§32ΣΩ. δίψος δʼ αὖ φθορὰ καὶ λύπη, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ὑγροῦ πάλιν τὸ ξηρανθὲν πληροῦσα δύναμις ἡδονή·
SOCRATES: And again, thirst is a destruction and a pain, while the power of moisture filling up again what has been dried is a pleasure.
διάκρισις δέ γʼ αὖ καὶ διάλυσις ἡ παρὰ φύσιν, τοῦ πνίγους πάθη, λύπη, κατὰ φύσιν δὲ πάλιν ἀπόδοσίς τε καὶ ψῦξις ἡδονή.
And further, the unnatural separation and dissolution, which are the afflictions of stifling heat, are a pain, while the restoration according to nature and cooling are a pleasure.
ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
PROTARCHUS: Very much so.
ΣΩ. καὶ ῥίγους ἡ μὲν παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ ζῴου τῆς ὑγρότητος πῆξις λύπη· πάλιν δʼ εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀπιόντων καὶ διακρινομένων ἡ κατὰ φύσιν ὁδὸς ἡδονή.
SOCRATES: And as for cold, the unnatural freezing of the animal's moisture is a pain; but when they return to the same state and are dissolved, the path according to nature is a pleasure.
καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ σκόπει εἴ σοι μέτριος ὁ λόγος ὃς ἂν φῇ τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἀπείρου καὶ πέρατος κατὰ φύσιν ἔμψυχον γεγονὸς εἶδος, ὅπερ ἔλεγον ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν, ὅταν μὲν τοῦτο φθείρηται, τὴν μὲν φθορὰν λύπην εἶναι, τὴν δʼ εἰς τὴν αὑτῶν οὐσίαν ὁδόν, ταύτην δὲ αὖ πάλιν τὴν ἀναχώρησιν πάντων ἡδονήν.
And in a word, consider whether the argument seems reasonable to you which says that when the form that has come to be according to nature as an ensouled being from the unlimited and the limit—which I was speaking of before—is destroyed, this destruction is pain, but the path toward their own essence, and this restoration of all of them, is again pleasure.
ΠΡΩ. ἔστω· δοκεῖ γάρ μοι τύπον γέ τινα ἔχειν.
PROTARCHUS: Let it be so; for it seems to me to have at least some general outline.
ΣΩ. τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἓν εἶδος τιθώμεθα λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς ἐν τούτοις τοῖς πάθεσιν ἑκατέροις;
SOCRATES: Shall we then posit this as one form of pain and pleasure in each of these experiences?
ΠΡΩ. κείσθω.
PROTARCHUS: Let it be posited.
ΣΩ. τίθει τοίνυν αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς κατὰ τὸ τούτων τῶν παθημάτων προσδόκημα τὸ μὲν πρὸ τῶν ἡδέων ἐλπιζόμενον ἡδὺ καὶ θαρραλέον, τὸ δὲ πρὸ τῶν λυπηρῶν φοβερὸν καὶ ἀλγεινόν.
SOCRATES: Position then, concerning the expectation of these experiences, that of the soul itself: that which is hoped for before pleasant things as pleasant and encouraging, and that which is before painful things as fearful and agonizing.
ΠΡΩ. ἔστι γὰρ οὖν τοῦθʼ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἕτερον εἶδος, τὸ χωρὶς τοῦ σώματος αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς διὰ προσδοκίας γιγνόμενον.
PROTARCHUS: Indeed, this is another form of pleasure and pain, which comes to be in the soul itself, apart from the body, through expectation.
ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς ὑπέλαβες.
SOCRATES: You have understood correctly.
ἐν γὰρ τούτοις οἶμαι, κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν, εἰλικρινέσιν τε ἑκατέροις γιγνομένοις, ὡς δοκεῖ, καὶ ἀμείκτοις λύπης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς, ἐμφανὲς ἔσεσθαι τὸ περὶ τὴν ἡδονήν, πότερον ὅλον ἐστὶ τὸ γένος ἀσπαστόν, ἢ τοῦτο μὲν ἑτέρῳ τινὶ τῶν προειρημένων δοτέον ἡμῖν γενῶν, ἡδονῇ δὲ καὶ λύπῃ, καθάπερ θερμῷ καὶ ψυχρῷ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις, τοτὲ μὲν ἀσπαστέον αὐτά, τοτὲ δὲ οὐκ ἀσπαστέον, ὡς ἀγαθὰ μὲν οὐκ ὄντα, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ ἔνια δεχόμενα τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἔστιν ὅτε φύσιν.
For in these, I think, according to my opinion, when both of them come to be pure, as it seems, and unmixed with pain and pleasure, it will become manifest concerning pleasure, whether the whole genus is desirable, or whether this must be granted by us to some other of the aforementioned genera, while for pleasure and pain, just as for hot and cold and all such things, sometimes we should welcome them and sometimes not, as they are not goods, but sometimes and in some cases admitting the nature of goods.
ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα λέγεις, ὅτι ταύτῃ πῃ δεῖ διαπορηθῆναι τὸ νῦν μεταδιωκόμενον.
PROTARCHUS: Most rightly you say, for in this way indeed we must thoroughly examine what is now being pursued.
ΣΩ. πρῶτον μὲν τοίνυν τόδε συνίδωμεν· εἴπερ ὄντως ἔστι τὸ λεγόμενον, διαφθειρομένων μὲν αὐτῶν ἀλγηδών, ἀνασῳζομένων δὲ ἡδονή, τῶν μήτε διαφθειρομένων μήτε ἀνασῳζομένων ἐννοήσωμεν πέρι, τίνα ποτὲ ἕξιν δεῖ τότε ἐν ἑκάστοις εἶναι τοῖς ζῴοις, ὅταν οὕτως ἴσχῃ.
SOCRATES: First, then, let us perceive this: if indeed what is said is truly so, that their being destroyed is pain and their being restored is pleasure, let us consider concerning those things which are neither being destroyed nor being restored, what kind of state must then exist in each of the animals when they are in this condition.
σφόδρα δὲ προσέχων τὸν νοῦν εἰπέ· ἆρα οὐ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη πᾶν ἐν τῷ τότε χρόνῳ ζῷον μήτε τι λυπεῖσθαι μήτε ἥδεσθαι μήτε μέγα μήτε σμικρόν;
Pay very close attention and tell me: is it not an absolute necessity that every animal at that time is neither pained nor pleased in any way, whether great or small?
ΠΡΩ. ἀνάγκη μὲν οὖν.
PROTARCHUS: It is indeed necessary.