§201ΣΩ. ὁ τὸν ποταμὸν καθηγούμενος, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἔφη ἄρα δείξειν αὐτό· καὶ τοῦτο ἐὰν ἰόντες ἐρευνῶμεν, τάχʼ ἂν ἐμπόδιον γενόμενον αὐτὸ φήνειεν τὸ ζητούμενον, μένουσι δὲ δῆλον οὐδέν.
SOCRATES: The one who guides us across the river, Theaetetus, said indeed that the way itself will show it; and if we go on and search, perhaps the thing itself, crossing our path, will reveal what we are seeking, whereas to those who stay still, nothing is clear.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὀρθῶς λέγεις· ἀλλʼ ἴωμέν γε καὶ σκοπῶμεν.
THEAETETUS: You speak rightly; let us indeed go and examine it.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε βραχείας σκέψεως· τέχνη γάρ σοι ὅλη σημαίνει μὴ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτό.
SOCRATES: Well, this at least requires brief consideration; for a whole profession indicates to you that it is not knowledge.
ΘΕΑΙ. πῶς δή;
THEAETETUS: How so?
καὶ τίς αὕτη;
And what is this profession?
ΣΩ. ἡ τῶν μεγίστων εἰς σοφίαν, οὓς δὴ καλοῦσιν ῥήτοράς τε καὶ δικανικούς.
SOCRATES: That of those greatest in wisdom, whom they indeed call orators and advocates.
οὗτοι γάρ που τῇ ἑαυτῶν τέχνῃ πείθουσιν οὐ διδάσκοντες ἀλλὰ δοξάζειν ποιοῦντες ἃ ἂν βούλωνται.
For these men surely persuade by their own art, not teaching but making people opine whatever they wish.
ἢ σὺ οἴει δεινούς τινας οὕτω διδασκάλους εἶναι, ὥστε οἷς μὴ παρεγένοντό τινες ἀποστερουμένοις χρήματα ἤ τι ἄλλο βιαζομένοις, τούτοις δύνασθαι πρὸς ὕδωρ σμικρὸν διδάξαι ἱκανῶς τῶν γενομένων τὴν ἀλήθειαν;
Or do you think there are any teachers so clever as to be able to teach sufficiently, within a short flow of water, the truth of what happened to those who were not present when they were being robbed of money or suffered some other violence?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐδαμῶς ἔγωγε οἶμαι, ἀλλὰ πεῖσαι μέν.
THEAETETUS: Not at all do I think so, but rather they persuade.
ΣΩ. τὸ πεῖσαι δʼ οὐχὶ δοξάσαι λέγεις ποιῆσαι;
SOCRATES: And by persuading, do you not mean making them opine?
ΘΕΑΙ. τί μήν;
THEAETETUS: Of course.
ΣΩ. οὐκοῦν ὅταν δικαίως πεισθῶσιν δικασταὶ περὶ ὧν ἰδόντι μόνον ἔστιν εἰδέναι, ἄλλως δὲ μή, ταῦτα τότε ἐξ ἀκοῆς κρίνοντες, ἀληθῆ δόξαν λαβόντες, ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης ἔκριναν, ὀρθὰ πεισθέντες, εἴπερ εὖ ἐδίκασαν;
SOCRATES: Therefore, when judges are justly persuaded about things which it is possible to know only by seeing and not otherwise, judging these things at that time from hearsay, having acquired a true opinion, they judge without knowledge, though having been rightly persuaded, if indeed they judged well?
ΘΕΑΙ. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.
THEAETETUS: Absolutely.
ΣΩ. οὐκ ἄν, ὦ φίλε, εἴ γε ταὐτὸν ἦν δόξα τε ἀληθὴς καὶ δικαστήρια καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὀρθά ποτʼ ἂν δικαστὴς ἄκρος ἐδόξαζεν ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης· νῦν δὲ ἔοικεν ἄλλο τι ἑκάτερον εἶναι.
SOCRATES: My friend, if true opinion and knowledge were the same thing, an excellent judge would never have opined rightly without knowledge; but as it is, each seems to be something different.
