§260ΞΕ. σκόπει τοίνυν ὡς ἐν καιρῷ νυνδὴ τοῖς τοιούτοις διεμαχόμεθα καὶ προσηναγκάζομεν ἐᾶν ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ μείγνυσθαι.
STR. Consider then how opportunely just now we fought against such people and forced them to allow one thing to mix with another.
ΘΕΑΙ. πρὸς δὴ τί;
THEAE. To what end, indeed?
ΞΕ. πρὸς τὸ τὸν λόγον ἡμῖν τῶν ὄντων ἕν τι γενῶν εἶναι.
STR. To the end that speech might be one of the classes of beings for us.
τούτου γὰρ στερηθέντες, τὸ μὲν μέγιστον, φιλοσοφίας ἂν στερηθεῖμεν· ἔτι δʼ ἐν τῷ παρόντι δεῖ λόγον ἡμᾶς διομολογήσασθαι τί ποτʼ ἔστιν, εἰ δὲ ἀφῃρέθημεν αὐτὸ μηδʼ εἶναι τὸ παράπαν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔτι που λέγειν οἷοί τʼ ἦμεν.
For if we were deprived of this, we would be deprived of philosophy, which is the greatest thing; moreover, at present we must agree on what speech actually is, but if we had been deprived of it, so that it did not exist at all, we would no longer have been able to say anything.
ἀφῃρέθημεν δʼ ἄν, εἰ συνεχωρήσαμεν μηδεμίαν εἶναι μεῖξιν μηδενὶ πρὸς μηδέν.
And we would have been deprived of it, if we had conceded that there is no mixing of anything with anything else.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς τοῦτό γε·
THEAE.
λόγον δὲ διʼ ὅτι νῦν διομολογητέον οὐκ ἔμαθον.
That is indeed correct; but I did not understand why we must now agree about speech.
ΞΕ. ἀλλʼ ἴσως τῇδʼ ἑπόμενος ῥᾷστʼ ἂν μάθοις.
STR. But perhaps by following this way you would understand most easily.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῇ;
THEAE. In what way?
ΞΕ. τὸ μὲν δὴ μὴ ὂν ἡμῖν ἕν τι τῶν ἄλλων γένος ὂν ἀνεφάνη, κατὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα διεσπαρμένον.
STR. Indeed, not-being has appeared to us as one class among the others, dispersed throughout all beings.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.
THEAE. So it is.
ΞΕ. οὐκοῦν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο σκεπτέον εἰ δόξῃ τε καὶ λόγῳ μείγνυται.
STR. Therefore, next we must examine whether it mixes with opinion and speech.
ΘΕΑΙ. τί δή;
THEAE. Why so?
ΞΕ. μὴ μειγνυμένου μὲν αὐτοῦ τούτοις ἀναγκαῖον ἀληθῆ πάντʼ εἶναι, μειγνυμένου δὲ δόξα τε ψευδὴς γίγνεται καὶ λόγος·
STR. If it does not mix with them, everything must of necessity be true; but if it mixes, false opinion and false speech arise.
τὸ γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἢ λέγειν, τοῦτʼ ἔστι που τὸ ψεῦδος ἐν διανοίᾳ τε καὶ λόγοις γιγνόμενον.
For to think or say things that are not, this is surely what falsehood is, arising in thought and in speech.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτως.
THEAE. So it is.
ΞΕ. ὄντος δέ γε ψεύδους ἔστιν ἀπάτη.
STR. And if falsehood exists, deception exists.
ΘΕΑΙ. ναί.
THEAE. Yes.
ΞΕ. καὶ μὴν ἀπάτης οὔσης εἰδώλων τε καὶ εἰκόνων ἤδη καὶ φαντασίας πάντα ἀνάγκη μεστὰ εἶναι.
STR. And indeed, if deception exists, it is necessary that all things are already full of idols, images, and appearances.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς γὰρ οὔ;
THEAE. For how could they not be?
ΞΕ. τὸν δέ γε σοφιστὴν ἔφαμεν ἐν τούτῳ που τῷ τόπῳ καταπεφευγέναι μέν, ἔξαρνον δὲ γεγονέναι τὸ παράπαν μηδʼ εἶναι ψεῦδος· τὸ γὰρ μὴ ὂν οὔτε διανοεῖσθαί τινα οὔτε λέγειν· οὐσίας γὰρ οὐδὲν οὐδαμῇ τὸ μὴ ὂν μετέχειν.
