§134ἢ οὐ μανθάνεις ὃ λέγω;
Or do you not understand what I am saying?
πάνυ γʼ, εἰπεῖν τὸν Σωκράτη, μανθάνω.
Yes, indeed, said Socrates, I understand.
οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐπιστήμη, φάναι, αὐτὴ μὲν ὃ ἔστι ἐπιστήμη τῆς ὃ ἔστιν ἀλήθεια αὐτῆς ἂν ἐκείνης εἴη ἐπιστήμη;
Therefore, he said, would not knowledge itself, which is what knowledge is, be knowledge of truth itself, which is what truth is?
πάνυ γε.
Yes, indeed.
ἑκάστη δὲ αὖ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἣ ἔστιν, ἑκάστου τῶν ὄντων, ὃ ἔστιν, εἴη ἂν ἐπιστήμη·
And in turn would not each of the knowledges itself be knowledge of each of the beings itself?
ἢ οὔ;
Or not?
ναί.
Yes.
ἡ δὲ παρʼ ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμη οὐ τῆς παρʼ ἡμῖν ἂν ἀληθείας εἴη, καὶ αὖ ἑκάστη ἡ παρʼ ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμη τῶν παρʼ ἡμῖν ὄντων ἑκάστου ἂν ἐπιστήμη συμβαίνοι εἶναι;
And would not the knowledge in us be of the truth in us, and in turn each knowledge in us would turn out to be knowledge of each of the things in us?
ἀνάγκη.
Necessarily.
ἀλλὰ μὴν αὐτά γε τὰ εἴδη, ὡς ὁμολογεῖς, οὔτε ἔχομεν οὔτε παρʼ ἡμῖν οἷόν τε εἶναι.
But indeed, the forms themselves, as you agree, we neither possess nor is it possible for them to be in us.
οὐ γὰρ οὖν.
True.
γιγνώσκεται δέ γέ που ὑπʼ αὐτοῦ τοῦ εἴδους τοῦ τῆς ἐπιστήμης αὐτὰ τὰ γένη ἃ ἔστιν ἕκαστα;
But are not the kinds themselves, what each is, known by the form of knowledge itself?
ναί.
Yes.
ὅ γε ἡμεῖς οὐκ ἔχομεν.
Which we, at least, do not possess.
οὐ γάρ.
No, we do not.
οὐκ ἄρα ὑπό γε ἡμῶν γιγνώσκεται τῶν εἰδῶν οὐδέν, ἐπειδὴ αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης οὐ μετέχομεν.
Therefore, none of the forms is known by us, since we do not participate in knowledge itself.
οὐκ ἔοικεν.
It seems not.
ἄγνωστον ἄρα ἡμῖν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν ὃ ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ πάντα ἃ δὴ ὡς ἰδέας αὐτὰς οὔσας ὑπολαμβάνομεν.
Unknown to us, then, is both beauty itself, what it is, and goodness, and all things which we assume to be ideas themselves.
κινδυνεύει.
It seems so.
ὅρα δὴ ἔτι τούτου δεινότερον τόδε.
Look then at this which is still more terrible than this.
τὸ ποῖον;
What is that?
φαίης ἄν που, εἴπερ ἔστιν αὐτό τι γένος ἐπιστήμης, πολὺ αὐτὸ ἀκριβέστερον εἶναι ἢ τὴν παρʼ ἡμῖν ἐπιστήμην, καὶ κάλλος καὶ τἆλλα πάντα οὕτω.
You would say, I suppose, that if there is indeed a certain kind of knowledge itself, it is much more accurate than the knowledge in us, and so with beauty and all other things.
ναί.
Yes.
οὐκοῦν εἴπερ τι ἄλλο αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης μετέχει, οὐκ ἄν τινα μᾶλλον ἢ θεὸν φαίης ἔχειν τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἐπιστήμην;
Therefore, if indeed anything else participates in knowledge itself, would you not say that God, rather than anyone else, possesses the most accurate knowledge?
ἀνάγκη.
Necessarily.
ἆρʼ οὖν οἷός τε αὖ ἔσται ὁ θεὸς τὰ παρʼ ἡμῖν γιγνώσκειν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχων;
Will God then, in turn, be able to know the things in us, possessing knowledge itself?
