Plato · Alcibiades I §115

The Beautiful, the Good, and Rescuing Friends in Battle

Passage 9 of 21 · Greek

Summary

Socrates and Alcibiades examine the relationship between the beautiful and the good, and the shameful and the bad. Using the example of helping a friend in war, they establish that while it is beautiful and good in respect of courage, it is also bad in respect of death.

§115ΣΩ. μαντικὸς γὰρ εἶ.

SOCRATES: For you are a prophet.

καί μοι λέγε· τῶν δικαίων φῂς ἔνια μὲν συμφέρειν, ἔνια δʼ οὔ;

And tell me: of just things, do you say some are advantageous, and some not?

ΑΛ. ναί.

ALCIBIADES: Yes.

ΣΩ. τί δέ;

SOCRATES: What then?

τὰ μὲν καλὰ αὐτῶν εἶναι, τὰ δʼ οὔ;

That some of them are beautiful, and some not?

ΑΛ. πῶς τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς;

ALCIBIADES: How do you mean this question?

ΣΩ. εἴ τις ἤδη σοι ἔδοξεν αἰσχρὰ μέν, δίκαια δὲ πράττειν;

SOCRATES: Whether anyone has ever seemed to you to act shamefully, but justly?

ΑΛ. οὐκ ἔμοιγε.

ALCIBIADES: Not to me, at least.

ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ πάντα τὰ δίκαια καὶ καλά;

SOCRATES: But rather, are all just things also beautiful?

ΑΛ. ναί.

ALCIBIADES: Yes.

ΣΩ. τί δʼ αὖ τὰ καλά;

SOCRATES: What then, in turn, of beautiful things?

πότερον πάντα ἀγαθά, ἢ τὰ μέν, τὰ δʼ οὔ;

Are they all good, or some indeed, and some not?

ΑΛ. οἴομαι ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔνια τῶν καλῶν κακὰ εἶναι.

ALCIBIADES: I, for my part, think, Socrates, that some beautiful things are bad.

ΣΩ. ἦ καὶ αἰσχρὰ ἀγαθά;

SOCRATES: And also that some shameful things are good?

ΑΛ. ναί.

ALCIBIADES: Yes.

ΣΩ. ἆρα λέγεις τὰ τοιάδε, οἷον πολλοὶ ἐν πολέμῳ βοηθήσαντες ἑταίρῳ ἢ οἰκείῳ τραύματα ἔλαβον καὶ ἀπέθανον, οἱ δʼ οὐ βοηθήσαντες, δέον, ὑγιεῖς ἀπῆλθον;

SOCRATES: Do you mean things like this: for instance, many who in war helped a comrade or a relative received wounds and died, whereas those who did not help, though they ought to have, came away safe and sound?

ΑΛ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ALCIBIADES: Exactly so.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὴν τοιαύτην βοήθειαν καλὴν μὲν λέγεις κατὰ τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν τοῦ σῶσαι οὓς ἔδει, τοῦτο δʼ ἐστὶν ἀνδρεία· ἢ οὔ;

SOCRATES: Therefore, such help, you call it beautiful indeed in respect of the attempt to save those whom one ought to, and this is courage, is it not?

ΑΛ. ναί.

ALCIBIADES: Yes.

ΣΩ. κακὴν δέ γε κατὰ τοὺς θανάτους τε καὶ ἕλκη· ἦ γάρ;

SOCRATES: But bad, however, in respect of the deaths and wounds; is it not so?

ΑΛ. ναί.

ALCIBIADES: Yes.

ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐκ ἄλλο μὲν ἡ ἀνδρεία, ἄλλο δὲ ὁ θάνατος;

SOCRATES: Is not, then, courage one thing, and death another?

ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ALCIBIADES: Certainly.

ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα κατὰ ταὐτόν γʼ ἐστι καλὸν καὶ κακὸν τὸ τοῖς φίλοις βοηθεῖν;

SOCRATES: Therefore, it is not in respect of the same thing, at any rate, that helping one's friends is both beautiful and bad?

ΑΛ. οὐ φαίνεται.

ALCIBIADES: It does not appear so.

ΣΩ. ὅρα τοίνυν εἰ, ᾗ γε καλόν, καὶ ἀγαθόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐνταῦθα.

SOCRATES: See then if, inso far indeed as it is beautiful, it is also good, just as in this case too.

κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν γὰρ ὡμολόγεις καλὸν εἶναι τὴν βοήθειαν· τοῦτʼ οὖν αὐτὸ σκόπει, τὴν ἀνδρείαν, ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν;

For you agreed that the help was beautiful in respect of courage; examine, then, this very thing, courage, is it good or bad?

ὧδε δὲ σκόπει· σὺ πότερʼ ἂν δέξαιό σοι εἶναι, ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακά;

Examine it this way: which would you wish to have for yourself, good things or bad things?

