§131πάνυ γε, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη.
"Certainly," said Socrates.
οὐκοῦν ἤτοι ὅλου τοῦ εἴδους ἢ μέρους ἕκαστον τὸ μεταλαμβάνον μεταλαμβάνει;
"Then does each participant participate in the whole form or in a part?
ἢ ἄλλη τις ἂν μετάληψις χωρὶς τούτων γένοιτο; καὶ πῶς ἄν; εἶπεν.
Or could there be some other participation apart from these?" "How indeed could there be?" he said.
πότερον οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ὅλον τὸ εἶδος ἐν ἑκάστῳ εἶναι τῶν πολλῶν ἓν ὄν, ἢ πῶς; τί γὰρ κωλύει, φάναι τὸν Σωκράτη, ὦ Παρμενίδη,;
"Does it then seem to you that the whole form is in each of the many, being one, or how?" "For what prevents it, Parmenides?" said Socrates.
ἓν ἄρα ὂν καὶ ταὐτὸν ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ χωρὶς οὖσιν ὅλον ἅμα ἐνέσται, καὶ οὕτως αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ χωρὶς ἂν εἴη. οὐκ ἄν, εἴ γε, φάναι, οἷον ἡμέρα μία καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ οὖσα πολλαχοῦ ἅμα ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον αὐτὴ αὑτῆς χωρίς ἐστιν, εἰ οὕτω καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν ἓν ἐν πᾶσιν ἅμα ταὐτὸν εἴη. ἡδέως γε, φάναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἓν ταὐτὸν ἅμα πολλαχοῦ ποιεῖς, οἷον εἰ ἱστίῳ καταπετάσας πολλοὺς ἀνθρώπους φαίης ἓν ἐπὶ πολλοῖς εἶναι ὅλον· ἢ οὐ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἡγῇ λέγειν; ἴσως, φάναι.
"Then, being one and the same, it will be in many separate things as a whole at the same time, and thus it would be separate from itself." "It would not," he said, "if, just as one and the same day is in many places at the same time and is not any the more separate from itself, if in this way each of the forms were also one and the same in all at the same time." "You make one and the same thing to be in many places at the same time very pleasantly, Socrates," he said, "just as if, having spread a sail over many men, you should say that one whole is over many; or do you not think you mean something of this sort?" "Perhaps," he said.
ἦ οὖν ὅλον ἐφʼ ἑκάστῳ τὸ ἱστίον εἴη ἄν, ἢ μέρος αὐτοῦ ἄλλο ἐπʼ ἄλλῳ; μέρος. μεριστὰ ἄρα, φάναι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔστιν αὐτὰ τὰ εἴδη, καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτῶν μέρους ἂν μετέχοι, καὶ οὐκέτι ἐν ἑκάστῳ ὅλον, ἀλλὰ μέρος ἑκάστου ἂν εἴη. φαίνεται οὕτω γε. ἦ οὖν ἐθελήσεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, φάναι τὸ ἓν εἶδος ἡμῖν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μερίζεσθαι, καὶ ἔτι ἓν ἔσται; οὐδαμῶς, εἰπεῖν.
"Would the sail then be as a whole over each, or a different part of it over a different person?" "A part." "Then the forms themselves, Socrates, are divisible," he said, "and the things participating in them would participate in a part, and no longer would the whole be in each, but a part of each." "It appears so, at least." "Are you then willing, Socrates," he said, "to say that our one form is truly divided, and will it still be one?" "Not at all," he said.
ὅρα γάρ, φάναι· εἰ αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος μεριεῖς καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν πολλῶν μεγάλων μεγέθους μέρει σμικροτέρῳ αὐτοῦ τοῦ μεγέθους μέγα ἔσται, ἆρα οὐκ ἄλογον φανεῖται; πάνυ γʼ, ἔφη.
"For look," he said: "if you divide greatness itself, and each of the many great things is to be great by a part of greatness smaller than greatness itself, will that not appear unreasonable?" "Certainly indeed," he said.
τί δέ;
"And what about this?
