§22ΣΩ. τί δʼ ὁ συναμφότερος, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἐξ ἀμφοῖν συμμειχθεὶς κοινὸς γενόμενος;
SOCRATES: What about the combined life, Protarchus, mixed from both and made common?
ΠΡΩ. ἡδονῆς λέγεις καὶ νοῦ καὶ φρονήσεως;
PROTARCHUS: Do you mean of pleasure and of intellect and wisdom?
ΣΩ. οὕτω καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἔγωγε.
SOCRATES: Thus, yes, and of such things indeed.
ΠΡΩ. πᾶς δήπου τοῦτόν γε αἱρήσεται πρότερον ἢ ʼκείνων ὁποτερονοῦν, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις οὐχ ὁ μέν, ὁ δʼ οὔ.
PROTARCHUS: Surely everyone will choose this before either of those, and in addition, not some will and some will not.
ΣΩ. μανθάνομεν οὖν ὅτι νῦν ἡμῖν ἐστι τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐν τοῖς παροῦσι λόγοις;
SOCRATES: Do we understand then what is happening to us now in the present arguments?
ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὅτι γε τρεῖς μὲν βίοι προυτέθησαν, τοῖν δυοῖν δʼ οὐδέτερος ἱκανὸς οὐδὲ αἱρετὸς οὔτε ἀνθρώπων οὔτε ζῴων οὐδενί.
PROTARCHUS: By all means, namely that three lives have been proposed, and of the two, neither is sufficient nor desirable for any of humans or of animals.
ΣΩ. μῶν οὖν οὐκ ἤδη τούτων γε πέρι δῆλον ὡς οὐδέτερος αὐτοῖν εἶχε τἀγαθόν;
SOCRATES: Is it not then already clear concerning these that neither of them possessed the good?
ἦν γὰρ ἂν ἱκανὸς καὶ τέλεος καὶ πᾶσι φυτοῖς καὶ ζῴοις αἱρετός, οἷσπερ δυνατὸν ἦν οὕτως ἀεὶ διὰ βίου ζῆν· εἰ δέ τις ἄλλα ᾑρεῖθʼ ἡμῶν, παρὰ φύσιν ἂν τὴν τοῦ ἀληθῶς αἱρετοῦ ἐλάμβανεν ἄκων ἐξ ἀγνοίας ἤ τινος ἀνάγκης οὐκ εὐδαίμονος.
For it would have been sufficient and complete and desirable for all plants and animals, for as many as were able to live thus always throughout life; but if any of us chose other things, he would have taken it contrary to the nature of what is truly desirable, unwillingly from ignorance or from some unhappy necessity.
ΠΡΩ. ἔοικε γοῦν ταῦθʼ οὕτως ἔχειν.
PROTARCHUS: It seems indeed to be thus.
ΣΩ. ὡς μὲν τοίνυν τήν γε Φιλήβου θεὸν οὐ δεῖ διανοεῖσθαι ταὐτὸν καὶ τἀγαθόν, ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαί μοι δοκεῖ.
SOCRATES: That we must not, then, think of Philebus' goddess as identical with the good, seems to me to have been sufficiently said.
ΦΙ. οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ σὸς νοῦς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔστι τἀγαθόν, ἀλλʼ ἕξει που ταὐτὰ ἐγκλήματα.
PHILEBUS: Nor indeed is your intellect, Socrates, the good, but it will surely have the same charges.
ΣΩ. τάχʼ ἄν, ὦ Φίληβε, ὅ γʼ ἐμός· οὐ μέντοι τόν γε ἀληθινὸν ἅμα καὶ θεῖον οἶμαι νοῦν, ἀλλʼ ἄλλως πως ἔχειν.
SOCRATES: Perhaps, Philebus, mine at least; but not, I think, the true and divine intellect, which is in another state.
τῶν μὲν οὖν νικητηρίων πρὸς τὸν κοινὸν βίον οὐκ ἀμφισβητῶ πω ὑπὲρ νοῦ, τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερείων ὁρᾶν καὶ σκοπεῖν χρὴ πέρι τί δράσομεν· τάχα γὰρ ἂν τοῦ κοινοῦ τούτου βίου αἰτιῴμεθʼ ἂν ἑκάτερος ὁ μὲν τὸν νοῦν αἴτιον, ὁ δʼ ἡδονὴν εἶναι, καὶ οὕτω τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν τούτων ἀμφοτέρων οὐδέτερον ἂν εἴη, τάχα δʼ ἂν αἴτιόν τις ὑπολάβοι πότερον αὐτῶν εἶναι.
