§14ΣΩ. πολλαί τε αἱ συνάπασαι ἐπιστῆμαι δόξουσιν εἶναι καὶ ἀνόμοιοί τινες αὐτῶν ἀλλήλαις·
SOCRATES: And all the branches of knowledge, taken together, will seem to be many, and some of them unlike one another.
εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐναντίαι πῃ γίγνονταί τινες, ἆρα ἄξιος ἂν εἴην τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι νῦν, εἰ φοβηθεὶς τοῦτο αὐτὸ μηδεμίαν ἀνόμοιον φαίην ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμῃ γίγνεσθαι, κἄπειθʼ ἡμῖν οὕτως ὁ λόγος ὥσπερ μῦθος ἀπολόμενος οἴχοιτο, αὐτοὶ δὲ σῳζοίμεθα ἐπί τινος ἀλογίας;
And if some of them even turn out to be opposite in some way, would I be worthy of holding a discussion now, if, fearing this very thing, I should say that no branch of knowledge becomes unlike another, and then our argument, like a tale, should perish and be gone, while we ourselves find safety upon some irrationality?
ΠΡΩ. ἀλλʼ οὐ μὴν δεῖ τοῦτο γενέσθαι, πλὴν τοῦ σωθῆναι.
PROTARCHUS: But this must certainly not happen, except for our being saved.
τό γε μήν μοι ἴσον τοῦ σοῦ τε καὶ ἐμοῦ λόγου ἀρέσκει· πολλαὶ μὲν ἡδοναὶ καὶ ἀνόμοιοι γιγνέσθων, πολλαὶ δὲ ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ διάφοροι.
However, the equal treatment of your argument and mine pleases me: let there be many and unlike pleasures, and many and different branches of knowledge.
ΣΩ. τὴν τοίνυν διαφορότητα, ὦ Πρώταρχε, τοῦ τʼ ἐμοῦ καὶ τοῦ σοῦ μὴ ἀποκρυπτόμενοι, κατατιθέντες δὲ εἰς τὸ μέσον, τολμῶμεν, ἄν πῃ ἐλεγχόμενοι μηνύσωσι πότερον ἡδονὴν τἀγαθὸν δεῖ λέγειν ἢ φρόνησιν ἤ τι τρίτον ἄλλο εἶναι.
SOCRATES: Then, Protarchus, let us not conceal the difference between my argument and yours, but placing it in the middle, let us be bold, to see if under examination they will somehow show whether we ought to say that pleasure is the good, or wisdom, or some third thing.
νῦν γὰρ οὐ δήπου πρός γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο φιλονικοῦμεν, ὅπως ἁγὼ τίθεμαι, ταῦτʼ ἔσται τὰ νικῶντα, ἢ ταῦθʼ ἃ σύ, τῷ δʼ ἀληθεστάτῳ δεῖ που συμμαχεῖν ἡμᾶς ἄμφω.
For now we are surely not contending for this very thing, that what I posit should be victorious, or what you do, but we both must surely ally ourselves with what is most true.
ΠΡΩ. δεῖ γὰρ οὖν.
PROTARCHUS: Indeed we must.
ΣΩ. τοῦτον τοίνυν τὸν λόγον ἔτι μᾶλλον διʼ ὁμολογίας βεβαιωσώμεθα.
SOCRATES: Then let us confirm this argument still more through agreement.
ΠΡΩ. τὸν ποῖον δή;
PROTARCHUS: Which one do you mean?
ΣΩ. τὸν πᾶσι παρέχοντα ἀνθρώποις πράγματα ἑκοῦσί τε καὶ ἄκουσιν ἐνίοις καὶ ἐνίοτε.
SOCRATES: The one that causes trouble for all human beings, some willingly, and some unwillingly, and sometimes.
ΠΡΩ. λέγε σαφέστερον.
PROTARCHUS: Speak more clearly.
ΣΩ. τὸν νυνδὴ παραπεσόντα λέγω, φύσει πως πεφυκότα θαυμαστόν.
SOCRATES: I mean the one that has just now cropped up, which is by nature somehow wondrous.
ἓν γὰρ δὴ τὰ πολλὰ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἓν πολλὰ θαυμαστὸν λεχθέν, καὶ ῥᾴδιον ἀμφισβητῆσαι τῷ τούτων ὁποτερονοῦν τιθεμένῳ.
For that the many are one, and the one is many, is a wondrous thing to say, and it is easy to dispute with anyone who posits either of these.
ΠΡΩ. ἆρʼ οὖν λέγεις ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φῇ Πρώταρχον ἕνα γεγονότα φύσει πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλιν τοὺς ἐμὲ καὶ ἐναντίους ἀλλήλοις, μέγαν καὶ σμικρὸν τιθέμενος καὶ βαρὺν καὶ κοῦφον τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἄλλα μυρία;
PROTARCHUS: Do you mean, then, when someone says that I, Protarchus, being by nature one, am in turn many 'me's, even opposite to one another, positing that the same person is both tall and short, heavy and light, and countless other things?
ΣΩ. σὺ μέν, ὦ Πρώταρχε, εἴρηκας τὰ δεδημευμένα τῶν θαυμαστῶν περὶ τὸ ἓν καὶ πολλά, συγκεχωρημένα δὲ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ὑπὸ πάντων ἤδη μὴ δεῖν τῶν τοιούτων ἅπτεσθαι, παιδαριώδη καὶ ῥᾴδια καὶ σφόδρα τοῖς λόγοις ἐμπόδια ὑπολαμβανόντων γίγνεσθαι, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ τὰ τοιάδε, ὅταν τις ἑκάστου τὰ μέλη τε καὶ ἅμα μέρη διελὼν τῷ λόγῳ, πάντα ταῦτα τὸ ἓν ἐκεῖνο εἶναι διομολογησάμενος, ἐλέγχῃ καταγελῶν ὅτι τέρατα διηνάγκασται φάναι, τό τε ἓν ὡς πολλά ἐστι καὶ ἄπειρα, καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ὡς ἓν μόνον.
SOCRATES: You, Protarchus, have stated the popularized wonders concerning the one and many, which are, so to speak, now agreed upon by everyone as not worth touching upon, since they assume them to be childish and easy, and a great hindrance to arguments; and not even things like this, when someone, having divided the limbs and at the same time parts of each thing in argument, and having agreed that all these are that one thing, refutes and ridicules by showing that he has been forced to say monstrous things: that the one is many and infinite, and the many is only one.
ΠΡΩ. σὺ δὲ δὴ ποῖα, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἕτερα λέγεις, ἃ μήπω συγκεχωρημένα δεδήμευται περὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τοῦτον λόγον;
PROTARCHUS: But what other kinds of things do you mean, Socrates, which have not yet been popularized and agreed upon concerning this same argument?