Humanitext Reader

Plato · Alcibiades I §109

Knowledge of Justice and Lack of Learning or Inquiry

Passage 5 of 21 · Greek

Summary

Socrates presses Alcibiades to admit that the 'better' in war and peace is nothing other than the 'more just'. He then exposes that Alcibiades has never learned how to distinguish justice from injustice from any teacher, nor has he ever searched for it on his own.

§109ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μέντοι αἰσχρόν γε εἰ μέν τις σε λέγοντα καὶ συμβουλεύοντα περὶ σιτίων ὅτι βέλτιον τόδε τοῦδε καὶ νῦν καὶ τοσοῦτον, ἔπειτα ἐρωτήσειεν τί τὸ ἄμεινον λέγεις, ὦ Ἀλκιβιάδη; περὶ μὲν τούτων ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ὅτι τὸ ὑγιεινότερον, καίτοι οὐ προσποιῇ γε ἰατρὸς εἶναι· περὶ δὲ οὗ προσποιῇ ἐπιστήμων εἶναι καὶ συμβουλεύσεις ἀνιστάμενος ὡς εἰδώς, τούτου δʼ, ὡς ἔοικας, πέρι ἐρωτηθεὶς ἐὰν μὴ ἔχῃς εἰπεῖν, οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ;
SOCRATES: But indeed, it is shameful if, on the one hand, when you are speaking and advising about food that this is better than that, both now and in such amount, someone should then ask, 'What do you mean by the "better", Alcibiades?' and you are able to say about these things that it is the 'healthier', although you do not pretend to be a doctor; but on the other hand, concerning that which you do pretend to be knowledgeable about, and will stand up to advise on as one who knows, if, when asked about this very thing, you are not able to say, as it seems, are you not ashamed?
ἢ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν φανεῖται;
Or will it not appear shameful?
ΑΛ. πάνυ γε.
ALCIBIADES: Quite so.
ΣΩ. σκόπει δὴ καὶ προθυμοῦ εἰπεῖν πρὸς τί τείνει τὸ ἐν τῷ εἰρήνην τε ἄγειν ἄμεινον καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ πολεμεῖν οἷς δεῖ;
SOCRATES: Well then, consider and be eager to say what the 'better' in keeping peace and in making war against those whom one ought to aims at?
ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ σκοπῶν οὐ δύναμαι ἐννοῆσαι.
ALCIBIADES: But even though I consider, I cannot grasp it.
ΣΩ. οὐδʼ οἶσθα, ἐπειδὰν πόλεμον ποιώμεθα, ὅτι ἐγκαλοῦντες ἀλλήλοις πάθημα ἐρχόμεθα εἰς τὸ πολεμεῖν, καὶ ὅτι αὐτὸ ὀνομάζοντες ἐρχόμεθα;
SOCRATES: Do you not even know that, whenever we make war, we go to war accusing one another of some grievance, and that we go naming this very thing?
ΑΛ. ἔγωγε, ὅτι γε ἐξαπατώμενοί τι ἢ βιαζόμενοι ἢ ἀποστερούμενοι.
ALCIBIADES: I do indeed; namely, that we are being deceived in some way, or forced, or defrauded.
ΣΩ. ἔχε· πῶς ἕκαστα τούτων πάσχοντες;
SOCRATES: Hold on: suffering each of these in what way?
πειρῶ εἰπεῖν τί διαφέρει τὸ ὧδε ἢ ὧδε.
Try to say what difference there is between this way and that way.
ΑΛ. ἦ τὸ ὧδε λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ δικαίως ἢ τὸ ἀδίκως;
ALCIBIADES: Do you mean by 'this way' or 'that way', Socrates, 'justly' or 'unjustly'?
ΣΩ. αὐτὸ τοῦτο.
SOCRATES: Precisely that.
ΑΛ. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτο γε διαφέρει ὅλον τε καὶ πᾶν.
ALCIBIADES: But indeed this makes all the difference in the world.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν;
SOCRATES: What then?
Ἀθηναίοις σὺ πρὸς ποτέρους συμβουλεύσεις πολεμεῖν, τοὺς ἀδικοῦντας ἢ τοὺς τὰ δίκαια πράττοντας;
Against which of the two will you advise the Athenians to make war: those who do wrong, or those who act justly?
ΑΛ. δεινὸν τοῦτό γε ἐρωτᾷς· εἰ γὰρ καὶ διανοεῖταί τις ὡς δεῖ πρὸς τοὺς τὰ δίκαια πράττοντας πολεμεῖν, οὐκ ἂν ὁμολογήσειέν γε.
ALCIBIADES: You ask a terrible thing; for even if someone should intend that they ought to make war against those who act justly, he would certainly not admit it.
ΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ νόμιμον τοῦθʼ, ὡς ἔοικεν.
