Plato · Alcibiades I §129-130

The Identification of the Self with the Soul

Passage 18 of 21 · Greek

Summary

Socrates and Alcibiades, after recognizing the difficulty of self-knowledge, argue that the user of an instrument is distinct from the instrument itself, thereby concluding that the human being, who uses the body, is nothing other than the soul.

§129ΑΛ. ἀδύνατον.

ALCIBIADES: Impossible.

ΣΩ. πότερον οὖν δὴ ῥᾴδιον τυγχάνει τὸ γνῶναι ἑαυτόν, καί τις ἦν φαῦλος ὁ τοῦτο ἀναθεὶς εἰς τὸν ἐν Πυθοῖ νεών, ἢ χαλεπόν τι καὶ οὐχὶ παντός;

SOCRATES: Is it then really an easy thing to know oneself, and was he some simpleton who inscribed this on the temple at Pytho, or is it something difficult and not for everyone?

ΑΛ. ἐμοὶ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλάκις μὲν ἔδοξε παντὸς εἶναι, πολλάκις δὲ παγχάλεπον.

ALCIBIADES: To me, Socrates, it has often seemed to be for everyone, and often to be extremely difficult.

ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, εἴτε ῥᾴδιον εἴτε μή ἐστιν, ὅμως γε ἡμῖν ὧδʼ ἔχει· γνόντες μὲν αὐτὸ τάχʼ ἂν γνοῖμεν τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἀγνοοῦντες δὲ οὐκ ἄν ποτε.

SOCRATES: But, Alcibiades, whether it is easy or not, nevertheless for us the matter stands thus: if we know it, we might quickly know the care of ourselves, but if we are ignorant of it, we never could.

ΑΛ. ἔστι ταῦτα.

ALCIBIADES: That is so.

ΣΩ. φέρε δή, τίνʼ ἂν τρόπον εὑρεθείη αὐτὸ ταὐτό;

SOCRATES: Come then, in what way could "itself the same" be found?

οὕτω μὲν γὰρ ἂν τάχʼ εὕροιμεν τί ποτʼ ἐσμὲν αὐτοί, τούτου δʼ ἔτι ὄντες ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ ἀδύνατοί που.

For in this way we might quickly find what we ourselves actually are, but while we are still in ignorance of this, we are surely unable.

ΑΛ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις.

ALCIBIADES: You speak correctly.

ΣΩ. ἔχε οὖν πρὸς Διός.

SOCRATES: Hold then, by Zeus!

τῷ διαλέγῃ σὺ νῦν;

With whom are you now conversing?

ἄλλο τι ἢ ἐμοί;

Is it with anyone other than me?

ΑΛ. ναί.

ALCIBIADES: No.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐγὼ σοί;

SOCRATES: And I with you?

ΑΛ. ναί.

ALCIBIADES: Yes.

ΣΩ. Σωκράτης ἄρʼ ἐστὶν ὁ διαλεγόμενος;

SOCRATES: Socrates then is the one conversing?

ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ALCIBIADES: Certainly.

ΣΩ. Ἀλκιβιάδης δʼ ὁ ἀκούων;

SOCRATES: And Alcibiades is the one listening?

ΑΛ. ναί.

ALCIBIADES: Yes.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν λόγῳ διαλέγεται ὁ Σωκράτης;

SOCRATES: Then Socrates converses by using speech?

ΑΛ. τί μήν;

ALCIBIADES: Of course.

ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ τὸ λόγῳ χρῆσθαι ταὐτόν που καλεῖς.

SOCRATES: And you call conversing and using speech surely the same thing?

ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ALCIBIADES: Certainly.

ΣΩ. ὁ δὲ χρώμενος καὶ ᾧ χρῆται οὐκ ἄλλο;

SOCRATES: But is not the user and that which he uses different?

ΑΛ. πῶς λέγεις;

ALCIBIADES: How do you mean?

ΣΩ. ὥσπερ σκυτοτόμος τέμνει που τομεῖ καὶ σμίλῃ καὶ ἄλλοις ὀργάνοις.

SOCRATES: Just as a shoemaker, I suppose, cuts with a cutting-knife, a chisel, and other instruments.

ΑΛ. ναί.

ALCIBIADES: Yes.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἄλλο μὲν ὁ τέμνων καὶ χρώμενος, ἄλλο δὲ οἷς τέμνων χρῆται;

SOCRATES: Is not, then, the one who cuts and uses different from the things which he uses in cutting?

ΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ALCIBIADES: Of course.

ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὕτως καὶ οἷς ὁ κιθαριστὴς κιθαρίζει καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ κιθαριστὴς ἄλλο ἂν εἴη;

SOCRATES: Would then the things with which the lyre-player plays the lyre and the lyre-player himself also be different?

ΑΛ. ναί.

ALCIBIADES: Yes.

ΣΩ. τοῦτο τοίνυν ἀρτίως ἠρώτων, εἰ ὁ χρώμενος καὶ ᾧ χρῆται ἀεὶ δοκεῖ ἕτερον εἶναι.

SOCRATES: This, then, is what I was asking just now, whether the user and that which he uses always seem to be different.