Concerning the first prize for the common life, I do not yet dispute on behalf of intellect, but concerning the second prize we must see and consider what we shall do; for perhaps each of us might claim that this common life has one or the other as its cause—the one intellect, the other pleasure—and thus the good would be neither of these two, but perhaps one of them might be assumed to be the cause.
τούτου δὴ πέρι καὶ μᾶλλον ἔτι πρὸς Φίληβον διαμαχοίμην ἂν ὡς ἐν τῷ μεικτῷ τούτῳ βίῳ, ὅτι ποτʼ ἔστι τοῦτο ὃ λαβὼν ὁ βίος οὗτος γέγονεν αἱρετὸς ἅμα καὶ ἀγαθός, οὐχ ἡδονὴ ἀλλὰ νοῦς τούτῳ συγγενέστερον καὶ ὁμοιότερόν ἐστι, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον οὔτʼ ἂν τῶν πρωτείων οὐδʼ αὖ τῶν δευτερείων ἡδονῇ μετὸν ἀληθῶς ἄν ποτε λέγοιτο·
Concerning this indeed I would fight even more against Philebus, that in this mixed life, whatever this is which this life has received and so become desirable and good, it is not pleasure but intellect that is more akin and more similar to this.
πορρωτέρω δʼ ἐστὶ τῶν τριτείων, εἴ τι τῷ ἐμῷ νῷ δεῖ πιστεύειν ἡμᾶς τὰ νῦν.
And according to this argument, pleasure could never truly be said to have a share either in the first prize or in the second; and it is further off from the third prize, if we must trust my intellect in any way at present.
§23ΠΡΩ. ἀλλὰ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ νῦν μὲν ἡδονή σοι πεπτωκέναι καθαπερεὶ πληγεῖσα ὑπὸ τῶν νυνδὴ λόγων· τῶν γὰρ νικητηρίων πέρι μαχομένη κεῖται.
PROTARCHUS: But indeed, Socrates, it seems to me that pleasure has now fallen, as if struck down by the recent arguments; for she lies defeated in the fight for the first prize.
τὸν δὲ νοῦν, ὡς ἔοικε, λεκτέον ὡς ἐμφρόνως οὐκ ἀντεποιεῖτο τῶν νικητηρίων· τὰ γὰρ αὔτʼ ἔπαθεν ἄν.
As for intellect, as it seems, we must say that it wisely did not lay claim to the first prize; for it would have suffered the same.
τῶν δὲ δὴ δευτερείων στερηθεῖσα ἡδονὴ παντάπασιν ἄν τινα καὶ ἀτιμίαν σχοίη πρὸς τῶν αὑτῆς ἐραστῶν· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκείνοις ἔτʼ ἂν ὁμοίως φαίνοιτο καλή.
But if deprived of the second prize, pleasure would altogether suffer some dishonor from her lovers; for not even to them would she still appear equally beautiful.
ΣΩ. τί οὖν;
SOCRATES: What then?
οὐκ ἄμεινον αὐτὴν ἐᾶν ἤδη καὶ μὴ τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην αὐτῇ προσφέροντα βάσανον καὶ ἐξελέγχοντα λυπεῖν;
Is it not better to let her be now and not pain her by bringing the most exact test and refuting her?
ΠΡΩ. οὐδὲν λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες.
PROTARCHUS: You speak of nothing, Socrates.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ ὅτι τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶπον, λυπεῖν ἡδονήν;
SOCRATES: Is it because I spoke of the impossible, to pain pleasure?
ΠΡΩ. οὐ μόνον γε ἀλλʼ ὅτι καὶ ἀγνοεῖς ὡς οὐδείς πώ σε ἡμῶν μεθήσει πρὶν ἂν εἰς τέλος ἐπεξέλθῃς τούτων τῷ λόγῳ.
PROTARCHUS: Not only that, but also because you are ignorant that no one of us will let you go before you have gone through these things to the end in argument.
ΣΩ. βαβαῖ ἄρα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, συχνοῦ μὲν λόγου τοῦ λοιποῦ, σχεδὸν δὲ οὐδὲ ῥᾳδίου πάνυ τι νῦν.
SOCRATES: Alas then, Protarchus, there is a vast argument remaining, and indeed not at all easy now.
