§15ΣΩ. ὁπόταν, ὦ παῖ, τὸ ἓν μὴ τῶν γιγνομένων τε καὶ ἀπολλυμένων τις τιθῆται, καθάπερ ἀρτίως ἡμεῖς εἴπομεν.
SOCRATES: Whenever, my boy, someone posits the "one" as not belonging to the things that come to be and perish, just as we were saying just now.
ἐνταυθοῖ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἕν, ὅπερ εἴπομεν νυνδή, συγκεχώρηται τὸ μὴ δεῖν ἐλέγχειν· ὅταν δέ τις ἕνα ἄνθρωπον ἐπιχειρῇ τίθεσθαι καὶ βοῦν ἕνα καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἓν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἕν, περὶ τούτων τῶν ἑνάδων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ πολλὴ σπουδὴ μετὰ διαιρέσεως ἀμφισβήτησις γίγνεται.
For in those cases, it is agreed that there is no need to refute such a "one" as we mentioned just now; but when someone attempts to posit "one man," "one ox," "one beauty," and "one good," it is about these unities and things of this kind that great controversy and serious dispute arise, along with division.
ΠΡΩ. πῶς;
PROTARCHUS: How so?
ΣΩ. πρῶτον μὲν εἴ τινας δεῖ τοιαύτας εἶναι μονάδας ὑπολαμβάνειν ἀληθῶς οὔσας· εἶτα πῶς αὖ ταύτας, μίαν ἑκάστην οὖσαν ἀεὶ τὴν αὐτὴν καὶ μήτε γένεσιν μήτε ὄλεθρον προσδεχομένην, ὅμως εἶναι βεβαιότατα μίαν ταύτην; μετὰ δὲ τοῦτʼ ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις αὖ καὶ ἀπείροις εἴτε διεσπασμένην καὶ πολλὰ γεγονυῖαν θετέον, εἴθʼ ὅλην αὐτὴν αὑτῆς χωρίς, ὃ δὴ πάντων ἀδυνατώτατον φαίνοιτʼ ἄν, ταὐτὸν καὶ ἓν ἅμα ἐν ἑνί τε καὶ πολλοῖς γίγνεσθαι.
SOCRATES: First, whether one must assume that there exist some such monads, truly existing; then, how these, each being one and always the same, admitting neither coming-to-be nor destruction, can nevertheless most firmly be this very one; and after this, whether, in the things that come to be and are infinite, we must posit it as dispersed and having become many, or as a whole separate from itself—which indeed would seem most impossible of all—the same and one becoming at the same time in one and in many.
ταῦτʼ ἔστι τὰ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἓν καὶ πολλά, ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐκεῖνα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἁπάσης ἀπορίας αἴτια μὴ καλῶς ὁμολογηθέντα καὶ εὐπορίας αὖ καλῶς.
These are, Protarchus, the issues concerning the "one and many" in such things—and not those other ones—which, if not well agreed upon, cause every difficulty, but if well agreed upon, on the contrary, cause every facility.
ΠΡΩ. οὐκοῦν χρὴ τοῦθʼ ἡμᾶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ νῦν πρῶτον διαπονήσασθαι;
PROTARCHUS: Then must we, Socrates, first work this out thoroughly at present?
ΣΩ. ὡς γοῦν ἐγὼ φαίην ἄν.
SOCRATES: At least so I should say.
ΠΡΩ. καὶ πάντας τοίνυν ἡμᾶς ὑπόλαβε συγχωρεῖν σοι τούσδε τὰ τοιαῦτα· Φίληβον δʼ ἴσως κράτιστον ἐν τῷ νῦν ἐπερωτῶντα μὴ κινεῖν εὖ κείμενον.
PROTARCHUS: Then assume that all of us here agree with you on these points; and as for Philebus, perhaps it is best not to disturb him with questions, leaving well enough alone for the moment.
ΣΩ. εἶεν· πόθεν οὖν τις ταύτης ἄρξηται πολλῆς οὔσης καὶ παντοίας περὶ τὰ ἀμφισβητούμενα μάχης;
SOCRATES: Well then; from where should one begin this great and manifold battle about the disputed matters?
