§64ΣΩ.
ἀλλʼ ἅς τε ἡδονὰς ἀληθεῖς καὶ καθαρὰς εἶπες, σχεδὸν οἰκείας ἡμῖν νόμιζε, καὶ πρὸς ταύταις τὰς μεθʼ ὑγιείας καὶ τοῦ σωφρονεῖν, καὶ δὴ καὶ συμπάσης ἀρετῆς ὁπόσαι καθάπερ θεοῦ ὀπαδοὶ γιγνόμεναι αὐτῇ συνακολουθοῦσι πάντῃ, ταύτας μείγνυ· τὰς δʼ ἀεὶ μετʼ ἀφροσύνης καὶ τῆς ἄλλης κακίας ἑπομένας πολλή που ἀλογία τῷ νῷ μειγνύναι τὸν βουλόμενον ὅτι καλλίστην ἰδόντα καὶ ἀστασιαστοτάτην μεῖξιν καὶ κρᾶσιν, ἐν ταύτῃ μαθεῖν πειρᾶσθαι τί ποτε ἔν τʼ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ παντὶ πέφυκεν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τίνα ἰδέαν αὐτὴν εἶναί ποτε μαντευτέον.
SOCRATES: But as for the pleasures you called true and pure, consider them as almost akin to us, and in addition to these, those that accompany health and temperance, and indeed all those which, becoming like attendants of a god, follow in the train of virtue everywhere—mix these in; but as for those which always follow in the train of folly and other vice, it would surely be highly irrational for anyone who wishes to see the most beautiful and stable mixture and blend, and to try to learn in this what is by nature good in man and in the universe, and what form itself one must divine it to be, to mix them with intellect.
ἆρʼ οὐκ ἐμφρόνως ταῦτα καὶ ἐχόντως ἑαυτὸν τὸν νοῦν φήσομεν ὑπέρ τε αὑτοῦ καὶ μνήμης καὶ δόξης ὀρθῆς ἀποκρίνασθαι τὰ νῦν ῥηθέντα;
Shall we not say that intellect has answered wisely and like itself in what has just been said, on behalf of itself, memory, and right opinion?
ΠΡΩ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
PROTARCHUS: Entirely so, indeed.
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε γε ἀναγκαῖον, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλως ἄν ποτε γένοιτο οὐδʼ ἂν ἕν.
SOCRATES: But furthermore, this also is necessary, and otherwise not even one single thing could ever come to be.
ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον;
PROTARCHUS: What is that?
ΣΩ. ὧι μὴ μείξομεν ἀλήθειαν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε τοῦτο ἀληθῶς γίγνοιτο οὐδʼ ἂν γενόμενον εἴη.
SOCRATES: That in which we do not mix truth, could never truly come to be, nor could it exist even if it had come to be.
ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
PROTARCHUS: For how could it?
ΣΩ. οὐδαμῶς.
SOCRATES: By no means.
ἀλλʼ εἴ τινος ἔτι προσδεῖ τῇ συγκράσει ταύτῃ, λέγετε σὺ καὶ Φίληβος.
But if there is still any need of anything for this mixture, do you and Philebus say so.
ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ καθαπερεὶ κόσμος τις ἀσώματος ἄρξων καλῶς ἐμψύχου σώματος ὁ νῦν λόγος ἀπειργάσθαι φαίνεται.
For to me the present argument seems to have been completed like an incorporeal order that is to rule well over an animate body.
ΠΡΩ. καὶ ἐμοὶ τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω λέγε δεδόχθαι.
PROTARCHUS: Then for me too, Socrates, consider it to be so decided.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ νῦν ἤδη προθύροις τῆς οἰκήσεως ἐφεστάναι λέγοντες ἴσως ὀρθῶς ἄν τινα τρόπον φαῖμεν;
SOCRATES: Shall we then, saying that we are now standing at the very vestibule of the dwelling of the good, perhaps speak correctly in a certain way?
ΠΡΩ. ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.
PROTARCHUS: To me at least, it seems so.
ΣΩ. τί δῆτα ἐν τῇ συμμείξει τιμιώτατον ἅμα καὶ μάλιστʼ αἴτιον εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν ἡμῖν τοῦ πᾶσιν γεγονέναι προσφιλῆ τὴν τοιαύτην διάθεσιν;
SOCRATES: What, then, in the mixture would seem to us to be at once the most precious and the chief cause of such a state becoming pleasing to all?
