§237ΦΑΙ. λέγε δή.
PHAEDRUS: Speak then.
ΣΩ. οἶσθʼ οὖν ὡς ποιήσω;
SOCRATES: Do you know, then, how I shall do it?
ΦΑΙ. τοῦ πέρι;
PHAEDRUS: About what?
ΣΩ. ἐγκαλυψάμενος ἐρῶ, ἵνʼ ὅτι τάχιστα διαδράμω τὸν λόγον καὶ μὴ βλέπων πρὸς σὲ ὑπʼ αἰσχύνης διαπορῶμαι.
SOCRATES: I shall speak with my head covered, so that I may run through the speech as quickly as possible and not, by looking at you, be embarrassed out of shame.
ΦΑΙ. λέγε μόνον, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα ὅπως βούλει ποίει.
PHAEDRUS: Only speak, and as for the rest, do as you wish.
ΣΩ. ἄγετε δή, ὦ Μοῦσαι, εἴτε διʼ ᾠδῆς εἶδος λίγειαι, εἴτε διὰ γένος μουσικὸν τὸ Λιγύων ταύτην ἔσχετʼ ἐπωνυμίαν,
ξύμ μοι λάβεσθε
τοῦ μύθου, ὅν με ἀναγκάζει ὁ βέλτιστος οὑτοσὶ λέγειν, ἵνʼ ὁ ἑταῖρος αὐτοῦ, καὶ πρότερον δοκῶν τούτῳ σοφὸς εἶναι, νῦν ἔτι μᾶλλον δόξῃ.
SOCRATES: Come then, O Muses, whether you got this name from the clear quality of your song, or whether from the musical race of the Ligurians, take part with me in the myth which this excellent fellow here forces me to tell, so that his companion, who even before seemed wise to him, may now seem even more so.
ἦν οὕτω δὴ παῖς, μᾶλλον δὲ μειρακίσκος, μάλα καλός· τούτῳ δὲ ἦσαν ἐρασταὶ πάνυ πολλοί.
There was once a boy, or rather a youth, exceedingly beautiful; and he had very many lovers.
εἷς δέ τις αὐτῶν αἱμύλος ἦν, ὃς οὐδενὸς ἧττον ἐρῶν ἐπεπείκει τὸν παῖδα ὡς οὐκ ἐρῴη.
And one of them was a wily man, who, though loving him no less than anyone else, had persuaded the boy that he did not love him.
καί ποτε αὐτὸν αἰτῶν ἔπειθεν τοῦτʼ αὐτό, ὡς μὴ ἐρῶντι πρὸ τοῦ ἐρῶντος δέοι χαρίζεσθαι, ἔλεγέν τε ὧδε— περὶ παντός, ὦ παῖ, μία ἀρχὴ τοῖς μέλλουσι καλῶς βουλεύσεσθαι· εἰδέναι δεῖ περὶ οὗ ἂν ᾖ ἡ βουλή, ἢ παντὸς ἁμαρτάνειν ἀνάγκη.
And once, in wooing him, he tried to persuade him of this very thing, that one ought to gratify a non-lover rather than a lover, and he spoke as follows: "In everything, my boy, there is one starting point for those who are going to deliberate well: they must know what the deliberation is about, or they must fail in everything.
τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς λέληθεν ὅτι οὐκ ἴσασι τὴν οὐσίαν ἑκάστου.
But it escapes the notice of the majority that they do not know the real essence of each thing.
ὡς οὖν εἰδότες οὐ διομολογοῦνται ἐν ἀρχῇ τῆς σκέψεως, προελθόντες δὲ τὸ εἰκὸς ἀποδιδόασιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς οὔτε ἀλλήλοις ὁμολογοῦσιν.
Therefore, as if they knew it, they do not come to an agreement at the beginning of their inquiry, and as they proceed they pay the natural penalty; for they agree neither with themselves nor with one another.
ἐγὼ οὖν καὶ σὺ μὴ πάθωμεν ὃ ἄλλοις ἐπιτιμῶμεν, ἀλλʼ ἐπειδὴ σοὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ ὁ λόγος πρόκειται πότερα ἐρῶντι ἢ μὴ μᾶλλον εἰς φιλίαν ἰτέον, περὶ ἔρωτος οἷόν τʼ ἔστι καὶ ἣν ἔχει δύναμιν, ὁμολογίᾳ θέμενοι ὅρον, εἰς τοῦτο ἀποβλέποντες καὶ ἀναφέροντες τὴν σκέψιν ποιώμεθα εἴτε ὠφελίαν εἴτε βλάβην παρέχει.
