§266ΣΩ. τὸ πάλιν κατʼ εἴδη δύνασθαι διατέμνειν κατʼ ἄρθρα ᾗ πέφυκεν, καὶ μὴ ἐπιχειρεῖν καταγνύναι μέρος μηδέν, κακοῦ μαγείρου τρόπῳ χρώμενον·
SOCRATES: It is, conversely, to be able to cut it back again according to forms, along its natural joints, and not to attempt to shatter any part, after the manner of a bad carver.
ἀλλʼ ὥσπερ ἄρτι τὼ λόγω τὸ μὲν ἄφρον τῆς διανοίας ἕν τι κοινῇ εἶδος ἐλαβέτην, ὥσπερ δὲ σώματος ἐξ ἑνὸς διπλᾶ καὶ ὁμώνυμα πέφυκε, σκαιά, τὰ δὲ δεξιὰ κληθέντα, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τῆς παρανοίας ὡς ἓν ἐν ἡμῖν πεφυκὸς εἶδος ἡγησαμένω τὼ λόγω, ὁ μὲν τὸ ἐπʼ ἀριστερὰ τεμνόμενος μέρος, πάλιν τοῦτο τέμνων οὐκ ἐπανῆκεν πρὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐφευρὼν ὀνομαζόμενον σκαιόν τινα ἔρωτα ἐλοιδόρησεν μάλʼ ἐν δίκῃ, ὁ δʼ εἰς τὰ ἐν δεξιᾷ τῆς μανίας ἀγαγὼν ἡμᾶς, ὁμώνυμον μὲν ἐκείνῳ, θεῖον δʼ αὖ τινα ἔρωτα ἐφευρὼν καὶ προτεινάμενος ἐπῄνεσεν ὡς μεγίστων αἴτιον ἡμῖν ἀγαθῶν.
But just as the two speeches just now took the foolish part of the mind as some single common form, and just as from one body twin and homonymous parts naturally grow—the ones called left, the others right—so also the two speeches, having deemed the madness in us to be one naturally existing form, the one cutting the left-hand part, and cutting this again, did not desist before discovering among them a certain 'left-hand' love so-called, which it abused very justly; while the other, leading us to the right-hand parts of madness, having discovered a certain divine love, homonymous indeed to that other, and having held it out, praised it as the cause of our greatest goods.
ΦΑΙ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
PHAEDRUS: You speak most truly.
ΣΩ. τούτων δὴ ἔγωγε αὐτός τε ἐραστής, ὦ Φαῖδρε, τῶν διαιρέσεων καὶ συναγωγῶν, ἵνα οἷός τε ὦ λέγειν τε καὶ φρονεῖν·
SOCRATES: Of these divisions and collections, Phaedrus, I myself am a lover, so that I may be able to speak and to think.
ἐάν τέ τινʼ ἄλλον ἡγήσωμαι δυνατὸν εἰς ἓν καὶ ἐπὶ πολλὰ πεφυκόθʼ ὁρᾶν, τοῦτον διώκω
κατόπισθε μετʼ ἴχνιον ὥστε θεοῖο. καὶ μέντοι καὶ τοὺς δυναμένους αὐτὸ δρᾶν εἰ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ προσαγορεύω, θεὸς οἶδε, καλῶ δὲ οὖν μέχρι τοῦδε διαλεκτικούς.
And if I think anyone else is capable of seeing a nature that is one and also extends over many, him I follow 'behind, in his footsteps as if of a god.' And moreover, those who are able to do this, whether I address them rightly or not, God knows, but at any rate up to now I call them dialecticians.
τὰ δὲ νῦν παρὰ σοῦ τε καὶ Λυσίου μαθόντας εἰπὲ τί χρὴ καλεῖν· ἢ τοῦτο ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν ἡ λόγων τέχνη, ᾗ Θρασύμαχός τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι χρώμενοι σοφοὶ μὲν αὐτοὶ λέγειν γεγόνασιν, ἄλλους τε ποιοῦσιν, οἳ ἂν δωροφορεῖν αὐτοῖς ὡς βασιλεῦσιν ἐθέλωσιν;
But tell me now what we must call those who learn from you and Lysias; or is this that very art of speeches which Thrasymachus and the other wise men use, by which they themselves have become skilled in speaking, and make others so, who are willing to bring them gifts as if to kings?
