόμενος δεῖν οὐδενὶ σοφίας φθονεῖν, ἅτε ὢν καλός τε κἀγαθός.
He did these things because he wished to educate the citizens, so that he might rule over them as they were as good as possible, thinking that he ought not to grudge wisdom to anyone, since he was a noble and good man.
ἐπειδὴ δὲ αὐτῷ οἱ περὶ τὸ ἄστυ τῶν πολιτῶν πεπαιδευμένοι ἦσαν καὶ ἐθαύμαζον αὐτὸν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, ἐπιβουλεύων αὖ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ἀγροῖς παιδεῦσαι ἔστησεν αὐτοῖς Ἑρμᾶς κατὰ τὰς ὁδοὺς ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ ἄστεος καὶ τῶν δήμων ἑκάστων, κἄπειτα τῆς σοφίας τῆς αὑτοῦ, ἥν τʼ ἔμαθεν καὶ ἣν αὐτὸς ἐξηῦρεν, ἐκλεξάμενος ἃ ἡγεῖτο σοφώτατα εἶναι, ταῦτα αὐτὸς ἐντείνας εἰς ἐλεγεῖον αὑτοῦ ποιήματα καὶ ἐπιδείγματα τῆς σοφίας ἐπέγραψεν, ἵνα πρῶτον μὲν τὰ ἐν Δελφοῖς γράμματα τὰ σοφὰ ταῦτα μὴ θαυμάζοιεν οἱ πολῖται αὐτοῦ, τό τε "γνῶθι σαυτόν" καὶ τὸ "μηδὲν ἄγαν" καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀλλὰ τὰ Ἱππάρχου ῥήματα μᾶλλον σοφὰ ἡγοῖντο, ἔπειτα παριόντες ἄνω καὶ κάτω καὶ ἀναγιγνώσκοντες καὶ γεῦμα λαμβάνοντες αὐτοῦ τῆς σοφίας φοιτῷεν ἐκ τῶν ἀγρῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ λοιπὰ παιδευθησόμενοι.
And when the citizens about the city had been educated by him and admired him for his wisdom, planning in turn to educate those in the countryside, he set up Herms for them along the roads midway between the city and each of the demes. Then, choosing from his own wisdom, both what he had learned and what he had himself discovered, what he thought was wisest, he himself framed these into elegiac verses of his own composition, and inscribed them as displays of his wisdom, so that first, his citizens might not admire those wise inscriptions at Delphi, both "Know thyself" and "Nothing in excess" and the other such things, but might rather consider the sayings of Hipparchus to be wiser; and secondly, that passing back and forth, and reading them and getting a taste of his wisdom, they might come from the countryside to be further educated in the rest.

Notes

  1. 227dεἴ τις, ὦ Σώκρατες οἶμαι ὀρθῶς λαμβάνοι τὸν φιλοκερδῆ — The optative verb λαμβάνοι forms the protasis of a conditional sentence, corresponding to the preceding question of Socrates ("which argument would one use and not err", οὐκ ἂν ἐξαμαρτάνοι). The apodasis (e.g., "one would not err", οὐκ ἂν ἐξαμαρτάνοι) is omitted and must be understood from the context.
  2. 228bοὐ μεντἂν καλῶς ποιοίην οὐ πειθόμενος ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ καὶ σοφῷ — The combination οὐ μεντἂν is a crasis of οὐ μέντοι ἄν. The negative participle οὐ πειθόμενος functions conditionally ("if I did not obey"), serving as the protasis for the potential optative καλῶς ποιοίην in the apodasis.
  3. 228cἵνʼ ὡς βελτίστων ὄντων αὐτῶν ἄρχοι — The phrase ὡς βελτίστων ὄντων αὐτῶν constitutes a genitive absolute construction introduced by ὡς, expressing a subjective reason or purpose ("on the ground that/in order that they might be as good as possible"). The particle ὡς also intensifies the superlative βελτίστων ("as good as possible").

Cite this passage

Plato, Hipparchus §227-228. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg015.humanitext-grc2:227-228

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