τοῦτο γὰρ ἰδόντες μετὰ τοῦτʼ ἐπισκεψόμεθα εἴθʼ ἡδονῇ εἴτε τῷ νῷ προσφυέστερον καὶ οἰκειότερον ἐν τῷ παντὶ συνέστηκεν.
For having seen this, we shall after this examine whether it is established in the universe as more closely related and akin to pleasure or to intellect.
ΠΡΩ. ὀρθῶς· τοῦτο γὰρ εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἡμῖν ἐστι συμφορώτατον.
PROTARCHUS: Rightly; for this is most useful to us for our judgment.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν καὶ συμπάσης γε μείξεως οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν τὴν αἰτίαν, διʼ ἣν ἢ παντὸς ἀξία γίγνεται ἡτισοῦν ἢ τὸ παράπαν οὐδενός.
SOCRATES: And indeed, for any mixture whatsoever, it is not difficult to see the cause through which it becomes either of the greatest value or of no value at all.
ΠΡΩ. πῶς λέγεις;
PROTARCHUS: How do you mean?
ΣΩ. οὐδείς που τοῦτο ἀνθρώπων ἀγνοεῖ.
SOCRATES: Surely no man is ignorant of this.
ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον;
PROTARCHUS: What is that?
ΣΩ. ὅτι μέτρου καὶ τῆς συμμέτρου φύσεως μὴ τυχοῦσα ἡτισοῦν καὶ ὁπωσοῦν σύγκρασις πᾶσα ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀπόλλυσι τά τε κεραννύμενα καὶ πρώτην αὑτήν· οὐδὲ γὰρ κρᾶσις ἀλλά τις ἄκρατος συμπεφορημένη ἀληθῶς ἡ τοιαύτη γίγνεται ἑκάστοτε ὄντως τοῖς κεκτημένοις συμφορά.
SOCRATES: That any mixture whatsoever, in whatever way, if it does not attain measure and a proportionate nature, necessarily destroys both the ingredients and first of all itself; for indeed, such a thing is not even a blend, but truly an unblended, jumbled mass, and every time is really a misfortune to those who possess it.
ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα.
PROTARCHUS: Most true.
ΣΩ. νῦν δὴ καταπέφευγεν ἡμῖν ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δύναμις εἰς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ φύσιν· μετριότης γὰρ καὶ συμμετρία κάλλος δήπου καὶ ἀρετὴ πανταχοῦ συμβαίνει γίγνεσθαι.
SOCRATES: Now, then, the power of the good has fled for refuge for us into the nature of the beautiful; for measure and proportion, surely, happen everywhere to become beauty and virtue.
ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
PROTARCHUS: By all means, indeed.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν ἀλήθειάν γε ἔφαμεν αὐτοῖς ἐν τῇ κράσει μεμεῖχθαι.
SOCRATES: And indeed, we said that truth also was mixed with them in the blend.
ΠΡΩ. πάνυ γε.
PROTARCHUS: Certainly.
§65ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ μὴ μιᾷ δυνάμεθα ἰδέᾳ τὸ ἀγαθὸν θηρεῦσαι, σὺν τρισὶ λαβόντες, κάλλει καὶ συμμετρίᾳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ, λέγωμεν ὡς τοῦτο οἷον ἓν ὀρθότατʼ ἂν αἰτιασαίμεθʼ ἂν τῶν ἐν τῇ συμμείξει, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ὡς ἀγαθὸν ὂν τοιαύτην αὐτὴν γεγονέναι.
SOCRATES: Therefore, if we cannot hunt down the good with one single form, let us take it with three—beauty, proportion, and truth—and say that we might most rightly hold this, as if it were one, responsible for what is in the mixture, and that because of this, as being good, the mixture itself has become such.
ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα μὲν οὖν.
PROTARCHUS: Most rightly, indeed.
ΣΩ. ἤδη τοίνυν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἱκανὸς ἡμῖν γένοιτʼ ἂν ὁστισοῦν κριτὴς ἡδονῆς τε πέρι καὶ φρονήσεως, ὁπότερον αὐτοῖν τοῦ ἀρίστου συγγενέστερόν τε καὶ τιμιώτερον ἐν ἀνθρώποις τέ ἐστι καὶ θεοῖς.
SOCRATES: Now, then, Protarchus, anyone whatsoever would become for us a sufficient judge concerning pleasure and wisdom, as to which of the two is more akin and more precious to the best, both among men and gods.
ΠΡΩ. δῆλον μέν, ὅμως δʼ οὖν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπεξελθεῖν βέλτιον.
PROTARCHUS: It is clear indeed, but nevertheless it is better to go through with the argument.
