§57ΣΩ. τί δέ;
SOCRATES: What about this?
λογιστικὴ καὶ μετρητικὴ ἡ κατὰ τεκτονικὴν καὶ κατʼ ἐμπορικὴν τῆς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν γεωμετρίας τε καὶ λογισμῶν καταμελετωμένων—πότερον ὡς μία ἑκατέρα λεκτέον ἢ δύο τιθῶμεν;
Are we to say that the calculation and measurement in carpentry and commerce, and the geometry and carefully practiced calculations in philosophy, are each one, or should we set them down as two?
ΠΡΩ. τῇ πρόσθεν ἑπόμενος ἔγωγʼ ἂν δύο κατὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ψῆφον τιθείην ἑκατέραν τούτων.
PROTARCHUS: Following the previous argument, I for my part, according to my vote, would set down each of them as two.
ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς.
SOCRATES: Correct.
οὗ δʼ ἕνεκα ταῦτα προηνεγκάμεθα εἰς τὸ μέσον, ἆρα ἐννοεῖς;
But do you understand the reason why we brought these things forward into the open?
ΠΡΩ. ἴσως, ἀλλὰ σὲ βουλοίμην ἂν ἀποφήνασθαι τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον.
PROTARCHUS: Perhaps, but I would like you to declare the answer to what is now being asked.
ΣΩ. δοκεῖ τοίνυν ἔμοιγε οὗτος ὁ λόγος, οὐχ ἧττον ἢ ὅτε λέγειν αὐτὸν ἠρχόμεθα, ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ζητῶν ἀντίστροφον ἐνταῦθα προβεβληκέναι σκοπῶν ἆρά ἐστί τις ἑτέρας ἄλλη καθαρωτέρα ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη, καθάπερ ἡδονῆς ἡδονή.
SOCRATES: Well then, it seems to me that this argument, no less than when we began to state it, in seeking a counterpart to pleasures, has put this forward here in order to consider whether one knowledge is purer than another, just as one pleasure is purer than another.
ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα σαφὲς τοῦτό γε, ὅτι ταῦθʼ ἕνεκα τούτων ἐπικεχείρηκεν.
PROTARCHUS: That is certainly very clear, that the argument has undertaken these things for the sake of this.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν;
SOCRATES: What then?
ἆρʼ οὐκ ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἐπʼ ἄλλοις ἄλλην τέχνην οὖσαν ἀνηυρήκειν σαφεστέραν καὶ ἀσαφεστέραν ἄλλην ἄλλης;
Did we not find in the previous discussion that there are different crafts for different things, and that one is clearer and another less clear?
ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
PROTARCHUS: Entirely so.
ΣΩ. ἐν τούτοις δὲ ἆρʼ οὔ τινα τέχνην ὡς ὁμώνυμον φθεγξάμενος, εἰς δόξαν καταστήσας ὡς μιᾶς, πάλιν ὡς δυοῖν ἐπανερωτᾷ τούτοιν αὐτοῖν τὸ σαφὲς καὶ τὸ καθαρὸν περὶ ταῦτα πότερον ἡ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων ἢ μὴ φιλοσοφούντων ἀκριβέστερον ἔχει;
SOCRATES: But in these cases, having spoken of a certain craft as homonymous, and having established the opinion that it is single, does it not ask again about these very two, whether the clarity and purity concerning them is possessed more accurately by the craft of those who do philosophy or of those who do not?
ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα δοκεῖ μοι τοῦτο διερωτᾶν.
PROTARCHUS: It certainly seems to me to be asking this very question.
ΣΩ. τίνʼ οὖν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, αὐτῷ δίδομεν ἀπόκρισιν;
SOCRATES: What answer, then, Protarchus, do we give to it?
ΠΡΩ. ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰς θαυμαστὸν διαφορᾶς μέγεθος εἰς σαφήνειαν προεληλύθαμεν ἐπιστημῶν.
PROTARCHUS: Socrates, we have advanced to an astonishingly great difference regarding the clarity of kinds of knowledge.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἀποκρινούμεθα ῥᾷον;
SOCRATES: Will we not, then, answer more easily?
ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;
PROTARCHUS: Of course.