καὶ γὰρ δὴ φαίνεται δεῖν ἄλλης μηχανῆς, ἐπὶ τὰ δευτερεῖα ὑπὲρ νοῦ πορευόμενον οἷον βέλη ἔχειν ἕτερα τῶν ἔμπροσθεν λόγων· ἔστι δὲ ἴσως ἔνια καὶ ταὐτά.
For indeed there seems to be need of another device, in going for the second prize on behalf of intellect, as if having weapons other than those of the previous arguments; though some are perhaps also the same.
οὐκοῦν χρή;
Must we not then use them?
ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
PROTARCHUS: How indeed not?
ΣΩ. τὴν δέ γε ἀρχὴν αὐτοῦ διευλαβεῖσθαι πειρώμεθα τιθέμενοι.
SOCRATES: Let us then try to guard its beginning carefully as we establish it.
ΠΡΩ. ποίαν δὴ λέγεις;
PROTARCHUS: What kind do you mean?
ΣΩ. πάντα τὰ νῦν ὄντα ἐν τῷ παντὶ διχῇ διαλάβωμεν, μᾶλλον δʼ, εἰ βούλει, τριχῇ.
SOCRATES: Let us divide all things now existing in the universe into two, or rather, if you wish, into three.
ΠΡΩ. καθʼ ὅτι, φράζοις ἄν;
PROTARCHUS: In what way, would you explain?
ΣΩ. λάβωμεν ἄττα τῶν νυνδὴ λόγων.
SOCRATES: Let us take some points from the recent arguments.
ΠΡΩ. ποῖα;
PROTARCHUS: Which ones?
ΣΩ. τὸν θεὸν ἐλέγομέν που τὸ μὲν ἄπειρον δεῖξαι τῶν ὄντων, τὸ δὲ πέρας; ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
SOCRATES: We were saying somewhere, I believe, that God showed one part of existing things to be the unlimited, and the other the limit? PROTARCHUS: By all means.
ΣΩ. τούτω δὴ τῶν εἰδῶν τὰ δύο τιθώμεθα, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν τούτοιν ἕν τι συμμισγόμενον. εἰμὶ δʼ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐγὼ γελοῖός τις ἄνθρωπος κατʼ εἴδη διιστὰς καὶ συναριθμούμενος.
SOCRATES: Let us establish these two as the forms, and the third as something mixed, made one from both of these. But I seem, as it appears, to be a ridiculous fellow, separating by forms and numbering them up.
ΠΡΩ. τί φῄς, ὠγαθέ;
PROTARCHUS: What do you say, my good man?
ΣΩ. τετάρτου μοι γένους αὖ προσδεῖν φαίνεται.
SOCRATES: It seems to me that a fourth kind is needed in turn.
ΠΡΩ. λέγε τίνος.
PROTARCHUS: Tell us what kind.
ΣΩ. τῆς συμμείξεως τούτων πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν αἰτίαν ὅρα, καὶ τίθει μοι πρὸς τρισὶν ἐκείνοις τέταρτον τοῦτο.
SOCRATES: Look for the cause of the mixture of these with one another, and establish this for me as a fourth in addition to those three.
ΠΡΩ. μῶν οὖν σοι καὶ πέμπτου προσδεήσει διάκρισίν τινος δυναμένου;
PROTARCHUS: Will you then also need a fifth, capable of separating some things?
ΣΩ. τάχʼ ἄν· οὐ μὴν οἶμαί γε ἐν τῷ νῦν· ἂν δέ τι δέῃ, συγγνώσῃ πού μοι σὺ μεταδιώκοντι πέμπτον.
SOCRATES: Perhaps; but I do not think so in the present case; but if there should be any need, you will surely forgive me as I pursue a fifth.
ΠΡΩ. τί μήν;
PROTARCHUS: Of course.
ΣΩ. πρῶτον μὲν δὴ τῶν τεττάρων τὰ τρία διελόμενοι, τὰ δύο τούτων πειρώμεθα, πολλὰ ἑκάτερον ἐσχισμένον καὶ διεσπασμένον ἰδόντες, εἰς ἓν πάλιν ἑκάτερον συναγαγόντες, νοῆσαι πῇ ποτε ἦν αὐτῶν ἓν καὶ πολλὰ ἑκάτερον.
SOCRATES: First, then, dividing three of the four, let us try two of these, seeing each split and pulled apart into many, and bringing each back again into one, to understand how indeed each of them was both one and many.
ΠΡΩ. εἴ μοι σαφέστερον ἔτι περὶ αὐτῶν εἴποις, τάχʼ ἂν ἑποίμην.
PROTARCHUS: If you would speak of them to me still more clearly, I might perhaps follow.