ἆρʼ ἐνθένδε;
Shall it be from here?
ΠΡΩ. πόθεν;
PROTARCHUS: From where?
ΣΩ. φαμέν που ταὐτὸν ἓν καὶ πολλὰ ὑπὸ λόγων γιγνόμενα περιτρέχειν πάντῃ καθʼ ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων ἀεί, καὶ πάλαι καὶ νῦν.
SOCRATES: We say, I believe, that the same thing, becoming one and many by arguments, runs around everywhere, in every single thing that is said, always, both of old and now.
καὶ τοῦτο οὔτε μὴ παύσηταί ποτε οὔτε ἤρξατο νῦν, ἀλλʼ ἔστι τὸ τοιοῦτον, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν ἀθάνατόν τι καὶ ἀγήρων πάθος ἐν ἡμῖν·
And this will never cease, nor did it begin now, but such a thing is, as it seems to me, an immortal and ageless affection of arguments themselves within us.
ὁ δὲ πρῶτον αὐτοῦ γευσάμενος ἑκάστοτε τῶν νέων, ἡσθεὶς ὥς τινα σοφίας ηὑρηκὼς θησαυρόν, ὑφʼ ἡδονῆς ἐνθουσιᾷ τε καὶ πάντα κινεῖ λόγον ἅσμενος, τοτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα κυκλῶν καὶ συμφύρων εἰς ἕν, τοτὲ δὲ πάλιν ἀνειλίττων καὶ διαμερίζων, εἰς ἀπορίαν αὑτὸν μὲν πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα καταβάλλων, δεύτερον δʼ ἀεὶ τὸν ἐχόμενον, ἄντε νεώτερος ἄντε πρεσβύτερος ἄντε ἧλιξ ὢν τυγχάνῃ, φειδόμενος οὔτε πατρὸς οὔτε μητρὸς οὔτε ἄλλου τῶν ἀκουόντων οὐδενός, ὀλίγου δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἐπεὶ βαρβάρων γε οὐδενὸς ἂν φείσαιτο, εἴπερ μόνον ἑρμηνέα ποθὲν ἔχοι.
And the one among the young who has tasted it for the first time on each occasion, delighted as if he had found some treasure of wisdom, is inspired by pleasure and joyfully stirs up every argument, at one time rolling it to one side and mixing it into one, and at another time again unrolling it and dividing it, casting into confusion first and foremost himself, and secondly always the one who is next to him, whether he happens to be younger, older, or of his own age, sparing neither father nor mother nor any other of his listeners, and almost not even the other living creatures, not just human beings, since he would certainly not spare any of the barbarians, if only he could get an interpreter from somewhere.
§16ΠΡΩ. ἆρʼ, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐχ ὁρᾷς ἡμῶν τὸ πλῆθος, ὅτι νέοι πάντες ἐσμέν, καὶ οὐ φοβῇ μή σοι μετὰ Φιλήβου συνεπιθώμεθα, ἐὰν ἡμᾶς λοιδορῇς;
PROTARCHUS: Socrates, do you not see our number, that we are all young, and are you not afraid that we might join Philebus in attacking you, if you insult us?
ὅμως δὲ μανθάνομεν γὰρ ὃ λέγεις, εἴ τις τρόπος ἔστι καὶ μηχανὴ τὴν μὲν τοιαύτην ταραχὴν ἡμῖν ἔξω τοῦ λόγου εὐμενῶς πως ἀπελθεῖν, ὁδὸν δέ τινα καλλίω ταύτης ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον ἀνευρεῖν, σύ τε προθυμοῦ τοῦτο καὶ ἡμεῖς συνακολουθήσομεν εἰς δύναμιν· οὐ γὰρ σμικρὸς ὁ παρὼν λόγος, ὦ Σώκρατες.
Nevertheless—for we do understand what you mean—if there is any way and device for such confusion to depart from our discussion in some friendly manner, and to find some better way than this toward the argument, do you show your eagerness for this, and we will follow along to the best of our ability; for the present argument is no small matter, Socrates.
ΣΩ. οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ὦ παῖδες, ὥς φησιν ὑμᾶς προσαγορεύων Φίληβος.