STR. And as for the sophist, we said that he had fled somewhere into this region and had completely denied that falsehood even exists, on the grounds that no one can think or say what is not, since what is not does not share in being in any way whatsoever.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἦν ταῦτα.
THEAE. That was so.
ΞΕ. νῦν δέ γε τοῦτο μὲν ἐφάνη μετέχον τοῦ ὄντος, ὥστε ταύτῃ μὲν ἴσως οὐκ ἂν μάχοιτο ἔτι·
STR. But now, since this has appeared to share in being, he would perhaps no longer fight on this point.
τάχα δʼ ἂν φαίη τῶν εἰδῶν τὰ μὲν μετέχειν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος, τὰ δʼ οὔ, καὶ λόγον δὴ καὶ δόξαν εἶναι τῶν οὐ μετεχόντων, ὥστε τὴν εἰδωλοποιικὴν καὶ φανταστικήν, ἐν ᾗ φαμεν αὐτὸν εἶναι, διαμάχοιτʼ ἂν πάλιν ὡς παντάπασιν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπειδὴ δόξα καὶ λόγος οὐ κοινωνεῖ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος·
However, he might quickly say that some of the forms share in not-being and some do not, and that speech and opinion are among those that do not share; so that he would again fight against the existence of the image-making and appearance-producing art, in which we say he is, on the grounds that it does not exist at all, since opinion and speech have no communion with not-being.
ψεῦδος γὰρ τὸ παράπαν οὐκ εἶναι ταύτης μὴ συνισταμένης τῆς κοινωνίας.
For he would say that falsehood does not exist at all, unless this communion is established.
§261ΞΕ. διὰ ταῦτʼ οὖν λόγον πρῶτον καὶ δόξαν καὶ φαντασίαν διερευνητέον ὅτι ποτʼ ἔστιν, ἵνα φανέντων καὶ τὴν κοινωνίαν αὐτῶν τῷ μὴ ὄντι κατίδωμεν, κατιδόντες δὲ τὸ ψεῦδος ὂν ἀποδείξωμεν, ἀποδείξαντες δὲ τὸν σοφιστὴν εἰς αὐτὸ ἐνδήσωμεν, εἴπερ ἔνοχός ἐστιν, ἢ καὶ ἀπολύσαντες ἐν ἄλλῳ γένει ζητῶμεν.
STR. Therefore, for this reason, we must first investigate speech, opinion, and appearance to see what each is, so that, when they are revealed, we may also perceive their communion with not-being, and having perceived it, we may prove that falsehood exists, and having proven it, we may bind the sophist in it, if he is liable, or otherwise release him and seek him in another class.
ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ δέ γε, ὦ ξένε, ἔοικεν ἀληθὲς εἶναι τὸ περὶ τὸν σοφιστὴν κατʼ ἀρχὰς λεχθέν, ὅτι δυσθήρευτον εἴη τὸ γένος.
THEAE. Indeed, O stranger, what was said at the beginning about the sophist seems to be entirely true: that this class of being is hard to catch.
φαίνεται γὰρ οὖν προβλημάτων γέμειν, ὧν ἐπειδάν τι προβάλῃ, τοῦτο πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον διαμάχεσθαι πρὶν ἐπʼ αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον ἀφικέσθαι.
For it clearly appears to be full of obstacles, and whenever it throws one up, it is necessary to fight through this first before reaching the man himself.
νῦν γὰρ μόγις μὲν τὸ μὴ ὂν ὡς οὐκ ἔστι προβληθὲν διεπεράσαμεν, ἕτερον δὲ προβέβληται, καὶ δεῖ δὴ ψεῦδος ὡς ἔστι καὶ περὶ λόγον καὶ περὶ δόξαν ἀποδεῖξαι, καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο ἴσως ἕτερον, καὶ ἔτʼ ἄλλο μετʼ ἐκεῖνο· καὶ πέρας, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὐδὲν φανήσεταί ποτε.