ΑΛ. δοκεῖ.

ALCIBIADES: They do.

ΣΩ. τί οὖν φῶμεν τὸν σκυτοτόμον;

SOCRATES: What then shall we say of the shoemaker?

τέμνειν ὀργάνοις μόνον ἢ καὶ χερσίν;

Does he cut with instruments only, or also with his hands?

ΑΛ. καὶ χερσίν.

ALCIBIADES: Also with his hands.

ΣΩ. χρῆται ἄρα καὶ ταύταις;

SOCRATES: He uses them too, then?

ΑΛ. ναί.

ALCIBIADES: Yes.

ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς χρώμενος σκυτοτομεῖ;

SOCRATES: And does he also use his eyes when making shoes?

ΑΛ. ναί.

ALCIBIADES: Yes.

ΣΩ. τὸν δὲ χρώμενον καὶ οἷς χρῆται ἕτερα ὁμολογοῦμεν;

SOCRATES: And we agree that the user and the things he uses are different?

ΑΛ. ναί.

ALCIBIADES: Yes.

ΣΩ. ἕτερον ἄρα σκυτοτόμος καὶ κιθαριστὴς χειρῶν καὶ ὀφθαλμῶν οἷς ἐργάζονται;

SOCRATES: Different, then, are the shoemaker and the lyre-player from the hands and eyes with which they work?

ΑΛ. φαίνεται.

ALCIBIADES: So it appears.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ παντὶ τῷ σώματι χρῆται ἅνθρωπος;

SOCRATES: Does not man also use his whole body?

ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ALCIBIADES: Certainly.

ΣΩ. ἕτερον δʼ ἦν τό τε χρώμενον καὶ ᾧ χρῆται;

SOCRATES: And the user and that which he uses were different?

ΑΛ. ναί.

ALCIBIADES: Yes.

ΣΩ. ἕτερον ἄρα ἅνθρωπός ἐστι τοῦ σώματος τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ;

SOCRATES: Different, then, is man from his own body?

ΑΛ. ἔοικεν.

ALCIBIADES: It seems so.

ΣΩ. τί ποτʼ οὖν ὁ ἄνθρωπος;

SOCRATES: What then is man?

ΑΛ. οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν.

ALCIBIADES: I cannot say.

ΣΩ. ἔχεις μὲν οὖν, ὅτι γε τὸ τῷ σώματι χρώμενον.

SOCRATES: Yes, you can, at least that he is that which uses the body.

ΑΛ. ναί.

ALCIBIADES: Yes.

§130ΣΩ. ἦ οὖν ἄλλο τι χρῆται αὐτῷ ἢ ψυχή;

SOCRATES: Does anything else then use it than the soul?

ΑΛ. οὐκ ἄλλο.

ALCIBIADES: Nothing else.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἄρχουσα;

SOCRATES: And as ruler?

ΑΛ. ναί.

ALCIBIADES: Yes.

ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν τόδε γʼ οἶμαι οὐδένα ἂν ἄλλως οἰηθῆναι.

SOCRATES: And indeed, I think no one would think otherwise of this.

ΑΛ. τὸ ποῖον;

ALCIBIADES: What kind of thing?

ΣΩ. μὴ οὐ τριῶν ἕν γέ τι εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον.

SOCRATES: That man is not one of three things.

ΑΛ. τίνων;

ALCIBIADES: Which things?

ΣΩ. ψυχὴν ἢ σῶμα ἢ συναμφότερον, τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο.

SOCRATES: Soul, or body, or both together as this whole.

ΑΛ. τί μήν;

ALCIBIADES: Of course.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτό γε τὸ τοῦ σώματος ἄρχον ὡμολογήσαμεν ἄνθρωπον εἶναι;

SOCRATES: But did we agree that that which rules the body is man?

ΑΛ. ὡμολογήσαμεν.

ALCIBIADES: We did.

ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν σῶμα αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἄρχει;

SOCRATES: Does then the body rule itself?

ΑΛ. οὐδαμῶς.

ALCIBIADES: By no means.

ΣΩ. ἄρχεσθαι γὰρ αὐτὸ εἴπομεν.

SOCRATES: For we said that it is ruled.

ΑΛ. ναί.

ALCIBIADES: Yes.

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἂν δὴ τοῦτό γε εἴη ὃ ζητοῦμεν.

SOCRATES: This then could not be what we are seeking.

ΑΛ. οὐκ ἔοικεν.

ALCIBIADES: It does not seem so.

ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἄρα τὸ συναμφότερον τοῦ σώματος ἄρχει, καὶ ἔστι δὴ τοῦτο ἄνθρωπος;

SOCRATES: But does both together rule the body, and is this indeed man?

ΑΛ. ἴσως δῆτα.

ALCIBIADES: Perhaps indeed.

ΣΩ. πάντων γε ἥκιστα· μὴ γὰρ συνάρχοντος τοῦ ἑτέρου οὐδεμία που μηχανὴ τὸ συναμφότερον ἄρχειν.

SOCRATES: Least of all; for if one of them does not rule with it, there is surely no way that both together can rule.