SOCRATES: Indeed it is not, my boys, as Philebus calls you in addressing you.
οὐ μὴν ἔστι καλλίων ὁδὸς οὐδʼ ἂν γένοιτο ἧς ἐγὼ ἐραστὴς μέν εἰμι ἀεί, πολλάκις δέ με ἤδη διαφυγοῦσα ἔρημον καὶ ἄπορον κατέστησεν.
And indeed there is not, nor could there ever be, a better way than that of which I am always a lover, but which has already many times escaped me and left me desolate and helpless.
ΠΡΩ. τίς αὕτη;
PROTARCHUS: What is this way?
λεγέσθω μόνον.
Only let it be told.
ΣΩ. ἣν δηλῶσαι μὲν οὐ πάνυ χαλεπόν, χρῆσθαι δὲ παγχάλεπον· πάντα γὰρ ὅσα τέχνης ἐχόμενα ἀνηυρέθη πώποτε διὰ ταύτης φανερὰ γέγονε.
SOCRATES: One which is not at all difficult to point out, but extremely difficult to use; for everything that has ever been discovered belonging to art has become manifest through this.
σκόπει δὲ ἣν λέγω.
Consider the one I mean.
ΠΡΩ. λέγε μόνον.
PROTARCHUS: Only speak.
ΣΩ. θεῶν μὲν εἰς ἀνθρώπους δόσις, ὥς γε καταφαίνεται ἐμοί, ποθὲν ἐκ θεῶν ἐρρίφη διά τινος Προμηθέως ἅμα φανοτάτῳ τινὶ πυρί· καὶ οἱ μὲν παλαιοί, κρείττονες ἡμῶν καὶ ἐγγυτέρω θεῶν οἰκοῦντες, ταύτην φήμην παρέδοσαν, ὡς ἐξ ἑνὸς μὲν καὶ πολλῶν ὄντων τῶν ἀεὶ λεγομένων εἶναι, πέρας δὲ καὶ ἀπειρίαν ἐν αὑτοῖς σύμφυτον ἐχόντων.
SOCRATES: A gift of gods to men, as it appears to me at least, was somehow tossed down from the gods through some Prometheus along with a most brilliant fire; and the ancients, being better than we and dwelling closer to the gods, handed down this tradition: that the things that are ever said to be are from one and many, having limit and unlimitedness inborn within themselves.
δεῖν οὖν ἡμᾶς τούτων οὕτω διακεκοσμημένων ἀεὶ μίαν ἰδέαν περὶ παντὸς ἑκάστοτε θεμένους ζητεῖν—εὑρήσειν γὰρ ἐνοῦσαν— ἐὰν οὖν μεταλάβωμεν, μετὰ μίαν δύο, εἴ πως εἰσί, σκοπεῖν, εἰ δὲ μή, τρεῖς ἤ τινα ἄλλον ἀριθμόν, καὶ τῶν ἓν ἐκείνων ἕκαστον πάλιν ὡσαύτως, μέχριπερ ἂν τὸ κατʼ ἀρχὰς ἓν μὴ ὅτι ἓν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ἄπειρά ἐστι μόνον ἴδῃ τις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁπόσα· τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀπείρου ἰδέαν πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος μὴ προσφέρειν πρὶν ἄν τις τὸν ἀριθμὸν αὐτοῦ πάντα κατίδῃ τὸν μεταξὺ τοῦ ἀπείρου τε καὶ τοῦ ἑνός, τότε δʼ ἤδη τὸ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν πάντων εἰς τὸ ἄπειρον μεθέντα χαίρειν ἐᾶν.
Therefore, since these things have been thus ordered, we must always posit one idea concerning everything on each occasion and seek it—for we shall find it therein—and if we grasp it, after the one we must look for two, if they are somehow there, or if not, three or some other number, and each of those "ones" again in the same way, until one sees that the original "one" is not only one and many and infinite, but also how many it is; and one must not apply the idea of the unlimited to the plurality until one has discerned its entire number between the unlimited and the one, and only then should one let each "one" of all things go into the unlimited and dismiss it.