§18ΦΙ. κἀμοὶ ταῦτά γε αὐτά·
PHILEBUS: To me, too, these very things seem so.
ἀλλὰ τί δή ποτε πρὸς ἡμᾶς ὁ λόγος οὗτος νῦν εἴρηται καὶ τί ποτε βουλόμενος;
But why on earth has this discourse been spoken to us now, and what does it want to achieve?
ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς μέντοι τοῦθʼ ἡμᾶς, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἠρώτηκε Φίληβος.
SOCRATES: Indeed, Protarchus, Philebus has asked us this rightly.
ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν, καὶ ἀποκρίνου γε αὐτῷ.
PROTARCHUS: Absolutely, and do answer him.
ΣΩ. δράσω ταῦτα διελθὼν σμικρὸν ἔτι περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων.
SOCRATES: I will do so, after going through a little more concerning these very things.
ὥσπερ γὰρ ἓν ὁτιοῦν εἴ τίς ποτε λάβοι, τοῦτον, ὥς φαμεν, οὐκ ἐπʼ ἀπείρου φύσιν δεῖ βλέπειν εὐθὺς ἀλλʼ ἐπί τινα ἀριθμόν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον ὅταν τις τὸ ἄπειρον ἀναγκασθῇ πρῶτον λαμβάνειν, μὴ ἐπὶ τὸ ἓν εὐθύς, ἀλλʼ ἀριθμὸν αὖ τινα πλῆθος ἕκαστον ἔχοντά τι κατανοεῖν, τελευτᾶν τε ἐκ πάντων εἰς ἕν. πάλιν δὲ ἐν τοῖς γράμμασι τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον λάβωμεν.
For just as if someone should ever grasp any "one" whatever, this person, as we say, must not look immediately to the nature of the unlimited but to some number, so also conversely, when someone is forced to grasp the unlimited first, they must look not immediately to the "one" but must in turn discern some number, each having some plurality, and end by going from all of them to the "one." Let us grasp what is now being said again in the case of letters.
ΠΡΩ. πῶς;
PROTARCHUS: How?
ΣΩ. ἐπειδὴ φωνὴν ἄπειρον κατενόησεν εἴτε τις θεὸς εἴτε καὶ θεῖος ἄνθρωπος—ὡς λόγος ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ Θεῦθ τινα τοῦτον γενέσθαι λέγων, ὃς πρῶτος τὰ φωνήεντα ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ κατενόησεν οὐχ ἓν ὄντα ἀλλὰ πλείω, καὶ πάλιν ἕτερα φωνῆς μὲν οὔ, φθόγγου δὲ μετέχοντά τινος, ἀριθμὸν δέ τινα καὶ τούτων εἶναι, τρίτον δὲ εἶδος γραμμάτων διεστήσατο τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα ἄφωνα ἡμῖν· τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο διῄρει τά τε ἄφθογγα καὶ ἄφωνα μέχρι ἑνὸς ἑκάστου, καὶ τὰ φωνήεντα καὶ τὰ μέσα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἕως ἀριθμὸν αὐτῶν λαβὼν ἑνί τε ἑκάστῳ καὶ σύμπασι στοιχεῖον ἐπωνόμασε· καθορῶν δὲ ὡς οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν οὐδʼ ἂν ἓν αὐτὸ καθʼ αὑτὸ ἄνευ πάντων αὐτῶν μάθοι, τοῦτον τὸν δεσμὸν αὖ λογισάμενος ὡς ὄντα ἕνα καὶ πάντα ταῦτα ἕν πως ποιοῦντα μίαν ἐπʼ αὐτοῖς ὡς οὖσαν γραμματικὴν τέχνην ἐπεφθέγξατο προσειπών.
SOCRATES: When some god or divine man discerned that sound is infinite—as the story goes that in Egypt there was a certain Theuth who was the first to discern that the vowels in the unlimited are not one but more, and again others which are not indeed voiced, but participate in some sound, and that there is a certain number of these as well, and as a third kind of letters he set apart those that are now called "mute" by us; after this he divided the soundless and voiceless things down to each single one, and the vowels and the intermediates in the same way, until, having grasped their number, he gave the name "letter" to each individual one and to them all together; and perceiving that none of us could learn any one of them itself by itself without all of them, and considering this bond in turn to be one and as making all these things somehow one, he declared that there was one art over them, calling it the art of grammar.