ΣΩ. καθʼ ἓν ἕκαστον τοίνυν τῶν τριῶν πρὸς τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τὸν νοῦν κρίνωμεν· δεῖ γὰρ ἰδεῖν ποτέρῳ ὡς μᾶλλον συγγενὲς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἀπονεμοῦμεν.
SOCRATES: Let us, then, judge each of the three in relation to pleasure and intellect; for we must see to which of the two we shall assign each of them as being more akin.
ΠΡΩ. κάλλους καὶ ἀληθείας καὶ μετριότητος πέρι λέγεις;
PROTARCHUS: Do you mean beauty, truth, and measure?
ΣΩ. ναί.
SOCRATES: Yes.
πρῶτον δέ γε ἀληθείας λαβοῦ, ὦ Πρώταρχε· καὶ λαβόμενος βλέψας εἰς τρία, νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν καὶ ἡδονήν, πολὺν ἐπισχὼν χρόνον ἀπόκριναι σαυτῷ πότερον ἡδονὴ συγγενέστερον ἢ νοῦς ἀληθείᾳ.
But first take hold of truth, Protarchus; and having taken hold of it, looking at the three—intellect, truth, and pleasure—having waited for a long time, answer to yourself whether pleasure or intellect is more akin to truth.
ΠΡΩ. τί δὲ χρόνου δεῖ;
PROTARCHUS: What need is there of time?
πολὺ γὰρ οἶμαι διαφέρετον.
For I think the two differ greatly.
ἡδονὴ μὲν γὰρ ἁπάντων ἀλαζονίστατον, ὡς δὲ λόγος, καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ταῖς περὶ τἀφροδίσια, αἳ δὴ μέγισται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἐπιορκεῖν συγγνώμην εἴληφε παρὰ θεῶν, ὡς καθάπερ παίδων τῶν ἡδονῶν νοῦν οὐδὲ τὸν ὀλίγιστον κεκτημένων·
For pleasure is the most boastful of all things, and as the saying goes, even in the pleasures of sex, which indeed seem to be the greatest, even perjury has received forgiveness from the gods, as if pleasures, like children, possessed not the slightest bit of intellect.
νοῦς δὲ ἤτοι ταὐτὸν καὶ ἀλήθειά ἐστιν ἢ πάντων ὁμοιότατόν τε καὶ ἀληθέστατον.
But intellect is either the same as truth, or of all things most like it and most true.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο τὴν μετριότητα ὡσαύτως σκέψαι, πότερον ἡδονὴ φρονήσεως ἢ φρόνησις ἡδονῆς πλείω κέκτηται;
SOCRATES: Then after this, examine measure in the same way, whether pleasure has acquired more of it than wisdom, or wisdom more than pleasure.
ΠΡΩ. εὔσκεπτόν γε καὶ ταύτην σκέψιν προβέβληκας· οἶμαι γὰρ ἡδονῆς μὲν καὶ περιχαρείας οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων πεφυκὸς ἀμετρώτερον εὑρεῖν ἄν τινα, νοῦ δὲ καὶ ἐπιστήμης ἐμμετρώτερον οὐδʼ ἂν ἕν ποτε.
PROTARCHUS: You have proposed an easily examined inquiry indeed; for I think one could find nothing in existence by nature more immoderate than pleasure and excessive joy, and never even one single thing more moderate than intellect and knowledge.
ΣΩ. καλῶς εἴρηκας.
SOCRATES: You have spoken well.
ὅμως δʼ ἔτι λέγε τὸ τρίτον.
But nevertheless tell still the third.
νοῦς ἡμῖν κάλλους μετείληφε πλεῖον ἢ τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς γένος, ὥστε εἶναι καλλίω νοῦν ἡδονῆς, ἢ τοὐναντίον;
Has intellect shared for us more in beauty than the class of pleasure, so that intellect is more beautiful than pleasure, or the opposite?
ΠΡΩ. ἀλλʼ οὖν φρόνησιν μὲν καὶ νοῦν, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐδεὶς πώποτε οὔθʼ ὕπαρ οὔτʼ ὄναρ αἰσχρὸν οὔτε εἶδεν οὔτε ἐπενόησεν οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς οὔτε γιγνόμενον οὔτε ὄντα οὔτε ἐσόμενον.
PROTARCHUS: But indeed, Socrates, no one has ever, either awake or in a dream, either seen or conceived wisdom and intellect to be ugly in any way or manner whatsoever, whether in the process of becoming, or being, or to be in the future.
ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς.
SOCRATES: Right.