ΑΛ. ὀρθῶς.

ALCIBIADES: Correct.

ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ δʼ οὔτε σῶμα οὔτε τὸ συναμφότερόν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος, λείπεται οἶμαι ἢ μηδὲν αὔτʼ εἶναι, ἢ εἴπερ τί ἐστι, μηδὲν ἄλλο τὸν ἄνθρωπον συμβαίνειν ἢ ψυχήν.

SOCRATES: Since then neither the body nor both together is man, it remains, I think, either that he is nothing, or if he is something, man turns out to be nothing other than the soul.

ΑΛ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.

ALCIBIADES: Absolutely so.

ΣΩ. ἔτι οὖν τι σαφέστερον δεῖ ἀποδειχθῆναί σοι ὅτι ἡ ψυχή ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος;

SOCRATES: Does it then need to be demonstrated to you still more clearly that the soul is man?

ΑΛ. μὰ Δία, ἀλλʼ ἱκανῶς μοι δοκεῖ ἔχειν.

ALCIBIADES: No, by Zeus, but it seems to me to be sufficient.

ΣΩ. εἰ δέ γε μὴ ἀκριβῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ μετρίως, ἐξαρκεῖ ἡμῖν· ἀκριβῶς μὲν γὰρ τότε εἰσόμεθα, ὅταν εὕρωμεν ὃ νυνδὴ παρήλθομεν διὰ τὸ πολλῆς εἶναι σκέψεως.

SOCRATES: And if it is not exact but reasonable, it is enough for us; for we shall know it exactly then, when we find what we just now passed over because it required much investigation.

ΑΛ. τί τοῦτο;

ALCIBIADES: What is that?

ΣΩ. ὃ ἄρτι οὕτω πως ἐρρήθη, ὅτι πρῶτον σκεπτέον εἴη αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτό· νῦν δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ἐσκέμμεθα ὅτι ἐστί.

SOCRATES: What was said just now in some such way, that we must first consider "itself the self"; but now, instead of the self, we have considered what each thing itself is.

καὶ ἴσως ἐξαρκέσει· οὐ γάρ που κυριώτερόν γε οὐδὲν ἂν ἡμῶν αὐτῶν φήσαιμεν ἢ τὴν ψυχήν.

And perhaps it will be sufficient; for surely we would say that nothing is more sovereign of ourselves than the soul.

ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα.

ALCIBIADES: Certainly not.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καλῶς ἔχει οὕτω νομίζειν, ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ προσομιλεῖν ἀλλήλοις τοῖς λόγοις χρωμένους τῇ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν;

SOCRATES: Then is it correct to think thus, that you and I are conversing with each other, using speech, soul to soul?

ΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ALCIBIADES: Absolutely.

ΣΩ. τοῦτʼ ἄρα ἦν ὃ καὶ ὀλίγῳ ἔμπροσθεν εἴπομεν, ὅτι Σωκράτης Ἀλκιβιάδῃ διαλέγεται λόγῳ χρώμενος, οὐ πρὸς τὸ σὸν πρόσωπον, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν Ἀλκιβιάδην ποιούμενος τοὺς λόγους· τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή.

SOCRATES: This, then, was what we said a little earlier, that Socrates converses with Alcibiades by using speech, not to your face, as it seems, but directing the words to Alcibiades—and this is the soul.

ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ALCIBIADES: So it seems to me.

ΣΩ. ψυχὴν ἄρα ἡμᾶς κελεύει γνωρίσαι ὁ ἐπιτάττων γνῶναι ἑαυτόν.

SOCRATES: He then who orders "know yourself" bids us to know the soul.

Notes

129aτὸ γνῶναι ἑαυτόν, καί τις ἦν φαῦλος ὁ τοῦτο ἀναθεὶς εἰς τὸν ἐν Πυθοῖ νεών, ἢ χαλεπόν τι καὶ οὐχὶ παντός — The imperfect `ἦν` refers to the historical act of dedicating the maxim at Delphi, while also conveying a modal nuance of realization or questioning in the context ("was he, as it turns out, a simpleton?").
129bαὐτὸ ταὐτό — Referring to "the same itself" or "the self itself," this phrase is virtually synonymous with `αὐτὸ τὸ αὐτό` at 130d. It designates the inquiry into the absolute essence of the self rather than particular objects.
130aμὴ οὐ τριῶν ἕν γέ τι εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον — Following the negative main clause `οὐδένα ἂν ἄλλως οἰηθῆναι` ("no one would think otherwise"), the double negative `μὴ οὐ` with the infinitive expresses a strong affirmation: "that man cannot but be one of the three (i.e., must be one of the three)."
130dἀντὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ ἕκαστον ἐσκέμμεθα — The genitive `τοῦ αὐτοῦ` (here a shorthand for `αὐτοῦ τοῦ αὐτοῦ`, "the self itself") is sharply contrasted with the accusative `αὐτὸ ἕκαστον` ("each thing itself," referring to the essence of individual objects like shoes or rings) as objects of inquiry.

Cite this passage

Plato, Alcibiades I §129-130. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg013.humanitext-grc2:129-130

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