ΦΙ. ταῦτʼ ἔτι σαφέστερον ἐκείνων αὐτά γε πρὸς ἄλληλα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἔμαθον·
PHILEBUS: These things, Protarchus, I understand even more clearly than those, at least in their relation to each other.
τὸ δʼ αὐτό μοι τοῦ λόγου νῦν τε καὶ σμικρὸν ἔμπροσθεν ἐλλείπεται.
But the same point in the argument escapes me now as a little earlier.
ΣΩ. μῶν, ὦ Φίληβε, τὸ τί πρὸς ἔπος αὖ ταῦτʼ ἐστίν;
SOCRATES: Is it, Philebus, the question of what on earth these things have to do with our topic?
ΦΙ. ναί, τοῦτʼ ἔστιν ὃ πάλαι ζητοῦμεν ἐγώ τε καὶΠρώταρχος.
PHILEBUS: Yes, that is what Protarchus and I have been seeking for a long time.
ΣΩ. ἦ μὴν ἐπʼ αὐτῷ γε ἤδη γεγονότες ζητεῖτε, ὡς φῄς, πάλαι.
SOCRATES: Yet surely you are searching for it, as you say, for a long time, when you have already arrived right at it.
ΦΙ. πῶς;
PHILEBUS: How?
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ οὐ περὶ φρονήσεως ἦν καὶ ἡδονῆς ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ λόγος, ὁπότερον αὐτοῖν αἱρετέον;
SOCRATES: Was our discussion from the beginning not about wisdom and pleasure, which of the two is to be chosen?
ΦΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
PHILEBUS: How indeed could it not be?
ΣΩ. καὶ μὴν ἕν γε ἑκάτερον αὐτοῖν εἶναί φαμεν.
SOCRATES: And indeed we say that each of them is one.
ΦΙ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
PHILEBUS: Absolutely.
§19ΣΩ. τοῦτʼ αὐτὸ τοίνυν ἡμᾶς ὁ πρόσθεν λόγος ἀπαιτεῖ, πῶς ἔστιν ἓν καὶ πολλὰ αὐτῶν ἑκάτερον, καὶ πῶς μὴ ἄπειρα εὐθύς, ἀλλά τινά ποτε ἀριθμὸν ἑκάτερον ἔμπροσθεν κέκτηται τοῦ ἄπειρα αὐτῶν ἕκαστα γεγονέναι;
SOCRATES: This very thing, then, is what the previous argument requires of us: how each of them is one and many, and how they are not immediately infinite, but each has acquired some specific number before each of them becomes infinite.
ΠΡΩ. οὐκ εἰς φαῦλόν γε ἐρώτημα, ὦ Φίληβε, οὐκ οἶδʼ ὅντινα τρόπον κύκλῳ πως περιαγαγὼν ἡμᾶς ἐμβέβληκε Σωκράτης.
PROTARCHUS: Philebus, Socrates has thrown us into no trivial question, having led us around in circles in some way I don't understand.
καὶ σκόπει δὴ πότερος ἡμῶν ἀποκρινεῖται τὸ νῦν ἐρωτώμενον.
And consider now which of us will answer what is now being asked.
ἴσως δὴ γελοῖον τὸ ἐμὲ τοῦ λόγου διάδοχον παντελῶς ὑποστάντα διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι τὸ νῦν ἐρωτηθὲν ἀποκρίνασθαι σοὶ πάλιν τοῦτο προστάττειν· γελοιότερον δʼ οἶμαι πολὺ τὸ μηδέτερον ἡμῶν δύνασθαι.
Perhaps indeed it is ridiculous for me, having completely taken over the succession of the argument, to order you in turn to do this because of my inability to answer what is now asked; but far more ridiculous, I think, is for neither of us to be able to do so.
σκόπει δὴ τί δράσομεν.
Consider then what we shall do.
εἴδη γάρ μοι δοκεῖ νῦν ἐρωτᾶν ἡδονῆς ἡμᾶς Σωκράτης εἴτε ἔστιν εἴτε μή, καὶ ὁπόσα ἐστὶ καὶ ὁποῖα· τῆς τʼ αὖ φρονήσεως πέρι κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως.