Let you and me, then, not suffer what we find fault with in others; but since the question proposed for you and me is whether one should enter into friendship with a lover rather than a non-lover, let us establish a definition of love by agreement as to what sort of thing it is and what power it has, and looking to this and referring our inquiry to it, let us examine whether it offers benefit or harm.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν δὴ ἐπιθυμία τις ὁ ἔρως, ἅπαντι δῆλον· ὅτι δʼ αὖ καὶ μὴ ἐρῶντες ἐπιθυμοῦσι τῶν καλῶν, ἴσμεν.
Now, that love is a certain desire is clear to everyone; and on the other hand, we know that even non-lovers desire beautiful things.
τῷ δὴ τὸν ἐρῶντά τε καὶ μὴ κρινοῦμεν;
By what, then, shall we distinguish the lover and the non-lover?
δεῖ αὖ νοῆσαι ὅτι ἡμῶν ἐν ἑκάστῳ δύο τινέ ἐστον ἰδέα ἄρχοντε καὶ ἄγοντε, οἷν ἑπόμεθα ᾗ ἂν ἄγητον, ἡ μὲν ἔμφυτος οὖσα ἐπιθυμία ἡδονῶν, ἄλλη δὲ ἐπίκτητος δόξα, ἐφιεμένη τοῦ ἀρίστου.
We must further understand that in each of us there are two ruling and leading principles, which we follow wherever they lead: one is an innate desire for pleasures, the other an acquired opinion that aims at the best.
τούτω δὲ ἐν ἡμῖν τοτὲ μὲν ὁμονοεῖτον, ἔστι δὲ ὅτε στασιάζετον· καὶ τοτὲ μὲν ἡ ἑτέρα, ἄλλοτε δὲ ἡ ἑτέρα κρατεῖ. §238ΣΩ. δόξης μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄριστον λόγῳ ἀγούσης καὶ κρατούσης τῷ κράτει σωφροσύνη ὄνομα·
These two in us sometimes agree, but at other times they are in conflict; and sometimes one, and at other times the other, rules." SOCRATES: "Now, when opinion leads by reason toward the best and has the upper hand, its rule is called temperance; but when desire drags us irrationally toward pleasures and rules in us, its rule is named wantonness.
ἐπιθυμίας δὲ ἀλόγως ἑλκούσης ἐπὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ ἀρξάσης ἐν ἡμῖν τῇ ἀρχῇ ὕβρις ἐπωνομάσθη. ὕβρις δὲ δὴ πολυώνυμον —πολυμελὲς γὰρ καὶ πολυμερές—καὶ τούτων τῶν ἰδεῶν ἐκπρεπὴς ἣ ἂν τύχῃ γενομένη, τὴν αὑτῆς ἐπωνυμίαν ὀνομαζόμενον τὸν ἔχοντα παρέχεται, οὔτε τινὰ καλὴν οὔτʼ ἐπαξίαν κεκτῆσθαι.
Now wantonness has many names—for it has many limbs and many parts—and whichever of these forms happens to become prominent gives its own name as a designation to the person who possesses it, a name that is neither beautiful nor worth acquiring.
περὶ μὲν γὰρ ἐδωδὴν κρατοῦσα τοῦ λόγου τε τοῦ ἀρίστου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐπιθυμία γαστριμαργία τε καὶ τὸν ἔχοντα ταὐτὸν τοῦτο κεκλημένον παρέξεται· περὶ δʼ αὖ μέθας τυραννεύσασα, τὸν κεκτημένον ταύτῃ ἄγουσα, δῆλον οὗ τεύξεται προσρήματος·
For example, the desire for food that rules over the best reason and the other desires will be called gluttony, and will cause the person who has it to be called by this very same name; and again, that which plays the tyrant over drinking, and leads the one who possesses it in this direction, it is clear what title it will obtain.
καὶ τἆλλα δὴ τὰ τούτων ἀδελφὰ καὶ ἀδελφῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ὀνόματα τῆς ἀεὶ δυναστευούσης ᾗ προσήκει καλεῖσθαι πρόδηλον.
And it is obvious what the other similar names of these brother desires should be called, according to whichever one happens to be always dominant.
