§33ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἔστι τις τρίτη ἡμῶν ἡ τοιαύτη διάθεσις παρά τε τὴν τοῦ χαίροντος καὶ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ λυπουμένου;
SOCRATES: Is there not, then, a third state of ours, such as this, besides that of the one who rejoices and that of the one who is pained?
ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;
PROTARCHUS: Certainly.
ΣΩ. ἄγε δὴ τοίνυν, ταύτης προθυμοῦ μεμνῆσθαι.
SOCRATES: Come then, be eager to remember this.
πρὸς γὰρ τὴν τῆς ἡδονῆς κρίσιν οὐ σμικρὸν μεμνῆσθαι ταύτην ἔσθʼ ἡμῖν ἢ μή.
For whether we remember this or not is of no small importance for our judgment of pleasure.
βραχὺ δέ τι περὶ αὐτῆς, εἰ βούλει, διαπεράνωμεν.
Let us settle a brief point about it, if you will.
ΠΡΩ. λέγε ποῖον.
PROTARCHUS: Tell me what it is.
ΣΩ. τὸν τοῦ φρονεῖν βίον οἶσθʼ ὡς τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει ζῆν.
SOCRATES: You know that nothing prevents one from living the life of intellect in this manner.
ΠΡΩ. τὸν τοῦ μὴ χαίρειν μηδὲ λυπεῖσθαι λέγεις;
PROTARCHUS: You mean the life of neither rejoicing nor being pained?
ΣΩ. ἐρρήθη γάρ που τότε ἐν τῇ παραβολῇ τῶν βίων μηδὲν δεῖν μήτε μέγα μήτε σμικρὸν χαίρειν τῷ τὸν τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ φρονεῖν βίον ἑλομένῳ.
SOCRATES: Yes, for it was said, I believe, back then in the comparison of lives, that it is not necessary at all, either greatly or slightly, for the one who has chosen the life of thinking and understanding to rejoice.
ΠΡΩ. καὶ μάλα οὕτως ἐρρήθη.
PROTARCHUS: It was indeed said so.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὕτως ἂν ἐκείνῳ γε ὑπάρχοι· καὶ ἴσως οὐδὲν ἄτοπον εἰ πάντων τῶν βίων ἐστὶ θειότατος.
SOCRATES: Then such a state would belong to that person; and perhaps it is not at all strange if of all lives this is the most divine.
ΠΡΩ. οὔκουν εἰκός γε οὔτε χαίρειν θεοὺς οὔτε τὸ ἐναντίον.
PROTARCHUS: It is certainly not likely that the gods either rejoice or the opposite.
ΣΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰκός· ἄσχημον γοῦν αὐτῶν ἑκάτερον γιγνόμενόν ἐστιν.
SOCRATES: Very much unlikely indeed; at any rate, either of these happening to them is unseemly.
ἀλλὰ δὴ τοῦτο μὲν ἔτι καὶ εἰς αὖθις ἐπισκεψόμεθα, ἐὰν πρὸς λόγον τι ᾖ, καὶ τῷ νῷ πρὸς τὰ δευτερεῖα, ἐὰν μὴ πρὸς τὰ πρωτεῖα δυνώμεθα προσθεῖναι, προσθήσομεν.
But this indeed we shall examine again hereafter, if it is relevant to the argument, and we shall add it for intellect to the second prize, if we cannot assign it to the first.
ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις.
PROTARCHUS: Most rightly you say.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν τό γε ἕτερον εἶδος τῶν ἡδονῶν, ὃ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς ἔφαμεν εἶναι, διὰ μνήμης πᾶν ἐστι γεγονός.
SOCRATES: Furthermore, the other form of pleasures, which we said belongs to the soul itself, has all come to be through memory.
ΠΡΩ. πῶς;
PROTARCHUS: How?
ΣΩ. μνήμην, ὡς ἔοικεν, ὅτι ποτʼ ἔστιν πρότερον ἀναληπτέον, καὶ κινδυνεύει πάλιν ἔτι πρότερον αἴσθησιν μνήμης, εἰ μέλλει τὰ περὶ ταῦθʼ ἡμῖν κατὰ τρόπον φανερά πῃ γενήσεσθαι.
SOCRATES: It seems we must first grasp what memory itself is, and it is likely that we must grasp perception even before memory, if these matters are to become somehow clear to us in the proper way.
ΠΡΩ. πῶς φῄς;
PROTARCHUS: What do you mean?
ΣΩ. θὲς τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἑκάστοτε παθημάτων τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι κατασβεννύμενα πρὶν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν διεξελθεῖν ἀπαθῆ ἐκείνην ἐάσαντα, τὰ δὲ διʼ ἀμφοῖν ἰόντα καί τινα ὥσπερ σεισμὸν ἐντιθέντα ἴδιόν τε καὶ κοινὸν ἑκατέρῳ.
SOCRATES: Posit that of the affections occurring in our body at any time, some are extinguished in the body before passing through to the soul, leaving it unaffected, while others go through both and produce a kind of tremor, both peculiar and common to each.
ΠΡΩ. κείσθω.
PROTARCHUS: Let it be posited.
ΣΩ. τὰ μὲν δὴ μὴ διʼ ἀμφοῖν ἰόντα ἐὰν τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν φῶμεν λανθάνειν, τὰ δὲ διʼ ἀμφοῖν μὴ λανθάνειν, ἆρʼ ὀρθότατα ἐροῦμεν;
SOCRATES: If we say that those which do not go through both escape the notice of our soul, whereas those which do go through both do not escape it, shall we speak most rightly?
ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
PROTARCHUS: How could we not?
ΣΩ. τὸ τοίνυν λεληθέναι μηδαμῶς ὑπολάβῃς ὡς λέγω λήθης ἐνταῦθά που γένεσιν· ἔστι γὰρ λήθη μνήμης ἔξοδος, ἡ δʼ ἐν τῷ λεγομένῳ νῦν οὔπω γέγονε.
SOCRATES: By no means, then, suppose that by "escaping notice" I mean the occurrence of forgetfulness here; for forgetfulness is the departure of memory, which in the case now spoken of has not yet come to be.
τοῦ δὴ μήτε ὄντος μήτε γεγονότος πω γίγνεσθαι φάναι τινὰ ἀποβολὴν ἄτοπον.
To say that a loss occurs of what neither is nor has yet come to be is absurd.
ἦ γάρ;
Is it not?
ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;
PROTARCHUS: Certainly.
ΣΩ. τὰ τοίνυν ὀνόματα μετάβαλε μόνον.
SOCRATES: Change only the names, then.
ΠΡΩ. πῶς;
PROTARCHUS: How?