ΦΑΙ. βασιλικοὶ μὲν ἇνδρες, οὐ μὲν δὴ ἐπιστήμονές γε ὧν ἐρωτᾷς.
PHAEDRUS: Kingly men they are indeed, but certainly not knowledgeable in what you ask.
ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν τὸ εἶδος ὀρθῶς ἔμοιγε δοκεῖς καλεῖν, διαλεκτικὸν καλῶν· τὸ δὲ ῥητορικὸν δοκεῖ μοι διαφεύγειν ἔθʼ ἡμᾶς.
But this class you seem to me to call correctly, calling it dialectic; but rhetoric, it seems to me, still escapes us.
ΣΩ. πῶς φῄς;
SOCRATES: How do you mean?
καλόν πού τι ἂν εἴη, ὃ τούτων ἀπολειφθὲν ὅμως τέχνῃ λαμβάνεται;
Would there be some beautiful thing which, though left behind by these, is nevertheless grasped by art?
πάντως δʼ οὐκ ἀτιμαστέον αὐτὸ σοί τε καὶ ἐμοί, λεκτέον δὲ τί μέντοι καὶ ἔστι τὸ λειπόμενον τῆς ῥητορικῆς.
At all events, it must not be disdained by you and me, but we must state what indeed is that remaining part of rhetoric.
ΦΑΙ. καὶ μάλα που συχνά, ὦ Σώκρατες, τά γʼ ἐν τοῖς βιβλίοις τοῖς περὶ λόγων τέχνης γεγραμμένοις.
PHAEDRUS: And indeed quite a lot of things, Socrates, at least those written in the books on the art of speeches.
ΣΩ. καλῶς γε ὑπέμνησας.
SOCRATES: You have reminded me well.
προοίμιον μὲν οἶμαι πρῶτον ὡς δεῖ τοῦ λόγου λέγεσθαι ἐν ἀρχῇ· ταῦτα λέγεις —ἦ γάρ; —τὰ κομψὰ τῆς τέχνης;
First, I think, an introduction must be spoken at the beginning of the speech; is this what you mean—is it not?—the fine points of the art?
ΦΑΙ. ναί.
PHAEDRUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. δεύτερον δὲ δὴ διήγησίν τινα μαρτυρίας τʼ ἐπʼ αὐτῇ, τρίτον τεκμήρια, τέταρτον εἰκότα· καὶ πίστωσιν οἶμαι καὶ ἐπιπίστωσιν λέγειν τόν γε βέλτιστον λογοδαίδαλον Βυζάντιον ἄνδρα.
SOCRATES: And second, to be sure, a narrative and testimonies upon it, thirdly proofs, fourthly probabilities; and I think the most excellent speech-artificer from Byzantium speaks also of confirmation and further confirmation.
ΦΑΙ. τὸν χρηστὸν λέγεις Θεόδωρον;
PHAEDRUS: Do you mean the worthy Theodorus?
§267ΣΩ. τί μήν;
SOCRATES: Why, of course.
καὶ ἔλεγχόν γε καὶ ἐπεξέλεγχον ὡς ποιητέον ἐν κατηγορίᾳ τε καὶ ἀπολογίᾳ.
And also refutation and further refutation, which must be made in accusation and defense.
τὸν δὲ κάλλιστον Πάριον Εὐηνὸν ἐς μέσον οὐκ ἄγομεν, ὃς ὑποδήλωσίν τε πρῶτος ηὗρεν καὶ παρεπαίνους—οἱ δʼ αὐτὸν καὶ παραψόγους φασὶν ἐν μέτρῳ λέγειν μνήμης χάριν—σοφὸς γὰρ ἁνήρ.
And do we not bring into the midst the most beautiful Evenus of Paros, who first discovered indirect insinuation and indirect praises—and some say he spoke also of indirect slanders in meter for the sake of memory—for he is a wise man.
Τεισίαν δὲ Γοργίαν τε ἐάσομεν εὕδειν, οἳ πρὸ τῶν ἀληθῶν τὰ εἰκότα εἶδον ὡς τιμητέα μᾶλλον, τά τε αὖ σμικρὰ μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μεγάλα σμικρὰ φαίνεσθαι ποιοῦσιν διὰ ῥώμην λόγου, καινά τε ἀρχαίως τά τʼ ἐναντία καινῶς, συντομίαν τε λόγων καὶ ἄπειρα μήκη περὶ πάντων ἀνηῦρον;
And shall we let Tisias and Gorgias sleep, who saw that probabilities are to be honored more than truths, and who, moreover, make small things appear great and great things small through the strength of speech, and new things in an ancient way and their opposites in a new way, and discovered both conciseness of speech and infinite lengths on all subjects?
