Plato · Alcibiades I §128

Distinction Between Caring for Self and Possessions

Passage 17 of 21 · Greek

Summary

Socrates distinguishes between "caring for oneself" and "caring for one's belongings," using the body and its accessories as examples to show they involve different arts. He concludes that to care for oneself, one must first know what oneself is.

§128ΣΩ. φέρε δή, τί ἐστιν τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι—μὴ πολλάκις λάθωμεν οὐχ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι, οἰόμενοι δέ —καὶ πότʼ ἄρα αὐτὸ ποιεῖ ἅνθρωπος;

SOCRATES: Come then, what is caring for oneself? Let us be careful lest we often unconsciously fail to care for ourselves, while thinking we do. And when indeed does a man do this?

ἆρʼ ὅταν τῶν αὑτοῦ ἐπιμελῆται, τότε καὶ αὑτοῦ;

Is it when he cares for his own things, that he then also cares for himself?

ΑΛ. ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.

ALCIBIADES: So it seems to me, at least.

ΣΩ. τί δέ;

SOCRATES: And what?

ποδῶν ἅνθρωπος ποτε ἐπιμελεῖται;

Does a man ever care for feet?

ἆρʼ ὅταν ἐκείνων ἐπιμελῆται ἅ ἐστι τῶν ποδῶν;

Is it when he cares for those things which belong to the feet?

ΑΛ. οὐ μανθάνω.

ALCIBIADES: I don't understand.

ΣΩ. καλεῖς δέ τι χειρός;

SOCRATES: But do you call something "belonging to the hand"?

οἷον δακτύλιον ἔστιν ὅτου ἂν ἄλλου τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φαίης ἢ δακτύλου;

For instance, a ring, would you say it belongs to any other of the things belonging to man than the finger?

ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.

ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ποδὸς ὑπόδημα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον;

SOCRATES: Then a shoe belongs to the foot in the same way?

ΑΛ. ναί.

ALCIBIADES: Yes.

ΣΩ. καὶ ἱμάτια καὶ στρώματα τοῦ ἄλλου σώματος ὁμοίως; ΑΛ. ναί.

SOCRATES: And clothes and blankets to the rest of the body likewise? ALCIBIADES: Yes.

ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ὅταν ὑποδημάτων ἐπιμελώμεθα, τότε ποδῶν ἐπιμελούμεθα;

SOCRATES: Is it then the case that when we care for shoes, we then care for feet?

ΑΛ. οὐ πάνυ μανθάνω, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ALCIBIADES: I don't quite understand, Socrates.

ΣΩ. τί δέ, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη;

SOCRATES: What then, Alcibiades?

ὀρθῶς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καλεῖς τι ὁτουοῦν πράγματος;

Do you call something "correctly caring" for any thing whatsoever?

ΑΛ. ἔγωγε.

ALCIBIADES: I do.

ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ὅταν τίς τι βέλτιον ποιῇ, τότε ὀρθὴν λέγεις ἐπιμέλειαν;

SOCRATES: Is it then when someone makes a thing better, that you call it correct care?

ΑΛ. ναί.

ALCIBIADES: Yes.

ΣΩ. τίς οὖν τέχνη ὑποδήματα βελτίω ποιεῖ;

SOCRATES: Then what art makes shoes better?

ΑΛ. σκυτική.

ALCIBIADES: Shoemaking.

ΣΩ. σκυτικῇ ἄρα ὑποδημάτων ἐπιμελούμεθα;

SOCRATES: Then is it by shoemaking that we care for shoes?

ΑΛ. ναί.

ALCIBIADES: Yes.

ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ ποδὸς σκυτικῇ;

SOCRATES: And is it also by shoemaking that we care for the foot?

ἢ ἐκείνῃ ᾗ πόδας βελτίους ποιοῦμεν;

Or by that art by which we make feet better?

ΑΛ. ἐκείνῃ.

ALCIBIADES: By that art.

ΣΩ. βελτίους δὲ πόδας οὐχ ᾗπερ καὶ τὸ ἄλλο σῶμα;

SOCRATES: And do we not make feet better by the same art by which we make the rest of the body better?

ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ALCIBIADES: So it seems to me.

ΣΩ. αὕτη δʼ οὐ γυμναστική;

SOCRATES: And is this not gymnastics?

ΑΛ. μάλιστα.

ALCIBIADES: Certainly.

ΣΩ. γυμναστικῇ μὲν ἄρα ποδὸς ἐπιμελούμεθα, σκυτικῇ δὲ τῶν τοῦ ποδός;

SOCRATES: Then by gymnastics we care for the foot, but by shoemaking we care for the things belonging to the foot?

ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ALCIBIADES: Exactly.

ΣΩ. καὶ γυμναστικῇ μὲν χειρῶν, δακτυλιογλυφίᾳ δὲ τῶν τῆς χειρός;

SOCRATES: And by gymnastics we care for hands, but by ring-engraving we care for the things belonging to the hand?

