Humanitext Reader

Plato · Statesman §305-306

Directive Role of Statesmanship and Conflict Between Virtues

Passage 31 of 34 · Greek

Summary

The Stranger demarcates political science from other subordinate arts such as generalship and the administration of justice, establishing that the true kingly art does not practice actions itself but directs and integrates those that do. He then introduces the surprising thesis that different parts of virtue, such as courage and temperance, are not simply in harmony but are in conflict with one another in many respects.

§305ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν ἄρχουσαν ταύτης αὐτὴν ἀποφανούμεθα, εἴπερ τοῖς ἔμπροσθέν γε ὑποληψόμεθα ὁμοίως;
STRANGER: Shall we then declare that this science rules over that one, if indeed we are to assume in like manner according to what was said before?
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. φημί.
YOUNG SOCRATES: I say so.
ΞΕ. τίνʼ οὖν ποτε καὶ ἐπιχειρήσομεν οὕτω δεινῆς καὶ μεγάλης τέχνης συμπάσης τῆς πολεμικῆς δεσπότιν ἀποφαίνεσθαι πλήν γε δὴ τὴν ὄντως οὖσαν βασιλικήν;
STRANGER: What other art indeed shall we ever attempt to declare as the mistress of all this generalship, which is so formidable and great, except surely that which is truly kingly?
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. οὐδεμίαν ἄλλην.
YOUNG SOCRATES: No other.
ΞΕ. οὐκ ἄρα πολιτικὴν θήσομεν, ὑπηρετικήν γε οὖσαν, τὴν τῶν στρατηγῶν ἐπιστήμην.
STRANGER: We shall not then set down the science of the generals as political, since it is ministering.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. οὐκ εἰκός.
YOUNG SOCRATES: It is not likely.
ΞΕ. ἴθι δή, καὶ τὴν τῶν δικαστῶν τῶν ὀρθῶς δικαζόντων θεασώμεθα δύναμιν.
STRANGER: Come then, let us also behold the power of the judges who judge rightly.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. πάνυ μὲν οὖν.
YOUNG SOCRATES: By all means.
ΞΕ. ἆρʼ οὖν ἐπὶ πλέον τι δύναται τοῦ περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια πάνθʼ ὁπόσα κεῖται νόμιμα παρὰ νομοθέτου βασιλέως παραλαβοῦσα, κρίνειν εἰς ἐκεῖνα σκοποῦσα τά τε δίκαια ταχθέντʼ εἶναι καὶ ἄδικα, τὴν αὑτῆς ἰδίαν ἀρετὴν παρεχομένη τοῦ μήθʼ ὑπό τινων δώρων μήθʼ ὑπὸ φόβων μήτε οἴκτων μήθʼ ὑπό τινος ἄλλης ἔχθρας μηδὲ φιλίας ἡττηθεῖσα παρὰ τὴν τοῦ νομοθέτου τάξιν ἐθέλειν ἂν τἀλλήλων ἐγκλήματα διαιρεῖν;
STRANGER: Does it then have power for anything more than, having received from the lawgiver-king all the established laws concerning contracts, judging by looking to those laws as to what has been ordered as just and unjust, presenting its own peculiar virtue of never being willing, through being defeated by bribes or fears or pity or any other enmity or friendship, to decide their mutual disputes contrary to the ordinance of the lawgiver?
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. οὔκ, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ὅσον εἴρηκας ταύτης ἐστὶ τῆς δυνάμεως ἔργον.
YOUNG SOCRATES: No, but almost as much as you have said is the work of this power.
ΞΕ. καὶ τὴν τῶν δικαστῶν ἄρα ῥώμην ἀνευρίσκομεν οὐ βασιλικὴν οὖσαν ἀλλὰ νόμων φύλακα καὶ ὑπηρέτιν ἐκείνης.
STRANGER: We find then that the strength of the judges also is not kingly, but a guardian of the laws and ministering to that kingly art.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ἔοικέν γε.
YOUNG SOCRATES: It seems so.
ΞΕ. τόδε δὴ κατανοητέον ἰδόντι συναπάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας αἳ εἴρηνται, ὅτι πολιτική γε αὐτῶν οὐδεμία ἀνεφάνη.
STRANGER: This indeed must be understood by one who looks at all the sciences that have been mentioned together, that none of them appeared to be political.
τὴν γὰρ ὄντως οὖσαν βασιλικὴν οὐκ αὐτὴν δεῖ πράττειν ἀλλʼ ἄρχειν τῶν δυναμένων πράττειν, γιγνώσκουσαν τὴν ἀρχήν τε καὶ ὁρμὴν τῶν μεγίστων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐγκαιρίας τε πέρι καὶ ἀκαιρίας, τὰς δʼ ἄλλας τὰ προσταχθέντα δρᾶν.
