§60ΣΩ. ἃ καὶ πρότερον ἐμνήσθημεν· εὖ δʼ ἡ παροιμία δοκεῖ ἔχειν, τὸ καὶ δὶς καὶ τρὶς τό γε καλῶς ἔχον ἐπαναπολεῖν τῷ λόγῳ δεῖν. ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;
: The very things we mentioned before; for the proverb seems to be well-stated, that "it is necessary to turn over in the discussion even twice and thrice that which is well-done."\nPROTARCHUS: Why, of course.\nSOCRATES: Come then, by Zeus!
ΣΩ. φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διός· οἶμαι γὰρ οὑτωσί πως τὰ τότε λεχθέντα ῥηθῆναι. ΠΡΩ. πῶς; ΣΩ. Φίληβός φησι τὴν ἡδονὴν σκοπὸν ὀρθὸν πᾶσι ζῴοις γεγονέναι καὶ δεῖν πάντας τούτου στοχάζεσθαι, καὶ δὴ καὶ τἀγαθὸν τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ εἶναι σύμπασι, καὶ δύο ὀνόματα, ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδύ, ἑνί τινι καὶ φύσει μιᾷ τούτω ὀρθῶς τεθέντʼ ἔχειν·
For I think the things said then were spoken in some such way as this.\nPROTARCHUS: How?\nSOCRATES: Philebus says that pleasure is the correct goal for all living beings and that everyone must aim at this, and indeed that this very thing is the good for all, and that these two names, "good" and "pleasant," are correctly applied to one single thing and one single nature.
Σωκράτης δʼ ἓν μὲν οὔ φησι τοῦτʼ εἶναι, δύο δὲ καθάπερ τὰ ὀνόματα, καὶ τό τε ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδὺ διάφορον ἀλλήλων φύσιν ἔχειν, μᾶλλον δὲ μέτοχον εἶναι τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρας τὴν φρόνησιν ἢ τὴν ἡδονήν.
Socrates, on the other hand, says that this is not one, but two, just as the names are, and that the good and the pleasant have a nature different from one another, and rather that wisdom participates in the portion of the good more than pleasure does.
οὐ ταῦτʼ ἔστιν τε καὶ ἦν τὰ τότε λεγόμενα, ὦ Πρώταρχε; ΠΡΩ. σφόδρα μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε καὶ τότε καὶ νῦν ἡμῖν ἂν συνομολογοῖτο; ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον; ΣΩ. τὴν τἀγαθοῦ διαφέρειν φύσιν τῷδε τῶν ἄλλων. ΠΡΩ. τίνι; ΣΩ. ὧι παρείη τοῦτʼ ἀεὶ τῶν ζῴων διὰ τέλους πάντως καὶ πάντῃ, μηδενὸς ἑτέρου ποτὲ ἔτι προσδεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἱκανὸν τελεώτατον ἔχειν.
Is this not, Protarchus, what was said then and is still our position?\nPROTARCHUS: Most true, indeed.\nSOCRATES: Would this then also be agreed upon by us, both then and now?\nPROTARCHUS: What is that?\nSOCRATES: That the nature of the good differs from other things in this respect.\n PROTARCHUS: In what?\nSOCRATES: That that living being to which this is always present through to the end, in every way and in all respects, never has any further need of anything else, but possesses sufficiency most perfectly.
οὐχ οὕτως; ΠΡΩ. οὕτω μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τῷ λόγῳ ἐπειράθημεν χωρὶς ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρου θέντες εἰς τὸν βίον ἑκάστων, ἄμεικτον μὲν ἡδονὴν φρονήσει, φρόνησιν δὲ ὡσαύτως ἡδονῆς μηδὲ τὸ σμικρότατον ἔχουσαν; ΠΡΩ. ἦν ταῦτα. ΣΩ. μῶν οὖν ἡμῖν αὐτῶν τότε πότερον ἱκανὸν ἔδοξεν εἶναί τῳ; ΠΡΩ. καὶ πῶς; ΣΩ. εἰ δέ γε παρηνέχθημέν τι τότε, νῦν ὁστισοῦν ἐπαναλαβὼν ὀρθότερον εἰπάτω, μνήμην καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ ἀληθῆ δόξαν τῆς αὐτῆς ἰδέας τιθέμενος καὶ σκοπῶν εἴ τις ἄνευ τούτων δέξαιτʼ ἄν οἱ καὶ ὁτιοῦν εἶναι ἢ καὶ γίγνεσθαι, μὴ ὅτι δή γε ἡδονὴν εἴθʼ ὡς πλείστην εἴθʼ ὡς σφοδροτάτην, ἣν μήτε ἀληθῶς δοξάζοι χαίρειν μήτε τὸ παράπαν γιγνώσκοι τί ποτε πέπονθε πάθος μήτʼ αὖ μνήμην τοῦ πάθους μηδʼ ὁντινοῦν χρόνον ἔχοι.
