Humanitext Reader

Plato · Philebus §20-21

Examining the Lives of Pure Pleasure and Pure Intellect

Passage 7 of 34 · Greek

Summary

Protarchus urges Socrates to answer his own question, and Socrates proposes that the good might be a third thing distinct from both pleasure and wisdom. To test this, they examine a life of pure pleasure devoid of intellect and a life of pure intellect devoid of pleasure, concluding that neither is desirable for human beings.

§20ΠΡΩ. εἰς ἀπορίαν ἐμβάλλων καὶ ἀνερωτῶν ὧν μὴ δυναίμεθʼ ἂν ἱκανὴν ἀπόκρισιν ἐν τῷ παρόντι διδόναι σοι.
PROTARCHUS: By throwing us into difficulty and asking in turn those things of which we would not be able to give you a sufficient answer at present.
μὴ γὰρ οἰώμεθα τέλος ἡμῖν εἶναι τῶν νῦν τὴν πάντων ἡμῶν ἀπορίαν, ἀλλʼ εἰ δρᾶν τοῦθʼ ἡμεῖς ἀδυνατοῦμεν, σοὶ δραστέον· ὑπέσχου γάρ.
For let us not think that the end for us of the present discussion is this perplexity of us all, but if we are unable to do this, it must be done by you; for you promised.
βουλεύου δὴ πρὸς ταῦτα αὐτὸς πότερον ἡδονῆς εἴδη σοι καὶ ἐπιστήμης διαιρετέον ἢ καὶ ἐατέον, εἴ πῃ καθʼ ἕτερόν τινα τρόπον οἷός τʼ εἶ καὶ βούλει δηλῶσαί πως ἄλλως τὰ νῦν ἀμφισβητούμενα παρʼ ἡμῖν.
Decide, therefore, on these matters yourself, whether you must divide the forms of pleasure and knowledge or let them be, if in some other way you are able and willing to clarify the things now disputed among us in some other manner.
ΣΩ. δεινὸν μὲν τοίνυν ἔτι προσδοκᾶν οὐδὲν δεῖ τὸν ἐμέ, ἐπειδὴ τοῦθʼ οὕτως εἶπες· τὸ γὰρ εἰ βούλει ῥηθὲν λύει πάντα φόβον ἑκάστων πέρι.
SOCRATES: Well, there is no longer any need for me to expect anything terrible, since you have said this in this way; for the statement "if you wish" dissolves all fear concerning each point.
πρὸς δὲ αὖ τοῖς μνήμην τινὰ δοκεῖ τίς μοι δεδωκέναι θεῶν ἡμῖν.
In addition, some one of the gods seems to me to have given us a certain memory.
ΠΡΩ. πῶς δὴ καὶ τίνων;
PROTARCHUS: How indeed and of what?
ΣΩ. λόγων ποτέ τινων πάλαι ἀκούσας ὄναρ ἢ καὶ ἐγρηγορὼς νῦν ἐννοῶ περί τε ἡδονῆς καὶ φρονήσεως, ὡς οὐδέτερον αὐτοῖν ἐστι τἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ ἄλλο τι τρίτον, ἕτερον μὲν τούτων, ἄμεινον δὲ ἀμφοῖν.
SOCRATES: Having once heard some arguments long ago, in a dream or perhaps awake, I am now thinking about pleasure and wisdom, that neither of them is the good, but some other third thing, different from these and better than both.
καίτοι τοῦτό γε ἂν ἐναργῶς ἡμῖν φανῇ νῦν, ἀπήλλακται μὲν ἡδονὴ τοῦ νικᾶν·
And yet, if this should clearly appear to us now, pleasure is released from victory; for the good would no longer be identical with it.
τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ταὐτὸν αὐτῇ γίγνοιτο. ἢ πῶς;
Or how is it?
ΠΡΩ. οὕτως.
PROTARCHUS: Thus.
ΣΩ. τῶν δέ γε εἰς τὴν διαίρεσιν εἰδῶν ἡδονῆς οὐδὲν ἔτι προσδεησόμεθα κατʼ ἐμὴν δόξαν.
SOCRATES: And we shall no longer stand in need of any of the forms of pleasure for division, in my opinion.
προϊὸν δʼ ἔτι σαφέστερον δείξει.
As we proceed, it will show this still more clearly.
ΠΡΩ. κάλλιστʼ εἰπὼν οὕτω καὶ διαπέραινε.
PROTARCHUS: Speak most excellently and carry it through.
ΣΩ. μίκρʼ ἄττα τοίνυν ἔμπροσθεν ἔτι διομολογησώμεθα.
SOCRATES: Let us then agree on a few small points first.
ΠΡΩ. τὰ ποῖα;
PROTARCHUS: What kind of points?
ΣΩ. τὴν τἀγαθοῦ μοῖραν πότερον ἀνάγκη τέλεον ἢ μὴ τέλεον εἶναι;
SOCRATES: Must the portion of the good be complete or not complete?
ΠΡΩ. πάντων δήπου τελεώτατον, ὦ Σώκρατες.
PROTARCHUS: Surely the most complete of all, Socrates.
ΣΩ. τί δέ;
SOCRATES: What then?
ἱκανὸν τἀγαθόν;
Is the good sufficient?
ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
PROTARCHUS: How could it not be?