ταῦτα δὲ ἀκούων ποτέ μου Πρόδικος ἐγέλασεν, καὶ μόνος αὐτὸς ηὑρηκέναι ἔφη ὧν δεῖ λόγων τέχνην· δεῖν δὲ οὔτε μακρῶν οὔτε βραχέων ἀλλὰ μετρίων.
Hearing these things from me once, Prodicus laughed, and said that he alone had discovered what kind of speeches art requires: that they should be neither long nor short, but moderate.
ΦΑΙ. σοφώτατά γε, ὦ Πρόδικε.
PHAEDRUS: Very wisely indeed, Prodicus!
ΣΩ. Ἱππίαν δὲ οὐ λέγομεν;
SOCRATES: And do we not speak of Hippias?
οἶμαι γὰρ ἂν σύμψηφον αὐτῷ καὶ τὸν Ἠλεῖον ξένον γενέσθαι.
For I think the stranger from Elis would also cast his vote with him.
ΦΑΙ. τί δʼ οὔ;
PHAEDRUS: Why indeed not?
ΣΩ. τὰ δὲ Πώλου πῶς φράσωμεν αὖ μουσεῖα λόγων—ὡς διπλασιολογίαν καὶ γνωμολογίαν καὶ εἰκονολογίαν—ὀνομάτων τε Λικυμνίων ἃ ἐκείνῳ ἐδωρήσατο πρὸς ποίησιν εὐεπείας;
SOCRATES: And how, in turn, shall we describe Polus' museums of speeches—such as duplication of words, and maxims, and imagery—and those words of Licymnius which he gifted to him for the creation of fine style?
ΦΑΙ. Πρωταγόρεια δέ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἦν μέντοι τοιαῦτʼ ἄττα;
PHAEDRUS: But Socrates, were there not indeed some things of that kind belonging to Protagoras?
ΣΩ. ὀρθοέπειά γέ τις, ὦ παῖ, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ καὶ καλά.
SOCRATES: A certain 'correctness of diction,' my boy, and many other beautiful things.
τῶν γε μὴν οἰκτρογόων ἐπὶ γῆρας καὶ πενίαν ἑλκομένων λόγων κεκρατηκέναι τέχνῃ μοι φαίνεται τὸ τοῦ Χαλκηδονίου σθένος, ὀργίσαι τε αὖ πολλοὺς ἅμα δεινὸς ἁνὴρ γέγονεν, καὶ πάλιν ὠργισμένοις ἐπᾴδων κηλεῖν, ὡς ἔφη·
But indeed, in speeches of lamentation dragged down to old age and poverty, the might of the Chalcedonian seems to me to have triumphed by art. And he has become a man terrible at making many angry at once, and again, by chanting incantations, at soothing those who are angry, as he said.
διαβάλλειν τε καὶ ἀπολύσασθαι διαβολὰς ὁθενδὴ κράτιστος.
And he is strongest at casting slanders and dissolving slanders from whatever source.
τὸ δὲ δὴ τέλος τῶν λόγων κοινῇ πᾶσιν ἔοικε συνδεδογμένον εἶναι, ᾧ τινες μὲν ἐπάνοδον, ἄλλοι δʼ ἄλλο τίθενται ὄνομα.
And indeed, the end of speeches seems to have been agreed upon in common by all, to which some give the name 'recapitulation,' and others give other names.
ΦΑΙ. τὸ ἐν κεφαλαίῳ ἕκαστα λέγεις ὑπομνῆσαι ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τοὺς ἀκούοντας περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων;
PHAEDRUS: You mean reminding the hearers at the end, in summary, about the things that have been said?
ΣΩ. ταῦτα λέγω, καὶ εἴ τι σὺ ἄλλο ἔχεις εἰπεῖν λόγων τέχνης πέρι.
SOCRATES: That is what I mean, and also if you have anything else to say about the art of speeches.
ΦΑΙ. σμικρά γε καὶ οὐκ ἄξια λέγειν.
PHAEDRUS: Small things, at any rate, and not worth speaking of.