§34ΣΩ. ἀντὶ μὲν τοῦ λεληθέναι τὴν ψυχήν, ὅταν ἀπαθὴς αὕτη γίγνηται τῶν σεισμῶν τῶν τοῦ σώματος, ἣν νῦν λήθην καλεῖς ἀναισθησίαν ἐπονόμασον.
SOCRATES: Instead of "escaping the notice of the soul," when it remains unaffected by the tremors of the body, what you now call "forgetfulness" rename "insensibility." PROTARCHUS: I understand.
ΠΡΩ. ἔμαθον. ΣΩ. τὸ δʼ ἐν ἑνὶ πάθει τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τὸ σῶμα κοινῇ γιγνόμενον κοινῇ καὶ κινεῖσθαι, ταύτην δʼ αὖ τὴν κίνησιν ὀνομάζων αἴσθησιν οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου φθέγγοιʼ ἄν.
SOCRATES: On the other hand, for the soul and the body to experience a single affection in common and to be moved in common—if you call this movement "perception," you would not speak out of place.
ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
PROTARCHUS: Most truly you say.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἤδη μανθάνομεν ὃ βουλόμεθα καλεῖν τὴν αἴσθησιν;
SOCRATES: Do we then already understand what we want to call "perception"?
ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;
PROTARCHUS: Certainly.
ΣΩ. σωτηρίαν τοίνυν αἰσθήσεως τὴν μνήμην λέγων ὀρθῶς ἄν τις λέγοι κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν.
SOCRATES: Then, saying that memory is the preservation of perception, one would speak correctly, at least in my opinion.
ΠΡΩ. ὀρθῶς γὰρ οὖν.
PROTARCHUS: Correctly indeed.
ΣΩ. μνήμης δὲ ἀνάμνησιν ἆρʼ οὐ διαφέρουσαν λέγομεν;
SOCRATES: But do we not say that recollection is different from memory?
ΠΡΩ. ἴσως.
PROTARCHUS: Perhaps.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν οὐ τόδε;
SOCRATES: Is it not, then, this?
ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον;
PROTARCHUS: What sort of thing?
ΣΩ. ὅταν ἃ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔπασχέν ποθʼ ἡ ψυχή, ταῦτʼ ἄνευ τοῦ σώματος αὐτὴ ἐν ἑαυτῇ ὅτι μάλιστα ἀναλαμβάνῃ, τότε ἀναμιμνῄσκεσθαί που λέγομεν. ἦ γάρ;
SOCRATES: When the soul, entirely by itself and without the body, recovers as much as possible within itself what it once experienced together with the body, then, I suppose, we say it "recollects." Is it not so?
ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
PROTARCHUS: Very much so.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅταν ἀπολέσασα μνήμην εἴτʼ αἰσθήσεως εἴτʼ αὖ μαθήματος αὖθις ταύτην ἀναπολήσῃ πάλιν αὐτὴ ἐν ἑαυτῇ, καὶ ταῦτα σύμπαντα ἀναμνήσεις που λέγομεν.
SOCRATES: Furthermore, when having lost the memory either of a perception or of a piece of learning, it reviews this again by itself within itself, all these too we call "recollections," I suppose.
ΠΡΩ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις.
PROTARCHUS: Rightly you say.
ΣΩ. οὗ δὴ χάριν ἅπαντʼ εἴρηται ταῦτʼ, ἔστι τόδε.
SOCRATES: The reason why all this has been said is this.
ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον;
PROTARCHUS: What sort of thing?
ΣΩ. ἵνα πῃ τὴν ψυχῆς ἡδονὴν χωρὶς σώματος ὅτι μάλιστα καὶ ἐναργέστατα λάβοιμεν, καὶ ἅμα ἐπιθυμίαν· διὰ γὰρ τούτων πως ταῦτα ἀμφότερα ἔοικεν δηλοῦσθαι.
SOCRATES: So that we might grasp, as clearly and vividly as possible, the pleasure of the soul apart from the body, and at the same time, desire; for through these matters both of them seem somehow to be made manifest.
ΠΡΩ. λέγωμεν τοίνυν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἤδη τὸ μετὰ ταῦτα.
PROTARCHUS: Let us speak, then, Socrates, now of what comes next.
ΣΩ. πολλά γε περὶ γένεσιν ἡδονῆς καὶ πᾶσαν μορφὴν αὐτῆς ἀναγκαῖον, ὡς ἔοικε, λέγοντας σκοπεῖν.
SOCRATES: It is necessary, it seems, for those who speak about the generation of pleasure and its every form to examine many things.
καὶ γὰρ νῦν πρότερον ἔτι φαίνεται ληπτέον ἐπιθυμίαν εἶναι τί ποτʼ ἔστι καὶ ποῦ γίγνεται.