ΑΛ. ἀγαθά.

ALCIBIADES: Good things.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὰ μέγιστα μάλιστα.

SOCRATES: And therefore, the greatest things most of all?

ΑΛ. ναί.

ALCIBIADES: Yes.

ΣΩ. καὶ ἥκιστα τῶν τοιούτων δέξαιο ἂν στέρεσθαι;

SOCRATES: And you would least of all wish to be deprived of such things?

ΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

ALCIBIADES: For how could I not?

ΣΩ. πῶς οὖν λέγεις περὶ ἀνδρείας;

SOCRATES: How then do you say of courage?

ἐπὶ πόσῳ ἂν αὐτοῦ δέξαιο στέρεσθαι;

At what price would you accept to be deprived of it?

ΑΛ. οὐδὲ ζῆν ἂν ἐγὼ δεξαίμην δειλὸς ὤν.

ALCIBIADES: I would not even choose to live if I were a coward.

ΣΩ. ἔσχατον ἄρα κακῶν εἶναί σοι δοκεῖ ἡ δειλία.

SOCRATES: Cowardice, then, seems to you to be the extreme of evils.

ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε.

ALCIBIADES: To me, at least.

ΣΩ. ἐξ ἴσου τῷ τεθνάναι, ὡς ἔοικε.

SOCRATES: On an equal footing with being dead, as it seems.

ΑΛ. φημί.

ALCIBIADES: I agree.

ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν θανάτῳ τε καὶ δειλίᾳ ἐναντιώτατον ζωὴ καὶ ἀνδρεία;

SOCRATES: Are not, then, life and courage most opposite to death and cowardice?

ΑΛ. ναί.

ALCIBIADES: Yes.

ΣΩ. καὶ τὰ μὲν μάλιστʼ ἂν εἶναι βούλοιό σοι, τὰ δὲ ἥκιστα;

SOCRATES: And the former you would wish most of all to have, and the latter least?

ΑΛ. ναί.

ALCIBIADES: Yes.

ΣΩ. ἆρʼ ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἄριστα ἡγῇ, τὰ δὲ κάκιστα;

SOCRATES: Is it because you regard the former as the best, and the latter as the worst?

ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.

ALCIBIADES: Certainly.

ΣΩ. ἐν τοῖς ἀρίστοις ἄρα σὺ ἡγῇ ἀνδρείαν εἶναι κἀν τοῖς κακίστοις θάνατον.

SOCRATES: Therefore you regard courage to be among the best things, and death among the worst.

ΑΛ. ἔγωγε.

ALCIBIADES: I do.

ΣΩ. τὸ ἄρα βοηθεῖν ἐν πολέμῳ τοῖς φίλοις, ᾗ μὲν καλόν, κατʼ ἀγαθοῦ πρᾶξιν τὴν τῆς ἀνδρείας, καλὸν αὐτὸ προσεῖπας;

SOCRATES: Therefore, as to helping one's friends in war, insofar as it is beautiful, in respect of the achievement of a good thing, namely courage, did you call it beautiful?

ΑΛ. φαίνομαί γε.

ALCIBIADES: So it seems.

ΣΩ. κατὰ δέ γε κακοῦ πρᾶξιν τὴν τοῦ θανάτου κακόν;

SOCRATES: But, on the other hand, in respect of the experience of an evil, namely death, you called it bad?

ΑΛ. ναί.

ALCIBIADES: Yes.

Notes

115aεἴ τις ἤδη σοι ἔδοξεν αἰσχρὰ μέν, δίκαια δὲ πράττειν; — The conjunction `εἰ` normally introduces an indirect question ('whether...'), but here it is used elliptically without a governing main verb (such as 'I ask'), serving as an independent explanatory reply to Alcibiades' question `πῶς τοῦτο ἐρωτᾷς;`.
115dἐπὶ πόσῳ ἂν αὐτοῦ δέξαιο στέρεσθαι; — The prepositional phrase `ἐπὶ πόσῳ` uses the dative of price or condition ('at what cost'), while `αὐτοῦ` is a genitive of deprivation depending on `στέρεσθαι` ('to be deprived of'). Although `ἀνδρείας` is feminine, `αὐτοῦ` refers back to it as a generalized neuter concept.
115eκατʼ ἀγαθοῦ πρᾶξιν τὴν τῆς ἀνδρείας — The preposition `κατά` here means 'in respect of' or 'according to'. The noun `πρᾶξιν` is used not merely as 'action' but in the sense of 'realization' or 'achievement' of a good thing, namely courage, which is defined and stood in apposition by `τὴν τῆς ἀνδρείας`.

Cite this passage

Plato, Alcibiades I §115. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg013.humanitext-grc2:115

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