§66ΠΡΩ. ἡδονὰς δέ γέ που, καὶ ταῦτα σχεδὸν τὰς μεγίστας, ὅταν ἴδωμεν ἡδόμενον ὁντινοῦν, ἢ τὸ γελοῖον ἐπʼ αὐταῖς ἢ τὸ πάντων αἴσχιστον ἑπόμενον ὁρῶντες αὐτοί τε αἰσχυνόμεθα καὶ ἀφανίζοντες κρύπτομεν ὅτι μάλιστα, νυκτὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα διδόντες, ὡς φῶς οὐ δέον ὁρᾶν αὐτά.
PROTARCHUS: But as for pleasures, and indeed those that are almost the greatest, whenever we see anyone enjoying them, seeing either the ridiculous or the most shameful of all following upon them, we ourselves are ashamed and hide them as much as possible, consigning all such things to the night, as if light ought not to see them.
ΣΩ. πάντῃ δὴ φήσεις, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ὑπό τε ἀγγέλων πέμπων καὶ παροῦσι φράζων, ὡς ἡδονὴ κτῆμα οὐκ ἔστι πρῶτον οὐδʼ αὖ δεύτερον, ἀλλὰ πρῶτον μέν πῃ περὶ μέτρον καὶ τὸ μέτριον καὶ καίριον καὶ πάντα ὁπόσα χρὴ τοιαῦτα νομίζειν, τὴν ἀίδιον ᾑρῆσθαι.
SOCRATES: In every way then you will say, Protarchus, sending word by messengers and telling those present, that pleasure is not the first possession, nor again the second, but that the first has been chosen somewhere in the region of measure and the moderate and the opportune, and all such things as we must deem to be of that eternal nature.
ΠΡΩ. φαίνεται γοῦν ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων.
PROTARCHUS: So it appears, at least, from what is now being said.
ΣΩ. δεύτερον μὴν περὶ τὸ σύμμετρον καὶ καλὸν καὶ τὸ τέλεον καὶ ἱκανὸν καὶ πάνθʼ ὁπόσα τῆς γενεᾶς αὖ ταύτης ἐστίν.
SOCRATES: And second in the region of the proportionate and beautiful and perfect and sufficient and all things which, in turn, belong to this family.
ΠΡΩ. ἔοικε γοῦν.
PROTARCHUS: It seems so, at least.
ΣΩ. τὸ τοίνυν τρίτον, ὡς ἡ ἐμὴ μαντεία, νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν τιθεὶς οὐκ ἂν μέγα τι τῆς ἀληθείας παρεξέλθοις.
SOCRATES: If then, as my prophecy goes, you place intellect and wisdom third, you would not stray far from the truth.
ΠΡΩ. ἴσως.
PROTARCHUS: Perhaps.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ τέταρτα, ἃ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἔθεμεν, ἐπιστήμας τε καὶ τέχνας καὶ δόξας ὀρθὰς λεχθείσας, ταῦτʼ εἶναι τὰ πρὸς τοῖς τρισὶ τέταρτα, εἴπερ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ γέ ἐστι μᾶλλον τῆς ἡδονῆς συγγενῆ;
SOCRATES: Are they then not fourth, those which we established as belonging to the soul itself—namely, knowledges, arts, and what are called right opinions—that these, in addition to the three, are the fourth, if indeed they are more akin to the good than to pleasure?
ΠΡΩ. τάχʼ ἄν.
PROTARCHUS: Perhaps.
ΣΩ. πέμπτας τοίνυν, ἃς ἡδονὰς ἔθεμεν ἀλύπους ὁρισάμενοι, καθαρὰς ἐπονομάσαντες τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς, ἐπιστήμαις, τὰς δὲ αἰσθήσεσιν ἑπομένας;
SOCRATES: And fifth, then, those pleasures which we established, defining them as painless, calling them pure pleasures of the soul itself, some accompanying knowledges, others sensations?
ΠΡΩ. ἴσως.
PROTARCHUS: Perhaps.
ΣΩ.
ἕκτῃ δʼ ἐν γενεᾷ,
φησὶν Ὀρφεύς,
καταπαύσατε κόσμον ἀοιδῆς· ἀτὰρ κινδυνεύει καὶ ὁ ἡμέτερος λόγος ἐν ἕκτῃ καταπεπαυμένος εἶναι κρίσει.
SOCRATES: "And in the sixth generation," says Orpheus, "bring to an end the order of song." But our discourse, too, seems to have been brought to an end in the sixth judgment.
τὸ δὴ μετὰ ταῦθʼ ἡμῖν οὐδὲν λοιπὸν πλὴν ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν ἀποδοῦναι τοῖς εἰρημένοις.
After this, then, there is nothing left for us but to add, as it were, a head to what has been said.
ΠΡΩ. οὐκοῦν χρή.
PROTARCHUS: Then we must do so.
ΣΩ. ἴθι δή, τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι τὸν αὐτὸν διαμαρτυράμενοι λόγον ἐπεξέλθωμεν.
SOCRATES: Come then, let us go through the same argument once more, testifying for the third time to the Savior.
ΠΡΩ. ποῖον δή;
PROTARCHUS: Which one, then?
ΣΩ. Φίληβος τἀγαθὸν ἐτίθετο ἡμῖν ἡδονὴν εἶναι πᾶσαν καὶ παντελῆ.