Is it not so?\nPROTARCHUS: Just so, indeed.\nSOCRATES: Did we not, then, attempt in our discussion to set each of them apart from the other, placing them in the life of each—namely, pleasure unmixed with wisdom, and likewise wisdom not possessing even the slightest bit of pleasure?\nPROTARCHUS: That was so.\nSOCRATES: Did either of them, then, seem to us at that time to be sufficient for anyone?\nPROTARCHUS: How indeed could it?\nSOCRATES: But if we went astray in any way then, let anyone now take it up again and speak more correctly, placing memory, wisdom, knowledge, and true opinion under the same class, and examining whether anyone would accept that anything at all exists or even comes to be for him without these—not to mention pleasure, whether the greatest or most intense, which he would neither truly believe he is enjoying nor recognize at all what affection he has suffered, nor indeed possess any memory of the affection for any length of time whatsoever.
ταὐτὰ δὲ λεγέτω καὶ περὶ φρονήσεως, εἴ τις ἄνευ πάσης ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς βραχυτάτης δέξαιτʼ ἂν φρόνησιν ἔχειν μᾶλλον ἢ μετά τινων ἡδονῶν ἢ πάσας ἡδονὰς χωρὶς φρονήσεως μᾶλλον ἢ μετὰ φρονήσεως αὖ τινος. ΠΡΩ. οὐκ ἔστιν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλʼ οὐδὲν δεῖ ταῦτά γε πολλάκις ἐπερωτᾶν. §61ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τό γε τέλεον καὶ πᾶσιν αἱρετὸν καὶ τὸ παντάπασιν ἀγαθὸν οὐδέτερον ἂν τούτων εἴη; ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν; ΣΩ. τὸ τοίνυν ἀγαθὸν ἤτοι σαφῶς ἢ καί τινα τύπον αὐτοῦ ληπτέον, ἵνʼ, ὅπερ ἐλέγομεν, δευτερεῖα ὅτῳ δώσομεν ἔχωμεν. ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὁδὸν μέν τινα ἐπὶ τἀγαθὸν εἰλήφαμεν; ΠΡΩ. τίνα; ΣΩ. καθάπερ εἴ τίς τινα ἄνθρωπον ζητῶν τὴν οἴκησιν πρῶτον ὀρθῶς ἵνʼ οἰκεῖ πύθοιτο αὐτοῦ, μέγα τι δήπου πρὸς τὴν εὕρεσιν ἂν ἔχοι τοῦ ζητουμένου. ΠΡΩ. πῶς δʼ οὔ; ΣΩ. καὶ νῦν δή τις λόγος ἐμήνυσεν ἡμῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ κατʼ ἀρχάς, μὴ ζητεῖν ἐν τῷ ἀμείκτῳ βίῳ τἀγαθὸν ἀλλʼ ἐν τῷ μεικτῷ. ΠΡΩ. πάνυ γε. ΣΩ. ἐλπὶς μὴν πλείων ἐν τῷ μειχθέντι καλῶς τὸ ζητούμενον ἔσεσθαι φανερώτερον ἢ ἐν τῷ μή; ΠΡΩ. πολύ γε. ΣΩ. τοῖς δὴ θεοῖς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, εὐχόμενοι κεραννύωμεν, εἴτε Διόνυσος εἴτε Ἥφαιστος εἴθʼ ὅστις θεῶν ταύτην τὴν τιμὴν εἴληχε τῆς συγκράσεως. ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν καθάπερ ἡμῖν οἰνοχόοις τισὶ παρεστᾶσι κρῆναι—μέλιτος μὲν ἂν ἀπεικάζοι τις τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς, τὴν δὲ τῆς φρονήσεως νηφαντικὴν καὶ ἄοινον αὐστηροῦ καὶ ὑγιεινοῦ τινος ὕδατος—ἃς προθυμητέον ὡς κάλλιστα συμμειγνύναι. ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. φέρε δὴ πρότερον· ἆρα πᾶσαν ἡδονὴν πάσῃ φρονήσει μειγνύντες τοῦ καλῶς ἂν μάλιστα ἐπιτύχοιμεν; ΠΡΩ. ἴσως. ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἀσφαλές.