ΘΕΑΙ. ὅ γε ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπόντος του ἀκούσας ἐπελελήσμην, νῦν δʼ ἐννοῶ· ἔφη δὲ τὴν μὲν μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἄλογον ἐκτὸς ἐπιστήμης· καὶ ὧν μὲν μή ἐστι λόγος, οὐκ ἐπιστητὰ εἶναι, οὑτωσὶ καὶ ὀνομάζων, ἃ δʼ ἔχει, ἐπιστητά.
THEAETETUS: It is something, Socrates, which I had forgotten, having heard someone say it, but now I recollect: he said that true opinion with an account is knowledge, but the one without an account is outside of knowledge; and those things of which there is no account are not knowable—calling them so—whereas those that have one are knowable.
ΣΩ. ἦ καλῶς λέγεις.
SOCRATES: You speak well.
τὰ δὲ δὴ ἐπιστητὰ ταῦτα καὶ μὴ πῇ διῄρει, λέγε, εἰ ἄρα κατὰ ταὐτὰ σύ τε κἀγὼ ἀκηκόαμεν.
But tell me, how did he distinguish these knowable and unknowable things? Let us see if you and I have heard the same account.
ΘΕΑΙ. ἀλλʼ οὐκ οἶδα εἰ ἐξευρήσω· λέγοντος μεντἂν ἑτέρου, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, ἀκολουθήσαιμʼ ἄν.
THEAETETUS: But I do not know if I can find it out; though if another were speaking, I think I could follow.
ΣΩ. ἄκουε δὴ ὄναρ ἀντὶ ὀνείρατος.
SOCRATES: Listen then to a dream in return for a dream.
ἐγὼ γὰρ αὖ ἐδόκουν ἀκούειν τινῶν ὅτι τὰ μὲν πρῶτα οἱονπερεὶ στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν ἡμεῖς τε συγκείμεθα καὶ τἆλλα, λόγον οὐκ ἔχοι.
For I in my turn seemed to hear from certain people that the primary elements, as it were, out of which both we and all other things are composed, have no account.
§202ΣΩ. αὐτὸ γὰρ καθʼ αὑτὸ ἕκαστον ὀνομάσαι μόνον εἴη, προσειπεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δυνατόν, οὔθʼ ὡς ἔστιν, οὔθʼ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν· ἤδη γὰρ ἂν οὐσίαν ἢ μὴ οὐσίαν αὐτῷ προστίθεσθαι, δεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν προσφέρειν, εἴπερ αὐτὸ ἐκεῖνο μόνον τις ἐρεῖ.
SOCRATES: For each of them by itself can only be named, and it is not possible to express anything else besides, neither that it "is" nor that it "is not"; for that indeed would be to add "being" or "not being" to it, whereas one ought to apply nothing to it, if indeed one is to speak of that thing alone.
ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τὸ
αὐτὸ
οὐδὲ τὸ
ἐκεῖνο
οὐδὲ τὸ
ἕκαστον
οὐδὲ τὸ
μόνον
οὐδὲ
τοῦτο
προσοιστέον οὐδʼ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα· ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ περιτρέχοντα πᾶσι προσφέρεσθαι, ἕτερα ὄντα ἐκείνων οἷς προστίθεται, δεῖν δέ, εἴπερ ἦν δυνατὸν αὐτὸ λέγεσθαι καὶ εἶχεν οἰκεῖον αὑτοῦ λόγον, ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων λέγεσθαι.
Since neither "the same" nor "that" nor "each" nor "alone" nor "this" must be applied, nor many other such words; for these, running around, are applied to all things, being different from the things to which they are added, whereas, if indeed it were possible for the element itself to be spoken of and it had an account of its own, it ought to be spoken of without all the others.
νῦν δὲ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ὁτιοῦν τῶν πρώτων ῥηθῆναι λόγῳ· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι αὐτῷ ἀλλʼ ἢ ὀνομάζεσθαι μόνον—ὄνομα γὰρ μόνον ἔχειν—τὰ δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἤδη συγκείμενα, ὥσπερ αὐτὰ πέπλεκται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτῶν συμπλακέντα λόγον γεγονέναι· ὀνομάτων γὰρ συμπλοκὴν εἶναι λόγου οὐσίαν.
But as it is, it is impossible for any of the primary elements to be expressed in an account; for it has nothing else but to be named only—for it has only a name—but the things composed of these, just as they themselves are woven together, so also their names, being woven together, have become an account; for the weaving together of names is the essence of an account.