ΑΛ. ναί.

ALCIBIADES: Yes.

ΣΩ. καὶ γυμναστικῇ μὲν σώματος, ὑφαντικῇ δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τῶν τοῦ σώματος;

SOCRATES: And by gymnastics we care for the body, but by weaving and other arts we care for the things belonging to the body?

ΑΛ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ALCIBIADES: Absolutely.

ΣΩ. ἄλλῃ μὲν ἄρα τέχνῃ αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου ἐπιμελούμεθα, ἄλλῃ δὲ τῶν αὐτοῦ.

SOCRATES: Then by one art we care for each thing itself, and by another we care for its belongings.

ΑΛ. φαίνεται.

ALCIBIADES: So it appears.

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα ὅταν τῶν σαυτοῦ ἐπιμελῇ, σαυτοῦ ἐπιμελῇ.

SOCRATES: Therefore, when you care for your belongings, you do not care for yourself.

ΑΛ. οὐδαμῶς.

ALCIBIADES: By no means.

ΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ τέχνη, ὡς ἔοικεν, ᾗ τις ἂν αὑτοῦ τε ἐπιμελοῖτο καὶ τῶν αὑτοῦ.

SOCRATES: For it is not the same art, as it seems, by which one would care for both oneself and one's belongings.

ΑΛ. οὐ φαίνεται.

ALCIBIADES: So it does not appear.

ΣΩ. φέρε δή, ποίᾳ ποτʼ ἂν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμεληθείημεν;

SOCRATES: Come then, by what art would we care for ourselves?

ΑΛ. οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.

ALCIBIADES: I cannot say.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ τοσόνδε γε ὡμολόγηται, ὅτι οὐχ ᾗ ἂν τῶν ἡμετέρων καὶ ὁτιοῦν βέλτιον ποιοῖμεν, ἀλλʼ ᾗ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς;

SOCRATES: But at least this much has been agreed, that it is not by the art by which we would make any of our belongings better, but by that by which we would make ourselves better?

ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.

ALCIBIADES: You speak the truth.

ΣΩ. ἦ οὖν ἔγνωμεν ἄν ποτε τίς τέχνη ὑπόδημα βέλτιον ποιεῖ, μὴ εἰδότες ὑπόδημα;

SOCRATES: Could we then ever know what art makes a shoe better, if we did not know what a shoe is?

ΑΛ. ἀδύνατον.

ALCIBIADES: Impossible.

ΣΩ. οὐδέ γε τίς τέχνη δακτυλίους βελτίους ποιεῖ, ἀγνοοῦντες δακτύλιον.

SOCRATES: Nor indeed what art makes rings better, if we were ignorant of a ring.

ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ.

ALCIBIADES: True.

ΣΩ. τί δέ;

SOCRATES: What then?

τίς τέχνη βελτίω ποιεῖ αὐτόν, ἆρʼ ἄν ποτε γνοῖμεν ἀγνοοῦντες τί ποτʼ ἐσμὲν αὐτοί;

Could we ever know what art makes oneself better, if we were ignorant of what we ourselves actually are?

Notes

128aμὴ πολλάκις λάθωμεν οὐχ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι, οἰόμενοι δέ — The subjunctive verb λάθωμεν in a μὴ clause (expressing apprehension or a cautious warning) is completed by the supplementary participles οὐχ ... ἐπιμελούμενοι and οἰόμενοι. It literally means 'let us be careful lest we unconsciously fail to take care of ourselves while thinking we do.'
128aἔστιν ὅτου ἂν ἄλλου τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φαίης ἢ δακτύλου — The phrase ἔστιν ὅτου is an idiomatic contraction equivalent to τινός ('any/some'). The genitive τῶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου serves as a partitive genitive ('of the things of man'), and ἢ δακτύλου ('than the finger') depends on the comparative adjective ἄλλου ('other'). The construction poses whether a ring could belong to any other human part than the finger.
128dἄλλῃ μὲν ἄρα τέχνῃ αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου ἐπιμελούμεθα, ἄλλῃ δὲ τῶν αὐτοῦ — The word ἄλλῃ functions as a dative of means (modifying the implied or preceding noun τέχνῃ). Both αὐτοῦ ἑκάστου ('each thing itself') and τῶν αὐτοῦ ('the things belonging to it') are genitive objects governed by the verb ἐπιμελούμεθα. This sentence strictly structures the contrast between caring for an entity itself versus its accessories.
128eτίς τέχνη βελτίω ποιεῖ αὐτόν — The pronoun αὐτόν ('itself/oneself') functions here as the direct object of βελτίω ποιεῖ. In contrast to the specific objects mentioned in the context (shoes and rings), it refers to 'the self itself' or 'the human being as such.'

Cite this passage

Plato, Alcibiades I §128. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg013.humanitext-grc2:128

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