For even now, it appears we must first grasp what desire is and where it arises.
ΠΡΩ. σκοπῶμεν τοίνυν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπολοῦμεν.
PROTARCHUS: Let us examine it then; for we shall lose nothing.
ΣΩ. ἀπολοῦμεν μὲν οὖν ταῦτά γε, ὦ Πρώταρχε· εὑρόντες ὃ νῦν ζητοῦμεν, ἀπολοῦμεν τὴν περὶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἀπορίαν.
SOCRATES: On the contrary, Protarchus, we shall lose these very things; for by finding what we are now seeking, we shall lose our perplexity about these very matters.
ΠΡΩ. ὀρθῶς ἠμύνω· τὸ δʼ ἐφεξῆς τούτοις πειρώμεθα λέγειν.
PROTARCHUS: Well defended; let us try to speak of what follows these.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν νυνδὴ πείνην τε καὶ δίψος καὶ πολλὰ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα ἔφαμεν εἶναί τινας ἐπιθυμίας;
SOCRATES: Did we not say just now that hunger, thirst, and many other such things are certain desires?
ΠΡΩ. σφόδρα γε.
PROTARCHUS: Very much so.
ΣΩ. πρὸς τί ποτε ἄρα ταὐτὸν βλέψαντες οὕτω πολὺ διαφέροντα ταῦθʼ ἑνὶ προσαγορεύομεν ὀνόματι;
SOCRATES: Looking to what identical thing, then, do we call these things, which differ so much, by one name?
ΠΡΩ. μὰ Δίʼ οὐ ῥᾴδιον ἴσως εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλʼ ὅμως λεκτέον.
PROTARCHUS: By Zeus, it is perhaps not easy to say, Socrates, but still it must be said.
ΣΩ. ἐκεῖθεν δὴ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν πάλιν ἀναλάβωμεν.
SOCRATES: Let us take it up again from there, from the same things.
ΠΡΩ. πόθεν δή;
PROTARCHUS: From where?
ΣΩ. διψῇ γέ που λέγομεν ἑκάστοτέ τι;
SOCRATES: We say, I suppose, each time that we "thirst" for something?
ΠΡΩ. πῶς δʼ οὔ;
PROTARCHUS: How could we not?
ΣΩ. τοῦτο δέ γʼ ἐστὶ κενοῦται;
SOCRATES: And this is "being emptied"?
ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;
PROTARCHUS: Certainly.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν τὸ δίψος ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία;
SOCRATES: Is thirst, then, a desire?
ΠΡΩ. ναί, πώματός γε.
PROTARCHUS: Yes, of drink.
§35ΣΩ. πώματος, ἢ πληρώσεως πώματος;
SOCRATES: Of drink, or of the filling of drink?
ΠΡΩ. οἶμαι μὲν πληρώσεως.
PROTARCHUS: Of the filling, I think.
ΣΩ. ὁ κενούμενος ἡμῶν ἄρα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἐναντίων ἢ πάσχει· κενούμενος γὰρ ἐρᾷ πληροῦσθαι.
SOCRATES: The one of us who is emptied, then, as it seems, desires the opposites of what he experiences; for being emptied, he longs to be filled.
ΠΡΩ. σαφέστατά γε.
PROTARCHUS: Most clearly.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν;
SOCRATES: What then?
ὁ τὸ πρῶτον κενούμενος ἔστιν ὁπόθεν εἴτʼ αἰσθήσει πληρώσεως ἐφάπτοιτʼ ἂν εἴτε μνήμῃ, τούτου ὃ μήτʼ ἐν τῷ νῦν χρόνῳ πάσχει μήτʼ ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν πώποτε ἔπαθεν;
Is it possible for the one who is being emptied for the first time to touch, either by perception or by memory, filling—something which he neither experiences in the present time nor ever experienced in the past?
ΠΡΩ. καὶ πῶς;
PROTARCHUS: How could he?
ΣΩ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅ γε ἐπιθυμῶν τινὸς ἐπιθυμεῖ, φαμέν.
SOCRATES: But indeed, the one who desires, desires something, we say.
ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
PROTARCHUS: How could he not?
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄρα ὅ γε πάσχει, τούτου ἐπιθυμεῖ.
SOCRATES: It is not, therefore, what he experiences that he desires.
διψῇ γάρ, τοῦτο δὲ κένωσις· ὁ δʼ ἐπιθυμεῖ πληρώσεως.
For he thirsts, and this is an emptying, but he desires filling.
ΠΡΩ. ναί.
PROTARCHUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. πληρώσεώς γʼ ἄρα πῄ τι τῶν τοῦ διψῶντος ἂν ἐφάπτοιτο.