For Socrates seems to me to be asking now about the forms of pleasure, whether they exist or not, and how many they are and of what kind; and about wisdom in turn in the same way.
ΣΩ. ἀληθέστατα λέγεις, ὦ παῖ Καλλίου· μὴ γὰρ δυνάμενοι τοῦτο κατὰ παντὸς ἑνὸς καὶ ὁμοίου καὶ ταὐτοῦ δρᾶν καὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου, ὡς ὁ παρελθὼν λόγος ἐμήνυσεν, οὐδεὶς εἰς οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς ἂν ἡμῶν οὐδέποτε γένοιτο ἄξιος.
SOCRATES: You speak most truly, son of Callias; for if we are unable to do this in the case of every "one" and similar and same, and its opposite, as the preceding discussion indicated, none of us would ever be of any worth for anything.
ΠΡΩ. σχεδὸν ἔοικεν οὕτως, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔχειν.
PROTARCHUS: It pretty much seems to be so, Socrates.
ἀλλὰ καλὸν μὲν τὸ σύμπαντα γιγνώσκειν τῷ σώφρονι, δεύτερος δʼ εἶναι πλοῦς δοκεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν αὐτὸν αὑτόν.
But while to know all things is beautiful for the wise person, the second best voyage seems to be not to be ignorant of oneself.
τί δή μοι τοῦτο εἴρηται τὰ νῦν;
Why on earth have I said this just now?
ἐγώ σοι φράσω.
I will tell you.
σὺ τήνδε ἡμῖν τὴν συνουσίαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπέδωκας πᾶσι καὶ σεαυτὸν πρὸς τὸ διελέσθαι τί τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων κτημάτων ἄριστον.
You, Socrates, have offered this conversation to us all, and yourself for discussing what is the best of human possessions.
Φιλήβου γὰρ εἰπόντος ἡδονὴν καὶ τέρψιν καὶ χαρὰν καὶ πάνθʼ ὁπόσα τοιαῦτʼ ἐστί, σὺ πρὸς αὐτὰ ἀντεῖπες ὡς οὐ ταῦτα ἀλλʼ ἐκεῖνά ἐστιν ἃ πολλάκις ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἀναμιμνῄσκομεν ἑκόντες, ὀρθῶς δρῶντες, ἵνʼ ἐν μνήμῃ παρακείμενα ἑκάτερα βασανίζηται.
For when Philebus said it is pleasure, delight, joy, and all such things, you argued against them that it is not these, but rather those which we often willingly remind ourselves of, acting rightly, so that both being laid side by side in memory may be examined.
φῂς δʼ, ὡς ἔοικε, σὺ τὸ προσρηθησόμενον ὀρθῶς ἄμεινον ἡδονῆς γε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι νοῦν, ἐπιστήμην, σύνεσιν, τέχνην καὶ πάντα αὖ τὰ τούτων συγγενῆ, ἃ κτᾶσθαι δεῖν ἀλλʼ οὐχὶ ἐκεῖνα.
And you say, as it seems, that what is rightly called better than pleasure as a good is intellect, knowledge, understanding, art, and all their relatives in turn, which we ought to acquire, and not those.
τούτων δὴ μετʼ ἀμφισβητήσεως ἑκατέρων λεχθέντων ἡμεῖς σοι μετὰ παιδιᾶς ἠπειλήσαμεν ὡς οὐκ ἀφήσομεν οἴκαδέ σε πρὶν ἂν τούτων τῶν λόγων πέρας ἱκανὸν γένηταί τι διορισθέντων, σὺ δὲ συνεχώρησας καὶ ἔδωκας εἰς ταῦθʼ ἡμῖν σαυτόν, ἡμεῖς δὲ δὴ λέγομεν, καθάπερ οἱ παῖδες, ὅτι τῶν ὀρθῶς δοθέντων ἀφαίρεσις οὐκ ἔστι·
When both of these had been stated with dispute, we threatened you in jest that we would not let you go home until some sufficient limit of these arguments should be reached by defining them, and you agreed and gave yourself to us for this; and we indeed say, just like children, that there is no taking back of things rightly given.
παῦσαι δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἡμῖν ἀπαντῶν τοῦτον ἐπὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα.
So stop meeting us in this manner concerning what is now being discussed.
ΣΩ. τίνα λέγεις;
SOCRATES: What manner do you mean?