καὶ εἰρήσθω γε ὅτι πολὺ μὲν αὗται τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν διαφέρουσι, τούτων δʼ αὐτῶν αἱ περὶ τὴν τῶν ὄντως φιλοσοφούντων ὁρμὴν ἀμήχανον ἀκριβείᾳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ περὶ μέτρα τε καὶ ἀριθμοὺς διαφέρουσιν.
And let it be said that these crafts differ greatly from the other crafts, and that among these themselves, those that concern the impulse of those who truly do philosophy differ beyond measure in accuracy and truth concerning measures and numbers.
ΣΩ. ἔστω ταῦτα κατὰ σέ, καὶ σοὶ δὴ πιστεύοντες θαρροῦντες ἀποκρινόμεθα τοῖς δεινοῖς περὶ λόγων ὁλκήν—
ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον;
SOCRATES: Let this be so according to you, and trusting you, we confidently answer those who are clever at dragging out arguments— PROTARCHUS: Answer what?
ΣΩ. ὡς εἰσὶ δύο ἀριθμητικαὶ καὶ δύο μετρητικαὶ καὶ ταύταις ἄλλαι τοιαῦται συνεπόμεναι συχναί, τὴν διδυμότητα ἔχουσαι ταύτην, ὀνόματος δὲ ἑνὸς κεκοινωμέναι.
SOCRATES: That there are two kinds of arithmetic and two of measurement, and many other such crafts following these which possess this twofold nature, though they share a single name.
ΠΡΩ. διδῶμεν τύχῃ ἀγαθῇ τούτοις οὓς φῂς δεινοὺς εἶναι ταύτην τὴν ἀπόκρισιν, ὦ Σώκρατες.
PROTARCHUS: Socrates, with good fortune, let us give this answer to those whom you say are clever.
ΣΩ. ταύτας οὖν λέγομεν ἐπιστήμας ἀκριβεῖς μάλιστʼ εἶναι;
SOCRATES: Do we say, then, that these are the most accurate kinds of knowledge?
ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
PROTARCHUS: Entirely so.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ ἡμᾶς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἀναίνοιτʼ ἂν ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμις, εἴ τινα πρὸ αὐτῆς ἄλλην κρίναιμεν.
SOCRATES: But, Protarchus, the power of dialectic would disown us if we were to judge any other knowledge before it.
ΠΡΩ. τίνα δὲ ταύτην αὖ δεῖ λέγειν;
PROTARCHUS: And what must we say this one is in turn?
§58ΣΩ. δῆλον ὁτιὴ πᾶς ἂν τήν γε νῦν λεγομένην γνοίη·
SOCRATES: Clearly everyone would recognize the one now being spoken of.
τὴν γὰρ περὶ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὸ ὄντως καὶ τὸ κατὰ ταὐτὸν ἀεὶ πεφυκὸς πάντως ἔγωγε οἶμαι ἡγεῖσθαι σύμπαντας ὅσοις νοῦ καὶ σμικρὸν προσήρτηται μακρῷ ἀληθεστάτην εἶναι γνῶσιν.
For I think that absolutely everyone who has even a small portion of intellect attached to them would regard the knowledge concerning that which is, that which really is, and that which is by nature always in the same state, as by far the truest knowledge.
σὺ δὲ τί;
What about you?
πῶς τοῦτο, ὦ Πρώταρχε, διακρίνοις ἄν;
How would you decide this, Protarchus?
ΠΡΩ. ἤκουον μὲν ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἑκάστοτε Γοργίου πολλάκις ὡς ἡ τοῦ πείθειν πολὺ διαφέροι πασῶν τεχνῶν —πάντα γὰρ ὑφʼ αὑτῇ δοῦλα διʼ ἑκόντων ἀλλʼ οὐ διὰ βίας ποιοῖτο, καὶ μακρῷ ἀρίστη πασῶν εἴη τῶν τεχνῶν—νῦν δʼ οὔτε σοὶ οὔτε δὴ ἐκείνῳ βουλοίμην ἂν ἐναντία τίθεσθαι.
PROTARCHUS: Socrates, I for my part used to hear Gorgias state repeatedly on various occasions that the art of persuasion differs greatly from all crafts—for it would make everything its slaves willingly and not by force, and would be by far the best of all crafts. But now, I would not wish to set myself in opposition either to you or indeed to him.