τοῦ ἴσου μέρος ἕκαστον σμικρὸν ἀπολαβόν τι ἕξει ᾧ ἐλάττονι ὄντι αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἴσου τὸ ἔχον ἴσον τῳ ἔσται; ἀδύνατον.
Will each, having received some small part of equality, possess something by which, being smaller than equality itself, that which possesses it will be equal to something?" "Impossible." "But what if one of us will have a part of the small?
ἀλλὰ τοῦ σμικροῦ μέρος τις ἡμῶν ἕξει, τούτου δὲ αὐτοῦ τὸ σμικρὸν μεῖζον ἔσται ἅτε μέρους ἑαυτοῦ ὄντος, καὶ οὕτω δὴ αὐτὸ τὸ σμικρὸν μεῖζον ἔσται· ᾧ δʼ ἂν προστεθῇ τὸ ἀφαιρεθέν, τοῦτο σμικρότερον ἔσται ἀλλʼ οὐ μεῖζον ἢ πρίν. οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο, φάναι, τοῦτό γε.
The small itself will be greater than this very part, since it is a part of itself, and thus the small itself will be greater; and that to which the subtracted part is added will be smaller, but not greater, than before." "That indeed could not happen," he said.
τίνα οὖν τρόπον, εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῶν εἰδῶν σοι τὰ ἄλλα μεταλήψεται, μήτε κατὰ μέρη μήτε κατὰ ὅλα μεταλαμβάνειν δυνάμενα; οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, φάναι, οὔ μοι δοκεῖ εὔκολον εἶναι τὸ τοιοῦτον οὐδαμῶς διορίσασθαι. τί δὲ δή; πρὸς τόδε πῶς ἔχεις; τὸ ποῖον;
"In what way, then, Socrates," he said, "will the other things participate in the forms for you, being able to participate neither by parts nor by wholes?" "By Zeus," he said, "it does not seem to me to be at all easy to determine such a thing." "And what about this?
§132οἶμαί σε ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦδε ἓν ἕκαστον εἶδος οἴεσθαι εἶναι· ὅταν πόλλʼ ἄττα μεγάλα σοι δόξῃ εἶναι, μία τις ἴσως δοκεῖ ἰδέα ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι, ὅθεν ἓν τὸ μέγα ἡγῇ εἶναι. ἀληθῆ λέγεις, φάναι.
How do you feel about the following?" "What sort of thing?" "I think you believe each form is one for some such reason: when many great things seem to you to be great, there is perhaps some one and the same idea that seems to you to belong to all as you look at them, whence you think greatness is one." "You speak the truth," he said.
τί δʼ αὐτὸ τὸ μέγα καὶ τἆλλα τὰ μεγάλα, ἐὰν ὡσαύτως τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπὶ πάντα ἴδῃς, οὐχὶ ἕν τι αὖ μέγα φανεῖται, ᾧ ταῦτα πάντα μεγάλα φαίνεσθαι;
"But what about greatness itself and the other great things?
ἔοικεν. ἄλλο ἄρα εἶδος μεγέθους ἀναφανήσεται, παρʼ αὐτό τε τὸ μέγεθος γεγονὸς καὶ τὰ μετέχοντα αὐτοῦ· καὶ ἐπὶ τούτοις αὖ πᾶσιν ἕτερον, ᾧ ταῦτα πάντα μεγάλα ἔσται· καὶ οὐκέτι δὴ ἓν ἕκαστόν σοι τῶν εἰδῶν ἔσται, ἀλλὰ ἄπειρα τὸ πλῆθος. ἀλλά, φάναι, ὦ Παρμενίδη, τὸν Σωκράτη, μὴ τῶν εἰδῶν ἕκαστον ᾖ τούτων νόημα, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ αὐτῷ προσήκῃ ἐγγίγνεσθαι ἄλλοθι ἢ ἐν ψυχαῖς· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἕν γε ἕκαστον εἴη καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἔτι πάσχοι ἃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγετο. τί οὖν; φάναι, ἓν ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν νοημάτων, νόημα δὲ οὐδενός; ἀλλʼ ἀδύνατον, εἰπεῖν.
