§116ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὧδε δίκαιον προσαγορεύειν ἑκάστην τῶν πράξεων· εἴπερ ᾗ κακὸν ἀπεργάζεται κακὴν καλεῖς, καὶ ᾗ ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθὴν κλητέον.
SOCRATES: Is it not just, then, to address each of the actions in this way: if indeed you call it bad insofar as it produces bad, you must also call it good insofar as it produces good?
ΑΛ. ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.
ALCIBIADES: So it seems to me.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν καὶ ᾗ ἀγαθόν, καλόν· ᾗ δὲ κακόν, αἰσχρόν;
SOCRATES: Is it then also, insofar as it is good, beautiful; and insofar as it is bad, shameful?
ΑΛ. ναί.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
ΣΩ. τὴν ἄρʼ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τοῖς φίλοις βοήθειαν λέγων καλὴν μὲν εἶναι, κακὴν δέ, οὐδὲν διαφερόντως λέγεις ἢ εἰ προσεῖπες αὐτὴν ἀγαθὴν μέν, κακὴν δέ.
SOCRATES: Therefore, in saying that help to one's friends in war is beautiful indeed, but bad, you say nothing different than if you had addressed it as good indeed, but bad.
ΑΛ. ἀληθῆ μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ALCIBIADES: You seem to me to speak the truth, Socrates.
ΣΩ. οὐδὲν ἄρα τῶν καλῶν, καθʼ ὅσον καλόν, κακόν, οὐδὲ τῶν αἰσχρῶν, καθʼ ὅσον αἰσχρόν, ἀγαθόν.
SOCRATES: Therefore, nothing of beautiful things, insofar as it is beautiful, is bad, nor of shameful things, insofar as it is shameful, is good.
ΑΛ. οὐ φαίνεται.
ALCIBIADES: It does not appear so.
ΣΩ. ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ ὧδε σκέψαι. ὅστις καλῶς πράττει, οὐχὶ καὶ εὖ πράττει;
SOCRATES: Consider it, then, further in this way: does not whoever acts beautifully also act well?
ΑΛ. ναί.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
ΣΩ. οἱ δʼ εὖ πράττοντες οὐκ εὐδαίμονες;
SOCRATES: And are not those who act well happy?
ΑΛ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
ALCIBIADES: For how could they not be?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εὐδαίμονες διʼ ἀγαθῶν κτῆσιν;
SOCRATES: And are they not happy through the acquisition of good things?
ΑΛ. μάλιστα.
ALCIBIADES: Most certainly.
ΣΩ. κτῶνται δὲ ταῦτα τῷ εὖ καὶ καλῶς πράττειν;
SOCRATES: And do they acquire these by acting well and beautifully?
ΑΛ. ναί.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
ΣΩ. τὸ εὖ ἄρα πράττειν ἀγαθόν;
SOCRATES: Is acting well, then, a good thing?
ΑΛ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
ALCIBIADES: Of course.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καλὸν ἡ εὐπραγία;
SOCRATES: Is not, then, well-acting beautiful?
ΑΛ. ναί.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
ΣΩ. ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐφάνη ἡμῖν πάλιν αὖ καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν.
SOCRATES: Therefore, beautiful and good have appeared to us once again to be the same.
ΑΛ. φαίνεται.
ALCIBIADES: So it appears.
ΣΩ. ὅτι ἂν ἄρα εὕρωμεν καλόν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν εὑρήσομεν ἔκ γε τούτου τοῦ λόγου.
SOCRATES: Whatever, therefore, we find to be beautiful, we shall also find to be good, at least according to this argument.
ΑΛ. ἀνάγκη.
ALCIBIADES: Necessarily.
ΣΩ. τί δέ;
SOCRATES: What then?
τὰ ἀγαθὰ συμφέρει ἢ οὔ;
Do good things benefit or not?
ΑΛ. συμφέρει.
ALCIBIADES: They benefit.
ΣΩ. μνημονεύεις οὖν περὶ τῶν δικαίων πῶς ὡμολογήσαμεν;
SOCRATES: Do you remember, then, how we agreed concerning just things?
ΑΛ. οἶμαί γε τοὺς τὰ δίκαια πράττοντας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καλὰ πράττειν.
ALCIBIADES: I think we agreed that it is necessary for those who act justly to act beautifully.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τοὺς τὰ καλὰ ἀγαθά;
SOCRATES: And therefore also those who act beautifully, act well?
ΑΛ. ναί.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
ΣΩ. τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ συμφέρειν;
SOCRATES: And that good things benefit?
ΑΛ. ναί.
ALCIBIADES: Yes.
ΣΩ. τὰ δίκαια ἄρα, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη, συμφέροντά ἐστιν.
SOCRATES: Therefore, Alcibiades, just things are beneficial.
ΑΛ. ἔοικεν.
ALCIBIADES: So it seems.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν;
SOCRATES: What then?
ταῦτα οὐ σὺ ὁ λέγων, ἐγὼ δὲ ὁ ἐρωτῶν;
Is it not you who are saying these things, and I who am asking the questions?
ΑΛ. φαίνομαι, ὡς ἔοικα.
ALCIBIADES: I appear to be, so it seems.
ΣΩ. εἰ οὖν τις ἀνίσταται συμβουλεύσων εἴτε Ἀθηναίοις εἴτε Πεπαρηθίοις, οἰόμενος γιγνώσκειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα, φήσει δʼ εἶναι τὰ δίκαια κακὰ ἐνίοτε, ἄλλο τι ἢ καταγελῴης ἂν αὐτοῦ, ἐπειδήπερ τυγχάνεις καὶ σὺ λέγων ὅτι ταὐτά ἐστι δίκαιά τε καὶ συμφέροντα;
SOCRATES: If, then, someone stands up to advise either the Athenians or the Peparethians, thinking that he knows what is just and what is unjust, and should say that just things are sometimes bad, would you do anything else than laugh at him, since you yourself also happen to say that the same things are both just and beneficial?
ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ μὰ τοὺς θεούς, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ οἶδʼ ἔγωγε οὐδʼ ὅτι λέγω, ἀλλʼ ἀτεχνῶς ἔοικα ἀτόπως ἔχοντι· τοτὲ μὲν γάρ μοι ἕτερα δοκεῖ σοῦ ἐρωτῶντος, τοτὲ δʼ ἄλλα.
ALCIBIADES: But by the gods, Socrates, I for my part do not even know what I am saying, but I seem to be in an altogether strange condition; for at one time one thing seems to me to be the case when you ask, and at another time another.
ΣΩ. εἶτα τοῦτο, ὦ φίλε, ἀγνοεῖς τὸ πάθημα τί ἐστιν;
SOCRATES: Do you then, my friend, not know what this state is?
ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
ALCIBIADES: Not at all.
ΣΩ. οἴει ἂν οὖν, εἴ τις ἐρωτῴη σε δύο ὀφθαλμοὺς ἢ τρεῖς ἔχεις, καὶ δύο χεῖρας ἢ τέτταρας, ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, τοτὲ μὲν ἕτερα ἂν ἀποκρίνασθαι, τοτὲ δὲ ἄλλα, ἢ ἀεὶ τὰ αὐτά;
SOCRATES: Do you think, then, if someone should ask you whether you have two eyes or three, or two hands or four, or anything else of that sort, that you would answer one thing at one time and another at another, or always the same?