§13ΣΩ. καὶ γὰρ χρῶμα, ὦ δαιμόνιε, χρώματι· κατά γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὐδὲν διοίσει τὸ χρῶμα εἶναι πᾶν, τό γε μὴν μέλαν τῷ λευκῷ πάντες γιγνώσκομεν ὡς πρὸς τῷ διάφορον εἶναι καὶ ἐναντιώτατον ὂν τυγχάνει.
SOCRATES: For indeed, my amazing friend, color is like color; in this very respect, that it is all color, there will be no difference, but yet we all know that black is not only different from white but even happens to be most opposite to it.
καὶ δὴ καὶ σχῆμα σχήματι κατὰ ταὐτόν· γένει μέν ἐστι πᾶν ἕν, τὰ δὲ μέρη τοῖς μέρεσιν αὐτοῦ τὰ μὲν ἐναντιώτατα ἀλλήλοις, τὰ δὲ διαφορότητʼ ἔχοντα μυρίαν που τυγχάνει, καὶ πολλὰ ἕτερα οὕτως ἔχονθʼ εὑρήσομεν.
And indeed, shape also is like shape in the same way; as a genus, it is all one, but of its parts, some happen to be most opposite to one another, and others to have infinite differences, and we shall find many other things in this condition.
ὥστε τούτῳ γε τῷ λόγῳ μὴ πίστευε, τῷ πάντα τὰ ἐναντιώτατα ἓν ποιοῦντι.
Therefore, do not trust this argument, which makes all the most opposite things one.
φοβοῦμαι δὲ μή τινας ἡδονὰς ἡδοναῖς εὑρήσομεν ἐναντίας.
And I fear we may find some pleasures opposite to other pleasures.
ΠΡΩ. ἴσως· ἀλλὰ τί τοῦθʼ ἡμῶν βλάψει τὸν λόγον;
PROTARCHUS: Perhaps; but how will this harm our argument?
ΣΩ. ὅτι προσαγορεύεις αὐτὰ ἀνόμοια ὄντα ἑτέρῳ, φήσομεν, ὀνόματι·
SOCRATES: Because, we shall say, you address them, though they are unlike, by another name.
λέγεις γὰρ ἀγαθὰ πάντʼ εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα.
For you say that all pleasant things are good.
τὸ μὲν οὖν μὴ οὐχὶ ἡδέα εἶναι τὰ ἡδέα λόγος οὐδεὶς ἀμφισβητεῖ· κακὰ δʼ ὄντα αὐτῶν τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ δέ, ὡς ἡμεῖς φαμέν, ὅμως πάντα σὺ προσαγορεύεις ἀγαθὰ αὐτά, ὁμολογῶν ἀνόμοια εἶναι, τῷ λόγῳ εἴ τίς σε προσαναγκάζοι.
Now, no argument disputes that pleasant things are indeed pleasant; but though many of them are bad, and others good, as we assert, you nevertheless address them all as good, although you admit they are unlike, if anyone should force you to do so in argument.
τί οὖν δὴ ταὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς κακαῖς ὁμοίως καὶ ἐν ἀγαθαῖς ἐνὸν πάσας ἡδονὰς ἀγαθὸν εἶναι προσαγορεύεις;
What, then, is this same thing which is present equally in the bad and in the good pleasures, by virtue of which you call all pleasures good?
ΠΡΩ. πῶς λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες;
PROTARCHUS: What do you mean, Socrates?
οἴει γάρ τινα συγχωρήσεσθαι, θέμενον ἡδονὴν εἶναι τἀγαθόν, εἶτα ἀνέξεσθαί σου λέγοντος τὰς μὲν εἶναί τινας ἀγαθὰς ἡδονάς, τὰς δέ τινας ἑτέρας αὐτῶν κακάς;
Do you think anyone who has posited that pleasure is the good will agree, or will tolerate your saying, that some pleasures are good, and others bad?
ΣΩ. ἀλλʼ οὖν ἀνομοίους γε φήσεις αὐτὰς ἀλλήλαις εἶναι καί τινας ἐναντίας.
SOCRATES: But at any rate you will say they are unlike one another, and some even opposite.
ΠΡΩ. οὔτι καθʼ ὅσον γε ἡδοναί.
PROTARCHUS: Not insofar as they are pleasures, certainly.
ΣΩ. πάλιν εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν φερόμεθα λόγον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, οὐδʼ ἄρα ἡδονὴν ἡδονῆς διάφορον, ἀλλὰ πάσας ὁμοίας εἶναι φήσομεν, καὶ τὰ παραδείγματα ἡμᾶς τὰ νυνδὴ λεχθέντα οὐδὲν τιτρώσκει, πεισόμεθα δὲ καὶ ἐροῦμεν ἅπερ οἱ πάντων φαυλότατοί τε καὶ περὶ λόγους ἅμα νέοι.
SOCRATES: We are carried back to the same argument, Protarchus; we shall say, then, that one pleasure is no different from another, but all are alike, and the examples just now mentioned do not hurt us at all, but we shall comply with and say just what the most worthless of all men say, who are at the same time novices in argument.
ΠΡΩ. τὰ ποῖα δὴ λέγεις;
PROTARCHUS: What sort of things do you mean?
ΣΩ. ὅτι σε μιμούμενος ἐγὼ καὶ ἀμυνόμενος ἐὰν τολμῶ λέγειν ὡς τὸ ἀνομοιότατόν ἐστι τῷ ἀνομοιοτάτῳ πάντων ὁμοιότατον, ἕξω τὰ αὐτὰ σοὶ λέγειν, καὶ φανούμεθά γε νεώτεροι τοῦ δέοντος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐκπεσὼν οἰχήσεται.
SOCRATES: That if I, imitating you and defending myself, should dare to say that the most unlike thing is of all things most like the most unlike, I shall have the same to say as you, and we shall appear younger than is fitting, and our argument, falling flat, will be gone.
πάλιν οὖν αὐτὸν ἀνακρουώμεθα, καὶ τάχʼ ἂν ἰόντες εἰς τὰς ὁμοίας ἴσως ἄν πως ἀλλήλοις συγχωρήσαιμεν.
Let us, therefore, steer it back again, and perhaps by returning to similar points we might somehow come to an agreement with each other.
ΠΡΩ. λέγε πῶς;
PROTARCHUS: Tell me how.
ΣΩ. ἐμὲ θὲς ὑπὸ σοῦ πάλιν ἐρωτώμενον, ὦ Πρώταρχε.
SOCRATES: Assume, Protarchus, that I am being questioned by you in turn.
ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον δή;
PROTARCHUS: What is the question?
ΣΩ. φρόνησίς τε καὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς καὶ πάνθʼ ὁπόσα δὴ κατʼ ἀρχὰς ἐγὼ θέμενος εἶπον ἀγαθά, διερωτώμενος ὅτι ποτʼ ἐστὶν ἀγαθόν, ἆρʼ οὐ ταὐτὸν πείσονται τοῦτο ὅπερ ὁ σὸς λόγος;
SOCRATES: Wisdom, knowledge, intellect, and all those things which I posited and called good at the beginning, when I am cross-examined as to what the good is, will they not experience this very same thing that your argument has?
ΠΡΩ. πῶς;
PROTARCHUS: How so?