§51ΠΡΩ. κάλλιστʼ εἶπες. ΣΩ. ἐγὼ δὴ πειράσομαι μεταβαλὼν σημαίνειν ἡμῖν αὐτάς.
\n PROTARCHUS: You have spoken most beautifully.\nSOCRATES: I indeed shall try, by shifting direction, to indicate them to us.
τοῖς γὰρ φάσκουσι λυπῶν εἶναι παῦλαν πάσας τὰς ἡδονὰς οὐ πάνυ πως πείθομαι, ἀλλʼ ὅπερ εἶπον, μάρτυσι καταχρῶμαι πρὸς τὸ τινὰς ἡδονὰς εἶναι δοκούσας, οὔσας δʼ οὐδαμῶς, καὶ μεγάλας ἑτέρας τινὰς ἅμα καὶ πολλὰς φαντασθείσας, εἶναι δʼ αὐτὰς συμπεφυρμένας ὁμοῦ λύπαις τε καὶ ἀναπαύσεσιν ὀδυνῶν τῶν μεγίστων περί τε σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς ἀπορίας. ΠΡΩ. ἀληθεῖς δʼ αὖ τίνας, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπολαμβάνων ὀρθῶς τις διανοοῖτʼ ἄν; ΣΩ. τὰς περί τε τὰ καλὰ λεγόμενα χρώματα καὶ περὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ τῶν ὀσμῶν τὰς πλείστας καὶ τὰς τῶν φθόγγων καὶ ὅσα τὰς ἐνδείας ἀναισθήτους ἔχοντα καὶ ἀλύπους τὰς πληρώσεις αἰσθητὰς καὶ ἡδείας παραδίδωσιν. ΠΡΩ. πῶς δὴ ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὖ λέγομεν οὕτω; ΣΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν οὐκ εὐθὺς δῆλά ἐστιν ἃ λέγω, πειρατέον μὴν δηλοῦν.
For I do not quite believe those who assert that all pleasures are a cessation of pains; rather, as I said, I make use of them as witnesses for the fact that some pleasures seem to be so but are by no means so, and that certain other pleasures, being at once huge and many, appear, but they are actually mixed together with both pains and cessations of the greatest sufferings concerning the difficulties of both body and soul.\n PROTARCHUS: But again, Socrates, what kind of pleasures would one rightly conceive if assuming them to be true?\nSOCRATES: Those concerning the so-called beautiful colors, and those concerning shapes, and most of those of smells, and those of sounds, and all those which, having imperceptible and painless lacks, deliver perceptible and pleasant fulfillments.\nPROTARCHUS: How indeed, Socrates, do we say these things in this way again?\nSOCRATES: What I am saying is not at all immediately clear, yet we must try to make it clear.
σχημάτων τε γὰρ κάλλος οὐχ ὅπερ ἂν ὑπολάβοιεν οἱ πολλοὶ πειρῶμαι νῦν λέγειν, ἢ ζῴων ἤ τινων ζωγραφημάτων, ἀλλʼ εὐθύ τι λέγω, φησὶν ὁ λόγος, καὶ περιφερὲς καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων δὴ τά τε τοῖς τόρνοις γιγνόμενα ἐπίπεδά τε καὶ στερεὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς κανόσι καὶ γωνίαις, εἴ μου μανθάνεις.
For by the beauty of shapes, I am trying now to speak not of what the many would suppose, such as that of living beings or of certain paintings, but I mean something straight, as the argument says, and circular, and from these indeed the things made by lathes, both flat and solid, and those made by rulers and squares, if you understand me.
ταῦτα γὰρ οὐκ εἶναι πρός τι καλὰ λέγω, καθάπερ ἄλλα, ἀλλʼ ἀεὶ καλὰ καθʼ αὑτὰ πεφυκέναι καί τινας ἡδονὰς οἰκείας ἔχειν, οὐδὲν ταῖς τῶν κνήσεων προσφερεῖς· καὶ χρώματα δὴ τοῦτον τὸν τύπον ἔχοντα ἀλλʼ ἆρα μανθάνομεν, ἢ πῶς;
For I say these are not beautiful in relation to something, like other things, but are always beautiful by nature in themselves, and have certain peculiar pleasures of their own, in no way similar to those of scratchings; and colors indeed have this character.
