§133οὐκ ἄρα οἷόν τέ τι τῷ εἴδει ὅμοιον εἶναι, οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος ἄλλῳ· εἰ δὲ μή, παρὰ τὸ εἶδος ἀεὶ ἄλλο ἀναφανήσεται εἶδος, καὶ ἂν ἐκεῖνό τῳ ὅμοιον ᾖ, ἕτερον αὖ, καὶ οὐδέποτε παύσεται ἀεὶ καινὸν εἶδος γιγνόμενον, ἐὰν τὸ εἶδος τῷ ἑαυτοῦ μετέχοντι ὅμοιον γίγνηται.
Therefore it is not possible for anything to be like the form, nor for the form to be like another; otherwise, alongside the form, another form will always appear, and if that one is like something, another in turn, and it will never cease that a new form is always arising, if the form becomes like that which participates in itself.
ἀληθέστατα λέγεις.
You speak most truly.
οὐκ ἄρα ὁμοιότητι τἆλλα τῶν εἰδῶν μεταλαμβάνει, ἀλλά τι ἄλλο δεῖ ζητεῖν ᾧ μεταλαμβάνει.
Therefore, the other things do not participate in the forms by likeness, but we must seek something else by which they participate.
ἔοικεν.
It seems so.
ὁρᾷς οὖν, φάναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὅση ἡ ἀπορία ἐάν τις ὡς εἴδη ὄντα αὐτὰ καθʼ αὑτὰ διορίζηται;
Do you see then, Socrates, he said, how great the difficulty is if one defines them as forms existing itself by itself?
καὶ μάλα.
Very much so.
εὖ τοίνυν ἴσθι, φάναι, ὅτι ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδέπω ἅπτῃ αὐτῆς ὅση ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπορία, εἰ ἓν εἶδος ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἀεί τι ἀφοριζόμενος θήσεις.
Know well then, he said, that, so to speak, you have not yet even touched the difficulty, how great it is, if you are always setting up one form for each of existing things, distinguishing it as something.
πῶς δή; εἰπεῖν.
How so? he said.
πολλὰ μὲν καὶ ἄλλα, φάναι, μέγιστον δὲ τόδε. εἴ τις φαίη μηδὲ προσήκειν αὐτὰ γιγνώσκεσθαι ὄντα τοιαῦτα οἷά φαμεν δεῖν εἶναι τὰ εἴδη, τῷ ταῦτα λέγοντι οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι τις ἐνδείξασθαι ὅτι ψεύδεται, εἰ μὴ πολλῶν μὲν τύχοι ἔμπειρος ὢν ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν καὶ μὴ ἀφυής, ἐθέλοι δὲ πάνυ πολλὰ καὶ πόρρωθεν πραγματευομένου τοῦ ἐνδεικνυμένου ἕπεσθαι, ἀλλʼ ἀπίθανος εἴη ὁ ἄγνωστα ἀναγκάζων αὐτὰ εἶναι.
There are many other things, he said, but the greatest is this: if anyone should say that they ought not even to be known, being such as we say the forms must be, no one could demonstrate to the speaker that he is wrong, unless the disputant happened to be experienced in many things and not ungifted, and were willing to follow the demonstrator through very many and far-fetched arguments; otherwise, he who insists that they are unknowable would remain unpersuaded.
πῇ δή, ὦ Παρμενίδη; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.
In what way then, Parmenides? said Socrates.
ὅτι, ὦ Σώκρατες, οἶμαι ἂν καὶ σὲ καὶ ἄλλον, ὅστις αὐτήν τινα καθʼ αὑτὴν ἑκάστου οὐσίαν τίθεται εἶναι, ὁμολογῆσαι ἂν πρῶτον μὲν μηδεμίαν αὐτῶν εἶναι ἐν ἡμῖν.
Because, Socrates, he said, I think that both you and anyone else who posits some essence of each thing itself by itself, would agree first of all that none of them is in us.
πῶς γὰρ ἂν αὐτὴ καθʼ αὑτὴν ἔτι εἴη; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.
For how indeed could it still be itself by itself? said Socrates.
καλῶς λέγεις, εἰπεῖν.
You speak well, he said.
οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅσαι τῶν ἰδεῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλας εἰσὶν αἵ εἰσιν, αὐταὶ πρὸς αὑτὰς τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχουσιν, ἀλλʼ οὐ πρὸς τὰ παρʼ ἡμῖν εἴτε ὁμοιώματα εἴτε ὅπῃ δή τις αὐτὰ τίθεται, ὧν ἡμεῖς μετέχοντες εἶναι ἕκαστα ἐπονομαζόμεθα· τὰ δὲ παρʼ ἡμῖν ταῦτα ὁμώνυμα ὄντα ἐκείνοις αὐτὰ αὖ πρὸς αὑτά ἐστιν ἀλλʼ οὐ πρὸς τὰ εἴδη, καὶ ἑαυτῶν ἀλλʼ οὐκ ἐκείνων ὅσα αὖ ὀνομάζεται οὕτως.
Therefore, also, all those ideas which are what they are in relation to one another have their essence in relation to themselves, and not in relation to the things in us, whether they are likenesses or however one posits them, by participating in which we are named by each of their names; and these things in us, being homonymous with those, are in turn related to themselves and not to the forms, and whatever are so named are of themselves and not of those.
πῶς λέγεις; φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.
How do you mean? said Socrates.
οἷον, φάναι τὸν Παρμενίδην, εἴ τις ἡμῶν του δεσπότης ἢ δοῦλός ἐστιν, οὐκ αὐτοῦ δεσπότου δήπου, ὃ ἔστι δεσπότης, ἐκείνου δοῦλός ἐστιν, οὐδὲ αὐτοῦ δούλου, ὃ ἔστι δοῦλος, δεσπότης ὁ δεσπότης, ἀλλʼ ἄνθρωπος ὢν ἀνθρώπου ἀμφότερα ταῦτʼ ἐστίν· αὐτὴ δὲ δεσποτεία αὐτῆς δουλείας ἐστὶν ὅ ἐστι, καὶ δουλεία ὡσαύτως αὐτὴ δουλεία αὐτῆς δεσποτείας, ἀλλʼ οὐ τὰ ἐν ἡμῖν πρὸς ἐκεῖνα τὴν δύναμιν ἔχει οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ἀλλʼ, ὃ λέγω, αὐτὰ αὑτῶν καὶ πρὸς αὑτὰ ἐκεῖνά τέ ἐστι, καὶ τὰ παρʼ ἡμῖν ὡσαύτως πρὸς αὑτά.
For example, said Parmenides, if one of us is a master or a slave of someone, he is surely not a slave of master itself, which is what master is, nor is the master a master of slave itself, which is what slave is, but being a human, he is both of these in relation to a human; but mastership itself is what it is of slavery itself, and likewise slavery itself is slavery of mastership itself, but the things in us do not have their power in relation to those, nor those in relation to us, but, as I say, those are of themselves and in relation to themselves, and the things in us likewise in relation to themselves.