§11ΣΩ. ὅρα δή, Πρώταρχε, τίνα λόγον μέλλεις παρὰ Φιλήβου δέχεσθαι νυνὶ καὶ πρὸς τίνα τὸν παρʼ ἡμῖν ἀμφισβητεῖν, ἐὰν μή σοι κατὰ νοῦν ᾖ λεγόμενος.
SOCRATES: See now, Protarchus, what sort of doctrine you are now about to receive from Philebus, and against what doctrine of ours you are to contend, if it should not be to your mind when it is spoken.
βούλει συγκεφαλαιωσώμεθα ἑκάτερον;
Do you wish us to summarize each of them?
ΠΡΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
PROTARCHUS: By all means.
ΣΩ. Φίληβος μὲν τοίνυν ἀγαθὸν εἶναί φησι τὸ χαίρειν πᾶσι ζῴοις καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ τέρψιν, καὶ ὅσα τοῦ γένους ἐστὶ τούτου σύμφωνα·
SOCRATES: Well, Philebus says that the good for all living beings is enjoyment, pleasure, and delight, and whatever is in harmony with this class of things.
τὸ δὲ παρʼ ἡμῶν ἀμφισβήτημά ἐστι μὴ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ τὰ τούτων αὖ συγγενῆ, δόξαν τε ὀρθὴν καὶ ἀληθεῖς λογισμούς, τῆς γε ἡδονῆς ἀμείνω καὶ λῴω γίγνεσθαι σύμπασιν ὅσαπερ αὐτῶν δυνατὰ μεταλαβεῖν· δυνατοῖς δὲ μετασχεῖν ὠφελιμώτατον ἁπάντων εἶναι πᾶσι τοῖς οὖσί τε καὶ ἐσομένοις.
Our contention, on the other hand, is not this, but that wisdom, thought, memory, and things akin to these, right opinion and true reasonings, are better and more desirable than pleasure for all those able to partake of them; and that to those who are able to participate, it is of all things the most beneficial to all beings, both present and future.
μῶν οὐχ οὕτω πως λέγομεν, ὦ Φίληβε, ἑκάτεροι;
Do we not, Philebus, each of us state our case in some such way?
ΦΙ. πάντων μὲν οὖν μάλιστα, ὦ Σώκρατες.
PHILEBUS: Most certainly, Socrates.
ΣΩ. δέχῃ δὴ τοῦτον τὸν νῦν διδόμενον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, λόγον;
SOCRATES: Do you then, Protarchus, accept this argument which is now offered to you?
ΠΡΩ. ἀνάγκη δέχεσθαι· Φίληβος γὰρ ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς ἀπείρηκεν.
PROTARCHUS: I must accept it; for our handsome Philebus has given up.
ΣΩ. δεῖ δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν τρόπῳ παντὶ τἀληθές πῃ περανθῆναι;
SOCRATES: Must the truth about them be reached in some way or other by all means?
ΠΡΩ. δεῖ γὰρ οὖν.
PROTARCHUS: Indeed it must.
ΣΩ. ἴθι δή, πρὸς τούτοις διομολογησώμεθα καὶ τόδε.
SOCRATES: Come then, in addition to this let us also agree on this point.
ΠΡΩ. τὸ ποῖον;
PROTARCHUS: What point?
ΣΩ. ὡς νῦν ἡμῶν ἑκάτερος ἕξιν ψυχῆς καὶ διάθεσιν ἀποφαίνειν τινὰ ἐπιχειρήσει τὴν δυναμένην ἀνθρώποις πᾶσι τὸν βίον εὐδαίμονα παρέχειν.
SOCRATES: That each of us will now try to show a state and condition of the soul which is able to render life happy for all human beings.
ἆρʼ οὐχ οὕτως;
Is it not so?
ΠΡΩ. οὕτω μὲν οὖν.
PROTARCHUS: Certainly it is.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὑμεῖς μὲν τὴν τοῦ χαίρειν, ἡμεῖς δʼ αὖ τὴν τοῦ φρονεῖν;
SOCRATES: You, then, will show the state of enjoyment, and we in turn that of wisdom?
ΠΡΩ. ἔστι ταῦτα.
PROTARCHUS: That is it.
ΣΩ. τί δʼ ἂν ἄλλη τις κρείττων τούτων φανῇ;
SOCRATES: But what if some other state should appear better than these?
μῶν οὐκ, ἂν μὲν ἡδονῇ μᾶλλον φαίνηται συγγενής, ἡττώμεθα μὲν ἀμφότεροι τοῦ ταῦτα ἔχοντος βεβαίως βίου, κρατεῖ δὲ ὁ τῆς ἡδονῆς τὸν τῆς φρονήσεως;
Would it not be that, if it should appear more akin to pleasure, we are both defeated by the life which firmly possesses these things, but the life of pleasure defeats that of wisdom?
§12ΠΡΩ. ναί.
PROTARCHUS: Yes.
ΣΩ. ἂν δέ γε φρονήσει, νικᾷ μὲν φρόνησις τὴν ἡδονήν, ἡ δὲ ἡττᾶται;
SOCRATES: But if it is more akin to wisdom, then wisdom conquers pleasure, and pleasure is defeated?
ταῦθʼ οὕτως ὁμολογούμενά φατε, ἢ πῶς;
Do you agree that this is so, or how do you say?
ΠΡΩ. ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ.
