§114ΣΩ. οἷον τοῦτο ποιεῖς.
SOCRATES: What a thing to do!
εἴ τι μὴ ὀρθῶς λέγεις, τυγχάνει δὲ δυνατὸν ὂν ἀποδεῖξαι διʼ οὗπερ καὶ τὸ πρότερον λόγου, οἴει δὴ καινὰ ἄττα δεῖν ἀκούειν ἀποδείξεις τε ἑτέρας, ὡς τῶν προτέρων οἷον σκευαρίων κατατετριμμένων, καὶ οὐκέτʼ ἂν σὺ αὐτὰ ἀμπίσχοιο, εἰ μή τίς σοι τεκμήριον καθαρὸν καὶ ἄχραντον οἴσει.
If you say something incorrect, and it happens to be possible to prove it by the very same argument as before, you think you need to hear some new things and different proofs, as if the previous ones were like worn-out garments, and you would no longer wrap yourself in them unless someone brings you a clean and undefiled proof.
ἐγὼ δὲ χαίρειν ἐάσας τὰς σὰς προδρομὰς τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐρήσομαι πόθεν μαθὼν αὖ τὰ συμφέροντʼ ἐπίστασαι, καὶ ὅστις ἐστὶν ὁ διδάσκαλος, καὶ πάντʼ ἐκεῖνα τὰ πρότερον ἐρωτῶ μιᾷ ἐρωτήσει;
But I, letting your evasive arguments go, will nonetheless ask you where you learned and know what is advantageous, who your teacher is, and ask all those previous questions in a single inquiry.
ἀλλὰ γὰρ δῆλον ὡς εἰς ταὐτὸν ἥξεις καὶ οὐχ ἕξεις ἀποδεῖξαι οὔθʼ ὡς ἐξευρὼν οἶσθα τὰ συμφέροντα οὔθʼ ὡς μαθών.
But indeed it is clear that you will come to the same result and will not be able to prove either that you know what is advantageous by having found it out yourself, or by having learned it.
ἐπειδὴ δὲ τρυφᾷς καὶ οὐκέτʼ ἂν ἡδέως τοῦ αὐτοῦ γεύσαιο λόγου, τοῦτον μὲν ἐῶ χαίρειν, εἴτʼ οἶσθα εἴτε μὴ τὰ Ἀθηναίοις συμφέροντα· πότερον δὲ ταὐτά ἐστι δίκαιά τε καὶ συμφέροντʼ ἢ ἕτερα, τί οὐκ ἀπέδειξας;
Since you are spoiled and would no longer gladly taste the same argument, I will let this matter go, whether you know what is advantageous to the Athenians or not; but as to whether the just and the advantageous are the same or different, why have you not proved it?
εἰ μὲν βούλει, ἐρωτῶν με ὥσπερ ἐγὼ σέ, εἰ δέ, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπὶ σεαυτοῦ λόγῳ διέξελθε.
If you wish, by questioning me as I did you, or if not, go through the argument in detail by yourself.
ΑΛ. ἀλλʼ οὐκ οἶδα εἰ οἷός τʼ ἂν εἴην, ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὸς σὲ διελθεῖν.
ALCIBIADES: But I do not know, Socrates, if I would be able to go through it with you.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ, ὠγαθέ, ἐμὲ ἐκκλησίαν νόμισον καὶ δῆμον·
SOCRATES: But, my good friend, think of me as the assembly and the people; and there, indeed, you will have to persuade each individual.
καὶ ἐκεῖ τοί σε δεήσει ἕνα ἕκαστον πείθειν. ἦ γάρ;
Is that not so?
ΑΛ. ναί.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἕνα τε οἷόν τε εἶναι κατὰ μόνας πείθειν καὶ συμπόλλους περὶ ὧν ἂν εἰδῇ, ὥσπερ ὁ γραμματιστὴς ἕνα τέ που πείθει περὶ γραμμάτων καὶ πολλούς;
SOCRATES: Is it not the part of the same person to be able to persuade an individual in private and many together about what he knows, just as the schoolmaster persuades one person, I suppose, about letters, and also many?
