§137καίτοι δοκῶ μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἰβυκείου ἵππου πεπονθέναι, ᾧ ἐκεῖνος ἀθλητῇ ὄντι καὶ πρεσβυτέρῳ, ὑφʼ ἅρματι μέλλοντι ἀγωνιεῖσθαι καὶ διʼ ἐμπειρίαν τρέμοντι τὸ μέλλον, ἑαυτὸν ἀπεικάζων ἄκων ἔφη καὶ αὐτὸς οὕτω πρεσβύτης ὢν εἰς τὸν ἔρωτα ἀναγκάζεσθαι ἰέναι·
And yet, I seem to myself to have experienced the same as the horse of Ibycus, to which he, likening himself—an old champion horse who is about to compete under a chariot and trembles at the future because of experience—said that he too, being so old, was forced to go into love against his will.
κἀγώ μοι δοκῶ μεμνημένος μάλα φοβεῖσθαι πῶς χρὴ τηλικόνδε ὄντα διανεῦσαι τοιοῦτόν τε καὶ τοσοῦτον πέλαγος λόγων·
And I too, remembering it, seem to myself to be very afraid how one of my age must swim through such and so great a sea of discourse.
ὅμως δὲ δεῖ γὰρ χαρίζεσθαι, ἐπειδὴ καί, ὃ Ζήνων λέγει, αὐτοί ἐσμεν.
But still, for we must comply, especially since, as Zeno says, we are by ourselves.
πόθεν οὖν δὴ ἀρξόμεθα καὶ τί πρῶτον ὑποθησόμεθα;
Where then indeed shall we begin, and what shall we first hypothesize?
ἢ βούλεσθε, ἐπειδήπερ δοκεῖ πραγματειώδη παιδιὰν παίζειν, ἀπʼ ἐμαυτοῦ ἄρξωμαι καὶ τῆς ἐμαυτοῦ ὑποθέσεως, περὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς αὐτοῦ ὑποθέμενος, εἴτε ἕν ἐστιν εἴτε μὴ ἕν, τί χρὴ συμβαίνειν;
Or, since we are decided to play a laborious game, do you wish that I begin from myself and my own hypothesis, hypothesizing about the one itself, whether it is one or not one, what must follow?
πάνυ μὲν οὖν, φάναι τὸν Ζήνωνα.
"By all means," said Zeno.
τίς οὖν, εἰπεῖν, μοὶ ἀποκρινεῖται;
"Who then," he said, "will answer me?
ἢ ὁ νεώτατος;
The youngest?
ἥκιστα γὰρ ἂν πολυπραγμονοῖ, καὶ ἃ οἴεται μάλιστα ἂν ἀποκρίνοιτο· καὶ ἅμα ἐμοὶ ἀνάπαυλα ἂν εἴη ἡ ἐκείνου ἀπόκρισις. ἕτοιμός σοι, ὦ Παρμενίδη, φάναι, τοῦτο, τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη· ἐμὲ γὰρ λέγεις τὸν νεώτατον λέγων.
For he would be least troublesome, and would answer mostly what he thinks; and at the same time, his answering would be a rest for me." "I am ready for you, Parmenides," said Aristotle, "for you mean me when you say the youngest.
ἀλλὰ ἐρώτα ὡς ἀποκρινουμένου. εἶεν δή
, φάναι·
But ask, and I will answer." "Very well then," he said.
εἰ ἕν ἐστιν, ἄλλο τι οὐκ ἂν εἴη πολλὰ τὸ ἕν; πῶς γὰρ ἄν; οὔτε ἄρα μέρος αὐτοῦ οὔτε ὅλον αὐτὸ δεῖ εἶναι. τί δή; τὸ μέρος που ὅλου μέρος ἐστίν. ναί. τί δὲ τὸ ὅλον; οὐχὶ οὗ ἂν μέρος μηδὲν ἀπῇ ὅλον ἂν εἴη;
"If the one is one, surely the one cannot be many?" "How could it?" "Therefore, there must be neither a part of it, nor must it be a whole itself." "Why so?" "A part, surely, is a part of a whole." "Yes." "And what is a whole?
πάνυ γε. ἀμφοτέρως ἄρα τὸ ἓν ἐκ μερῶν ἂν εἴη, ὅλον τε ὂν καὶ μέρη ἔχον. ἀνάγκη. ἀμφοτέρως ἂν ἄρα οὕτως τὸ ἓν πολλὰ εἴη ἀλλʼ οὐχ ἕν. ἀληθῆ. δεῖ δέ γε μὴ πολλὰ ἀλλʼ ἓν αὐτὸ εἶναι. δεῖ. οὔτʼ ἄρα ὅλον ἔσται οὔτε μέρη ἕξει, εἰ ἓν ἔσται τὸ ἕν. οὐ γάρ. οὐκοῦν εἰ μηδὲν ἔχει μέρος, οὔτʼ ἂν ἀρχὴν οὔτε τελευτὴν οὔτε μέσον ἔχοι· μέρη γὰρ ἂν ἤδη αὐτοῦ τὰ τοιαῦτα εἴη. ὀρθῶς. καὶ μὴν τελευτή γε καὶ ἀρχὴ πέρας ἑκάστου. πῶς δʼ οὔ; ἄπειρον ἄρα τὸ ἕν, εἰ μήτε ἀρχὴν μήτε τελευτὴν ἔχει. ἄπειρον. καὶ ἄνευ σχήματος ἄρα· οὔτε γὰρ στρογγύλου οὔτε εὐθέος μετέχει. πῶς; στρογγύλον γέ πού ἐστι τοῦτο οὗ ἂν τὰ ἔσχατα πανταχῇ ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου ἴσον ἀπέχῃ. ναί. καὶ μὴν εὐθύ γε, οὗ ἂν τὸ μέσον ἀμφοῖν τοῖν ἐσχάτοιν ἐπίπροσθεν ᾖ. οὕτως. οὐκοῦν μέρη ἂν ἔχοι τὸ ἓν καὶ πολλὰ ἂν εἴη, εἴτε εὐθέος σχήματος εἴτε περιφεροῦς μετέχοι. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. οὔτε ἄρα εὐθὺ οὔτε περιφερές ἐστιν, ἐπείπερ οὐδὲ μέρη ἔχει. ὀρθῶς.
Is not a whole that from which no part is missing?" "Certainly." "In either case, then, the one would consist of parts, both being a whole and having parts." "Necessarily." "In either case, therefore, the one would thus be many and not one." "True." "But it must be not many, but the one itself." "It must." "Therefore, it will neither be a whole nor have parts, if the one is to be one." "No." "Then, if it has no part, it could have neither beginning nor end nor middle; for such things would already be parts of it." "Correct." "And indeed, end and beginning are the limits of each thing." "How could they not be?" "The one, then, is limitless, if it has neither beginning nor end." "Limitless." "And it is also without shape, for it participates neither in the round nor in the straight." "How so?" "The round, surely, is that of which the extremes are everywhere equally distant from the middle." "Yes." "And the straight is that of which the middle is in front of both of the extremes." "Just so." "Then the one would have parts and would be many, whether it participated in a straight shape or a round one." "By all means." "Therefore, it is neither straight nor round, since indeed it has no parts." "Correct."