§49ΣΩ. τῶν ἀρετῶν δʼ ἆρʼ οὐ σοφίας πέρι τὸ πλῆθος πάντως ἀντεχόμενον μεστὸν ἐρίδων καὶ δοξοσοφίας ἐστὶ ψευδοῦς;
SOCRATES: And of the virtues, is it not regarding wisdom that the multitude is utterly grasping, being full of contention and of false conceit of wisdom?
ΠΡΩ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
PROTARCHUS: How could they not be?
ΣΩ. κακὸν μὲν δὴ πᾶν ἄν τις τὸ τοιοῦτον εἰπὼν ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴποι πάθος.
SOCRATES: Indeed, if anyone were to call all such affection an evil, he would speak correctly.
ΠΡΩ. σφόδρα γε.
PROTARCHUS: Very much so.
ΣΩ. τοῦτο τοίνυν ἔτι διαιρετέον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, δίχα, εἰ μέλλομεν τὸν παιδικὸν ἰδόντες φθόνον ἄτοπον ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ὄψεσθαι μεῖξιν.
SOCRATES: This, then, we must still divide in two, Protarchus, if we are to look upon childish envy and see an odd mixture of pleasure and pain.
πῶς οὖν τέμνομεν δίχα, λέγεις;
How then do we cut it in two, do you say?
πάντες ὁπόσοι ταύτην τὴν ψευδῆ δόξαν περὶ ἑαυτῶν ἀνοήτως δοξάζουσι, καθάπερ ἁπάντων ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τούτων ἀναγκαιότατον ἕπεσθαι τοῖς μὲν ῥώμην αὐτῶν καὶ δύναμιν, τοῖς δὲ οἶμαι τοὐναντίον.
In all those who foolishly hold this false opinion about themselves, just as with all mankind, it is most necessary that strength and power accompany some of them, and to others, I think, the opposite.
ΠΡΩ. ἀνάγκη.
PROTARCHUS: Inevitably.
ΣΩ. ταύτῃ τοίνυν δίελε, καὶ ὅσοι μὲν αὐτῶν εἰσι μετʼ ἀσθενείας τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἀδύνατοι καταγελώμενοι τιμωρεῖσθαι, γελοίους τούτους φάσκων εἶναι τἀληθῆ φθέγξῃ·
SOCRATES: Divide it, then, in this way: those of them who are in this condition with weakness, and are unable to take revenge when they are laughed at, you will speak the truth if you call them ridiculous; but those who are able to take revenge and are strong, if you call them fearsome and hostile, you will give yourself the most correct account of them.
τοὺς δὲ δυνατοὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι καὶ ἰσχυροὺς φοβεροὺς καὶ ἐχθροὺς προσαγορεύων ὀρθότατον τούτων σαυτῷ λόγον ἀποδώσεις. ἄγνοια γὰρ ἡ μὲν τῶν ἰσχυρῶν ἐχθρά τε καὶ αἰσχρά— βλαβερὰ γὰρ καὶ τοῖς πέλας αὐτή τε καὶ ὅσαι εἰκόνες αὐτῆς εἰσιν—ἡ δʼ ἀσθενὴς ἡμῖν τὴν τῶν γελοίων εἴληχε τάξιν τε καὶ φύσιν.
For the ignorance of the strong is both hostile and ugly—since both it itself and all its images are harmful to neighbors—but the weak kind has received for us the rank and nature of the ridiculous.
ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις.
PROTARCHUS: You speak most correctly.
ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ λυπῶν μεῖξις ἐν τούτοις οὔπω μοι καταφανής.
But indeed the mixture of pleasures and pains in these is not yet clear to me.
ΣΩ. τὴν τοίνυν τοῦ φθόνου λαβὲ δύναμιν πρῶτον.
SOCRATES: First, then, grasp the power of envy.
ΠΡΩ. λέγε μόνον.
PROTARCHUS: Just speak.
ΣΩ. λύπη τις ἄδικός ἐστί που καὶ ἡδονή;
SOCRATES: Is it not, after all, a certain unjust pain, and also a pleasure?
ΠΡΩ. τοῦτο μὲν ἀνάγκη.
PROTARCHUS: That is inevitably so.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς τῶν ἐχθρῶν κακοῖς οὔτʼ ἄδικον οὔτε φθονερόν ἐστι τὸ χαίρειν;
SOCRATES: Therefore, to rejoice at the misfortunes of enemies is neither unjust nor envious?
ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;
PROTARCHUS: Of course.
ΣΩ. τὰ δέ γε τῶν φίλων ὁρῶντας ἔστιν ὅτε κακὰ μὴ λυπεῖσθαι, χαίρειν δέ, ἆρα οὐκ ἄδικόν ἐστιν;
SOCRATES: But when seeing the misfortunes of friends, sometimes not to be pained but to rejoice, is that not unjust?
ΠΡΩ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
PROTARCHUS: How could it not be?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τὴν ἄγνοιαν εἴπομεν ὅτι κακὸν πᾶσιν;
SOCRATES: Now did we not say that ignorance is an evil to all?
ΠΡΩ. ὀρθῶς.
PROTARCHUS: Correctly.
ΣΩ. τὴν οὖν τῶν φίλων δοξοσοφίαν καὶ δοξοκαλίαν καὶ ὅσα νυνδὴ διήλθομεν, ἐν τρισὶν λέγοντες εἴδεσιν γίγνεσθαι, γελοῖα μὲν ὁπόσα ἀσθενῆ, μισητὰ δʼ ὁπόσα ἐρρωμένα, φῶμεν ἢ μὴ φῶμεν ὅπερ εἶπον ἄρτι, τὴν τῶν φίλων ἕξιν ταύτην ὅταν ἔχῃ τις τὴν ἀβλαβῆ τοῖς ἄλλοις, γελοίαν εἶναι;
SOCRATES: Therefore, regarding our friends' conceit of wisdom and conceit of beauty, and all those things we just went through, saying that they occur in three kinds—that those that are weak are ridiculous, while those that are strong are hateful—shall we say, or shall we not say, what I just mentioned: that when someone has this disposition among friends which is harmless to others, it is ridiculous?
ΠΡΩ. πάνυ γε.
PROTARCHUS: Quite so.
ΣΩ. κακὸν δʼ οὐχ ὁμολογοῦμεν αὐτὴν ἄγνοιάν γε οὖσαν εἶναι;
SOCRATES: And do we not agree that it is an evil, being as it is ignorance?
ΠΡΩ. σφόδρα γε.
PROTARCHUS: Very much so.
ΣΩ. χαίρομεν δὲ ἢ λυπούμεθα, ὅταν ἐπʼ αὐτῇ γελῶμεν;
SOCRATES: And do we rejoice or are we pained, when we laugh at it?
§50ΠΡΩ. δῆλον ὅτι χαίρομεν.
PROTARCHUS: Clearly we rejoice.
ΣΩ. ἡδονὴν δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων κακοῖς, οὐ φθόνον ἔφαμεν εἶναι τὸν τοῦτʼ ἀπεργαζόμενον;
SOCRATES: And did we not say that it is envy which produces this—pleasure at the misfortunes of friends?
ΠΡΩ. ἀνάγκη.
PROTARCHUS: Inevitably.
ΣΩ. γελῶντας ἄρα ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων γελοίοις φησὶν ὁ λόγος, κεραννύντας ἡδονὴν αὖ φθόνῳ, λύπῃ τὴν ἡδονὴν συγκεραννύναι·
SOCRATES: Therefore, the argument says that when we laugh at the ridiculous aspects of our friends, by mixing pleasure with envy, we are mixing pleasure with pain.
τὸν γὰρ φθόνον ὡμολογῆσθαι λύπην ψυχῆς ἡμῖν πάλαι, τὸ δὲ γελᾶν ἡδονήν, ἅμα γίγνεσθαι δὲ τούτω ἐν τούτοις τοῖς χρόνοις.
For we agreed some time ago that envy is a pain of the soul, and that laughing is a pleasure, and that both of these occur at the same time in these moments.
ΠΡΩ. ἀληθῆ.
PROTARCHUS: True.
ΣΩ. μηνύει δὴ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐν θρήνοις τε καὶ ἐν τραγῳδίαις καὶ κωμῳδίαις, μὴ τοῖς δράμασι μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ τοῦ βίου συμπάσῃ τραγῳδίᾳ καὶ κωμῳδίᾳ, λύπας ἡδοναῖς ἅμα κεράννυσθαι, καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δὴ μυρίοις.
SOCRATES: Now, then, the argument indicates to us that in lamentations and in tragedies and comedies, not only in stage plays but also in the entire tragedy and comedy of life, pains are mixed together with pleasures, and indeed in countless other things.