PROTARCHUS: It seems so to me, at least.
ΣΩ. τί δὲ Φιλήβῳ;
SOCRATES: And what about Philebus?
τί φῄς;
What do you say?
ΦΙ. ἐμοὶ μὲν πάντως νικᾶν ἡδονὴ δοκεῖ καὶ δόξει· σὺ δέ, Πρώταρχε, αὐτὸς γνώσῃ.
PHILEBUS: To me, pleasure seems and will always seem to conquer completely; but you, Protarchus, will decide for yourself.
ΠΡΩ. παραδούς, ὦ Φίληβε, ἡμῖν τὸν λόγον οὐκ ἂν ἔτι κύριος εἴης τῆς πρὸς Σωκράτη ὁμολογίας ἢ καὶ τοὐναντίον.
PROTARCHUS: Since you have handed over the argument to us, Philebus, you would no longer be master of the agreement with Socrates, or of its opposite.
ΦΙ. ἀληθῆ λέγεις· ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀφοσιοῦμαι καὶ μαρτύρομαι νῦν αὐτὴν τὴν θεόν.
PHILEBUS: You speak the truth; but indeed I clear myself of responsibility and call the goddess herself to witness now.
ΠΡΩ. καὶ ἡμεῖς σοι τούτων γε αὐτῶν συμμάρτυρες ἂν εἶμεν, ὡς ταῦτα ἔλεγες ἃ λέγεις.
PROTARCHUS: And we should be fellow-witnesses with you of these very things, that you said what you are saying.
ἀλλὰ δὴ τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα ἑξῆς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅμως καὶ μετὰ Φιλήβου ἑκόντος ἢ ὅπως ἂν ἐθέλῃ πειρώμεθα περαίνειν.
But anyway, Socrates, let us try to finish what comes next in order, whether with Philebus' consent or however he wishes.
ΣΩ. πειρατέον, ἀπʼ αὐτῆς δὴ τῆς θεοῦ, ἣν ὅδε Ἀφροδίτην μὲν λέγεσθαί φησι, τὸ δʼ ἀληθέστατον αὐτῆς ὄνομα ἡδονὴν εἶναι.
SOCRATES: We must try, beginning with the goddess herself, whom this man says is called Aphrodite, though her truest name is Pleasure.
ΠΡΩ. ὀρθότατα.
PROTARCHUS: Quite right.
ΣΩ. τὸ δʼ ἐμὸν δέος, ὦ Πρώταρχε, ἀεὶ πρὸς τὰ τῶν θεῶν ὀνόματα οὐκ ἔστι κατʼ ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ πέρα τοῦ μεγίστου φόβου.
SOCRATES: But my awe, Protarchus, in regard to the names of the gods is always not human, but beyond the greatest fear.
καὶ νῦν τὴν μὲν Ἀφροδίτην, ὅπῃ ἐκείνῃ φίλον, ταύτῃ προσαγορεύω· τὴν δὲ ἡδονὴν οἶδα ὡς ἔστι ποικίλον, καὶ ὅπερ εἶπον, ἀπʼ ἐκείνης ἡμᾶς ἀρχομένους ἐνθυμεῖσθαι δεῖ καὶ σκοπεῖν ἥντινα φύσιν ἔχει.
And now, as for Aphrodite, I address her in whatever way is pleasing to her; but as for pleasure, I know that it is a complex thing, and, as I said, we must begin with it and consider what sort of nature it has.
ἔστι γάρ, ἀκούειν μὲν οὕτως ἁπλῶς, ἕν τι, μορφὰς δὲ δήπου παντοίας εἴληφε καί τινα τρόπον ἀνομοίους ἀλλήλαις.
For, to hear it spoken of thus simply, it is one thing, but it has surely taken all sorts of shapes which are in a way unlike one another.
ἰδὲ γάρ· ἥδεσθαι μέν φαμεν τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἄνθρωπον, ἥδεσθαι δὲ καὶ τὸν σωφρονοῦντα αὐτῷ τῷ σωφρονεῖν· ἥδεσθαι δʼ αὖ καὶ τὸν ἀνοηταίνοντα καὶ ἀνοήτων δοξῶν καὶ ἐλπίδων μεστόν, ἥδεσθαι δʼ αὖ τὸν φρονοῦντα αὐτῷ τῷ φρονεῖν· καὶ τούτων τῶν ἡδονῶν ἑκατέρας πῶς ἄν τις ὁμοίας ἀλλήλαις εἶναι λέγων οὐκ ἀνόητος φαίνοιτο ἐνδίκως;
For look: we say that the intemperate man enjoys himself, and that the temperate man also enjoys himself in his very temperance; and again, that the foolish man, full of foolish opinions and hopes, enjoys himself, and again that the wise man enjoys himself in his very wisdom; and if anyone should say that either of these pleasures is like the other, how could he not justly appear foolish?
ΠΡΩ. εἰσὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀπʼ ἐναντίων, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὗται πραγμάτων, οὐ μὴν αὐταί γε ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι.
PROTARCHUS: Yes, Socrates, they arise from opposite things, but they themselves are not opposite to one another.
πῶς γὰρ ἡδονῇ γε ἡδονὴ οὐχ ὁμοιότατον ἂν εἴη, τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἑαυτῷ, πάντων χρημάτων;
For how could pleasure not be of all things most like pleasure, this very thing to itself?