ἧς δʼ ἕνεκα πάντα τὰ πρόσθεν εἴρηται, σχεδὸν μὲν ἤδη φανερόν, λεχθὲν δὲ ἢ μὴ λεχθὲν πάντως σαφέστερον·
But that for the sake of which all the preceding things have been said is already almost manifest, though if spoken it will be altogether clearer than if unspoken.
ἡ γὰρ ἄνευ λόγου δόξης ἐπὶ τὸ ὀρθὸν ὁρμώσης κρατήσασα ἐπιθυμία πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀχθεῖσα κάλλους, καὶ ὑπὸ αὖ τῶν ἑαυτῆς συγγενῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐπὶ σωμάτων κάλλος ἐρρωμένως ῥωσθεῖσα νικήσασα ἀγωγῇ, ἀπʼ αὐτῆς τῆς ῥώμης ἐπωνυμίαν λαβοῦσα, ἔρως ἐκλήθη. ἀτάρ, ὦ φίλε Φαῖδρε, δοκῶ τι σοί, ὥσπερ ἐμαυτῷ, θεῖον πάθος πεπονθέναι;
For the desire without reason, which has conquered the opinion that points toward the right, and is led toward the pleasure of beauty, and is again vigorously strengthened by its own kindred desires toward physical beauty, conquering in its leadership, has received its name from this very 'strength' (rhōmē) and is called 'love' (erōs)." But, my dear Phaedrus, do I seem to you, as I do to myself, to have experienced a divine state?
ΦΑΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, παρὰ τὸ εἰωθὸς εὔροιά τίς σε εἴληφεν.
PHAEDRUS: Very much so, Socrates; contrary to your custom, a certain fluency has seized you.
ΣΩ. σιγῇ τοίνυν μου ἄκουε.
SOCRATES: Listen to me, then, in silence.
τῷ ὄντι γὰρ θεῖος ἔοικεν ὁ τόπος εἶναι, ὥστε ἐὰν ἄρα πολλάκις νυμφόληπτος προϊόντος τοῦ λόγου γένωμαι, μὴ θαυμάσῃς· τὰ νῦν γὰρ οὐκέτι πόρρω διθυράμβων φθέγγομαι.
For in truth this place seems to be divine, so that if I should often become possessed by the nymphs as the speech proceeds, do not wonder; for even now my speech is not far from dithyrambs.
ΦΑΙ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
PHAEDRUS: You speak most truly.
ΣΩ. τούτων μέντοι σὺ αἴτιος.
SOCRATES: You indeed are the cause of these things.
ἀλλὰ τὰ λοιπὰ ἄκουε· ἴσως γὰρ κἂν ἀποτράποιτο τὸ ἐπιόν.
But hear the rest; for perhaps the impending thing might be averted.
ταῦτα μὲν οὖν θεῷ μελήσει, ἡμῖν δὲ πρὸς τὸν παῖδα πάλιν τῷ λόγῳ ἰτέον. εἶεν, ὦ φέριστε·
However, these things will be the concern of God, but we must return to the boy in our speech.
ὃ μὲν δὴ τυγχάνει ὂν περὶ οὗ βουλευτέον, εἴρηταί τε καὶ ὥρισται, βλέποντες δὲ δὴ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὰ λοιπὰ λέγωμεν τίς ὠφελία ἢ βλάβη ἀπό τε ἐρῶντος καὶ μὴ τῷ χαριζομένῳ ἐξ εἰκότος συμβήσεται.
"Well then, most excellent boy: what the thing is about which we must deliberate has been spoken and defined; and looking to this, let us speak of what remains, namely, what benefit or harm is likely to result to the one who gratifies a lover and a non-lover respectively.
τῷ δὴ ὑπὸ ἐπιθυμίας ἀρχομένῳ δουλεύοντί τε ἡδονῇ ἀνάγκη που τὸν ἐρώμενον ὡς ἥδιστον ἑαυτῷ παρασκευάζειν· νοσοῦντι δὲ πᾶν ἡδὺ τὸ μὴ ἀντιτεῖνον, κρεῖττον δὲ καὶ ἴσον ἐχθρόν.
Now, for him who is ruled by desire and enslaved to pleasure, it is necessary, I suppose, to make his beloved as pleasant as possible to himself; but to a diseased person, anything that does not resist is pleasant, whereas what is superior and equal is an enemy."