ΣΩ.
τὰ ὅπλα
μοι δοκεῖς βουληθεὶς εἰπεῖν αἰσχυνθεὶς ἀπολιπεῖν.
SOCRATES: It seems to me that you wanted to fight, but then felt ashamed and abandoned your weapons.
ΠΡΩ. ἔστω νῦν ταῦτα ταύτῃ ὅπῃ σοι δοκεῖ.
PROTARCHUS: Let these things be, then, in whatever way you think.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν αἴτιος ἐγὼ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς ὑπολαβεῖν σε;
SOCRATES: Am I then the cause of your not grasping my meaning well?
ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον;
PROTARCHUS: What do you mean?
ΣΩ. οὐκ, ὦ φίλε Πρώταρχε, τοῦτο ἔγωγε ἐζήτουν πω, τίς τέχνη ἢ τίς ἐπιστήμη πασῶν διαφέρει τῷ μεγίστη καὶ ἀρίστη καὶ πλεῖστα ὠφελοῦσα ἡμᾶς, ἀλλὰ τίς ποτε τὸ σαφὲς καὶ τἀκριβὲς καὶ τὸ ἀληθέστατον ἐπισκοπεῖ, κἂν εἰ σμικρὰ καὶ σμικρὰ ὀνινᾶσα, τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ὃ νῦν δὴ ζητοῦμεν.
SOCRATES: No, my dear Protarchus, I was not yet searching for this— namely, which craft or which knowledge differs from all others in being the greatest, the best, and of the most benefit to us; rather, we are now searching for which one looks to what is clear, accurate, and most true, even if it is small and yields only small benefits.
ἀλλʼ ὅρα—οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀπεχθήσῃ Γοργίᾳ, τῇ μὲν ἐκείνου ὑπάρχειν τέχνῃ διδοὺς πρὸς χρείαν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις κρατεῖν, ᾗ δʼ εἶπον ἐγὼ νῦν πραγματείᾳ, καθάπερ τοῦ λευκοῦ πέρι τότε ἔλεγον, κἂν εἰ σμικρόν, καθαρὸν δʼ εἴη, τοῦ πολλοῦ καὶ μὴ τοιούτου διαφέρειν, τούτῳ γʼ αὐτῷ τῷ ἀληθεστάτῳ, καὶ νῦν δὴ σφόδρα διανοηθέντες καὶ ἱκανῶς διαλογισάμενοι, μήτʼ εἴς τινας ὠφελίας ἐπιστημῶν βλέψαντες μήτε τινὰς εὐδοκιμίας, ἀλλʼ εἴ τις πέφυκε τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν δύναμις ἐρᾶν τε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καὶ πάντα ἕνεκα τούτου πράττειν, ταύτην εἴπωμεν διεξερευνησάμενοι—τὸ καθαρὸν νοῦ τε καὶ φρονήσεως εἰ ταύτην μάλιστα ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων ἐκτῆσθαι φαῖμεν ἂν ἤ τινα ἑτέραν ταύτης κυριωτέραν ἡμῖν ζητητέον.
But look—for you will not make yourself hateful to Gorgias if you grant to his craft that it is superior for the practical use of mankind, but to the pursuit I have just mentioned that, just as I was saying then about white, even if it is small, provided it is pure, it differs from a large amount of that which is not so, in this very respect of being the most true. And now, having thought this over deeply and deliberated sufficiently, without looking either to any utility of kinds of knowledge or to any high reputation, but rather to see whether there is in our soul a certain natural power to love the truth and to do everything for its sake—let us speak after searching this out thoroughly, and say whether we would most likely claim that this power possesses the pure element of intellect and wisdom, or whether we must seek some other power more authoritative than this.
ΠΡΩ. ἀλλὰ σκοπῶ, καὶ χαλεπὸν οἶμαι συγχωρῆσαί τινα ἄλλην ἐπιστήμην ἢ τέχνην τῆς ἀληθείας ἀντέχεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ταύτην.
PROTARCHUS: Indeed I am considering it, and I think it is difficult to concede that any other knowledge or craft holds fast to the truth more than this one.