ΑΛ. ναί.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ καὶ περὶ ἀριθμοῦ ὁ αὐτὸς ἕνα τε καὶ πολλοὺς πείσει;
SOCRATES: Will not, then, the same person also persuade both one and many about number?
ΑΛ. ναί.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
ΣΩ. οὗτος δʼ ἔσται ὁ εἰδώς, ὁ ἀριθμητικός;
SOCRATES: And will this person be the one who knows, the arithmetician?
ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
ALCIBIADES: Quite so.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ σὺ ἅπερ καὶ πολλοὺς οἷός τε πείθειν εἶ, ταῦτα καὶ ἕνα;
SOCRATES: Therefore, whatever you are able to persuade many about, can you not also persuade an individual about these things?
ΑΛ. εἰκός γε.
ALCIBIADES: It is likely.
ΣΩ. ἔστι δὲ ταῦτα δῆλον ὅτι ἃ οἶσθα.
SOCRATES: And these are clearly the things that you know.
ΑΛ. ναί.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
ΣΩ. ἄλλο τι οὖν τοσοῦτον μόνον διαφέρει τοῦ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ ῥήτορος ὁ ἐν τῇ τοιᾷδε συνουσίᾳ, ὅτι ὁ μὲν ἁθρόους πείθει τὰ αὐτά, ὁ δὲ καθʼ ἕνα;
SOCRATES: Does, then, the speaker in this kind of conversation differ from the orator in the assembly in only this much, that the one persuades a crowd of the same things, while the other persuades one by one?
ΑΛ. κινδυνεύει.
ALCIBIADES: It seems likely.
ΣΩ. ἴθι νῦν, ἐπειδὴ τοῦ αὐτοῦ φαίνεται πολλούς τε καὶ ἕνα πείθειν, ἐν ἐμοὶ ἐμμελέτησον καὶ ἐπιχείρησον ἐπιδεῖξαι ὡς τὸ δίκαιον ἐνίοτε οὐ συμφέρει.
SOCRATES: Come then, since it appears to be the part of the same person to persuade both many and one, practice on me and attempt to show that the just is sometimes not advantageous.
ΑΛ. ὑβριστὴς εἶ, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ALCIBIADES: You are abusive, Socrates.
ΣΩ. νῦν γοῦν ὑφʼ ὕβρεως μέλλω σε πείθειν τἀναντία οἷς σὺ ἐμὲ οὐκ ἐθέλεις.
SOCRATES: At any rate, now out of abusiveness I am about to persuade you of the opposite of what you do not want me to.
ΑΛ. λέγε δή.
ALCIBIADES: Speak, then.
ΣΩ. ἀποκρίνου μόνον τὰ ἐρωτώμενα.
SOCRATES: Only answer what is asked.
ΑΛ. μή, ἀλλὰ σὺ αὐτὸς λέγε.
ALCIBIADES: No, you speak yourself.
ΣΩ. τί δʼ;
SOCRATES: Why?
οὐχ ὅτι μάλιστα βούλει πεισθῆναι;
Do you not wish most of all to be persuaded?
ΑΛ. πάντως δήπου.
ALCIBIADES: Certainly, indeed.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ λέγεις ὅτι ταῦθʼ οὕτως ἔχει, μάλιστʼ ἂν εἴης πεπεισμένος;
SOCRATES: Therefore, if you yourself say that these things are so, would you not be most of all persuaded?
ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ALCIBIADES: It seems so to me.
ΣΩ. ἀποκρίνου δή· καὶ ἐὰν μὴ αὐτὸς σὺ σαυτοῦ ἀκούσῃς ὅτι τὰ δίκαια καὶ συμφέροντά ἐστιν, ἄλλῳ γε λέγοντι μὴ πιστεύσῃς.
SOCRATES: Answer, then; and unless you hear from your own self that the just and the advantageous are the same, do not believe anyone else who says so.
ΑΛ. οὔτοι, ἀλλʼ ἀποκριτέον· καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲν οἴομαι βλαβήσεσθαι.
ALCIBIADES: No indeed, but I must answer; for indeed I do not think I shall be harmed.