For that which is truly kingly must not itself act, but must rule over those capable of acting, knowing the beginning and impulse of the greatest things in the cities concerning opportune and inopportune times, while the others must do what is commanded.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ὀρθῶς.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Correctly.
ΞΕ. διὰ ταῦτα ἄρα ἃς μὲν ἄρτι διεληλύθαμεν, οὔτʼ ἀλλήλων οὔθʼ αὑτῶν ἄρχουσαι, περὶ δέ τινα ἰδίαν αὑτῆς οὖσα ἑκάστη πρᾶξιν, κατὰ τὴν ἰδιότητα τῶν πράξεων τοὔνομα δικαίως εἴληφεν ἴδιον.
STRANGER: Therefore, those sciences which we have just gone through, neither ruling over one another nor over themselves, but each being concerned with some peculiar activity of its own, have justly received a peculiar name according to the peculiarity of their activities.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. εἴξασι γοῦν.
YOUNG SOCRATES: So they seem, at least.
ΞΕ. τὴν δὲ πασῶν τε τούτων ἄρχουσαν καὶ τῶν νόμων καὶ συμπάντων τῶν κατὰ πόλιν ἐπιμελουμένην καὶ πάντα συνυφαίνουσαν ὀρθότατα, τοῦ κοινοῦ τῇ κλήσει περιλαβόντες τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς, προσαγορεύοιμεν δικαιότατʼ ἄν, ὡς ἔοικε, πολιτικήν.
STRANGER: But that which rules over all of these and over the laws and takes care of all things in the city and weaves all together most correctly, encompassing its power under a common appellation, we should most justly, as it seems, address as political.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Quite so.
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν δὴ καὶ κατὰ τὸ τῆς ὑφαντικῆς παράδειγμα βουλοίμεθʼ ἂν ἐπεξελθεῖν αὐτὴν νῦν, ὅτε καὶ πάντα τὰ γένη τὰ κατὰ πόλιν δῆλα ἡμῖν γέγονε;
STRANGER: Would we then wish to go through it now according to the model of weaving, since all the classes in the city have also become clear to us?
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. καὶ σφόδρα γε.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Very much so.
§306ΞΕ. τὴν δὴ βασιλικὴν συμπλοκήν, ὡς ἔοικε, λεκτέον ποία τέ ἐστι καὶ τίνι τρόπῳ συμπλέκουσα ποῖον ἡμῖν ὕφασμα ἀποδίδωσιν.
STRANGER: The kingly weaving, as it seems, must be told, what sort of thing it is and in what way weaving together what sort of fabric it gives us.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. δῆλον.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Clearly.
ΞΕ. ἦ χαλεπὸν ἐνδείξασθαι πρᾶγμα ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα γέγονεν, ὡς φαίνεται.
STRANGER: Indeed, a thing difficult to point out has, as it appears, necessarily arisen.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. πάντως γε μὴν ῥητέον.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Yet by all means it must be told.
ΞΕ. τὸ γὰρ ἀρετῆς μέρος ἀρετῆς εἴδει διάφορον εἶναί τινα τρόπον τοῖς περὶ λόγους ἀμφισβητητικοῖς καὶ μάλʼ εὐεπίθετον πρὸς τὰς τῶν πολλῶν δόξας.
STRANGER: For that a part of virtue is in some way different from a kind of virtue is a very easy point of attack for those who are disputatious in arguments against the opinions of the multitude.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. οὐκ ἔμαθον.
YOUNG SOCRATES: I did not understand.
ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ ὧδε πάλιν.
STRANGER: But here again.
ἀνδρείαν γὰρ οἶμαί σε ἡγεῖσθαι μέρος ἓν ἀρετῆς ἡμῖν εἶναι.
For I think you hold courage to be one part of virtue for us.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. πάνυ γε.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Certainly.
ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν σωφροσύνην γε ἀνδρείας μὲν ἕτερον, ἓν δʼ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο μόριον ἧς κἀκεῖνο.
STRANGER: And indeed temperance is different from courage, yet this too is one part of that of which that one also is a part.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ναί.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
ΞΕ. τούτων δὴ πέρι θαυμαστόν τινα λόγον ἀποφαίνεσθαι τολμητέον.