ΠΡΩ. ἀδύνατον μὴ ὁμολογεῖν ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰ καί τις φιλονικοῖ πάνυ πρὸς τἀναντία.
PROTARCHUS: It is impossible not to agree to this, Socrates, even if one were extremely contentious for the opposite view.
ΣΩ. ὀργὴν μὴν καὶ πόθον καὶ θρῆνον καὶ φόβον καὶ ἔρωτα καὶ ζῆλον καὶ φθόνον προυθέμεθα καὶ ὁπόσα τοιαῦτα, ἐν οἷς ἔφαμεν εὑρήσειν μειγνύμενα τὰ νῦν πολλάκις λεγόμενα.
SOCRATES: Indeed, anger, yearning, lamentation, fear, love, jealousy, and envy, and all such things, we set before us, in which we said we would find those things mixed which have now been frequently mentioned.
ἦ γάρ;
Is it not so?
ΠΡΩ. ναί.
PROTARCHUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. μανθάνομεν οὖν ὅτι θρήνου πέρι καὶ φθόνου καὶ ὀργῆς πάντα ἐστὶ τὰ νυνδὴ διαπερανθέντα;
SOCRATES: Do we understand, then, that all the things just concluded are regarding lamentation, envy, and anger?
ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὐ μανθάνομεν;
PROTARCHUS: How could we not?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν πολλὰ ἔτι τὰ λοιπά;
SOCRATES: Are there not, then, many things still remaining?
ΠΡΩ. καὶ πάνυ γε.
PROTARCHUS: Very much so.
ΣΩ. διὰ δὴ τί μάλισθʼ ὑπολαμβάνεις με δεῖξαί σοι τὴν ἐν τῇ κωμῳδίᾳ μεῖξιν;
SOCRATES: Why then do you suppose I showed you especially the mixture in comedy?
ἆρʼ οὐ πίστεως χάριν, ὅτι τήν γε ἐν τοῖς φόβοις καὶ ἔρωσι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ῥᾴδιον κρᾶσιν ἐπιδεῖξαι· λαβόντα δὲ τοῦτο παρὰ σαυτῷ ἀφεῖναί με μηκέτι ἐπʼ ἐκεῖνα ἰόντα δεῖν μηκύνειν τοὺς λόγους, ἀλλʼ ἁπλῶς λαβεῖν τοῦτο, ὅτι καὶ σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς καὶ ψυχὴ ἄνευ σώματος καὶ κοινῇ μετʼ ἀλλήλων ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι μεστά ἐστι συγκεκραμένης ἡδονῆς λύπαις;
Was it not for the sake of conviction, because it is easy to demonstrate the mixture in fears, loves, and the rest; and so that you, grasping this for yourself, might let me off from going to those and having to lengthen the discussion, but simply grasp this: that both body without soul, and soul without body, and both in common with each other, are full of pleasure mixed with pains in their affections?
νῦν οὖν λέγε πότερα ἀφίης με ἢ μέσας ποιήσεις νύκτας;
Now, then, say whether you let me off, or will you make it midnight?
εἰπὼν δὲ σμικρὰ οἶμαί σου τεύξεσθαι μεθεῖναί με· τούτων γὰρ ἁπάντων αὔριον ἐθελήσω σοι λόγον δοῦναι, τὰ νῦν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ λοιπὰ βούλομαι στέλλεσθαι πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν ἣν Φίληβος ἐπιτάττει.
But by saying a few words I think I shall obtain from you that you let me go; for tomorrow I shall be willing to give you an account of all these, but for now I want to set out for the remaining things towards the judgment which Philebus prescribes.
ΠΡΩ. καλῶς εἶπες, ὦ Σώκρατες· ἀλλʼ ὅσα λοιπὰ ἡμῖν διέξελθε ὅπῃ σοι φίλον.
PROTARCHUS: Well spoken, Socrates; but go through whatever remains for us in the way you please.
ΣΩ. κατὰ φύσιν τοίνυν μετὰ τὰς μειχθείσας ἡδονὰς ὑπὸ δή τινος ἀνάγκης ἐπὶ τὰς ἀμείκτους πορευοίμεθʼ ἂν ἐν τῷ μέρει.
SOCRATES: In the natural order, then, after the mixed pleasures, we should by some necessity proceed to the unmixed ones in our turn.