οὕτω δὴ τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἄλογα καὶ ἄγνωστα εἶναι, αἰσθητὰ δέ· τὰς δὲ συλλαβὰς γνωστάς τε καὶ ῥητὰς καὶ ἀληθεῖ δόξῃ δοξαστάς.
Thus, indeed, the elements are without account and unknowable, but perceptible; whereas the syllables are knowable and expressible and opinable with true opinion.
ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἄνευ λόγου τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν τινός τις λάβῃ, ἀληθεύειν μὲν αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν περὶ αὐτό, γιγνώσκειν δʼ οὔ· τὸν γὰρ μὴ δυνάμενον δοῦναί τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον ἀνεπιστήμονα εἶναι περὶ τούτου· προσλαβόντα δὲ λόγον δυνατόν τε ταῦτα πάντα γεγονέναι καὶ τελείως πρὸς ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν.
When, therefore, someone grasps the true opinion of something without an account, his soul indeed holds the truth about it, but does not know it; for he who is unable to give and receive an account is without knowledge about this thing; but having acquired an account in addition, he is capable of all these things and is perfectly disposed towards knowledge.
οὕτως σὺ τὸ ἐνύπνιον ἢ ἄλλως ἀκήκοας;
Did you hear the dream in this way, or otherwise?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὕτω μὲν οὖν παντάπασιν.
THEAETETUS: Absolutely in that way.
ΣΩ. ἀρέσκει οὖν σε καὶ τίθεσαι ταύτῃ, δόξαν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιστήμην εἶναι;
SOCRATES: Are you pleased then, and do you posit it this way, that true opinion with an account is knowledge?
ΘΕΑΙ. κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν.
THEAETETUS: Quite so.
ΣΩ. ἆρʼ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, νῦν οὕτω τῇδε τῇ ἡμέρᾳ εἰλήφαμεν ὃ πάλαι καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν ζητοῦντες πρὶν εὑρεῖν κατεγήρασαν;
SOCRATES: Have we then, Theaetetus, now on this very day grasped in this way what many of the wise have long been seeking and grew old before finding?
ΘΕΑΙ. ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καλῶς λέγεσθαι τὸ νῦν ῥηθέν.
THEAETETUS: To me at least, Socrates, what has now been said seems to be well said.
ΣΩ. καὶ εἰκός γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχειν· τίς γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἔτι ἐπιστήμη εἴη χωρὶς τοῦ λόγου τε καὶ ὀρθῆς δόξης;
SOCRATES: And indeed it is likely that this very thing is so; for what knowledge could there still be apart from an account and right opinion?
ἓν μέντοι τί με τῶν ῥηθέντων ἀπαρέσκει.
However, one thing among the statements displeases me.
ΘΕΑΙ. τὸ ποῖον δή;
THEAETETUS: What is that, indeed?
ΣΩ. ὃ καὶ δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι κομψότατα, ὡς τὰ μὲν στοιχεῖα ἄγνωστα, τὸ δὲ τῶν συλλαβῶν γένος γνωστόν.
SOCRATES: That which seems to be said most elegantly: that the elements are unknowable, but the class of syllables is knowable.
ΘΕΑΙ. οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς;
THEAETETUS: Is that not right, then?
ΣΩ. ἰστέον δή· ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁμήρους ἔχομεν τοῦ λόγου τὰ παραδείγματα οἷς χρώμενος εἶπε πάντα ταῦτα.
SOCRATES: We must see indeed; for we have as hostages of the argument the examples which the one who said all this used in speaking.
ΘΕΑΙ. ποῖα δή;
THEAETETUS: What kind of examples, indeed?
ΣΩ. τὰ τῶν γραμμάτων στοιχεῖά τε καὶ συλλαβάς.
SOCRATES: The elements and syllables of letters.
ἢ οἴει ἄλλοσέ ποι βλέποντα ταῦτα εἰπεῖν τὸν εἰπόντα ἃ λέγομεν;
Or do you think the one who said what we are saying was looking at anything else?
ΘΕΑΙ. οὔκ, ἀλλʼ εἰς ταῦτα.
THEAETETUS: No, but at these.