STRANGER: About these, then, we must dare to declare a certain wonderful statement.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ποῖον;
YOUNG SOCRATES: What sort of statement?
ΞΕ. ὡς ἐστὸν κατὰ δή τινα τρόπον εὖ μάλα πρὸς ἀλλήλας ἔχθραν καὶ στάσιν ἐναντίαν ἔχοντε ἐν πολλοῖς τῶν ὄντων.
STRANGER: That they are in a certain way very much hostile to each other and have an opposite faction in many of the things that exist.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. πῶς λέγεις;
YOUNG SOCRATES: How do you mean?
ΞΕ. οὐκ εἰωθότα λόγον οὐδαμῶς· πάντα γὰρ οὖν δὴ ἀλλήλοις τά γε τῆς ἀρετῆς μόρια λέγεταί που φίλια.
STRANGER: A statement not at all customary; for indeed all the parts of virtue are surely said to be friendly to one another.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ναί.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.
ΞΕ. σκοπῶμεν δὴ προσσχόντες τὸν νοῦν εὖ μάλα πότερον οὕτως ἁπλοῦν ἐστι τοῦτο, ἢ παντὸς μᾶλλον αὐτῶν ἔχει διαφορὰν τοῖς συγγενέσιν ἔς τι;
STRANGER: Let us then consider, paying attention very well, whether this is so simple, or whether they have more than anything a difference in some respect from their kindred.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ναί, λέγοις ἂν πῇ σκεπτέον.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes, you should say how we must consider it.
ΞΕ. ἐν τοῖς σύμπασι χρὴ ζητεῖν ὅσα καλὰ μὲν λέγομεν, εἰς δύο δὲ αὐτὰ τίθεμεν ἐναντία ἀλλήλων εἴδη.
STRANGER: We must seek among all the things that we call beautiful, but which we place into two opposite kinds.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. λέγʼ ἔτι σαφέστερον.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Speak still more clearly.
ΞΕ. ὀξύτητα καὶ τάχος, εἴτε κατὰ σώματα εἴτʼ ἐν ψυχαῖς εἴτε κατὰ φωνῆς φοράν, εἴτε αὐτῶν τούτων εἴτε ἐν εἰδώλοις ὄντων, ὁπόσα μουσικὴ μιμουμένη καὶ ἔτι γραφικὴ μιμήματα παρέχεται, τούτων τινὸς ἐπαινέτης εἴτε αὐτὸς πώποτε γέγονας εἴτε ἄλλου παρὼν ἐπαινοῦντος ᾔσθησαι;
STRANGER: Concerning sharpness and speed, whether in bodies or in souls or in the movement of the voice, whether in these themselves or in their images, as many as music by imitating and still painting present as imitations, have you yourself ever been an admirer of any of these, or have you been present when another was praising them?
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. τί μήν;
YOUNG SOCRATES: Of course.
ΞΕ. ἦ καὶ μνήμην ἔχεις ὅντινα τρόπον αὐτὸ δρῶσιν ἐν ἑκάστοις τούτων;
STRANGER: Do you also remember in what manner they do this in each of these cases?
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. οὐδαμῶς.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Not at all.
ΞΕ. ἆρʼ οὖν δυνατὸς αὐτὸ ἂν γενοίμην, ὥσπερ καὶ διανοοῦμαι, διὰ λόγων ἐνδείξασθαί σοι;
STRANGER: Shall I then be able to show it to you through arguments, just as I am thinking?
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. τί δʼ οὔ;
YOUNG SOCRATES: Why not?
ΞΕ. ῥᾴδιον ἔοικας ἡγεῖσθαι τὸ τοιοῦτον· σκοπώμεθα δʼ οὖν αὐτὸ ἐν τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις γένεσι.
STRANGER: You seem to think such a thing is easy; but let us consider it in the opposite kinds.
τῶν γὰρ δὴ πράξεων ἐν πολλαῖς καὶ πολλάκις ἑκάστοτε τάχος καὶ σφοδρότητα καὶ ὀξύτητα διανοήσεώς τε καὶ σώματος, ἔτι δὲ καὶ φωνῆς, ὅταν ἀγασθῶμεν, λέγομεν αὐτὸ ἐπαινοῦντες μιᾷ χρώμενοι προσρήσει τῇ τῆς ἀνδρείας.
For in many activities and often on each occasion, when we admire speed, intensity, and sharpness of intellect and body, and also of voice, we praise it by using one appellation, that of courage.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. πῶς;
YOUNG SOCRATES: How?
ΞΕ. ὀξὺ καὶ ἀνδρεῖον πρῶτόν πού φαμεν, καὶ ταχὺ καὶ ἀνδρικόν, καὶ σφοδρὸν ὡσαύτως· καὶ πάντως ἐπιφέροντες τοὔνομα ὃ λέγω κοινὸν πάσαις ταῖς φύσεσι ταύταις ἐπαινοῦμεν αὐτάς.
STRANGER: We say "sharp and courageous" first, I suppose, and "quick and manly," and "intense" likewise; and by applying the name which I say is common to all these natures, we praise them.
ΝΕ. ΣΩ. ναί.
YOUNG SOCRATES: Yes.

