§143ΣΩ. ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν καλῶς δοκεῖ καὶ ἀσφαλῶς λέγειν ὁ ποιητής·
SOCRATES: To me, then, the poet seems to speak well and safely; but if you have anything in mind against these things, do not be silent.
σὺ δʼ εἴ τι ἐν νῷ ἔχεις πρὸς ταῦτα, μὴ σιώπα. ΑΛ. χαλεπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐστὶν ἀντιλέγειν πρὸς τὰ καλῶς εἰρημένα· ἐκεῖνο δʼ οὖν ἐννοῶ, ὅσων κακῶν αἰτία ἡ ἄγνοια τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὁπότε, ὡς ἔοικε, λελήθαμεν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διὰ ταύτην καὶ πράττοντες καὶ τό γε ἔσχατον εὐχόμενοι ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς τὰ κάκιστα.
ALKIBIADES: It is difficult, Socrates, to argue against what has been well said; but at any rate, I am thinking of how many evils ignorance is the cause for men, since, as it seems, we escape our own notice because of it both doing and, what is worst of all, praying for the worst things for ourselves.
ὅπερ οὖν οὐδεὶς ἂν οἰηθείη, ἀλλὰ τοῦτό γε πᾶς ἂν οἴοιτο ἱκανὸς εἶναι, αὐτὸς αὑτῷ τὰ βέλτιστα εὔξασθαι, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὰ κάκιστα.
This is something that no one would think, but everyone would think that he is capable of this, at least: to pray for the best things for himself, and not the worst.
τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς κατάρᾳ τινὶ ἀλλʼ οὐκ εὐχῇ ὅμοιον ἂν εἴη.
For the latter would truly be more like a curse than a prayer.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἴσως, ὦ βέλτιστε, φαίη ἄν τις ἀνήρ, ὃς ἐμοῦ τε καὶ σοῦ σοφώτερος ὢν τυγχάνοι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἡμᾶς λέγειν, οὕτως εἰκῇ ψέγοντας ἄγνοιαν, εἴ γε μὴ προσθείημεν τὴν ἔστιν ὧν τε ἄγνοιαν καὶ ἔστιν οἷς καὶ ἔχουσί πως ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ ἐκείνοις κακόν.
SOCRATES: But perhaps, my excellent friend, some man who happens to be wiser than you and me might say that we do not speak correctly, thus blaming ignorance at random, unless we add that the ignorance of certain things, and for certain people in a certain state, is indeed a good, just as for those others it is an evil.
ΑΛ. πῶς λέγεις;
ALKIBIADES: What do you mean?
ἔστι γὰρ ὁτιοῦν πρᾶγμα ὅτῳ δὴ ὁπωσοῦν ἔχοντι ἄμεινον ἀγνοεῖν ἢ γιγνώσκειν;
For is there any matter whatsoever which it is better for anyone in any condition to be ignorant of than to know?
ΣΩ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ· σοὶ δʼ οὔ;
SOCRATES: It seems so to me; but not to you?
ΑΛ. οὐ μέντοι μὰ Δία.
ALKIBIADES: Certainly not, by Zeus.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνό σου καταγνώσομαι, ἐθέλειν ἄν σε πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ μητέρα διαπεπρᾶχθαι ἅπερ Ὀρέστην φασὶ καὶ τὸν Ἀλκμέωνα καὶ εἰ δή τινες ἄλλοι ἐκείνοις τυγχάνουσι ταὐτὰ διαπεπραγμένοι.
SOCRATES: And yet, I will not charge you with this, either: that you would wish to have done to your own mother what they say Orestes and Alkmeon did, and if indeed any others happen to have done the same things as they.
ΑΛ. εὐφήμει πρὸς Διός, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ALKIBIADES: Speak words of good omen, by Zeus, Socrates!