ΠΡΩ. πειρῶμαι μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες· πειράθητι δὲ καὶ σὺ σαφέστερον ἔτι λέγειν. ΣΩ. λέγω δὴ ἠχὰς τῶν φθόγγων τὰς λείας καὶ λαμπράς, τὰς ἕν τι καθαρὸν ἱείσας μέλος, οὐ πρὸς ἕτερον καλὰς ἀλλʼ αὐτὰς καθʼ αὑτὰς εἶναι, καὶ τούτων συμφύτους ἡδονὰς ἑπομένας. ΠΡΩ. ἔστι γὰρ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο. ΣΩ. τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς ὀσμὰς ἧττον μὲν τούτων θεῖον γένος ἡδονῶν· τὸ δὲ μὴ συμμεμεῖχθαι ἐν αὐταῖς ἀναγκαίους λύπας, καὶ ὅπῃ τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ὅτῳ τυγχάνει γεγονὸς ἡμῖν, τοῦτʼ ἐκείνοις τίθημι ἀντίστροφον ἅπαν.
Do we understand, then, or how?\nPROTARCHUS: I am trying, Socrates; but you too, try to speak still more clearly.\nSOCRATES: I mean indeed the smooth and clear sounds of voices, those which emit a single pure melody, which are not beautiful in relation to something else but are so themselves in themselves, and the innate pleasures that follow these.\nPROTARCHUS: Yes, for this too is so.\n SOCRATES: The class of pleasures concerning smells is less divine than these; but that necessary pains are not mixed in them, and in whatever way and in whatever thing this happens to occur for us, I set this as entirely corresponding to those.
ἀλλʼ, εἰ κατανοεῖς, ταῦτα εἴδη δύο ὧν λέγομεν ἡδονῶν. ΠΡΩ. κατανοῶ. §52ΣΩ. ἔτι δὴ τοίνυν τούτοις προσθῶμεν τὰς περὶ τὰ μαθήματα ἡδονάς, εἰ ἄρα δοκοῦσιν ἡμῖν αὗται πείνας μὲν μὴ ἔχειν τοῦ μανθάνειν μηδὲ διὰ μαθημάτων πείνην ἀλγηδόνας ἐξ ἀρχῆς γιγνομένας. ΠΡΩ. ἀλλʼ οὕτω συνδοκεῖ. ΣΩ. τί δέ;
But, if you understand, these are two kinds of the pleasures we are speaking of.\nPROTARCHUS: I understand.\n\nSOCRATES: Still indeed, then, let us add to these the pleasures concerning learning, if indeed these seem to us not to have hungers for learning, nor pains arising from the beginning due to the hunger for learning.\nPROTARCHUS: Yes, it seems so too.\nSOCRATES: What then?