Notes

  1. 305cτοῦ μήθʼ ὑπό τινων δώρων μήθʼ ὑπὸ φόβων μήτε οἴκτων μήθʼ ὑπό τινος ἄλλης ἔχθρας μηδὲ φιλίας ἡττηθεῖσα παρὰ τὴν τοῦ νομοθέτου τάξιν ἐθέλειν ἂν — This genitive infinitive phrase `τοῦ... ἐθέλειν ἂν` depends on the preceding comparative construction `ἐπὶ πλέον τι δύναται τοῦ...` ('can it do anything more than...'). The negative `μήθ'` applies to both the participle `ἡττηθεῖσα` (feminine nominative singular agreeing with `δύναμις`, the power of the judges) and the infinitive `ἐθέλειν`, meaning 'never being willing, through being defeated by bribes or fears, etc., to decide disputes contrary to the lawgiver's ordinance'.
  2. 306aτὸ γὰρ ἀρετῆς μέρος ἀρετῆς εἴδει διάφορον εἶναί τινα τρόπον — This clause lacks a main finite verb and functions as an accusative-with-infinitive clause explaining the 'difficult thing to show' mentioned in the previous sentence. The dative `τοῖς περὶ λόγους ἀμφισβητητικοῖς` ('for those who are disputatious in arguments') is a dative of interest, indicating that this fact (that a part of virtue differs from another part) is a highly convenient topic for them, making it easy to attack the opinions of the multitude (`εὐεπίθετον πρὸς τὰς τῶν πολλῶν δόξας`).

Cite this passage

Plato, Statesman §305-306. Humanitext Reader, https://reader.humanitext.ai/en/text/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0059.tlg008.humanitext-grc2:305-306

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