§36ΣΩ. διὰ μὲν τὸ πάθος ἀλγῇ, μεμνῆται δὲ τῶν ἡδέων ὧν γενομένων παύοιτʼ ἂν τῆς ἀλγηδόνος, πληρῶται δὲ μήπω·
SOCRATES: When someone is pained due to his affection, but remembers the pleasant things which, if they occurred, would make his pain cease, yet is not yet being filled—what then?
τί τότε; φῶμεν ἢ μὴ φῶμεν αὐτὸν ἐν μέσῳ τῶν παθημάτων εἶναι;
Shall we say or not say that he is in the middle of these affections?
ΠΡΩ. φῶμεν μὲν οὖν.
PROTARCHUS: Let us say so.
ΣΩ. πότερον ἀλγοῦνθʼ ὅλως ἢ χαίροντα;
SOCRATES: Is he pained as a whole, or rejoicing?
ΠΡΩ. μὰ Δίʼ, ἀλλὰ διπλῇ τινὶ λύπῃ λυπούμενον, κατὰ μὲν τὸ σῶμα ἐν τῷ παθήματι, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν προσδοκίας τινὶ πόθῳ.
PROTARCHUS: By Zeus, no, but he is pained by a certain double pain: in respect of the body, in the affection; in respect of the soul, in a certain longing of expectation.
ΣΩ. πῶς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τὸ διπλοῦν τῆς λύπης εἶπες;
SOCRATES: How do you mean "the double of the pain," Protarchus?
ἆρʼ οὐκ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τις ἡμῶν κενούμενος ἐν ἐλπίδι φανερᾷ τοῦ πληρωθήσεσθαι καθέστηκε, τοτὲ δὲ τοὐναντίον ἀνελπίστως ἔχει;
Is it not the case that sometimes one of us, being emptied, is established in a clear hope of being filled, while at other times, on the contrary, he is hopeless?
ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα γε.
PROTARCHUS: Very much so.
ΣΩ. μῶν οὖν οὐχὶ ἐλπίζων μὲν πληρωθήσεσθαι τῷ μεμνῆσθαι δοκεῖ σοι χαίρειν, ἅμα δὲ κενούμενος ἐν τούτοις ἀλγεῖν;
SOCRATES: Does it not seem to you, then, that while hoping to be filled, he rejoices because of remembering, but at the same time, being emptied, he is pained in these circumstances?
ΠΡΩ. ἀνάγκη.
PROTARCHUS: Necessarily.
ΣΩ. τότε ἄρʼ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τἆλλα ζῷα λυπεῖταί τε ἅμα καὶ χαίρει.
SOCRATES: In that case, then, a human being and other living things are pained and rejoice at the same time.
ΠΡΩ. κινδυνεύει.
PROTARCHUS: It seems so.
ΣΩ. τί δʼ ὅταν ἀνελπίστως ἔχῃ κενούμενος τεύξεσθαι πληρώσεως;
SOCRATES: But what when, being emptied, he is hopeless of obtaining filling?
ἆρʼ οὐ τότε τὸ διπλοῦν γίγνοιτʼ ἂν περὶ τὰς λύπας πάθος, ὃ σὺ νυνδὴ κατιδὼν ᾠήθης ἁπλῶς εἶναι διπλοῦν;
Would not then a double affection concerning pains occur, which you just now saw and thought was simply double?
ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα, ὦ Σώκρατες.
PROTARCHUS: Most true, Socrates.
ΣΩ. ταύτῃ δὴ τῇ σκέψει τούτων τῶν παθημάτων τόδε χρησώμεθα.
SOCRATES: Let us use this investigation of these affections for the following point.
ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον;
PROTARCHUS: What point?
ΣΩ. πότερον ἀληθεῖς ταύτας τὰς λύπας τε καὶ ἡδονὰς ἢ ψευδεῖς εἶναι λέξομεν;
SOCRATES: Shall we say that these pains and pleasures are true or false?