ΣΩ. οὔτοι τὸν λέγοντα, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοις σοι ταῦτα πεπρᾶχθαι, εὐφημεῖν δεῖ σε κελεύειν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον πολύ, εἴ τις τὰ ἐναντία λέγοι, ἐπειδὴ οὕτω σοι δοκεῖ σφόδρα δεινὸν εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα, ὥστʼ οὐδὲ ῥητέον εἶναι οὕτως εἰκῇ.
SOCRATES: Indeed, Alkibiades, you ought not to bid someone who says that you would not wish these things to be done by you to speak words of good omen, but much rather if someone were to say the opposite, since the matter seems to you to be so very dreadful that it is not even to be spoken of so lightly.
δοκεῖς δʼ ἂν τὸν Ὀρέστην, εἰ ἐτύγχανε φρόνιμος ὢν καὶ εἰδὼς ὅτι βέλτιστον ἦν αὐτῷ πράττειν, τολμῆσαι ἄν τι τούτων διαπράξασθαι;
And do you think Orestes, if he had happened to be prudent and to know what was best for him to do, would have dared to commit any of these things?
ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
ALKIBIADES: Surely not.
ΣΩ. οὐδέ γε ἄλλον οἶμαι οὐδένα.
SOCRATES: Nor any other, I think.
ΑΛ. οὐ μέντοι.
ALKIBIADES: Indeed not.
ΣΩ. κακὸν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ βελτίστου ἄγνοια καὶ τὸ ἀγνοεῖν τὸ βέλτιστον.
SOCRATES: Therefore, as it seems, the ignorance of the best, and not knowing the best, is an evil.
ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ALKIBIADES: It seems so to me.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐκείνῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν;
SOCRATES: Therefore, both for him and for all others?
ΑΛ. φημί.
ALKIBIADES: I agree.
§144ΣΩ. ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ τόδε ἐπισκεψώμεθα· εἴ σοι αὐτίκα μάλα παρεσταίη, οἰηθέντι βέλτιον εἶναι, Περικλέα τὸν σεαυτοῦ ἐπίτροπόν τε καὶ φίλον, ἐγχειρίδιον λαβόντα, ἐλθόντα ἐπὶ τὰς θύρας, εἰπεῖν εἰ ἔνδον ἐστί, βουλόμενον ἀποκτεῖναι αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον, ἄλλον δὲ μηδένα· οἱ δὲ φαῖεν ἔνδον εἶναι—καὶ οὐ λέγω ἐθέλειν ἄν σε τούτων τι πράττειν· ἀλλʼ εἰ, οἶμαι, δόξει σοι, ὅπερ οὐθὲν κωλύει δήπου τῷ γε ἀγνοοῦντι τὸ βέλτιστον παραστῆναί ποτε δόξαν, ὥστε οἰηθῆναι καὶ τὸ κάκιστόν ποτε βέλτιστον εἶναι·
SOCRATES: Let us then consider this also: if on the spot a thought should come to you, because you thought it was better, that having taken a dagger, having gone to the doors of Perikles, your guardian and friend, you should ask if he is within, wishing to kill him, that very man, and no one else; and they should say he is within—and I do not say that you would wish to do any of these things; but if, I think, the opinion should present itself to you, which indeed nothing prevents from sometimes presenting itself as an opinion to one who is ignorant of the best, so as to think that even the worst thing is sometimes the best—or does it not seem so to you?
ἢ οὐκ ἂν δοκεῖ σοι; ΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
ALKIBIADES: Entirely so.
ΣΩ. εἰ οὖν παρελθὼν εἴσω καὶ ἰδὼν αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον ἀγνοήσαις τε καὶ οἰηθείης ἂν ἄλλον εἶναί τινα, ἆρʼ ἔτι ἂν αὐτὸν τολμήσαις ἀποκτεῖναι;
SOCRATES: If, then, having gone inside and seeing him, you should be ignorant of him and think he was someone else, would you still dare to kill him?
ΑΛ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὐκ ἄν μοι δοκῶ.
ALKIBIADES: No, by Zeus, I think I would not.
ΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ δήπου τὸν ἐντυχόντα, ἀλλʼ αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον ὃν ἠβούλου.
SOCRATES: For you did not want to kill, I suppose, anyone you met, but that very man whom you wished.
ἦ γάρ;
Is that not so?
ΑΛ. ναί.
ALKIBIADES: Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰ πολλάκις ἐγχειροῖς, αἰεὶ δὲ ἀγνοοῖς τὸν Περικλέα, ὁπότε μέλλοις τοῦτο πράττειν, οὔποτε ἂν ἐπίθοιο αὐτῷ.
SOCRATES: Therefore, even if you made many attempts, but always were ignorant of Perikles whenever you were about to do this, you would never attack him.
ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.
ALKIBIADES: Surely not.
ΣΩ. τί δέ;
SOCRATES: What of this, then?
τὸν Ὀρέστην δοκεῖς ἄν ποτε τῇ μητρὶ ἐπιθέσθαι, εἴ γε ὡσαύτως ἠγνόησεν;
Do you think Orestes would ever have attacked his mother, if indeed he had been ignorant of her in the same way?
ΑΛ. οὐκ οἶμαι ἔγωγε.
ALKIBIADES: I do not think so, at least.
ΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ δήπου οὐδʼ ἐκεῖνος τὴν προστυχοῦσαν γυναῖκα οὐδὲ τὴν ὁτουοῦν μητέρα διενοεῖτο ἀποκτεῖναι, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ.
SOCRATES: For he did not intend, I suppose, to kill the first woman he met, nor anyone else's mother, but his own.
ΑΛ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
ALKIBIADES: That is so.
ΣΩ. ἀγνοεῖν ἄρα τά γε τοιαῦτα βέλτιον τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις καὶ τοιαύτας δόξας ἔχουσιν.
SOCRATES: Therefore, to be ignorant of such things, at least, is better for those who are so disposed and have such opinions.
ΑΛ. φαίνεται.
ALKIBIADES: It seems so.
ΣΩ. ὁρᾷς οὖν ὅτι ἡ ἔστιν ὧν τε ἄγνοια καὶ ἔστιν οἷς καὶ ἔχουσί πως ἀγαθόν, ἀλλʼ οὐ κακόν, ὥσπερ ἄρτι σοι ἐδόκει;
SOCRATES: Do you see, then, that the ignorance of certain things, and for certain people in a certain state, is indeed a good and not an evil, as it seemed to you just now?
ΑΛ. ἔοικεν.
ALKIBIADES: It seems so.
ΣΩ. ἔτι τοίνυν εἰ βούλει τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἄτοπον ἂν ἴσως ἄν σοι δόξειεν εἶναι.
SOCRATES: Furthermore, if you wish to consider what comes after this, it would perhaps seem strange to you.
ΑΛ. τί μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες;
ALKIBIADES: What in particular, Socrates?
ΣΩ. ὅτι, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, κινδυνεύει τό γε τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν κτῆμα, ἐάν τις ἄνευ τοῦ βελτίστου κεκτημένος ᾖ, ὀλιγάκις μὲν ὠφελεῖν, βλάπτειν δὲ τὰ πλείω τὸν ἔχοντα αὐτό. σκόπει δὲ ὧδε.
SOCRATES: That, so to speak, the possession of the other sciences, if someone possesses it without the science of the best, is likely to benefit but rarely, and to harm for the most part the one who has it.
ἆρʼ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖόν σοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὅταν τι μέλλωμεν ἤτοι πράττειν ἢ λέγειν, οἰηθῆναι δεῖν πρῶτον ἡμᾶς εἰδέναι ἢ τῷ ὄντι εἰδέναι τοῦθʼ ὃ ἂν προχειροτέρως μέλλωμεν ἢ λέγειν ἢ πράττειν;
Consider it in this way: does it not seem necessary to you that, whenever we are about to either do or say something, we must first either think we know, or really know, that which we are more readily about to either say or do?
ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ALKIBIADES: It seems so to me.