If you look at all of them in the same way with the soul, will not some other great thing in turn appear, by which all these appear great?" "It seems so." "Then another form of greatness will appear, having arisen alongside greatness itself and the things participating in it; and in turn, over all these, another, by which all these will be great; and each of your forms will no longer be one, but infinite in multitude." "But, Parmenides," said Socrates, "lest each of these forms be a thought, and it is proper for it to arise nowhere else than in souls; for thus each would be one and would no longer suffer what was just now being said." "What then?" he said, "Is each of the thoughts one, but a thought of nothing?" "But that is impossible," he said.
ἀλλὰ τινός; ναί. ὄντος ἢ οὐκ ὄντος; ὄντος. οὐχ ἑνός τινος, ὃ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐκεῖνο τὸ νόημα ἐπὸν νοεῖ, μίαν τινὰ οὖσαν ἰδέαν; ναί. εἶτα οὐκ εἶδος ἔσται τοῦτο τὸ νοούμενον ἓν εἶναι, ἀεὶ ὂν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν; ἀνάγκη αὖ φαίνεται. τί δὲ δή;
"But of something?" "Yes." "Of something that is, or of something that is not?" "Of something that is." "Is it not of some one thing, which that thought thinks as being over all, being some one idea?" "Yes." "Then will not this which is thought to be one, being always the same over all, be a form?" "That in turn appears necessary." "But what about this?" said Parmenides.
εἰπεῖν τὸν Παρμενίδην, οὐκ ἀνάγκῃ ᾗ τἆλλα φῂς τῶν εἰδῶν μετέχειν ἢ δοκεῖ σοι ἐκ νοημάτων ἕκαστον εἶναι καὶ πάντα νοεῖν, ἢ νοήματα ὄντα ἀνόητα εἶναι; ἀλλʼ οὐδὲ τοῦτο, φάναι, ἔχει λόγον, ἀλλʼ, ὦ Παρμενίδη, μάλιστα ἔμοιγε καταφαίνεται ὧδε ἔχειν· τὰ μὲν εἴδη ταῦτα ὥσπερ παραδείγματα ἑστάναι ἐν τῇ φύσει, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα τούτοις ἐοικέναι καὶ εἶναι ὁμοιώματα, καὶ ἡ μέθεξις αὕτη τοῖς ἄλλοις γίγνεσθαι τῶν εἰδῶν οὐκ ἄλλη τις ἢ εἰκασθῆναι αὐτοῖς. εἰ οὖν τι, ἔφη, ἔοικεν τῷ εἴδει, οἷόν τε ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος μὴ ὅμοιον εἶναι τῷ εἰκασθέντι, καθʼ ὅσον αὐτῷ ἀφωμοιώθη; ἢ ἔστι τις μηχανὴ τὸ ὅμοιον μὴ ὁμοίῳ ὅμοιον εἶναι;
"Does it not necessarily follow, since you say the other things participate in the forms, either that each form is made of thoughts and all things think, or that they are thoughts but are unthinking?" "But neither does this make sense," he said, "but, Parmenides, it appears to me most of all to be this way: these forms stand as paradigms in nature, and the other things resemble them and are likenesses, and this participation in the forms for the other things is nothing other than being made like them." "If then anything," he said, "resembles the form, is it possible for that form not to be like the thing made like it, insofar as it was made like it?
οὐκ ἔστι. τὸ δὲ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ ἆρʼ οὐ μεγάλη ἀνάγκη ἑνὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ μετέχειν; ἀνάγκη. οὗ δʼ ἂν τὰ ὅμοια μετέχοντα ὅμοια ᾖ, οὐκ ἐκεῖνο ἔσται αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος; παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
Or is there any way for the like not to be like the like?" "There is not." "But is there not a great necessity for the like to participate in one and the same thing as the like?" "Necessary." "And that of which the like things, by participating in it, are like, will not that be the form itself?" "Absolutely indeed."