τί γὰρ οὔ;
Why not?
ὅτι, ἔφη ὁ Παρμενίδης, ὡμολόγηται ἡμῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, μήτε ἐκεῖνα τὰ εἴδη πρὸς τὰ παρʼ ἡμῖν τὴν δύναμιν ἔχειν ἣν ἔχει, μήτε τὰ παρʼ ἡμῖν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα, ἀλλʼ αὐτὰ πρὸς αὑτὰ ἑκάτερα.
Because, Socrates, said Parmenides, it has been agreed by us that neither those forms have the power they have in relation to the things in us, nor the things in us in relation to those, but each in relation to themselves.
ὡμολόγηται γάρ.
Yes, it was agreed.
οὐκοῦν εἰ παρὰ τῷ θεῷ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη δεσποτεία καὶ αὕτη ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη ἐπιστήμη, οὔτʼ ἂν ἡ δεσποτεία ἡ ἐκείνων ἡμῶν ποτὲ ἂν δεσπόσειεν, οὔτʼ ἂν ἐπιστήμη ἡμᾶς γνοίη οὐδέ τι ἄλλο τῶν παρʼ ἡμῖν, ἀλλὰ ὁμοίως ἡμεῖς τε ἐκείνων οὐκ ἄρχομεν τῇ παρʼ ἡμῖν ἀρχῇ οὐδὲ γιγνώσκομεν τοῦ θείου οὐδὲν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ ἐπιστήμῃ, ἐκεῖνοί τε αὖ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον οὔτε δεσπόται ἡμῶν εἰσὶν οὔτε γιγνώσκουσι τὰ ἀνθρώπεια πράγματα θεοὶ ὄντες.
Therefore, if this most accurate mastership and this most accurate knowledge are with God, neither could the mastership of those forms ever master us, nor could the knowledge know us or anything else of the things in us; but likewise, we do not rule over them with our rule, nor do we know anything of the divine with our knowledge, and they in turn, by the same argument, being gods, are neither our masters nor do they know human affairs.
ἀλλὰ μὴ λίαν, ἔφη, ᾖ θαυμαστὸς ὁ λόγος, εἴ τις τὸν θεὸν ἀποστερήσει τοῦ εἰδέναι.
But, he said, may the argument not be too monstrous, if one should deprive God of knowing.
§135ταῦτα μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔφη ὁ Παρμενίδης, καὶ ἔτι ἄλλα πρὸς τούτοις πάνυ πολλὰ ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν τὰ εἴδη, εἰ εἰσὶν αὗται αἱ ἰδέαι τῶν ὄντων καὶ ὁριεῖταί τις αὐτό τι ἕκαστον εἶδος· ὥστε ἀπορεῖν τε τὸν ἀκούοντα καὶ ἀμφισβητεῖν ὡς οὔτε ἔστι ταῦτα, εἴ τε ὅτι μάλιστα εἴη, πολλὴ ἀνάγκη αὐτὰ εἶναι τῇ ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει ἄγνωστα, καὶ ταῦτα λέγοντα δοκεῖν τε τὶ λέγειν καί, ὃ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, θαυμαστῶς ὡς δυσανάπειστον εἶναι.
Yet, Socrates, said Parmenides, the forms must necessarily have these difficulties and still many others besides these, if indeed these ideas of existing things exist, and if someone is to define each form as something itself by itself; so that the hearer is puzzled and disputes, saying that they do not exist, or that, if they do exist to the highest degree, there is a strong necessity for them to be unknowable to human nature, and in saying this he seems to make a point and, as we said just now, is wondrously hard to persuade.
καὶ ἀνδρὸς πάνυ μὲν εὐφυοῦς τοῦ δυνησομένου μαθεῖν ὡς ἔστι γένος τι ἑκάστου καὶ οὐσία αὐτὴ καθʼ αὑτήν, ἔτι δὲ θαυμαστοτέρου τοῦ εὑρήσοντος καὶ ἄλλον δυνησομένου διδάξαι ταῦτα πάντα ἱκανῶς διευκρινησάμενον.
And it requires a man of very good natural parts to be able to learn that there is a certain kind for each thing and an essence itself by itself, and a still more wonderful man to discover it and be able to teach another to distinguish all these things adequately.