And let him say the same about wisdom, whether anyone would accept possessing wisdom without any pleasure whatsoever, even the briefest, rather than with some pleasures, or, on the other hand, possessing all pleasures without wisdom rather than with some wisdom.\nPROTARCHUS: It is not possible, Socrates; indeed, there is no need to ask these questions repeatedly.\n\n SOCRATES: Then that which is perfect, desirable for all, and altogether good would be neither of these?\nPROTARCHUS: How indeed could it be?\nSOCRATES: Therefore, we must grasp the good either clearly or at least in some outline, so that, as we were saying, we may have a basis for deciding to whom we shall award the second prize.\nPROTARCHUS: You speak most correctly.\nSOCRATES: Have we not, then, taken a certain path toward the good?\nPROTARCHUS: What path?\nSOCRATES: Just as if someone searching for a certain person were first to learn correctly where he dwells, he would surely have a great advantage toward finding the object of his search.\nPROTARCHUS: How could he not?\nSOCRATES: And now a certain argument has indicated to us, just as at the beginning, that we should search for the good not in the unmixed life but in the mixed one.\nPROTARCHUS: Certainly.\nSOCRATES: Is there indeed a greater hope that what is searched for will be more manifest in the beautifully mixed life than in the one that is not?\nPROTARCHUS: Far greater.\nSOCRATES: Then, Protarchus, let us pray to the gods and mix, whether it be Dionysus or Hephaestus, or whichever of the gods has received this honor of blending.\nPROTARCHUS: By all means, indeed.\nSOCRATES: And indeed, just as if we were wine-pourers, springs stand before us—one might compare the spring of pleasure to honey, and that of wisdom, sober and wineless, to some harsh and healthy water—which we must be eager to mix together as beautifully as possible.\nPROTARCHUS: How could we not?\n SOCRATES: Come then, first: would we succeed best in doing it beautifully if we mix all pleasure with all wisdom?\nPROTARCHUS: Perhaps.\nSOCRATES: But it is not safe.
ᾗ δὲ ἀκινδυνότερον ἂν μειγνύοιμεν, δόξαν μοι δοκῶ τινα ἀποφήνασθαι ἄν. ΠΡΩ. λέγε τίνα. ΣΩ. ἦν ἡμῖν ἡδονή τε ἀληθῶς, ὡς οἰόμεθα, μᾶλλον ἑτέρας ἄλλη καὶ δὴ καὶ τέχνη τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα; ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; ΣΩ. καὶ ἐπιστήμη δὴ ἐπιστήμης διάφορος, ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα ἀποβλέπουσα, ἡ δʼ ἐπὶ τὰ μήτε γιγνόμενα μήτε ἀπολλύμενα, κατὰ ταὐτὰ δὲ καὶ ὡσαύτως ὄντα ἀεί.
I think I can express a certain opinion on how we might mix them with less danger.\nPROTARCHUS: Say what it is.\nSOCRATES: Did we have, as we think, one pleasure that was truly more so than another, and indeed one craft that was more precise than another?\nPROTARCHUS: How indeed could it not be?\nSOCRATES: And also one knowledge differs from another, the one looking toward things that come to be and perish, and the other toward things that neither come to be nor perish, but are always in the same way and in the same state.
ταύτην εἰς τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐπισκοπούμενοι ἡγησάμεθα ἐκείνης ἀληθεστέραν εἶναι. ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς. ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν εἰ τἀληθέστατα τμήματα ἑκατέρας ἴδοιμεν πρῶτον συμμείξαντες, ἆρα ἱκανὰ ταῦτα συγκεκραμένα τὸν ἀγαπητότατον βίον ἀπεργασάμενα παρέχειν ἡμῖν, ἤ τινος ἔτι προσδεόμεθα καὶ τῶν μὴ τοιούτων;
Examining them with respect to truth, we held that the latter is truer than the former.\nPROTARCHUS: Entirely correct indeed.\nSOCRATES: Therefore, if we first mix the truest portions of each and see, are these, when blended together, sufficient to produce and provide for us the most desirable life, or do we still need something more, even of the portions that are not of this kind?