μαθημάτων πληρωθεῖσιν ἐὰν ὕστερον ἀποβολαὶ διὰ τῆς λήθης γίγνωνται, καθορᾷς τινας ἐν αὐταῖς ἀλγηδόνας; ΠΡΩ. οὔ τι φύσει γε, ἀλλʼ ἔν τισι λογισμοῖς τοῦ παθήματος, ὅταν τις στερηθεὶς λυπηθῇ διὰ τὴν χρείαν. ΣΩ. καὶ μήν, ὦ μακάριε, νῦν γε ἡμεῖς αὐτὰ τὰ τῆς φύσεως μόνον παθήματα χωρὶς τοῦ λογισμοῦ διαπεραίνομεν. ΠΡΩ. ἀληθῆ τοίνυν λέγεις ὅτι χωρὶς λύπης ἡμῖν λήθη γίγνεται ἑκάστοτε ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν. ΣΩ. ταύτας τοίνυν τὰς τῶν μαθημάτων ἡδονὰς ἀμείκτους τε εἶναι λύπαις ῥητέον καὶ οὐδαμῶς τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ τῶν σφόδρα ὀλίγων. ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ ῥητέον; ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὅτε μετρίως ἤδη διακεκρίμεθα χωρὶς τάς τε καθαρὰς ἡδονὰς καὶ τὰς σχεδὸν ἀκαθάρτους ὀρθῶς ἂν λεχθείσας, προσθῶμεν τῷ λόγῳ ταῖς μὲν σφοδραῖς ἡδοναῖς ἀμετρίαν, ταῖς δὲ μὴ τοὐναντίον ἐμμετρίαν· καὶ τὰς τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ σφοδρὸν αὖ δεχομένας, καὶ πολλάκις καὶ ὀλιγάκις γιγνομένας τοιαύτας, τῆς τοῦ ἀπείρου γε ἐκείνου καὶ ἧττον καὶ μᾶλλον διά τε σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς φερομένου θῶμεν αὐτὰς εἶναι γένους, τὰς δὲ μὴ τῶν ἐμμέτρων. ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΩ. ἔτι τοίνυν πρὸς τούτοις μετὰ ταῦτα τόδε αὐτῶν διαθεατέον. ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον; ΣΩ. τί ποτε χρὴ φάναι πρὸς ἀλήθειαν εἶναι;
If later, after being filled with learning, losses occur through forgetfulness, do you perceive any pains in them?\nPROTARCHUS: Not by nature at least, but in certain calculations about the affection, when someone, having been deprived, is pained because of the need.\nSOCRATES: And yet, my blessed friend, now at least we are going through only the affections of nature itself, apart from calculation.\nPROTARCHUS: You speak the truth, then, that forgetfulness always occurs in us without pain in the case of learning.\nSOCRATES: These pleasures of learning, then, must be said to be unmixed with pains, and in no way belonging to the many, but to the very few.\nPROTARCHUS: For how must it not be said?\n SOCRATES: Therefore, since we have now moderately distinguished apart both the pure pleasures and those which would rightly be called almost impure, let us add to the argument excess for the intense pleasures, and to the others, on the contrary, moderation; and those which receive the huge and the intense, and occur as such both often and rarely, let us place them in the class of that infinite and of the "more and less" which is carried through both body and soul, and the others in the class of the moderate.\nPROTARCHUS: You speak most correctly, Socrates.\nSOCRATES: Still, then, in addition to these, we must next contemplate this about them.\nPROTARCHUS: What sort of thing?\nSOCRATES: What indeed must we say exists in relation to truth?
τὸ καθαρόν τε καὶ εἰλικρινὲς ἢ τὸ σφόδρα τε καὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ ἰταμόν; ΠΡΩ. τί ποτʼ ἄρα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐρωτᾷς βουλόμενος; ΣΩ. μηδέν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἐπιλείπειν ἐλέγχων ἡδονῆς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης, εἰ τὸ μὲν ἄρʼ αὐτῶν ἑκατέρου καθαρόν ἐστι, τὸ δʼ οὐ καθαρόν, ἵνα καθαρὸν ἑκάτερον ἰὸν εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἐμοὶ καὶ σοὶ καὶ συνάπασι τοῖσδε ῥᾴω παρέχῃ τὴν κρίσιν. ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα. ΣΩ. ἴθι δή, περὶ πάντων, ὅσα καθαρὰ γένη λέγομεν, οὑτωσὶ διανοηθῶμεν· προελόμενοι πρῶτον αὐτῶν ἕν τι σκοπῶμεν.
Is it the pure and unmixed, or the intense, the much, the huge, and the vehement?\nPROTARCHUS: What indeed, Socrates, are you asking in your desire?\nSOCRATES: That I may leave nothing out, Protarchus, in testing both pleasure and knowledge, to see if indeed one part of each of them is pure and the other is not pure, so that each pure thing, going to the judgment, may provide an easier judgment for me and you and all these people.\nPROTARCHUS: Most correct.\nSOCRATES: Come then, concerning all the classes we call pure, let us think in this way: choosing first one of them, let us examine it.