συγχωρῶ σοι, ἔφη, ὦ Παρμενίδη, ὁ Σωκράτης· πάνυ γάρ μοι κατὰ νοῦν λέγεις.
I agree with you, Parmenides, said Socrates; for you speak very much to my mind.
ἀλλὰ μέντοι, εἶπεν ὁ Παρμενίδης, εἴ γέ τις δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὖ μὴ ἐάσει εἴδη τῶν ὄντων εἶναι, εἰς πάντα τὰ νυνδὴ καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα ἀποβλέψας, μηδέ τι ὁριεῖται εἶδος ἑνὸς ἑκάστου, οὐδὲ ὅποι τρέψει τὴν διάνοιαν ἕξει, μὴ ἐῶν ἰδέαν τῶν ὄντων ἑκάστου τὴν αὐτὴν ἀεὶ εἶναι, καὶ οὕτως τὴν τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι δύναμιν παντάπασι διαφθερεῖ.
But indeed, Socrates, said Parmenides, if anyone in turn will not allow that there are forms of existing things, looking at all the things just now and other such things, nor define a form for each single thing, he will not even have anywhere to turn his mind, not allowing the idea of each of the existing things to be always the same, and in this way he will completely destroy the power of dialectic.
τοῦ τοιούτου μὲν οὖν μοι δοκεῖς καὶ μᾶλλον ᾐσθῆσθαι.
Of such a thing indeed you seem to me to be even more aware.
ἀληθῆ λέγεις, φάναι.
You speak the truth, he said.
τί οὖν ποιήσεις φιλοσοφίας πέρι;
What then will you do about philosophy?
πῇ τρέψῃ ἀγνοουμένων τούτων;
Where will you turn, if these are unknown?
οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκῶ καθορᾶν ἔν γε τῷ παρόντι.
I do not think I see clearly, at least for the present.
πρῲ γάρ, εἰπεῖν, πρὶν γυμνασθῆναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὁρίζεσθαι ἐπιχειρεῖς καλόν τέ τι καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἓν ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν. ἐνενόησα γὰρ καὶ πρῴην σου ἀκούων διαλεγομένου ἐνθάδε Ἀριστοτέλει τῷδε.
For too early, he said, before being trained, Socrates, you attempt to define beauty, justice, goodness, and each single one of the forms.
καλὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ θεία, εὖ ἴσθι, ἡ ὁρμὴ ἣν ὁρμᾷς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους·
For I noticed it also the other day when I heard you conversing here with Aristotle here.
ἕλκυσον δὲ σαυτὸν καὶ γύμνασαι μᾶλλον διὰ τῆς δοκούσης ἀχρήστου εἶναι καὶ καλουμένης ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἀδολεσχίας, ἕως ἔτι νέος εἶ· εἰ δὲ μή, σὲ διαφεύξεται ἡ ἀλήθεια.
Know well then, beautiful and divine is the impulse you have toward arguments; but draw yourself back and train yourself more through what seems to be useless and is called by the many 'idle chatter', while you are still young; otherwise, the truth will escape you.
τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος, φάναι, ὦ Παρμενίδη, τῆς γυμνασίας;
What then, Parmenides, said he, is the method of training?
οὗτος, εἶπεν, ὅνπερ ἤκουσας Ζήνωνος.
This one, he said, which you heard from Zeno.
πλὴν τοῦτό γέ σου καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἠγάσθην εἰπόντος, ὅτι οὐκ εἴας ἐν τοῖς ὁρωμένοις οὐδὲ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πλάνην ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐκεῖνα ἃ μάλιστά τις ἂν λόγῳ λάβοι καὶ εἴδη ἂν ἡγήσαιτο εἶναι.
Except for this, I admired you in what you said to him, that you did not allow anyone to look at the wandering among visible things nor about them, but about those things which one can best grasp by reason and would think to be forms.
δοκεῖ γάρ μοι, ἔφη, ταύτῃ γε οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν εἶναι καὶ ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια καὶ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τὰ ὄντα πάσχοντα ἀποφαίνειν.
For it seems to me, he said, that in this way it is not at all difficult to show that existing things are both like and unlike, and suffer whatever else.