§138καὶ μὴν τοιοῦτόν γε ὂν οὐδαμοῦ ἂν εἴη· οὔτε γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ οὔτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴη. πῶς δή; ἐν ἄλλῳ μὲν ὂν κύκλῳ που ἂν περιέχοιτο ὑπʼ ἐκείνου ἐν ᾧ ἐνείη, καὶ πολλαχοῦ ἂν αὐτοῦ ἅπτοιτο πολλοῖς· τοῦ δὲ ἑνός τε καὶ ἀμεροῦς καὶ κύκλου μὴ μετέχοντος ἀδύνατον πολλαχῇ κύκλῳ ἅπτεσθαι. ἀδύνατον. ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτό γε ἐν ἑαυτῷ ὂν κἂν ἑαυτῷ εἴη περιέχον οὐκ ἄλλο ἢ αὑτό, εἴπερ καὶ ἐν ἑαυτῷ εἴη· ἔν τῳ γάρ τι εἶναι μὴ περιέχοντι ἀδύνατον. ἀδύνατον γάρ. οὐκοῦν ἕτερον μὲν ἄν τι εἴη αὐτὸ τὸ περιέχον, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ περιεχόμενον· οὐ γὰρ ὅλον γε ἄμφω ταὐτὸν ἅμα πείσεται καὶ ποιήσει· καὶ οὕτω τὸ ἓν οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἔτι ἓν ἀλλὰ δύο. οὐ γὰρ οὖν. οὐκ ἄρα ἐστίν που τὸ ἕν, μήτε ἐν αὑτῷ μήτε ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐνόν. οὐκ ἔστιν. ὅρα δή, οὕτως ἔχον εἰ οἷόν τέ ἐστιν ἑστάναι ἢ κινεῖσθαι. τί δὴ γὰρ οὔ; ὅτι κινούμενόν γε ἢ φέροιτο ἢ ἀλλοιοῖτο ἄν· αὗται γὰρ μόναι κινήσεις. ναί. ἀλλοιούμενον δὲ τὸ ἓν ἑαυτοῦ ἀδύνατόν που ἓν ἔτι εἶναι. ἀδύνατον. οὐκ ἄρα κατʼ ἀλλοίωσίν γε κινεῖται. οὐ φαίνεται. ἀλλʼ ἆρα τῷ φέρεσθαι; ἴσως. καὶ μὴν εἰ φέροιτο τὸ ἕν, ἤτοι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἂν περιφέροιτο κύκλῳ ἢ μεταλλάττοι χώραν ἑτέραν ἐξ ἑτέρας. ἀνάγκη. οὐκοῦν κύκλῳ μὲν περιφερόμενον ἐπὶ μέσου βεβηκέναι ἀνάγκη, καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸ μέσον φερόμενα ἄλλα μέρη ἔχειν ἑαυτοῦ· ᾧ δὲ μήτε μέσου μήτε μερῶν προσήκει, τίς μηχανὴ τοῦτο κύκλῳ ποτʼ ἐπὶ τοῦ μέσου ἐνεχθῆναι; οὐδεμία. ἀλλὰ δὴ χώραν ἀμεῖβον ἄλλοτʼ ἄλλοθι γίγνεται καὶ οὕτω κινεῖται; εἴπερ γε δή. οὐκοῦν εἶναι μέν που ἔν τινι αὐτῷ ἀδύνατον ἐφάνη; ναί. ἆρʼ οὖν γίγνεσθαι ἔτι ἀδυνατώτερον; οὐκ ἐννοῶ ὅπῃ. εἰ ἔν τῴ τι γίγνεται, οὐκ ἀνάγκη μήτε πω ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἶναι ἔτι ἐγγιγνόμενον, μήτʼ ἔτι ἔξω ἐκείνου παντάπασιν, εἴπερ ἤδη ἐγγίγνεται; ἀνάγκη. εἰ ἄρα τι ἄλλο πείσεται τοῦτο, ἐκεῖνο ἂν μόνον πάσχοι οὗ μέρη εἴη· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄν τι αὐτοῦ ἤδη ἐν ἐκείνῳ, τὸ δὲ ἔξω εἴη ἅμα· τὸ δὲ μὴ ἔχον μέρη οὐχ οἷόν τέ που ἔσται τρόπῳ οὐδενὶ ὅλον ἅμα μήτε ἐντὸς εἶναί τινος μήτε ἔξω. ἀληθῆ. οὗ δὲ μήτε μέρη εἰσὶ μήτε ὅλον τυγχάνει ὄν, οὐ πολὺ ἔτι ἀδυνατώτερον ἐγγίγνεσθαί που, μήτε κατὰ μέρη μήτε κατὰ ὅλον ἐγγιγνόμενον; φαίνεται.
"And indeed, being such, it would be nowhere; for it would be neither in another nor in itself." "How so?" "If it were in another, it would, I suppose, be contained in a circle by that in which it was, and would touch it at many points with many of its own parts; but for that which is one and without parts and does not participate in the circular shape, it is impossible to touch in many places all around." "Impossible." "But further, if it were itself in itself, that which contains would be none other than itself, if indeed it were actually in itself; for it is impossible for something to be in something that does not contain it." "Yes, for it is impossible." "Therefore, that which contains would be one thing, and that which is contained another; for the same thing as a whole will not at the same time undergo and do both; and thus the one would no longer be one, but two." "Certainly not." "Therefore the one is nowhere, being neither in itself nor in another." "It is not." "Consider then, being in this state, whether it is possible for it to stand or to move." "Why indeed not?" "Because if it moved, it would either be carried along or be altered; for these are the only motions." "Yes." "But if the one is altered from itself, it is surely impossible for it to still be one." "Impossible." "Therefore it does not move by alteration." "It does not seem so." "But then, by being carried along?" "Perhaps." "And indeed, if the one were carried along, it would either turn in a circle in the same place, or change from one place to another." "Necessarily." "Now, that which turns in a circle must stand on a center, and have other parts of itself that are carried around the center; but for that which has no relation to a center or to parts, what device is there for this ever to be carried in a circle on a center?" "None." "But then, by changing its place, does it come to be in different places at different times, and move in this way?" "If indeed it does." "Now, did it not appear impossible for it to be in anything?" "Yes." "Is it then even more impossible for it to come to be in anything?" "I do not understand how." "If something is coming to be in something, is it not necessary that, while it is still entering, it is not yet in it, nor yet entirely outside of it, if indeed it is already entering?" "Necessarily." "If then any other thing is to undergo this, only that which has parts could undergo it; for one part of it would already be in it, while another would be outside at the same time; but that which has no parts will surely not be able in any way, as a whole at the same time, to be neither inside something nor outside of it." "True." "And for that of which there are neither parts nor does it happen to be a whole, is it not much more impossible still for it to come to be somewhere, since it can come to be neither by parts nor as a whole?" "It seems so."