καὶ πάντων γε εἰς τοῦτο διαφέρειν τῶν ὄντων.
And indeed it excels all other existing things in this.
ΣΩ. τόδε γε μήν, ὡς οἶμαι, περὶ αὐτοῦ ἀναγκαιότατον εἶναι λέγειν, ὡς πᾶν τὸ γιγνῶσκον αὐτὸ θηρεύει καὶ ἐφίεται βουλόμενον ἑλεῖν καὶ περὶ αὑτὸ κτήσασθαι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν φροντίζει πλὴν τῶν ἀποτελουμένων ἅμα ἀγαθοῖς.
SOCRATES: This, however, I think is most necessary to say about it: that everything that knows hunts it and desires to grasp and acquire it for itself, and cares for nothing else except those things which are accomplished along with good things.
ΠΡΩ. οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις ἀντειπεῖν.
PROTARCHUS: It is impossible to speak against these.
ΣΩ. σκοπῶμεν δὴ καὶ κρίνωμεν τόν τε ἡδονῆς καὶ τὸν φρονήσεως βίον ἰδόντες χωρίς.
SOCRATES: Let us then consider and judge, looking at the life of pleasure and that of wisdom separately.
ΠΡΩ. πῶς εἶπες;
PROTARCHUS: How do you mean?
§21ΣΩ. μήτε ἐν τῷ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐνέστω φρόνησις μήτʼ ἐν τῷ τῆς φρονήσεως ἡδονή.
SOCRATES: Let there be no wisdom in the life of pleasure, nor pleasure in the life of wisdom.
δεῖ γάρ, εἴπερ πότερον αὐτῶν ἔστʼ ἀγαθόν, μηδὲν μηδενὸς ἔτι προσδεῖσθαι· δεόμενον δʼ ἂν φανῇ πότερον, οὐκ ἔστι που τοῦτʼ ἔτι τὸ ὄντως ἡμῖν ἀγαθόν.
For if indeed either of them is the good, it must no longer stand in need of anything from any other; but if either should appear to stand in need, this is surely no longer our truly existing good.
ΠΡΩ. πῶς γὰρ ἄν;
PROTARCHUS: For how could it be?
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ἐν σοὶ πειρώμεθα βασανίζοντες ταῦτα;
SOCRATES: Shall we not then try testing these in your case?
ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
PROTARCHUS: By all means.
ΣΩ. ἀποκρίνου δή.
SOCRATES: Answer then.
ΠΡΩ. λέγε.
PROTARCHUS: Speak.
ΣΩ. δέξαιʼ ἄν, Πρώταρχε, σὺ ζῆν τὸν βίον ἅπαντα ἡδόμενος ἡδονὰς τὰς μεγίστας;
SOCRATES: Would you, Protarchus, accept to live your whole life enjoying the greatest pleasures?
ΠΡΩ. τί δʼ οὔ;
PROTARCHUS: Why indeed not?
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἔτι τινὸς ἄν σοι προσδεῖν ἡγοῖο, εἰ τοῦτʼ ἔχεις παντελῶς;
SOCRATES: Would you then think you still need anything else, if you have this completely?
ΠΡΩ. οὐδαμῶς.
PROTARCHUS: In no way.
ΣΩ. ὅρα δή, τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ λογίζεσθαι τὰ δέοντα καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφά, μῶν μὴ δέοιʼ ἄν τι;
SOCRATES: Consider now, would you have any need of wisdom and intellect and calculating the necessary things and whatever are sister to these?
ΠΡΩ. καὶ τί;
PROTARCHUS: And why?
πάντα γὰρ ἔχοιμʼ ἄν που τὸ χαίρειν ἔχων.
For I would have everything, I suppose, if I have enjoyment.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν οὕτω ζῶν ἀεὶ μὲν διὰ βίου ταῖς μεγίσταις ἡδοναῖς χαίροις ἄν;
SOCRATES: Living in this way, then, would you enjoy the greatest pleasures always throughout life?
ΠΡΩ. τί δʼ οὔ;
PROTARCHUS: Why indeed not?
ΣΩ. νοῦν δέ γε καὶ μνήμην καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ δόξαν μὴ κεκτημένος ἀληθῆ, πρῶτον μὲν τοῦτο αὐτό, εἰ χαίρεις ἢ μὴ χαίρεις, ἀνάγκη δήπου σε ἀγνοεῖν, κενόν γε ὄντα πάσης φρονήσεως;
SOCRATES: But if you do not possess intellect, memory, knowledge, and true opinion, first of all, must you not surely be ignorant of this very thing, whether you are enjoying yourself or not, being empty of all wisdom?
ΠΡΩ. ἀνάγκη.
PROTARCHUS: Inevitably.