For just now, we have barely finished with the obstacle thrown up, that "not-being does not exist", and another has been thrown up, and we must show that falsehood exists, both in speech and in opinion, and after this perhaps another, and yet another after that; and it seems no limit will ever appear.
ΞΕ. θαρρεῖν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, χρὴ τὸν καὶ σμικρόν τι δυνάμενον εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν ἀεὶ προϊέναι.
STR. We must be of good courage, Theaetetus, if we can make even a little progress always forward.
τί γὰρ ὅ γʼ ἀθυμῶν ἐν τούτοις δράσειεν ἂν ἐν ἄλλοις, ἢ μηδὲν ἐν ἐκείνοις ἀνύτων ἢ καὶ πάλιν εἰς τοὔπισθεν ἀπωσθείς;
For what would someone who loses heart in these matters do in others, either achieving nothing in them or even being pushed backward?
σχολῇ που, τὸ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν λεγόμενον, ὅ γε τοιοῦτος ἄν ποτε ἕλοι πόλιν.
Scarcely, indeed, as the proverb says, would such a person ever take a city.
νῦν δʼ ἐπεί, ὠγαθέ, τοῦτο ὃ λέγεις διαπεπέρανται, τό τοι μέγιστον ἡμῖν τεῖχος ᾑρημένον ἂν εἴη, τὰ δʼ ἄλλα ἤδη ῥᾴω καὶ σμικρότερα.
But now, my good friend, since this which you speak of has been accomplished, the greatest wall has been taken by us, and the other things are now easier and smaller.
ΘΕΑΙ. καλῶς εἶπες.
THEAE. Well said.
ΞΕ. λόγον δὴ πρῶτον καὶ δόξαν, καθάπερ ἐρρήθη νυνδή, λάβωμεν, ἵνα ἐναργέστερον ἀπολογισώμεθα πότερον αὐτῶν ἅπτεται τὸ μὴ ὂν ἢ παντάπασιν ἀληθῆ μέν ἐστιν ἀμφότερα ταῦτα, ψεῦδος δὲ οὐδέποτε οὐδέτερον.
STR. Let us then first take speech and opinion, as was said just now, in order to calculate more clearly whether not-being touches them, or whether both of these are entirely true, and neither is ever false.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς.
THEAE. Rightly.
ΞΕ. φέρε δή, καθάπερ περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν γραμμάτων ἐλέγομεν, περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων πάλιν ὡσαύτως ἐπισκεψώμεθα.
STR. Come then, just as we spoke about forms and letters, let us investigate in the same way about names again.
φαίνεται γάρ πῃ ταύτῃ τὸ νῦν ζητούμενον.
For the object of our present inquiry seems to lie in this direction.
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον οὖν δὴ περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ὑπακουστέον;
THEAE. What sort of thing, then, must we understand about names?
ΞΕ. εἴτε πάντα ἀλλήλοις συναρμόττει εἴτε μηδέν, εἴτε τὰ μὲν ἐθέλει, τὰ δὲ μή.
STR. Whether they all fit together with one another, or none do, or some are willing to do so and others are not.
ΘΕΑΙ. δῆλον τοῦτό γε, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐθέλει, τὰ δʼ οὔ.
THEAE. That is indeed clear, that some are willing and some are not.
ΞΕ. τὸ τοιόνδε λέγεις ἴσως, ὅτι τὰ μὲν ἐφεξῆς λεγόμενα καὶ δηλοῦντά τι συναρμόττει, τὰ δὲ τῇ συνεχείᾳ μηδὲν σημαίνοντα ἀναρμοστεῖ.
STR. You mean, perhaps, something like this: that those which are spoken in succession and make something clear fit together, while those which signify nothing in their continuity do not fit.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς τί τοῦτʼ εἶπας;
THEAE. How so? What do you mean by this?
ΞΕ. ὅπερ ᾠήθην ὑπολαβόντα σε προσομολογεῖν.
STR. Just what I thought you understood when you agreed.
ἔστι γὰρ ἡμῖν που τῶν τῇ φωνῇ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν δηλωμάτων διττὸν γένος.
For we surely have a twofold class of vocal indications concerning being.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς;
THEAE. How so?