ἢ τὰς μέν τινας ἀληθεῖς, τὰς δʼ οὔ;
Or that some are true, but others are not?
ΠΡΩ. πῶς δʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἂν εἶεν ψευδεῖς ἡδοναὶ ἢ λῦπαι;
PROTARCHUS: And how, Socrates, could pleasures or pains be false?
ΣΩ. πῶς δέ, ὦ Πρώταρχε, φόβοι ἂν ἀληθεῖς ἢ ψευδεῖς, ἢ προσδοκίαι ἀληθεῖς ἢ μή, ἢ δόξαι ἀληθεῖς ἢ ψευδεῖς;
SOCRATES: And how, Protarchus, could fears be true or false, or expectations true or not, or opinions true or false?
ΠΡΩ. δόξας μὲν ἔγωγʼ ἄν που συγχωροίην, τὰ δʼ ἕτερα ταῦτʼ οὐκ ἄν.
PROTARCHUS: Opinions indeed I would perhaps concede, but not these other things.
ΣΩ. πῶς φῄς;
SOCRATES: How do you mean?
λόγον μέντοι τινὰ κινδυνεύομεν οὐ πάνυ σμικρὸν ἐπεγείρειν.
Indeed, we seem to be raising a not at all small argument.
ΠΡΩ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις.
PROTARCHUS: You say what is true.
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ εἰ πρὸς τὰ παρεληλυθότα, ὦ παῖ ʼκείνου τἀνδρός, προσήκοντα, τοῦτο σκεπτέον.
SOCRATES: But we must examine this, my boy of that man, if it is relevant to what has gone before.
ΠΡΩ. ἴσως τοῦτό γε.
PROTARCHUS: Perhaps indeed this.
ΣΩ. χαίρειν τοίνυν δεῖ λέγειν τοῖς ἄλλοις μήκεσιν ἢ καὶ ὁτῳοῦν τῶν παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον λεγομένων.
SOCRATES: We must, then, bid farewell to other lengthy discussions or to anything whatever that is spoken out of season.
ΠΡΩ. ὀρθῶς.
PROTARCHUS: Rightly.
ΣΩ. λέγε δή μοι· θαῦμα γάρ μέ γε ἔχει διὰ τέλους ἀεὶ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ ἃ νυνδὴ προυθέμεθα ἀπορήματα.
SOCRATES: Tell me then; for a wonder possesses me continually concerning the very same puzzles we just now proposed.
πῶς δὴ φῄς;
How indeed do you say?
ψευδεῖς, αἱ δʼ ἀληθεῖς οὐκ εἰσὶν ἡδοναί;
Are not some pleasures false and others true?
ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
PROTARCHUS: For how could they be?
ΣΩ. οὔτε δὴ ὄναρ οὔθʼ ὕπαρ, ὡς φῄς, οὔτʼ ἐν μανίαις οὔτʼ ἐν παραφροσύναις οὐδεὶς ἔσθʼ ὅστις ποτὲ δοκεῖ μὲν χαίρειν, χαίρει δὲ οὐδαμῶς, οὐδʼ αὖ δοκεῖ μὲν λυπεῖσθαι, λυπεῖται δʼ οὔ.
SOCRATES: Neither in a dream nor awake, as you say, nor in madness nor in delusions, is there anyone who ever seems to rejoice, yet does not rejoice at all, nor again seems to be pained, yet is not pained?
ΠΡΩ. πάνθʼ οὕτω ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔχειν πάντες ὑπειλήφαμεν.
PROTARCHUS: All these things, Socrates, we all suppose to be so.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ὀρθῶς;
SOCRATES: Is this then correct?
ἢ σκεπτέον εἴτʼ ὀρθῶς εἴτε μὴ ταῦτα λέγεται;
Or must we examine whether these things are said correctly or not?
ΠΡΩ. σκεπτέον, ὥς γʼ ἐγὼ φαίην ἄν.
PROTARCHUS: We must examine it, as I at least would say.