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν ὡσαύτως μνήμην μὴ κεκτημένον ἀνάγκη δήπου μηδʼ ὅτι ποτὲ ἔχαιρες μεμνῆσθαι, τῆς τʼ ἐν τῷ παραχρῆμα ἡδονῆς προσπιπτούσης μηδʼ ἡντινοῦν μνήμην ὑπομένειν· δόξαν δʼ αὖ μὴ κεκτημένον ἀληθῆ μὴ δοξάζειν χαίρειν χαίροντα, λογισμοῦ δὲ στερόμενον μηδʼ εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ὡς χαιρήσεις δυνατὸν εἶναι λογίζεσθαι, ζῆν δὲ οὐκ ἀνθρώπου βίον, ἀλλά τινος πλεύμονος ἢ τῶν ὅσα θαλάττια μετʼ ὀστρεΐνων ἔμψυχά ἐστι σωμάτων.
SOCRATES: And indeed, likewise, not possessing memory, you must surely not even remember that you ever enjoyed yourself, and of the pleasure that falls upon you at the moment, no memory whatever remains; and again, not possessing true opinion, you do not think you are enjoying yourself when you are; and being deprived of calculation, you cannot calculate even for the future that you will enjoy yourself, but you would live not the life of a human being, but of some sea-lung or such things as are living marine bodies with shells.
ἔστι ταῦτα, ἢ παρὰ ταῦτα ἔχομεν ἄλλα διανοηθῆναι;
Is this so, or can we conceive of other things besides these?
ΠΡΩ. καὶ πῶς;
PROTARCHUS: How indeed could we?
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν αἱρετὸς ἡμῖν βίος ὁ τοιοῦτος;
SOCRATES: Is such a life then desirable for us?
ΠΡΩ. εἰς ἀφασίαν παντάπασί με, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐμβέβληκε τὰ νῦν.
PROTARCHUS: This argument, Socrates, has thrown me completely into speechless silence at present.
ΣΩ. μήπω τοίνυν μαλθακιζώμεθα, τὸν δὲ τοῦ νοῦ μεταλαβόντες αὖ βίον ἴδωμεν.
SOCRATES: Let us not yet grow soft, then, but taking up the life of intellect in turn, let us look at it.
ΠΡΩ. τὸν ποῖον δὴ λέγεις;
PROTARCHUS: What kind of life do you mean?
ΣΩ. εἴ τις δέξαιτʼ ἂν αὖ ζῆν ἡμῶν φρόνησιν μὲν καὶ νοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμην καὶ μνήμην πᾶσαν πάντων κεκτημένος, ἡδονῆς δὲ μετέχων μήτε μέγα μήτε σμικρόν, μηδʼ αὖ λύπης, ἀλλὰ τὸ παράπαν ἀπαθὴς πάντων τῶν τοιούτων.
SOCRATES: If one of us should accept in turn to live possessing wisdom, intellect, knowledge, and all memory of all things, but participating in pleasure neither much nor little, nor in turn in pain, but being altogether unaffected by all such things.
ΠΡΩ. οὐδέτερος ὁ βίος, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔμοιγε τούτων αἱρετός, οὐδʼ ἄλλῳ μή ποτε, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, φανῇ.
PROTARCHUS: Neither of these lives, Socrates, is desirable to me, nor, as I think, will it ever appear so to anyone else.

Notes

  1. 20aὧν μὴ δυναίμεθʼ ἂν — Case attraction of the relative pronoun and ellipsis. "ὧν" would grammatically be the accusative "ἃ" as the object of "διδόναι", but it has been attracted to the genitive of its omitted antecedent "τούτων". The participle "ἐμβάλλων" at the beginning of the sentence functions as a manner of response to Socrates' question in the previous turn, syntactically continuing from "ἀπαντᾶν".
  2. 20dτῶν ἀποτελουμένων ἅμα ἀγαθοῖς — Interpretation of the participle "ἀποτελουμένων". It is a neuter plural genitive governed by "πλὴν", accompanied by "ἅμα ἀγαθοῖς" (together with good things). It means "things that are brought to completion along with the good," referring not only to the good itself but to secondary things or activities that derive their value from the presence of the good.
  3. 21cπλεύμονος — Metaphorical biological term. The word "πλεύμων" (literally "lung") here refers not to the anatomical organ, but to a primitive marine creature (often identified with the jellyfish or sea-squirt, historically termed "sea-lung") that resembles a lung in texture or appearance but possesses almost no perception or voluntary movement.

Cite this passage

Plato, Philebus §20-21. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg010.humanitext-grc2:20-21

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