SOCRATES: For that is not lawful, as it seems.
ΑΛ. οὐ δῆτα· οὐδέ γε καλὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι.
ALCIBIADES: Certainly not; nor indeed does it seem to be noble.
ΣΩ. πρὸς ταῦτʼ ἄρα καὶ σὺ τοὺς λόγους ποιήσῃ;
SOCRATES: Will you then make your speeches looking to these things?
ΑΛ. ἀνάγκη.
ALCIBIADES: Of necessity.
ΣΩ. ἄλλο τι οὖν, ὃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἠρώτων βέλτιον πρὸς τὸ πολεμεῖν καὶ μή, καὶ οἷς δεῖ καὶ οἷς μή, καὶ ὁπότε καὶ μή, τὸ δικαιότερον τυγχάνει ὄν;
SOCRATES: Is it not the case, then, that the 'better' which I was just now asking about regarding making war and not, and against whom one ought and whom not, and when and when not, turns out to be the 'more just'?
ἢ οὔ;
Or not?
ΑΛ. φαίνεταί γε.
ALCIBIADES: It appears so, indeed.
ΣΩ. πῶς οὖν, ὦ φίλε Ἀλκιβιάδη;
SOCRATES: How is this then, my dear Alcibiades?
πότερον σαυτὸν λέληθας ὅτι οὐκ ἐπίστασαι τοῦτο, ἢ ἐμὲ ἔλαθες μανθάνων καὶ φοιτῶν εἰς διδασκάλου ὅς σε ἐδίδασκε διαγιγνώσκειν τὸ δικαιότερόν τε καὶ ἀδικώτερον;
Have you escaped your own notice that you do not know this, or have you escaped my notice in learning it and attending the school of a teacher who taught you to distinguish the more just and the more unjust?
καὶ τίς ἐστιν οὗτος;
And who is this person?
φράσον καὶ ἐμοί, ἵνα αὐτῷ φοιτητὴν προξενήσῃς καὶ ἐμέ.
Tell me as well, so that you may introduce me to him as a pupil too.
ΑΛ. σκώπτεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.
ALCIBIADES: You are mocking me, Socrates.
ΣΩ. οὐ μὰ τὸν Φίλιον τὸν ἐμόν τε καὶ σόν, ὃν ἐγὼ ἥκιστʼ ἂν ἐπιορκήσαιμι· ἀλλʼ εἴπερ ἔχεις, εἰπὲ τίς ἐστιν.
SOCRATES: No, by the god of Friendship, who is both mine and yours, by whom I would least of all swear falsely; but if indeed you have one, tell me who he is.
ΑΛ. τί δʼ εἰ μὴ ἔχω;
ALCIBIADES: And what if I do not have one?
οὐκ ἂν οἴει με ἄλλως εἰδέναι περὶ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων;
Do you not think I could know about the just and unjust in some other way?
ΣΩ. ναί, εἴ γε εὕροις.
SOCRATES: Yes, if indeed you should have found it.
ΑΛ. ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἂν εὑρεῖν με ἡγῇ;
ALCIBIADES: But do you not think I could have found it?
ΣΩ. καὶ μάλα γε, εἰ ζητήσαις.
SOCRATES: Most certainly, if you had searched.
ΑΛ. εἶτα ζητῆσαι οὐκ ἂν οἴει με;
ALCIBIADES: Then you do not think I would have searched?
ΣΩ. ἔγωγε, εἰ οἰηθείης γε μὴ εἰδέναι.
SOCRATES: I do, if indeed you had thought that you did not know.
ΑΛ. εἶτα οὐκ ἦν ὅτʼ εἶχον οὕτω;
ALCIBIADES: Then, was there not a time when I was in that state?

Notes

  1. 109ἔχειν εἰπεῖν — Meaning 'to be able to say'. This is the idiomatic use of ἔχω with an infinitive meaning 'to be able to'. Positioned within the conditional structure, it serves as an infinitive of result or qualification in contrast (μὲν ... δέ) responding to the leading predicate αἰσχρόν (it is shameful).
  2. 109cἄλλο τι οὖν — The idiomatic expression ἄλλο τι ἤ... ('is it not the case that...?', 'is it anything other than...?') with ἤ omitted, or forming the construction ἄλλο τι οὖν... ἤ... It introduces a question strongly expecting an affirmative answer.
  3. 109dσαυτὸν λέληθας... ἐμὲ ἔλαθες μανθάνων — Two major constructions of the verb λανθάνω (to escape notice). The first, σαυτὸν λέληθας ὅτι..., takes a ὅτι-clause meaning 'you have escaped your own notice that...' (you are unaware of...). The second, ἐμὲ ἔλαθες μανθάνων, takes an accusative object (ἐμέ) and a supplementary participle (μανθάνων), meaning 'you escaped my notice in learning' (you learned without my knowing).

Cite this passage

Plato, Alcibiades I §109. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg013.humanitext-grc2:109

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