SOCRATES: Therefore, some part of the thirsting person must somehow touch filling.
ΠΡΩ. ἀναγκαῖον.
PROTARCHUS: Necessarily.
ΣΩ. τὸ μὲν δὴ σῶμα ἀδύνατον· κενοῦται γάρ που.
SOCRATES: The body, indeed, is impossible; for it is being emptied, I suppose.
ΠΡΩ. ναί.
PROTARCHUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. τὴν ψυχὴν ἄρα τῆς πληρώσεως ἐφάπτεσθαι λοιπόν, τῇ μνήμῃ δῆλον ὅτι· τῷ γὰρ ἂν ἔτʼ ἄλλῳ ἐφάψαιτο;
SOCRATES: It remains, therefore, that the soul touches the filling, clearly by memory; for by what other thing could it touch it?
ΠΡΩ. σχεδὸν οὐδενί.
PROTARCHUS: Hardly by anything else.
ΣΩ. μανθάνομεν οὖν ὃ συμβέβηχʼ ἡμῖν ἐκ τούτων τῶν λόγων;
SOCRATES: Do we understand, then, what has happened to us from these arguments?
ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον;
PROTARCHUS: What is it?
ΣΩ. σώματος ἐπιθυμίαν οὔ φησιν ἡμῖν οὗτος ὁ λόγος γίγνεσθαι.
SOCRATES: This argument says that desire of the body does not occur.
ΠΡΩ. πῶς;
PROTARCHUS: How?
ΣΩ. ὅτι τοῖς ἐκείνου παθήμασιν ἐναντίαν ἀεὶ παντὸς ζῴου μηνύει τὴν ἐπιχείρησιν.
SOCRATES: Because it reveals that the attempt of every living thing is always opposite to the affections of its body.
ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα.
PROTARCHUS: Very much so.
ΣΩ. ἡ δʼ ὁρμή γε ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον ἄγουσα ἢ τὰ παθήματα δηλοῖ που μνήμην οὖσαν τῶν τοῖς παθήμασιν ἐναντίων.
SOCRATES: And the impulse leading to the opposite of the affections surely indicates that there is memory of the opposites of the affections.
ΠΡΩ. πάνυ γε.
PROTARCHUS: Quite so.
ΣΩ. τὴν ἄρα ἐπάγουσαν ἐπὶ τὰ ἐπιθυμούμενα ἀποδείξας μνήμην ὁ λόγος ψυχῆς σύμπασαν τήν τε ὁρμὴν καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ζῴου παντὸς ἀπέφηνεν.
SOCRATES: By demonstrating, therefore, that it is memory which leads to the objects of desire, the argument has shown that all impulse, desire, and the ruling principle of every living thing belong to the soul.
ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα.
PROTARCHUS: Most rightly.
ΣΩ. διψῆν ἄρα ἡμῶν τὸ σῶμα ἢ πεινῆν ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων πάσχειν οὐδαμῇ ὁ λόγος αἱρεῖ.
SOCRATES: Therefore, that our body thirsts or hungers or experiences any of such things, the argument by no means allows.
ΠΡΩ. ἀληθέστατα.
PROTARCHUS: Most true.
ΣΩ. ἔτι δὴ καὶ τόδε περὶ ταὐτὰ ταῦτα κατανοήσωμεν.
SOCRATES: Let us further comprehend this too concerning these same matters.
βίου γὰρ εἶδός τί μοι φαίνεται βούλεσθαι δηλοῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐν τούτοις αὐτοῖς.
For the argument seems to me to want to reveal a certain kind of life in these very things.
ΠΡΩ. ἐν τίσι καὶ ποίου πέρι βίου φράζεις;
PROTARCHUS: In what things, and about what kind of life are you speaking?
ΣΩ. ἐν τῷ πληροῦσθαι καὶ κενοῦσθαι καὶ πᾶσιν ὅσα περὶ σωτηρίαν τέ ἐστι τῶν ζῴων καὶ τὴν φθοράν, καὶ εἴ τις τούτων ἐν ἑκατέρῳ γιγνόμενος ἡμῶν ἀλγεῖ, τοτὲ δὲ χαίρει κατὰ τὰς μεταβολάς.
SOCRATES: In the being filled and being emptied, and in all things that concern the preservation and destruction of living things, and whether any of us, being in either of these states, is pained, and at other times rejoices according to the changes.
ΠΡΩ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
PROTARCHUS: That is so.
ΣΩ. τί δʼ ὅταν ἐν μέσῳ τούτων γίγνηται;
SOCRATES: But what when one is in the middle of these?
ΠΡΩ. πῶς ἐν μέσῳ;
PROTARCHUS: How in the middle?