SOCRATES: Philebus maintained that for us the good is pleasure, all and complete.
ΠΡΩ. τὸ τρίτον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἔοικας, ἔλεγες ἀρτίως τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπαναλαβεῖν δεῖν λόγον.
PROTARCHUS: By 'the third time', Socrates, as it seems, you meant just now that we must repeat the argument from the beginning.
ΣΩ. ναί, τὸ δέ γε μετὰ τοῦτο ἀκούωμεν.
SOCRATES: Yes, but let us hear what follows.
ἐγὼ γὰρ δὴ κατιδὼν ἅπερ νυνδὴ διελήλυθα, καὶ δυσχεράνας τὸν Φιλήβου λόγον οὐ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλων πολλάκις μυρίων, εἶπον ὡς ἡδονῆς γε νοῦς εἴη μακρῷ βέλτιόν τε καὶ ἄμεινον τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων βίῳ.
For I, having perceived just what I have now gone through, and being displeased with the argument of Philebus, and not only his but also that of countless others, said that intellect is far better and more excellent than pleasure for the life of men.
ΠΡΩ. ἦν ταῦτα.
PROTARCHUS: That was indeed so.
ΣΩ. ὑποπτεύων δέ γε καὶ ἄλλα εἶναι πολλὰ εἶπον ὡς εἰ φανείη τι τούτοιν ἀμφοῖν βέλτιον, ὑπὲρ τῶν δευτερείων νῷ πρὸς ἡδονὴν συνδιαμαχοίμην, ἡδονὴ δὲ καὶ δευτερείων στερήσοιτο.
SOCRATES: And suspecting that there were also many other things, I said that if anything should appear better than both of these, I would fight alongside intellect against pleasure for the second place, and pleasure would be deprived even of the second prize.
§67ΠΡΩ. εἶπες γὰρ οὖν.
PROTARCHUS: Indeed you did say so.
ΣΩ. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτά γε πάντων ἱκανώτατα τούτοιν οὐδέτερον ἱκανὸν ἐφάνη.
SOCRATES: And after this, most sufficiently of all, neither of these two appeared to be sufficient.
ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα.
PROTARCHUS: Most true.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν παντάπασιν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ νοῦς ἀπήλλακτο καὶ ἡδονὴ μή τοι τἀγαθόν γε αὐτὸ μηδʼ ἕτερον αὐτοῖν εἶναι, στερομένοιν αὐταρκείας καὶ τῆς τοῦ ἱκανοῦ καὶ τελέου δυνάμεως;
SOCRATES: In this argument, then, were not both intellect and pleasure completely dismissed from being the good itself, since they both lack self-sufficiency and the power of the sufficient and perfect?
ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα.
PROTARCHUS: Most rightly.
ΣΩ. φανέντος δέ γε ἄλλου τρίτου κρείττονος τούτοιν ἑκατέρου, μυρίῳ γʼ αὖ νοῦς ἡδονῆς οἰκειότερον καὶ προσφυέστερον πέφανται νῦν τῇ τοῦ νικῶντος ἰδέᾳ.
SOCRATES: But when another third appeared, better than either of these two, intellect has now again appeared to be infinitely closer and more akin than pleasure to the form of the victor.
ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
PROTARCHUS: For how could it not be?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν πέμπτον κατὰ τὴν κρίσιν, ἣν νῦν ὁ λόγος ἀπεφήνατο, γίγνοιτʼ ἂν ἡ τῆς ἡδονῆς δύναμις.
SOCRATES: Therefore, according to the judgment which the discourse has now declared, the power of pleasure would be fifth.
ΠΡΩ. ἔοικεν.
PROTARCHUS: It seems so.
ΣΩ. πρῶτον δέ γε οὐδʼ ἂν οἱ πάντες βόες τε καὶ ἵπποι καὶ τἆλλα σύμπαντα θηρία φῶσι τῷ τὸ χαίρειν διώκειν· οἷς πιστεύοντες, ὥσπερ μάντεις ὄρνισιν, οἱ πολλοὶ κρίνουσι τὰς ἡδονὰς εἰς τὸ ζῆν ἡμῖν εὖ κρατίστας εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς θηρίων ἔρωτας οἴονται κυρίους εἶναι μάρτυρας μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς τῶν ἐν μούσῃ φιλοσόφῳ μεμαντευμένων ἑκάστοτε λόγων.
SOCRATES: But the first is by no means so, not even if all the oxen and horses and all other beasts say so by pursuing enjoyment; believing whom, as diviners believe birds, the many judge that pleasures are the most powerful things for our living well, and think that the desires of beasts are more authoritative witnesses than the arguments prophesied each time in the philosophical Muse.
ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰρῆσθαί σοι νῦν ἤδη φαμὲν ἅπαντες.
PROTARCHUS: Most truly, Socrates, we all now say that you have spoken.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀφίετέ με;
SOCRATES: Then do you also let me go?
ΠΡΩ. σμικρὸν ἔτι τὸ λοιπόν, ὦ Σώκρατες· οὐ γὰρ δήπου σύ γε ἀπερεῖς πρότερος ἡμῶν, ὑπομνήσω δέ σε τὰ λειπόμενα.
PROTARCHUS: A little still remains, Socrates; for surely you will not give up before us, and I will remind you of what is left.